area handbook series 

Lebanon 

a country study 




Lebanon 

a country study 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Edited by 
Thomas Collelo 
Research Completed 
December 1987 



On the cover: Representing Lebanon's tragic civil strife, a 
cedar, the national symbol, is shown split in two. 



Third Edition, First Printing, 1989. 

Copyright ®1989 United States Government as represented by 
the Secretary of the Army. All rights reserved. 

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Lebanon: A Country Study 

(DA Pam; 550-24) 
Research completed December 1987. 
Bibliography: pp. 245-261. 
Includes index. 

Supt. of Docs, no.: D 101.22:550-24/987 
1. Lebanon. I. Collelo, Thomas, 1948- 
II. Library of Congress. Federal Research Division. III. Series. 

DS80.L39 1989 956.92 88-600488 



Headquarters, Department of the Army 
DA Pam 550-24 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 



Foreword 



This volume is one in a continuing series of books now being 
prepared by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Con- 
gress under the Country Studies — Area Handbook Program. The 
last page of this book lists the other published studies. 

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign country, 
describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and national 
security systems and institutions, and examining the interrelation- 
ships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by cultural 
factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social 
scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic understanding of 
the observed society, striving for a dynamic rather than a static 
portrayal. Particular attention is devoted to the people who make 
up the society, their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their com- 
mon interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature 
and extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their 
attitudes toward each other and toward their social system and 
political order. 

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should not 
be construed as an expression of an official United States govern- 
ment position, policy, or decision. The authors have sought to 
adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. Corrections, 
additions, and suggestions for changes from readers will be wel- 
comed for use in future editions. 

Louis R. Mortimer 
Acting Chief 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Washington, D.C. 20540 



iii 



Acknowledgments 



The authors are grateful to individuals in various agencies of 
the United States government and private organizations in 
Washington, D.C., who gave of their time, research materials, and 
special knowledge of Lebanese affairs to provide data and perspec- 
tive. The authors also wish to express their gratitude to members 
of the Federal Research Division who contributed directly to the 
preparation of the manuscript. These include Helen C. Metz and 
Richard F. Nyrop, who reviewed the text; Ruth Nieland and 
Richard Kollodge, who edited chapters; Marilyn Majeska, who 
managed production; and Barbara Edgerton and Izella Watson, 
who performed word processing. Others involved in preparation 
of the book included Andrea T. Merrill, who performed the prepub- 
lication review; and Shirley Kessel, who prepared the index. 
Malinda B. Neale, of the Library of Congress Composing Unit, 
prepared the camera-ready copy under the supervision of Peggy 
Pixley. 

Special thanks are owed to those responsible for the excellent 
graphic work in the book. These include David P. Cabitto, who 
oversaw the entire process; Kimberly A. Lord, who designed the 
cover and chapter illustrations and who performed the page lay- 
out; Greenhorne and O'Mara, which produced the maps; and 
Harriett R. Blood, who prepared the topography and drainage map. 
The inclusion of photographs in this study was made possible by 
the generosity of individuals and private and public agencies. The 
authors acknowledge their indebtedness to those who provided origi- 
nal work not previously published. 



v 



Contents 



Page 



Foreword iii 

Acknowledgments v 

Preface xiii 

Country Profile xv 

Introduction xxi 

Chapter 1. Historical Setting l 

Afaf Sabeh McGowan 

ANCIENT TIMES 3 

The Phoenicians 3 

Assyrian Rule 4 

Babylonian Rule and the Persian Empire 5 

Rule of Alexander the Great 5 

The Seleucid Dynasty 5 

THE ARAB PERIOD 7 

The Arab Conquest, 634-36 7 

The Umayyads, 660-750 8 

The Abbasids, 750-1258 8 

Impact of Arab Rule 8 

The Crusades, 1095-1291 10 

The Mamluks, 1282-1516 11 

OTTOMAN RULE, 1516-1916 12 

The Maans, 1120-1697 12 

The Shihabs, 1697-1842 13 

Religious Conflicts 14 

WORLD WAR I AND THE FRENCH 

MANDATE, 1914-41 17 

World War I 17 

The Mandate Period 18 

World War II and Independence, 1939-41 19 

INDEPENDENT LEBANON, 1943-76 21 

The Khuri Era, 1943-52 21 

The Shamun Era, 1952-58 22 

The Rise of Shihabism, 1958-64 24 

The Hilu Era, 1964-70 25 

The Franjiyah Era, 1970-76 26 

The Civil War, 1975-76 29 



vii 



The Sarkis Administration, 1976-82 32 

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment .... 39 

As 9 ad AbuKhalil 

GEOGRAPHY 42 

Land 43 

Climate 45 

Rivers and Lakes 47 

POPULATION 48 

Migration 50 

The War and Displacement in Beirut 52 

The Palestinian Element 52 

SECTARIANISM 53 

Lebanese Confessional "Societies" 55 

Sectarian and Clan Consciousness 56 

RELIGION 57 

Tenets of Islam 59 

Muslim Sects 61 

Druzes 65 

Christian Sects 66 

Jews 70 

Others ... 71 

LANGUAGES 71 

Arabic 71 

Other Languages 72 

STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY 73 

The Family 73 

Sex Roles 74 

Marriage 75 

Child-Rearing Practices 77 

Impact of War on the Family 78 

LIVING CONDITIONS 79 

Prewar Conditions 79 

Wartime Conditions 80 

EDUCATION 81 

Primary Education 81 

Intermediate Education 82 

Secondary Education 82 

Technical and Vocational Education 82 

Higher Education 83 

HEALTH 84 

Chapter 3. The Economy 87 

John Roberts 

RECENT ECONOMIC HISTORY 93 

Civil War and Partial Recovery, 1974-82 93 



Vlll 



Invasion and Trauma, 1982-87 95 

THE OFFICIAL ECONOMY IN THE MID-1980S 97 

Balance of Payments 97 

Government Revenues 97 

External Debt and Foreign Exchange 98 

Inflation 99 

The Budget 100 

BANKING AND FINANCE 101 

Domestic Banking 101 

The Central Bank 103 

International Banking 105 

TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS 106 

Roads 106 

Railroads 109 

Shipping 110 

Aviation 112 

Telecommunications 115 

AGRICULTURE 115 

Land and Irrigation 115 

Crop Production 118 

INDUSTRY 122 

The State of Industry 122 

Cement 124 

Electric Power and Petroleum Refining 125 

AID AND RECONSTRUCTION 127 

Reconstruction and Hope, 1976-82 127 

Arab Reconstruction Aid 128 

Post-Israeli Invasion Reconstruction, 1982-84 131 

Reconstruction and Chaos, 1984-87 133 

Chapter 4. Government and Politics 137 

As 'ad AbuKhalil 

THE BASIS OF GOVERNMENT 141 

The Constitution 141 

The National Pact 143 

THE PRACTICE OF GOVERNMENT 144 

Zuama Clientelism 144 

The Presidency 146 

The Prime Minister and the Cabinet 147 

The Legislature 149 

The Judiciary 152 

The Bureaucracy 153 

POLITICAL PARTIES AND GROUPINGS 154 

Sectarian Groups 155 



ix 



Minority Parties 166 

Multisectarian Parties 167 

FOREIGN RELATIONS 170 

Syria 171 

Israel 173 

Palestinians 175 

Iran 176 

United States 176 

Soviet Union 177 

Chapter 5. National Security 179 

Robert Scott Mason 

THE CREATION OF THE ARMY 183 

THE LEBANESE POLITICAL-MILITARY SITUATION: 

INDEPENDENCE TO 1975 185 

The 1948 Arab-Israeli War 185 

The Rosewater Revolution 185 

The 1958 Civil War 185 

The Cairo Agreement and the Prelude to the 1975 

Civil War 186 

THE 1975 CIVIL WAR 188 

The Military Cabinet 189 

The Early Stages of Combat 190 

Syrian Intervention 192 

The Riyadh Conference and the Arab Deterrent 

Force 193 

The Red Line Arrangement 194 

THE INTERWAR YEARS 194 

Operation Litani 195 

Operations of the United Nations Interim Force 

in Lebanon 196 

The Ascendancy of Bashir Jumayyil 197 

The Missile Crisis 200 

The Two-Week War 200 

THE 1982 ISRAELI INVASION AND ITS 

AFTERMATH 201 

Operation Peace for Galilee 201 

The Siege of Beirut 204 

The Multinational Force 206 

The Rise of the Shias 208 

The May 17 Agreement 209 

The Israel Defense Forces Withdrawal and the 

Mountain War 210 

The Multinational Force Withdrawal 211 



x 



The Bikfayya Accord 212 

Events in Southern Lebanon 213 

Chaos in Beirut and Syrian Peacemaking Efforts .... 214 

THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES IN THE 1980s 218 

Organization and Command Structure 219 

The Army 222 

The Air Force and Navy 225 

INTERNAL SECURITY AND TERRORISM 226 

Suicide Bombings 227 

The Hostage Crisis 228 

Appendix A. Tables 233 

Appendix B. The Contending Sides in the 

1975 Civil War 239 

Robert Scott Mason 

THE LEBANESE FRONT 239 

The Phalange Party 239 

The Tigers 240 

The Marada Brigade 240 

The Guardians of the Cedars 240 

The Order of Maronite Monks 240 

At Tanzim 240 

THE LEBANESE NATIONAL MOVEMENT 240 

The Progressive Socialist Party 240 

The Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party 241 

Amal 241 

Communist Organizations 242 

The Najjadah 242 

The Lebanese Arab Army 242 

The Baath (Arab Socialist Resurrection) Party 242 

Nasserite Organizations 242 

Palestinians 243 

Bibliography 245 

Glossary 263 

Index 267 

List of Figures 

1. Administrative Divisions, 1987 xx 

2. Phoenician Colonization and Trade Routes 6 

3. Topography and Drainage 46 

4. Palestinian Refugee Camps in Lebanon, 1986 54 

5. Distribution of Religious Sects, 1983 58 



xi 



6. Transportation System, 1987 108 

7. Economic Activity, 1987 116 

8. The Cantons of Lebanon, 1986 156 

9. Beirut During the 1975 Civil War 190 

10. Lebanon on the Eve of the 1982 Israeli Invasion 198 



xii 



Preface 



Lebanon: A Country Study replaces the Area Handbook for Lebanon 
published in 1973. Like its predecessor, the present book is an 
attempt to treat in a concise and objective manner the dominant 
historical, social, economic, political, and national security aspects 
of contemporary Lebanon. But, like the country, which has under- 
gone radical changes since the mid-1970s, the present study bears 
little resemblance to the old book; it has been completely revised 
to reflect the current situation. Sources of information included 
scholarly books, journals, and monographs; official reports and 
documents of governments and international organizations; for- 
eign and domestic newspapers and periodicals; and interviews with 
Lebanese officials and individuals with special competence in 
Lebanese affairs. Because so much of the literature is polemical, 
the authors took special pains to separate fact from bias. In addi- 
tion, because the turmoil that has occurred since 1975 has precluded 
comprehensive and accurate accounting of economic and demo- 
graphic statistics, most data should be viewed as rough estimates. 

Much of the recent history and much of the political situation 
in Lebanon are associated with armed conflict. Accordingly, detailed 
information on these topics is likely to be found in the national 
security chapter rather than in the chapters on history or govern- 
ment and politics. 

Chapter bibliographies appear at the end of the book; brief com- 
ments on some of the more valuable sources for further reading 
appear at the conclusion of each chapter. Most measurements are 
given in the metric system (see table 1, Appendix A). Because of 
the complex nature of the fighting during the 1975 Civil War, the 
rival factions are treated at length in Appendix B. The Glossary 
provides brief definitions of terms that may be unfamiliar to the 
general reader. 

The transliteration of Arabic words and phrases posed a partic- 
ular problem. For many words — such as Muhammad, Muslim, 
and Quran — the authors followed a modified version of the sys- 
tem adopted by the United States Board on Geographic Names 
and the Permanent Committee on Geographic Names for British 
Official Use, known as the BGN/PCGN system. The modifica- 
tion entails the omission of diacritical markings and hyphens. In 
numerous instances, however, the names of persons or places are 
so wel 1 known by another spelling that to have used the BGN/PCGN 
system may have created confusion. For example, the reader will 



xiii 



find Beirut, Sidon, and Tyre rather than Bayrut, Sayda, and Sur. 
Furthermore, because press accounts generally use French in the 
spelling of personal names, the alternate French version is often 
given when such a name is introduced in each chapter. 



xiv 



Country Profile 




Country 

Formal Name: Republic of Lebanon. 
Short Form: Lebanon. 
Term for Citizens: Lebanese. 
Capital: Beirut. 

Geography 

Size: Approximately 10,452 square kilometers. 

Topography: Four major features running roughly from north to 
south: coastal strip, Lebanon Mountains, Biqa Valley, and Anti- 
Lebanon Mountains. Several perennial rivers, but none navigable. 



xv 



Climate: Mediterranean climate with hot, dry summers and cool, 
wet winters. Weather drier and hotter east of Lebanon Mountains. 

Society 

Population: Estimated at 2.6 million in 1983, not including about 
400,000 Palestinian refugees. 

Education: Five-year primary education mandatory. Education 
system disrupted during and after 1975 Civil War; many children 
did not attend school. 

Literacy: Estimated at nearly 80 percent in mid-1980s. 

Health: Drastically reduced health standards because of 1975 Civil 
War. In 1980s overall shortages of medical staff and facilities. Best 
health care available in private institutions. 

Languages: Arabic official language. French and English also wide- 
ly spoken. Armenian spoken by Armenian community. 

Ethnic Groups: More than 90 percent of population Arab; some 
Armenians, Kurds, and Jews. 

Religion: A variety of Muslim and Christian sects. Muslims 
included Shias, Sunnis, Druzes, Ismailis, and Alawis. Christians 
included Maronites, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholics, Roman 
Catholics, Jacobites, Armenian Orthodox, Assyrians, and Protes- 
tants. Fewer than 100 Jews in 1987. 

Economy 

Gross Domestic Product (GDP): Estimates in 1985 ranged from 
L£30 billion to L£43.8 billion (for value of the Lebanese pound — see 
Glossary); in either case, in real terms GDP no more than half 1974 
level. Inflation in 1987 estimated at more than 700 percent, and 
unemployment estimated at 35 percent. 

Agriculture: Diversity of crops grown throughout country. Biqa 
Valley most productive region, primarily grains but increasingly 
in late 1980s hashish and opium. Citrus crops grown on coast, es- 
pecially in south. Tobacco also cultivated in south. Only 11 per- 
cent of labor force employed in agriculture in 1980. 

Industry: Severely disrupted by civil strife. Employed about 27 
percent of labor force in 1980. Cement most important industrial 
export in 1980s; energy production and petroleum refining also 
significant. 



xvi 



Currency: Lebanese pound. 

Fiscal Year: Same as calendar year. 

Transportation and Communications 

Railroads: Two standard-gauge lines from Syria: one down coast 
through Tripoli and Beirut to Az Zahrani; the other through Biqa 
Valley to Riyaq. Narrow-gauge mountain line from Damascus to 
Beirut. In 1987 no trains operating on 407-kilometer system. 

Roads: Approximately 8,000 kilometers of roads in varying states 
of disrepair in 1987. Beirut hub of network extending north to 
Tripoli, south to Tyre, and east through mountains to Damascus. 
Roads also extending through Biqa Valley and crossing Lebanon 
Mountains. 

Ports: Major ports at Beirut, Tripoli, Sidon, and Tyre. In 1980s 
numerous smaller, illegal (unofficial) ports operated by militias. 

Pipelines: Trans- Arabia Pipeline (Tapline) from Saudi Arabia to 
Az Zahrani refinery but closed in mid-1980s. Iraq Petroleum Com- 
pany pipeline through Syria to Tripoli refinery but closed in 1981 . 

Airports: Main international airport at Beirut; closed intermit- 
tently in 1980s. Airport being built at Halat, but not cleared for 
civilian traffic as of 1987. 

Telecommunications: Much infrastructure destroyed during and 
after 1975 Civil War. International links continued to function in 
1980s. 

Government and Politics 

Government: Central government marginally functional in 1987 
and exercised only nominal control. Constitution vests executive 
power in president of republic, who appoints the cabinet ministers, 
from whom he selects prime minister. Legislative functions per- 
formed by unicameral Chamber of Deputies, elected for four-year 
terms by universal suffrage. In 1987 no elections had been held 
since 1972, and only seventy- seven deputies remained out of ninety- 
nine elected in 1972. Electoral system provided for proportional 
representation (based on 1932 census) in Chamber of Deputies by 
religion as well as by region. Chamber of Deputies elects presi- 
dent for six-year term and approves his cabinet appointments. By 
custom, president a Maronite, prime minister a Sunni Muslim, 
and speaker of the Chamber of Deputies a Shia Muslim. Judicial 
system, except for religious courts, based on French model. 



xvii 



Politics: 1975 Civil War, foreign intervention, and internal fight- 
ing generally have disrupted politics. Before 1975 many nonideo- 
logical political parties centered on powerful leaders whose followers 
were usually of same sect. Since 1975 militias have overtaken par- 
ties in importance. New president scheduled to be elected by Cham- 
ber of Deputies in September 1988 (see Introduction). 

Foreign Relations: In 1987 central government only one of many 
actors conducting foreign policy. Syria and Israel wielded greatest 
influence, followed by Iran (especially among some Shias) and 
Western nations (especially among some Christians). 

National Security 

Armed Forces: In 1987 consisted of 15,000- to 18,000-man, multi- 
sectarian army and small Christian air force (800 men) and navy 
(450 men). Army had nine brigades organized along sectarian lines, 
but not all loyal to central government. 

Equipment: Lightly equipped with mostly United States, British, 
and French materiel. 

Police: Most internal security personnel assimilated into armed 
forces by 1987. 

Militias: Principal militias, sectarian affiliations, and estimated 
combat strengths in 1987: Amal (Shia), 6,000 regulars (10,000 
reserves); Progressive Socialist Party (Druze), 5,000 regulars 
(12,000 reserves); Lebanese Forces (Christian), 4,500 regulars 
(30,000 reserves); Hizballah (Shia), 1,000; and South Lebanon 
Army (Christian), 1,000. 



xvm 




DAMASCUS 

33°3<K— 



UNITED NATIONS DISENGAGEMENT 
OBSERVER FORCE ZONE 



International boundary 

Province boundary 

Armistice line, 1949 
National capital 
Province capital 
5 10 15 Kilometers 



5 10 15 Miles 



Boundary representation not necessarily authoritative 



Figure 1. Administrative Divisions, 1987 



xx 



Introduction 



BY THE LATE 1980s, a new term had entered the vocabulary 
of the popular press — "Lebanonization, " a term used to refer to 
a wide range of political, social, and economic situations whose 
resolution appeared intractable. Because of Lebanon's deeply com- 
plicated ills, which included political factionalization, societal chaos, 
and economic fragmentation, the term could reasonably be applied 
to almost any problematic condition anywhere in the world. 

What "Lebanonization" failed to denote adequately, however, 
was the tragedy and suffering of the Lebanese people. As of late 
1987, estimates indicated that as many as 130,000 people had lost 
their lives during civil turmoil, which probably had inflicted at least 
twice that number of casualties and forced thousands of individ- 
uals from their homes. Figures could not show the impact these 
problems had on the national psyche. By the spring of 1988, 
Lebanon had experienced nearly continuous warfare of varying 
levels of intensity for thirteen years, and an entire generation had 
yet to know peace. 

Beginning in the darkest days of the Civil War in 1975 and 1976, 
tragic events followed almost without interruption. The litany of 
misfortune includes the Israeli thrust into southern Lebanon in 
search of Palestinian guerrillas in 1978, the intra-Christian battles 
of the late 1970s and early 1980s, the deeper Israeli invasion in 
1982, the massacres by Christian militiamen of Palestinians in the 
Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in 1982, the intra-Palestinian 
clashes of 1983, the fighting in the Shuf Mountains between the 
Lebanese Army and Druze (see Glossary) militia in 1983 and 1984, 
the suicide bombings of installations belonging to Western govern- 
ments in 1983-84, the Amal siege of Palestinian refugee camps in 
Beirut from 1985 to 1988, and the internecine Shia (see Glossary) 
Muslim battles of 1988. 

In spite of this turmoil, anarchy was a fairly recent phenome- 
non in Lebanon. Before the Civil War the nation was often regarded 
as one of only a few truly modernizing Middle Eastern states, and 
its government was considered a model of pluralism. Some ob- 
servers regarded Beirut as the jewel of the Arab world, a cosmopoli- 
tan city in which Christian and Muslim communities peacefully 
coexisted. These positive appearances notwithstanding, there were 
deep — and ominous — divisions in society. Many observers claim 
that these divisive forces have origins at least centuries old; others 



xxi 



believe that the sources of these forces can be traced back even 
further, perhaps as long ago as ancient times. 

As in much of the contemporary Middle East, the area occupied 
by present-day Lebanon has changed hands frequently (see fig. 1). 
The Phoenicians, the region's first known inhabitants, were a seafar- 
ing people with a penchant for commerce, a cultural trait that has 
continued through the centuries. But Lebanon's location on the 
Mediterranean Sea and its bountiful resources, although assets to 
the Phoenicians, also proved to be liabilities, as they were coveted 
by a succession of expansionary empires. Before the Christian era, 
Lebanon was conquered by the Egyptians, Assyrians, Babyloni- 
ans, Persians, Greeks, and Romans, although it enjoyed brief 
periods of independence (see Ancient Times, ch. 1). 

In addition to the sea, Lebanon's mountainous terrain has figured 
prominently in its history. The land's mountains, hills, and val- 
leys provided isolated sanctuaries for a variety of people; some 
sought escape from repression, while others sought the unfettered 
practice of their religions. Over the centuries the mountains' geo- 
graphic remoteness has allowed groups such as Druzes and 
Maronites (see Glossary) to maintain age-old customs and practices. 

From ancient times through the Ottoman era to the colonial era, 
the present-day states of Lebanon and Syria, along with parts of 
other states, often have been regarded as one area termed Greater 
Syria (see Glossary). And, as this name suggests, Syria has played 
an influential role in the history of the area. Lebanon and Syria 
have been linked socially and economically, but especially politi- 
cally. For example, following the Islamic conquest of the region 
in the seventh century A.D. , the Arab caliph Muawiyah ruled the 
entire area from his capital at Damascus. Later, under the Otto- 
man Empire, the pasha, or governor, of Damascus controlled 
Lebanon through a number of amirs, or princes. After World War I 
and the defeat of the Ottomans, the Allies granted France man- 
date authority over both Lebanon and Syria. In the 1980s, Syrian 
influence in Lebanon persisted because Syria had taken on the role 
of power broker and was viewed by some observers as the one actor 
that could bring about peace. 

Unlike the populations of many Third World nations that have 
experienced strife because of racial or ethnic divisions, Lebanon's 
population is ethnically homogeneous. It is overwhelmingly Arab, 
and its people speak a common language — Arabic. Lebanon's many 
conflicts have been the result of sectarianism and political differ- 
ences. Disputes based on sectarianism were evident as long ago 
as the 1840s, when Druzes and Maronites clashed in Mount 
Lebanon (see Glossary). Over the years, confessionalism (see 



xxn 



Glossary) has become more firmly entrenched, as individuals have 
come to identify with sect and clan rather than with national interest. 
Modernization and urbanization, which weakened traditional social 
systems and increased social alienation, contributed to the rise of 
sectarianism (see Sectarianism, ch. 2). Moreover, the confessional 
system became legitimated by the National Pact of 1943, which 
allocated political offices according to sect (see The National Pact, 
ch. 4). In the 1970s and 1980s, the consequences of the fragmen- 
tation of society became clear, as a multitude of groups clashed. 
But in Lebanon's ever-changing social milieu, today's opponent 
might become tomorrow's ally. 

Before the 1975 Civil War, Lebanon enjoyed a flourishing econ- 
omy (see Recent Economic History, ch. 3). Tourism, commerce, 
and other service sectors were all booming. Beirut's banks held 
large balances of foreign capital, mostly in the form of remittances 
from expatriates and deposits from West European and Persian 
Gulf states. As a transshipment point for goods coming from or 
going to a variety of Arab countries, the government reaped con- 
siderable revenues from import and export duties. 

Lebanon's wealth, however, was inequitably distributed, much 
of it concentrated in the hands of a small, predominantly Chris- 
tian, elite in Beirut. In the opinion of some observers, this mal- 
distribution of wealth contributed significantly to the outbreak of 
civil strife and the subsequent devastation of the economy. 

In the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, armed conflict and 
geographic fragmentation kept the economy in ruins. The govern- 
ment, although not bankrupt, was unable to collect sufficient 
revenues to maintain services and thus was forced to incur huge 
deficits. Rampant inflation spawned a large-scale black market, 
industry was almost moribund, and the once-thriving tourism sector 
was dead. Banks were still functioning, but at greatly diminished 
levels. Agricultural production, although reduced, continued in 
areas unaffected by the violence; in some cases, food crops were 
replaced by hashish and opium. Finally, reconstruction efforts, 
involving funding by Arab institutions and Western donors, had 
little impact because calm could not be maintained long enough 
to allow the implementation of programs. 

Lebanon's political structure often was cited by analysts as con- 
tributing to hostilities. Political participation was not only circum- 
scribed for all segments of society by the traditional power-broker 
system, called zuama (sing., zaim — see Glossary) clientelism, but 
this system also awarded undue power to Maronites (see Zuama 
Clientelism, ch. 4). The allocation of seats in the legislature, called 
the Chamber of Deputies, was based on the 1932 census, which 



xxm 



counted Christians to Muslims in a six-to-five ratio, and by cus- 
tom the presidency was set aside for a Maronite, the prime minis- 
try for a Sunni (see Glossary) Muslim, and the speaker of the 
Chamber of Deputies for a Shia. But as the population makeup 
changed, Muslims — especially Shias — clamored for greater repre- 
sentation and for reform to reduce the powers of the president; some 
groups advocated the wholesale restructuring of the political sys- 
tem. After the events of the mid-1970s, the system collapsed, and 
those parts that continued to function no longer resembled the 
prewar form. Political power was usurped by sectarian militias or 
external actors, especially Syria and, after 1982, Israel (see Sec- 
tarian Groups; Syria; Israel, ch. 4). In mid- 1988 the executive con- 
trolled only a small area around the Presidential Palace, the Council 
of Ministers seldom convened (and, in any case, did not cooper- 
ate with the president), and a new Chamber of Deputies had not 
been elected since 1972. Although reform of the system had been 
discussed over the years, the multitude of power centers espous- 
ing opposing ideologies prevented any meaningful change. 

By the late 1970s, the term national security, in the commonly 
understood sense of providing internal security and national defense, 
could no longer be applied to the Lebanese Armed Forces. In the 
prewar years, efforts were made to keep the armed forces out of 
politics, and, for the most part, those efforts succeeded. But dur- 
ing the violence of the mid-1970s, the armed forces fragmented 
along sectarian lines. In the late 1980s, as only the sixth or seventh 
most powerful military organization in the country, the armed forces 
were unable to fulfill their stated missions. In areas where security 
did exist, it was often the result of a sectarian militia imposing its 
authority. 

* * * 

After the research for this book was completed, several events 
occurred that reshaped Lebanon's political and social structure. 
The first of these events occurred in September 1988, when, after 
several failed attempts at convening, the Chamber of Deputies 
announced that it was unable to elect a new president. Before leav- 
ing office, however, President Amin Jumayyil (also seen as 
Gemayel) appointed the commander of the Lebanese Army, Major 
General Michel Awn (also seen as Aoun), to head an interim mili- 
tary government. Although he attempted to incorporate non- 
Christian sects into his cabinet, Muslims quickly renounced the 
move, and Salim al Huss (also seen as Hoss), the acting prime 
minister under Jumayyil, formed his own cabinet. 



xxiv 



In February 1989, to assert the authority of the state, Awn sent 
his army to wrest an unofficial (illegally operated) port in Beirut 
from the Christian Lebanese Forces (LF), a militia headed by Samir 
Jaja (also seen as Geagea). This operation resulted in a fierce bat- 
tle in East Beirut between artillery and armored units of the LF 
and the army. The fighting inflicted great damage on the people 
and neighborhoods of East Beirut, and soon after the conflict began, 
Jaja conceded to a cease-fire and agreed to vacate the port. 

Following this triumph, Awn sought to extend his control fur- 
ther and ordered the small Lebanese navy to blockade unofficial 
ports south of Beirut that were run by Druze and Shia militias. 
Again a bitter confrontation ensued, but in this instance, as had 
not been the case during the earlier localized, internecine fight- 
ing, Syria, which had about 40,000 troops in Lebanon, rallied to 
the Muslim side. During much of March and April, shells rained 
down on East and West Beirut, the Shuf Mountains, and the Chris- 
tian heartland north of Beirut. Observers reported that the fight- 
ing was as severe as any battle of the 1975 Civil War or the 1978 
Syrian siege of East Beirut. As many as 300,000 people were be- 
lieved to have fled the bombardments, and many of those who didn't 
leave were forced to live in basements, often without electricity or 
water. Reports claimed that all but a few of the several hundred 
killed and wounded were civilians. 

Thus, with rival Christian and Muslim governments and armies 
in place, and with intrasectarian and intersectarian disputes as com- 
mon and fierce as ever, prospects for peace seemed remote in early 
1989. 



May 2, 1989 Thomas Collelo 



XXV 



Chapter 1. Historical Setting 




The Temple of Jupiter, built by the Romans in Baalbek 



LIKE OTHER AREAS of the Middle East, Lebanon has a 
heritage almost as old as the earliest evidence of mankind. Its geo- 
graphic position as a crossroads linking the Mediterranean Basin 
with the great Asian hinterland has conferred on it a cosmopolitan 
character and a multicultural legacy. 

At different periods of its history, Lebanon has come under the 
domination of foreign rulers, including Assyrians, Babylonians, 
Persians, Greeks, Romans, Arabs, Ottomans, and French. Al- 
though often conquered, the Lebanese take pride in their rebel- 
lions against despotic and repressive rulers. Moreover, despite 
foreign domination, Lebanon's mountainous terrain has provided 
it with a certain protective isolation, enabling it to survive with 
an identity all its own. 

Its proximity to the sea has ensured that throughout its history 
Lebanon has held an important position as a trading center. This 
tradition of commerce began with the Phoenicians and continued 
through many centuries, remaining almost unaffected by foreign 
rule and the worst periods of internal strife. 

Lebanon has an Arab culture colored by Western influences. 
Although Lebanon traditionally considered itself the only Chris- 
tian country in the Arab world, by the 1970s the Muslim popula- 
tion was greater than that of the Christians, a situation that led 
to sectarian unrest and struggles for political and economic power. 

Ancient Times 
The Phoenicians 

The area now known as Lebanon first appeared in recorded his- 
tory around 3000 B.C. as a group of coastal cities and a heavily 
forested hinterland. It was inhabited by the Canaanites, a Semitic 
people, whom the Greeks called "Phoenicians" because of the pur- 
ple (phoinikies) dye they sold. These early inhabitants referred to 
themselves as "men of Sidon" or the like, according to their city 
of origin, and called the country "Lebanon." Because of the na- 
ture of the country and its location, the Phoenicians turned to the 
sea, where they engaged in trade and navigation. 

Each of the coastal cities was an independent kingdom noted for 
the special activities of its inhabitants. Tyre and Sidon were im- 
portant maritime and trade centers; Gubla (later known as Byblos 
and now as Jubayl) and Berytus (present-day Beirut) were trade 



3 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

and religious centers. Gubla was the first Phoenician city to trade 
actively with Egypt and the pharaohs of the Old Kingdom 
(2686-2181 B.C.), exporting cedar, olive oil, and wine, while im- 
porting gold and other products from the Nile Valley. 

Before the end of the seventeenth century B.C., Lebanese- 
Egyptian relations were interrupted when the Hyksos, a nomadic 
Semitic people, conquered Egypt. After about three decades of 
Hyksos rule (1600-1570 B.C.), Ahmose I (1570-45 B.C.), a 
Theban prince, launched the Egyptian liberation war. Opposition 
to the Hyksos increased, reaching a peak during the reign of the 
pharaoh Thutmose III (1490-36 B.C.), who invaded Syria, put 
an end to Hyksos domination, and incorporated Lebanon into the 
Egyptian Empire. 

Toward the end of the fourteenth century B.C., the Egyptian 
Empire weakened, and Lebanon was able to regain its indepen- 
dence by the beginning of the twelfth century B.C. The subsequent 
three centuries were a period of prosperity and freedom from for- 
eign control during which the earlier Phoenician invention of the 
alphabet facilitated communications and trade. The Phoenicians 
also excelled not only in producing textiles but also in carving ivory, 
in working with metal, and above all in making glass. Masters of 
the art of navigation, they founded colonies wherever they went 
in the Mediterranean Sea (specifically in Cyprus, Rhodes, Crete, 
and Carthage) and established trade routes to Europe and western 
Asia (see fig. 2). Furthermore, their ships circumnavigated Africa 
a thousand years before those of the Portuguese. These colonies 
and trade routes flourished until the invasion of the coastal areas 
by the Assyrians. 

Assyrian Rule 

Assyrian rule (875-608 B.C.) deprived the Phoenician cities of 
their independence and prosperity and brought repeated, unsuc- 
cessful rebellions. In the middle of the eighth century B.C., Tyre 
and Byblos rebelled, but the Assyrian ruler, Tiglath-Pileser, sub- 
dued the rebels and imposed heavy tributes. Oppression continued 
unabated, and Tyre rebelled again, this time against Sargon II 
(722-05 B.C.), who successfully besieged the city in 721 B.C. and 
punished its population. During the seventh century B.C., Sidon 
rebelled and was completely destroyed by Esarhaddon (681-68 
B.C.), and its inhabitants were enslaved. Esarhaddon built a new 
city on Sidon 's ruins. By the end of the seventh century B.C., the 
Assyrian Empire, weakened by the successive revolts, had been 
destroyed by Babylonia, a new Mesopotamian power. 



4 



Historical Setting 



Babylonian Rule and the Persian Empire 

Revolts in the Phoenician cities became more frequent under 
Babylonian rule (685-36 B.C.). Tyre rebelled again and for thir- 
teen years resisted a siege by the troops of Nebuchadnezzar (587-74 
B.C.). After this long siege, the city capitulated; its king was 
dethroned, and its citizens were enslaved. 

The Achaemenids ended Babylonian rule when Cyrus, founder 
of the Persian Empire, captured Babylon in 539-38 B.C. and 
Phoenicia and its neighbors passed into Persian hands. Cambyses 
(529-22 B.C.), Cyrus's son and successor, continued his father's 
policy of conquest and in 529 B.C. became suzerain of Syria, 
Lebanon, and Egypt. The Phoenician navy supported Persia dur- 
ing the Greco-Persian War (490-49 B.C.). But when the Phoeni- 
cians were overburdened with heavy tributes imposed by the 
successors of Darius I (521-485 B.C.), revolts and rebellions re- 
sumed in the Lebanese coastal cities. 

Rule of Alexander the Great 

The Persian Empire eventually fell to Alexander the Great, king 
of Macedonia. He attacked Asia Minor, defeated the Persian troops 
in 333 B.C., and advanced toward the Lebanese coast. Initially 
the Phoenician cities made no attempt to resist, and they recog- 
nized his suzerainty. However, when Alexander tried to offer a 
sacrifice to Melkurt, Tyre's god, the city resisted. Alexander be- 
sieged Tyre in retaliation in early 332 B.C. After six months of 
resistance, the city fell, and its people were sold into slavery. Despite 
his early death in 323 B.C., Alexander's conquest of the eastern 
Mediterranean Basin left a Greek imprint on the area. The Phoe- 
nicians, being a cosmopolitan people amenable to outside influences, 
adopted aspects of Greek civilization with ease. 

The Seleucid Dynasty 

After Alexander's death, his empire was divided among his 
Macedonian generals. The eastern part — Fhoenicia, Asia Minor, 
northern Syria, and Mesopotamia — fell to Seleucus I, founder of 
the Seleucid dynasty. The southern part of Syria and Egypt fell 
to Ptolemy, and the European part, including Macedonia, to 
Antigonus I. This settlement, however, failed to bring peace be- 
cause Seleucus I and Ptolemy clashed repeatedly in the course of 
their ambitious efforts to share in Phoenician prosperity. A final 
victory of the Seleucids ended a forty-year period of conflict. 

The last century of Seleucid rule was marked by disorder and 
dynastic struggles. These ended in 64 B.C., when the Roman 



5 



Lebanon: A Country Study 




Historical Setting 



general Pompey added Syria and Lebanon to the Roman Empire. 
Economic and intellectual activities flourished in Lebanon during 
the Pax Romana. The inhabitants of the principal Phoenician cities 
of Byblos, Sidon, and Tyre were granted Roman citizenship. These 
cities were centers of the pottery, glass, and purple dye industries; 
their harbors also served as warehouses for products imported from 
Syria, Persia, and India. They exported cedar, perfume, jewelry, 
wine, and fruit to Rome. Economic prosperity led to a revival in 
construction and urban development; temples and palaces were 
built throughout the country, as well as paved roads that linked 
the cities. 

Upon the death of Theodosius I in A.D. 395, the empire was 
divided in two: the eastern or Byzantine part with its capital at 
Constantinople, and the western part with its capital at Rome. 
Under the Byzantine Empire, intellectual and economic activities 
in Beirut, Tyre, and Sidon continued to flourish for more than a 
century. However, in the sixth century a series of earthquakes 
demolished the temples of Baalbek and destroyed the city of Beirut, 
leveling its famous law school and killing nearly 30,000 inhabitants. 
To these natural disasters were added the abuses and corruptions 
prevailing at that time in the empire. Heavy tributes and religious 
dissension produced disorder and confusion. Furthermore, the ecu- 
menical councils of the fifth and sixth centuries A.D. were unsuc- 
cessful in settling religious disagreements. This turbulent period 
weakened the empire and made it easy prey to the newly converted 
Muslim Arabs of the Arabian Peninsula. 

The Arab Period 

The Arab Conquest, 634-36 

The followers of the Prophet Muhammad, the founder of Islam, 
embarked on a movement to establish their religious and civil con- 
trol throughout the eastern Mediterranean from their base in the 
Arabian Peninsula. Their determination to conquer other lands 
resulted both from economic necessity and from religious beliefs, 
which imbued them with contempt for death. 

Calling for a jihad (holy war) against non-Muslims, the Prophet's 
successor, Caliph Abu Bakr (632-34), brought Islam to the area 
surrounding Lebanon. Dividing his forces into three groups, he 
ordered one to move in the direction of Palestine, one toward 
Damascus, and one toward the Jordan River. The Arab groups 
under General Khalid ibn al Walid defeated the forces from Con- 
stantinople in 636 at the Battle of Yarmuk in northwestern Jordan. 



7 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

The Umayyads, 660-750 

After the Battle of Yarmuk, Caliph Umar appointed the Arab 
Muawiyah, founder of the Umayyad dynasty, as governor of Syria, 
an area that included present-day Lebanon. Muawiyah garrisoned 
troops on the Lebanese coast and had the Lebanese shipbuilders 
help him construct a navy to resist any potential Byzantine attack. 
He also stopped raids by the Marada, a powerful people who had 
settled in the Lebanese mountains and who were used by the Byzan- 
tine rulers to prevent any Arab invasion that would threaten the 
Byzantine Empire. Concerned with consolidating his authority in 
Arabia and Iraq, Muawiyah negotiated an agreement in 667 with 
Constantine IV, the Byzantine emperor, whereby he agreed to pay 
Constantine an annual tribute in return for the cessation of Marada 
incursions. During this period some of the Arab tribes settled in 
the Lebanese and Syrian coastal areas. 

The Abbasids, 750-1258 

The Abbasids, founded by the Arab Abul Abbas, replaced the 
Umayyads in early 750. They treated Lebanon and Syria as con- 
quered countries, and their harshness led to several revolts, includ- 
ing an abortive rebellion of Lebanese mountaineers in 759. By the 
end of the tenth century, the amir of Tyre proclaimed his indepen- 
dence from the Abbasids and coined money in his own name. 
However, his rule was terminated by the Fatimids of Egypt, an 
independent Arab Muslim dynasty. 

Impact of Arab Rule 

Arab rule under the Umayyads and Abbasids had a profound 
impact on the eastern Mediterranean area and, to a great degree, 
was responsible for the composition of modern Lebanese society. 
It was during this period that Lebanon became a refuge for vari- 
ous ethnic and religious groups. The presence of these diverse, co- 
hesive groups led to the eventual emergence of the Lebanese 
confessional (see Glossary) state, whereby different religious com- 
munities were represented in the government according to their 
numerical strength (see The Basis of Government, ch. 4). 

The ancestors of the present-day Maronites (see Glossary) were 
among the Christian communities that settled in Lebanon during 
this period (see Christian Sects, ch. 2). To avoid feuds with other 
Christian sects in the area, these followers of Saint John Maron 
moved from the upper valley of the Orontes River and settled in 
the picturesque Qadisha Valley, located in the northern Lebanon 
Mountains, about twenty-five kilometers southeast of Tripoli. 



8 




A Roman temple in the mountain village of Bayt Miri 
Courtesy Lebanese Information and Research Center (Magnin) 



9 



Lebanon: A Country Study 



Lebanon also became the refuge for a small Christian group called 
Melchites, living in northern and central Lebanon. Influenced by 
the Greek Christian theology of Constantinople, they accepted the 
controversial decrees of the Council of Chalcedon, the fourth ecu- 
menical council of the church held in 451. As a result of mission- 
ary activity by the Roman Catholic Church, some were later drawn 
away from this creed and became known as Greek Catholics be- 
cause Greek is the language of their liturgy. They lived mainly in 
the central part of the Biqa Valley. 

During the Arab era, still another religious faith found sanctu- 
ary in Lebanon. After Al Hakim (996-1021), the Fatimid caliph 
of Egypt, proclaimed himself an incarnation of God, two of his 
followers, Hamza and Darazi, formulated the dogmas for his cult. 
Darazi left Egypt and continued to preach these tenets after settling 
in southern Lebanon. His followers became known as Druzes (see 
Glossary); along with Christians and Muslims, they constitute major 
communities in modern Lebanon. 

Under the Abbasids, philosophy, literature, and the sciences 
received great attention, especially during the caliphate of Harun 
ar Rashid and that of his son, Al Mamun. Lebanon made a nota- 
ble contribution to this intellectual renaissance. The physician 
Rashid ad Din, the jurist Al Awazi, and the philosopher Qusta 
ibn Luqa were leaders in their respective disciplines. The country 
also enjoyed an economic boom in which the Lebanese harbors 
of Tyre and Tripoli were busy with shipping as the textile, ceramic, 
and glass industries prospered. Lebanese products were sought after 
not only in Arab countries but also throughout the Mediterranean 
Basin. 

In general, Arab rulers were tolerant of Christians and Jews, 
both of whom were assessed special taxes and were exempted from 
military service. Later, under the Ottoman Empire, the practice 
developed of administering non-Muslim groups as separate com- 
munities called millets. In the late- 1980s, this system continued; 
each religious community was organized under its own head and 
observed its own laws pertaining to matters such as divorce and 
inheritance (see The Judiciary, ch. 4). 

The Crusades, 1095-1291 

The occupation of the Christian holy places in Palestine and the 
destruction of the Holy Sepulcher by Caliph Al Hakim led to a 
series of eight campaigns, known as the Crusades, undertaken by 
Christians of western Europe to recover the Holy Land from the 
Muslims. The first Crusade was proclaimed by Pope Urban II in 
1095 at the Council of Clermont-Ferrand in France. After taking 

10 



Historical Setting 



Jerusalem, the Crusaders turned their attention to the Lebanese 
coast. Tripoli capitulated in 1109; Beirut and Sidon, in 1110. Tyre 
stubbornly resisted but finally capitulated in 1 124 after a long siege. 

Although they failed to establish a permanent presence, the 
Crusaders left their imprint on Lebanon. Among the conspicuous 
results of the Crusades, which ended with the fall of Acre in 1291 , 
are the remains of many towers along the coast, ruins of castles 
on hills and mountain slopes, and numerous churches. 

Of all the contacts established by the Crusaders with the peo- 
ples of the Middle East, those with the Maronites of Lebanon were 
among the most enduring. They acquainted the Maronites with 
European influences and made them more receptive to friendly ap- 
proaches from Westerners. During this period the Maronites were 
brought into a union with the Holy See, a union that survived in 
the late 1980s. France was a major participant in the Crusades, 
and French interest in the region and its Christian population dates 
to this period. 

Bitter conflicts among the various regional and ethnic groups 
in Lebanon and Syria characterized the thirteenth century. The 
Crusaders, who came from Europe, the Mongols, who came from 
the steppes of Central Asia, and the Mamluks, who came from 
Egypt, all sought to be masters in the area. In this hard and con- 
fused struggle for supremacy, victory came to the Mamluks. 

The Mamluks, 1282-1516 

The Mamluks were a combination of Turkoman slaves from the 
area east of the Caspian Sea and Circassian slaves from the 
Caucasus Mountains between the Black Sea and Caspian Sea. They 
were brought in by the Muslim Ayyubid sultans of Egypt to serve 
as their bodyguards. One of these slaves, Muez-Aibak, assassinated 
the Ayyubid sultan, Al Ashraf Musa, in 1252 and founded the 
Mamluk sultanate, which ruled Egypt and Syria for more than two 
centuries. 

From the eleventh to the thirteenth century, the Shia (see Glos- 
sary) Muslims migrated from Syria, Iraq, and the Arabian Penin- 
sula to the northern part of the Biqa Valley and to the Kasrawan 
Region in the mountains northeast of Beirut. They and the Druzes 
rebelled in 1291 while the Mamluks were busy fighting European 
Crusaders and Mongols, but after repelling the invaders, the 
Mamluks crushed the rebellion in 1308. To escape from repres- 
sion and massacres by the Mamluks, the Shias abandoned 
Kasrawan and moved to southern Lebanon. 

The Mamluks indirectly fostered relations between Europe and 
the Middle East even after the fall of the Byzantine Empire. The 



11 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

Europeans, accustomed to luxury items from the Middle East, 
strongly desired both its raw materials and its manufactured 
products, and the people of the Middle East wished to exploit the 
lucrative European market. Beirut, favored by its geographical lo- 
cation, became the center of intense trading activity. Despite reli- 
gious conflicts among the different communities in Lebanon, 
intellectual life flourished, and economic prosperity continued until 
Mamluk rule was ended by the Ottoman Turks. 

Ottoman Rule, 1516-1916 

The Ottoman Turks were a Central Asian people who had served 
as slaves and warriors under the Abbasids. Because of their courage 
and discipline they became the masters of the palace in Baghdad 
during the caliphate of Al Mutasim (833-42). The Ottoman sul- 
tan, Salim I (1516-20), after defeating the Persians, conquered the 
Mamluks. His troops, invading Syria, destroyed Mamluk resistance 
in 1516 at Marj Dabaq, north of Aleppo. 

During the conflict between the Mamluks and the Ottomans, 
the amirs of Lebanon linked their fate to that of Ghazali, gover- 
nor (pasha) of Damascus. He won the confidence of the Ottomans 
by fighting on their side at Marj Dabaq and, apparently pleased 
with the behavior of the Lebanese amirs, introduced them to Salim 
I when he entered Damascus. Salim I, moved by the eloquence 
of the Lebanese ruler Amir Fakhr ad Din I (1516-44), decided to 
grant the Lebanese amirs a semiautonomous status. The Ottomans, 
through two great Druze feudal families, the Maans and the 
Shihabs, ruled Lebanon until the middle of the nineteenth cen- 
tury. It was during Ottoman rule that the term Greater Syria was 
coined to designate the approximate area included in present-day 
Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Israel. 

The Maans, 1120-1697 

The Maan family, under orders from the governor of Damas- 
cus, came to Lebanon in 1120 to defend it against the invading 
Crusaders. They settled on the southwestern slopes of the Leba- 
non Mountains and soon adopted the Druze religion. Their authori- 
ty began to rise with Fakhr ad Din I, who was permitted by 
Ottoman authorities to organize his own army, and reached its peak 
with Fakhr ad Din II (1570-1635). 

Although Fakhr ad Din IPs aspirations toward complete indepen- 
dence for Lebanon ended tragically, he greatly enhanced Leba- 
non's military and economic development. Noted for religious 
tolerance and suspected of being a Christian, Fakhr ad Din at- 
tempted to merge the country's different religious groups into one 



12 



Historical Setting 



Lebanese community. In an effort to attain complete independence 
for Lebanon, he concluded a secret agreement with Ferdinand I, 
duke of Tuscany in Italy, the two parties pledging to support each 
other against the Ottomans. Informed of this agreement, the 
Ottoman ruler in Constantinople reacted violently and ordered 
Ahmad al Hafiz, governor of Damascus, to attack Fakhr ad Din. 
Realizing his inability to cope with the regular army of Al Hafiz, 
the Lebanese ruler went to Tuscany in exile in 1613. He returned 
to Lebanon in 1618, after his good friend Muhammad Pasha be- 
came governor of Damascus. 

Following his return from Tuscany, Fakhr ad Din, realizing the 
need for a strong and disciplined armed force, channeled his finan- 
cial resources into building a regular army. This army proved it- 
self in 1623, when Mustafa Pasha, the new governor of Damascus, 
underestimating the capabilities of the Lebanese army, engaged 
it in battle and was decisively defeated at Anjar in the Biqa Val- 
ley. Impressed by the victory of the Lebanese ruler, the sultan of 
Constantinople gave him the title of Sultan al Barr (Sultan of the 
Mountain). 

In addition to building up the army, Fakhr ad Din, who became 
acquainted with Italian culture during his stay in Tuscany, initiated 
measures to modernize the country. After forming close ties with 
the dukes of Tuscany and Florence and establishing diplomatic re- 
lations with them, he brought in architects, irrigation engineers, 
and agricultural experts from Italy in an effort to promote prosperity 
in the country. He also strengthened Lebanon's strategic position 
by expanding its territory, building forts as far away as Palmyra 
in Syria, and gaining control of Palestine. Finally, the Ottoman 
sultan Murad IV of Constantinople, wanting to thwart Lebanon's 
progress toward complete independence, ordered Kutshuk, then 
governor of Damascus, to attack the Lebanese ruler. This time 
Fakhr ad Din was defeated, and he was executed in Constantinople 
in 1635. No significant Maan rulers succeeded Fakhr ad Din II. 

The Shihabs, 1697-1842 

The Shihabs succeeded the Maans in 1697. They originally lived 
in the Hawran region of southwestern Syria and settled in Wadi 
at Taim in southern Lebanon. The most prominent among them 
was Bashir II, who was much like his predecessor, Fakhr ad Din 
II. His ability as a statesman was first tested in 1799, when 
Napoleon besieged Acre, a well-fortified coastal city in Palestine, 
about forty kilometers south of Tyre. Both Napoleon and Al Jazzar, 
the governor of Acre, requested assistance from the Shihab leader; 
Bashir, however, remained neutral, declining to assist either 



13 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

combatant. Unable to conquer Acre, Napoleon returned to Egypt, 
and the death of Al Jazzar in 1804 removed Bashir's principal op- 
ponent in the area. 

When Bashir II decided to break away from the Ottoman Em- 
pire, he allied himself with Muhammad Ali, the founder of modern 
Egypt, and assisted Muhammad Ali's son, Ibrahim Pasha, in 
another siege of Acre. This siege lasted seven months, the city falling 
on May 27, 1832. The Egyptian army, with assistance from Bashir's 
troops, also attacked and conquered Damascus on June 14, 1832. 

Ibrahim Pasha and Bashir II at first ruled harshly and exacted 
high taxes. These practices led to several revolts and eventually 
ended their power. In May 1840, despite the efforts of Bashir, the 
Maronites and Druzes united their forces against the Egyptians. 
In addition, the principal European powers (Britain, Austria, 
Prussia, and Russia), opposing the pro-Egyptian policy of the 
French, signed the London Treaty with the Sublime Porte (the 
Ottoman ruler) on July 15, 1840. According to the terms of this 
treaty, Muhammad Ali was asked to leave Syria; when he rejected 
this request, Ottoman and British troops landed on the Lebanese 
coast on September 10, 1840. Faced with this combined force, 
Muhammad Ali retreated, and on October 14, 1840, Bashir II sur- 
rendered to the British and went into exile. 

Religious Conflicts 

On September 3, 1840, Bashir III was appointed amir of Mount 
Lebanon (see Glossary) by the Ottoman sultan. Geographically, 
Mount Lebanon represents the central part of present-day Lebanon, 
which historically has had a Christian majority. Greater Lebanon, 
on the other hand, created at the expense of Greater Syria, was 
formally constituted under the League of Nations mandate granted 
to France in 1920 and includes the Biqa Valley, Beirut, southern 
Lebanon (up to the border with Palestine/Israel), and northern 
Lebanon (up to the border with Syria). In practice, the terms 
Lebanon and Mount Lebanon tend to be used interchangeably by 
historians until the formal establishment of the Mandate. 

Bitter conflicts between Christians and Druzes, which had been 
simmering under Ibrahim Pasha's rule, resurfaced under the new 
amir. Hence, the sultan deposed Bashir III on January 13, 1842, 
and appointed Umar Pasha as governor of Mount Lebanon. This 
appointment, however, created more problems than it solved. 
Representatives of the European powers proposed to the sultan that 
Lebanon be partitioned into Christian and Druze sections. On 
December 7, 1842, the sultan adopted the proposal and asked Assad 
Pasha, the governor (wait) of Beirut, to divide the region, then 



14 



The palace at Bayt ad Din, 
built by Bashir II in the 
early nineteenth century 
Courtesy Lebanese Information 
and Research Center 



known as Mount Lebanon, into two districts: a northern district 
under a Christian deputy governor and a southern district under 
a Druze deputy governor. This arrangement came to be known 
as the Double Qaimaqamate. Both officials were to be responsible 
to the governor of Sidon, who resided in Beirut. The Beirut- 
Damascus highway was the dividing line between the two districts. 

This partition of Lebanon proved to be a mistake. Animosities 
between the religious sects increased, nurtured by outside powers. 
The French, for example, supported the Christians, while the British 
supported the Druzes, and the Ottomans fomented strife to increase 
their control. Not surprisingly, these tensions led to conflict be- 
tween Christians and Druzes as early as May 1845. Consequently, 
the European powers requested that the Ottoman sultan establish 
order in Lebanon, and he attempted to do so by establishing a majlis 
(council) in each of the districts. Each majlis was composed of mem- 
bers who represented the different religious communities and was 
intended to assist the deputy governor. 

This system failed to keep order when the peasants of Kasra- 
wan, overburdened by heavy taxes, rebelled against the feudal prac- 
tices that prevailed in Mount Lebanon. In 1858 Tanyus Shahin, 
a Maronite peasant leader, demanded that the feudal class abolish 
its privileges. When this demand was refused, the poor peasants 
revolted against the shaykhs of Mount Lebanon, pillaging the 
shaykhs' land and burning their homes. 



15 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

Foreign interests in Lebanon transformed these basically socio- 
political struggles into bitter religious conflicts, culminating in the 
1860 massacre of about 10,000 Maronites, as well as Greek Cath- 
olics and Greek Orthodox, by the Druzes. These events offered 
France the opportunity to intervene; in an attempt to forestall 
French intervention, the Ottoman government stepped in to re- 
store order. 

On October 5, 1860, an international commission composed of 
France, Britain, Austria, Prussia, and the Ottoman Empire met 
to investigate the causes of the events of 1860 and to recommend 
a new administrative and judicial system for Lebanon that would 
prevent the recurrence of such events. The commission members 
agreed that the partition of Mount Lebanon in 1842 between Druzes 
and Christians had been responsible for the massacre. Hence, in 
the Statute of 1861 Mount Lebanon was separated from Syria and 
reunited under a non-Lebanese Christian mutasarrif (governor) ap- 
pointed by the Ottoman sultan, with the approval of the European 
powers. The mutasarrif 'was to be assisted by an administrative coun- 
cil of twelve members from the various religious communities in 
Lebanon. 

Direct Ottoman rule of Lebanon remained in effect until the end 
of World War I. This period was generally characterized by a 
laissez-faire policy and corruption. However, a number of gover- 
nors, such as Daud Pasha and Naum Pasha, ruled the country effi- 
ciently and conscientiously. 

Restricted mainly to the mountains by the mutasarrifiyah (district 
governed by a mutasarrif) arrangement and unable to make a liv- 
ing, many Lebanese Christians emigrated to Egypt and other parts 
of Africa and to North America, South America, and East Asia. 
Remittances from these Lebanese emigrants to their relatives in 
Lebanon have continued to supplement the Lebanese economy to 
this day. 

In addition to being a center of commercial and religious activ- 
ity, Lebanon became an intellectual center in the second half of 
the nineteenth century. Foreign missionaries established schools 
throughout the country, with Beirut as the center of this renais- 
sance. The American University of Beirut was founded in 1866, 
followed by the French St. Joseph's University in 1875 (see Edu- 
cation, ch. 2). An intellectual guild that was formed at the same 
time gave new life to Arabic literature, which had stagnated under 
the Ottoman Empire. This new intellectual era was also marked 
by the appearance of numerous publications and by a highly pro- 
lific press. 



16 



Historical Setting 



The period was also marked by increased political activity. The 
harsh rule of Abdul Hamid II (1876-1909) prompted the Arab na- 
tionalists, both Christians and Muslims, in Beirut and Damascus 
to organize into clandestine political groups and parties. The 
Lebanese, however, had difficulties in deciding the best political 
course to advocate. Many Lebanese Christians were apprehensive 
of Turkish pan-Islamic policies, fearing a repetition of the 1860 
massacres. Some, especially the Maronites, began to contemplate 
secession rather than the reform of the Ottoman Empire. Others, 
particularly the Greek Orthodox, advocated an independent Syria 
with Lebanon as a separate province within it, so as to avoid 
Maronite rule. A number of Lebanese Muslims, on the other hand, 
sought not to liberalize the Ottoman regime but to maintain it, 
as Sunni (see Glossary) Muslims particularly liked to be identified 
with the caliphate. The Shias and Druzes, however, fearing minority 
status in a Turkish state, tended to favor an independent Leba- 
non or a continuation of the status quo. 

Originally the Arab reformist groups hoped their nationalist aims 
would be supported by the Young Turks, who had staged a revo- 
lution in 1908-1909. Unfortunately, after seizing power, the Young 
Turks became increasingly repressive and nationalistic. They aban- 
doned many of their liberal policies because of domestic opposi- 
tion and Turkey's engagement in foreign wars between 1911 and 
1913. Thus, the Arab nationalists could not count on the support 
of the Young Turks and instead were faced with opposition by the 
Turkish government. 

World War I and the French Mandate, 1914-41 
World War I 

The outbreak of World War I in August 1914 brought Leba- 
non further problems, as Turkey allied itself with Germany and 
Austria-Hungary. The Turkish government abolished Lebanon's 
semiautonomous status and appointed Jamal Pasha, then minister 
of the navy, as the commander in chief of the Turkish forces in 
Syria, with discretionary powers. Known for his harshness, he 
militarily occupied Lebanon and replaced the Armenian mutasarrif, 
Ohannes Pasha, with a Turk, Munif Pasha. 

In February 1915, frustrated by his unsuccessful attack on the 
British forces protecting the Suez Canal, Jamal Pasha initiated a 
blockade of the entire eastern Mediterranean coast to prevent sup- 
plies from reaching his enemies and indirectly caused thousands 
of deaths from widespread famine and plagues. Lebanon suffered 
as much as, or more than, any other Ottoman province. The 



17 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

blockade deprived the country of its tourists and summer visitors, 
and remittances from relatives and friends were lost or delayed for 
months. The Turkish Army cut down trees for wood to fuel trains 
or for military purposes. In 1916 Turkish authorities publicly ex- 
ecuted twenty-one Syrians and Lebanese in Damascus and Beirut, 
respectively, for alleged anti-Turkish activities. The date, May 6, 
is commemorated annually in both countries as Martyrs' Day, and 
the site in Beirut has come to be known as Martyrs' Square. 

Relief came,, however, in September 1918 when the British gen- 
eral Edmund Allenby and Faysal I, son of Sharif Husayn of Mecca, 
moved into Palestine with British and Arab forces, thus opening 
the way for the occupation of Syria and Lebanon. At the San Remo 
Conference held in Italy in April 1920, the Allies gave France a 
mandate over Greater Syria. France then appointed General Henri 
Gouraud to implement the mandate provisions. 

The Mandate Period 

On September 1, 1920, General Gouraud proclaimed the estab- 
lishment of Greater Lebanon with its present boundaries and with 
Beirut as its capital. The first Lebanese constitution was promul- 
gated on May 23, 1926, and subsequently was amended several 
times; it was still in effect as of late 1987. Modeled after that of 
the French Third Republic, it provided for a unicameral parlia- 
ment called the Chamber of Deputies, a president, and a Council 
of Ministers, or cabinet. The president was to be elected by the 
Chamber of Deputies for one six-year term and could not be re- 
elected until a six-year period had elapsed; deputies were to be popu- 
larly elected along confessional lines. The first and only complete 
census that had been held in Lebanon as of 1987 took place in 1932 
and resulted in the custom of selecting major political officers ac- 
cording to the proportion of the principal sects in the population 
(see The Basis of Government, ch. 4). Thus, the president was to 
be a Maronite Christian, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim, and 
the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies a Shia Muslim. Theoreti- 
cally, the Chamber of Deputies performed the legislative function, 
but in fact bills were prepared by the executive and submitted to 
the Chamber of Deputies, which passed them virtually without ex- 
ception. Under the Constitution, the French high commissioner 
still exercised supreme power, an arrangement that initially brought 
objections from the Lebanese nationalists. Nevertheless, Charles 
Dabbas, a Greek Orthodox, was elected the first president of 
Lebanon three days after the adoption of the Constitution. 

At the end of Dabbas 's first term in 1932, Bishara al Khuri (also 
seen as Khoury) and Emile Iddi (also seen as Edde) competed for 



18 



Historical Setting 



the office of president, thus dividing the Chamber of Deputies. To 
break the deadlock, some deputies suggested Shaykh Muhammad 
al Jisr, who was chairman of the Council of Ministers and the Mus- 
lim leader of Tripoli, as a compromise candidate. However, French 
high commissioner Henri Ponsot suspended the Constitution on 
May 9, 1932, and extended the term of Dabbas for one year; in 
this way he prevented the election of a Muslim as president. Dis- 
satisfied with Ponsot 's conduct, the French authorities replaced him 
with Comte Damien de Martel, who, on January 30, 1934, ap- 
pointed Habib as Saad as president for a one-year term (later ex- 
tended for an additional year). 

Emile Iddi was elected president on January 30, 1936. A year 
later, he partially reestablished the Constitution of 1926 and 
proceeded to hold elections for the Chamber of Deputies. However, 
the Constitution was again suspended by the French high com- 
missioner in September 1939, at the outbreak of World War II. 

World War II and Independence, 1939-41 

After the Vichy government assumed power in France in 1940, 
General Henri-Fernand Dentz was appointed high commissioner 
of Lebanon. This appointment led to Iddi's resignation on 
April 4, 1941. Five days later, Dentz appointed Alfred Naqqash 
(also seen as Naccache or Naccash) as head of state. The Vichy 
government's control ended a few months later when its forces were 
unable to repel the advance of French and British troops into 
Lebanon and Syria. An armistice was signed in Acre on July 14, 
1941. 

After signing the Acre Armistice, General Charles de Gaulle 
visited Lebanon, officially ending Vichy control. Lebanese national 
leaders took the opportunity to ask de Gaulle to end the French 
Mandate and unconditionally recognize Lebanon's independence. 
As a result of national and international pressure, on November 
26, 1941, General Georges Catroux, delegate general under de 
Gaulle, proclaimed the independence of Lebanon in the name of 
his government. The United States, Britain, the Soviet Union, the 
Arab states, and certain Asian countries recognized this indepen- 
dence, and some of them exchanged ambassadors with Beirut. 
However, even though the French technically recognized Leba- 
non's independence, they continued to exercise authority. 

General elections were held, and on September 21, 1943, the 
new Chamber of Deputies elected Bishara al Khuri as president. 
He appointed Riyad as Sulh (also seen as Solh) as prime minister 
and asked him to form the first government of independent Leba- 
non. On November 8, 1943, the Chamber of Deputies amended 



19 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

the Constitution, abolishing the articles that referred to the Man- 
date and modifying those that specified the powers of the high com- 
missioner, thus unilaterally ending the Mandate. The French 
authorities responded by arresting a number of prominent Lebanese 
politicians, including the president, the prime minister, and other 
cabinet members, and exiling them to the Castle of Rashayya 
(located about sixty-five kilometers east of Sidon). This action united 
the Christian and Muslim leaders in their determination to get rid 
of the French. France, finally yielding to mounting internal pres- 
sure and to the influence of Britain, the United States, and the 
Arab countries, released the prisoners at Rashayya on November 
22, 1943; since then, this day has been celebrated as Independence 
Day. 

The ending of the French Mandate left Lebanon a mixed legacy. 
When the Mandate began, Lebanon was still suffering from the 
religious conflicts of the 1860s and from World War I. The French 
authorities were concerned not only with maintaining control over 
the country but also with rebuilding the Lebanese economy and 
social systems. They repaired and enlarged the harbor of Beirut 
and developed a network of roads linking the major cities. They 
also began to develop a governmental structure that included new 
administrative and judicial systems and a new civil code. They im- 
proved the education system, agriculture, public health, and the 
standard of living. Concurrendy, however, they linked the Lebanese 
currency to the depreciating French franc, tying the Lebanese econ- 
omy to that of France. This action had a negative impact on 
Lebanon. Another negative effect of the Mandate was the place 
given to French as a language of instruction, a move that favored 
Christians at the expense of Muslims. 

The foundations of the new Lebanese state were established in 
1943 by an unwritten agreement between the two most prominent 
Christian and Muslim leaders, Khuri and Sulh. The contents of 
this agreement, later known as the National Pact or National 
Covenant (al Mithaq al Watani), were approved and supported 
by their followers. 

The National Pact laid down four principles. First, Lebanon was 
to be a completely independent state. The Christian communities 
were to cease identifying with the West; in return, the Muslim com- 
munities were to protect the independence of Lebanon and pre- 
vent its merger with any Arab state. Second, although Lebanon 
is an Arab country with Arabic as its official language, it could 
not cut off its spiritual and intellectual ties with the West, which 
had helped it attain such a notable degree of progress. Third, 
Lebanon, as a member of the family of Arab states, should cooperate 



20 



Historical Setting 



with the other Arab states, and in case of conflict among them, 
it should not side with one state against another. Fourth, public 
offices should be distributed proportionally among the recognized 
religious groups, but in technical positions preference should be 
given to competence without regard to confessional considerations. 
Moreover, the three top government positions should be distributed 
as follows: the president of the republic should be a Maronite; the 
prime minister, a Sunni Muslim; and the speaker of the Chamber 
of Deputies, a Shia Muslim. The ratio of deputies was to be six 
Christians to five Muslims. 

From the beginning, the balance provided for in the National 
Pact was fragile. Many observers believed that any serious inter- 
nal or external pressure might threaten the stability of the Lebanese 
political system, as was to happen in 1975. 

Lebanon became a member of the League of Arab States (Arab 
League) on March 22, 1945. It also participated in the San 
Francisco Conference of the United Nations (UN) and became a 
member in 1945. On December 31, 1946, French troops were com- 
pletely withdrawn from the country, with the signing of the Franco- 
Lebanese Treaty. 

Independent Lebanon, 1943-76 

The history of Lebanon during the 1943-76 period was domi- 
nated by prominent family networks and patron-client relationships. 
Each sectarian community had its prominent family: the Khuris, 
Shamuns, Shihabs, Franjiyahs, and Jumayyils for the Maronites; 
the Sulhs, Karamis, and Yafis for the Sunnis; the Jumblatts, 
Yazbaks, and Arslans for the Druzes; and the Asads and Hamadahs 
for the Shias. 

The Khuri Era, 1943-52 

Lebanon's first president after independence was Bishara al 
Khuri, elected in 1943 for a six-year term; reelected in 1949 for 
a second term, he became increasingly imperial in his actions. 
According to his opponents, his regime was characterized by a nar- 
row political structure supported by a strictly sectarian framework, 
and it did little to improve the economy. 

In June 1952 an organization called the Social National Front 
(SNF) was formed by nine deputies led by Kamal Jumblatt (also 
seen as Junblatt), head of the Progressive Socialist Party; Camille 
Shamun (also seen as Chamoun), former ambassador to Britain; 
Emile Bustani, a self-made millionaire businessman; and other 
prominent personalities. This front dedicated itself to radical re- 
form, demanding that the authorities end sectarianism and eradicate 



21 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

all abuses in the governmental system. The SNF founders were 
encouraged by people claiming to be dissatisfied with the favoritism 
and corruption thriving under the Khuri regime. 

On May 17, 1952, the front held a meeting at Dayr al Qamar, 
Shamun's native town. The meeting was attended by about 50,000 
people and turned into a mass rally. The speakers criticized the 
regime and threatened rebellion if the president did not resign. On 
July 23 the Phalange Party (see Glossary), led by Pierre Jumayyil 
(also seen as Gemayel), also voiced its discontent with the regime. 
On September 1 1 the SNF called for a general strike to force the 
president to resign; the appeal brought all activities in the major 
cities to a standstill. This general strike is sometimes referred to 
as the "Rosewater Revolution" because of its nonviolence. Presi- 
dent Khuri appealed to General Fuad Shihab (also seen as Chehab) 
the army chief of staff, to end the strike. However, Shihab refused 
to become involved in what he considered a political matter, and 
on September 18, Khuri finally resigned. 

The Shamun Era, 1952-58 

On September 23, 1952, the Chamber of Deputies elected 
Camille Shamun to succeed Khuri. In the spring of 1953, rela- 
tions between President Shamun and Jumblatt deteriorated as 
Jumblatt criticized Shamun for accommodating himself to the tradi- 
tional pattern of Lebanese politics and for toning down the radical 
ideals that had led to the change of government in 1952. The balance 
between religious communities, provided for in the National Pact, 
was precariously maintained, and undercurrents of hostility were 
discernible. The Muslim community criticized the regime in which 
Christians, alleging their numerical superiority, occupied the highest 
offices in the state and filled a disproportionate number of civil ser- 
vice positions. Accordingly, the Muslims asked for a census, which 
they were confident would prove their numerical superiority. The 
Christians refused unless the census were to include Lebanese 
emigrants who were mainly Christians, and they argued that Chris- 
tians contributed 80 percent of the tax revenue. 

The 1956-58 period brought many pressures to bear on Leba- 
non. First, there was general unrest in the Arab world following 
the Suez Canal crisis and the abortive attacks on Egypt by Brit- 
ain, France, and Israel. More specifically, however, political strug- 
gles occurred in two fields: rivalry among Lebanese political leaders 
who were linked to religious or clan groups and their followers; 
and the ideological struggle causing polarization between Lebanese 
nationalism and growing pan-Arabism. 



22 



Historical Setting 



President Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt became the symbol of 
pan-Arabism after the 1956 Suez crisis and the 1958 merger of 
Egypt with Syria to form the United Arab Republic. He had great 
influence on Lebanese Muslims, who looked to him for inspira- 
tion. In this period of unrest, the Lebanese authorities, most of 
whom were Christians, insisted on two things: maintaining the 
country's autonomy and cooperating with the West. Christians con- 
sidered their friendly relations with the West as the only guaran- 
tee of Lebanon's independence. President Shamun's refusal to 
respond favorably to pan- Arab pressures was in direct opposition 
to the stand of several prominent Sunni leaders, who devoted them- 
selves to Nasser and the pan- Arab cause. 

In 1957 the question of the reelection of Shamun was added to 
these problems of ideological cleavage. In order to be reelected, 
the president needed to have the Constitution amended to permit 
a president to succeed himself. A constitutional amendment required 
a two-thirds vote by the Chamber of Deputies, so Shamun and 
his followers had to obtain a majority in the May-June 1957 
elections. 

Shamun's followers did obtain a solid majority in the elections, 
which the opposition considered "rigged," with the result that some 
non-Christian leaders with pan- Arab- sympathies were not elected. 
Deprived of a legal platform from which to voice their political opin- 
ions, they sought to express them by extralegal means. The con- 
flict between Shamun and the pan-Arab opposition gained in 
intensity when Syria merged with Egypt. Pro-Nasser demonstra- 
tions grew in number and in violence until a full-scale rebellion 
was underway. The unrest was intensified by the assassination of 
Nassib Matni, the Maronite anti-Shamun editor of At Talagraph, 
a daily newspaper known for its outspoken pan-Arabism. The revolt 
almost became a religious conflict between Christians and Muslims. 

This state of turmoil increased when, in the early hours of July 
14, 1958, a revolution overthrew the monarchy in Iraq and the 
entire royal family was killed. In Lebanon jubilation prevailed in 
areas where anti-Shamun sentiment predominated, with radio sta- 
tions announcing that the Shamun regime would be next. Shamun, 
realizing the gravity of his situation, summoned the ambassadors 
of the United States, Britain, and France on the morning of July 
14. He requested immediate assistance, insisting that the indepen- 
dence of Lebanon was in jeopardy. 

Furthermore, he invoked the terms of the Eisenhower Doctrine, 
which Lebanon had signed the year before. According to its terms, 
the United States would "use armed forces to assist any [Middle 
East] nation . . . requesting assistance against armed aggression 



23 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

from any country controlled by international communism." Argu- 
ing that Lebanese Muslims were being helped by Syria, which had 
received arms from the Soviet Union, Shamun appealed for United 
States military intervention. The United States responded, in large 
measure because of concern over the situation in Iraq and the wish 
to reassure its allies, such as Iran and Turkey, that the United States 
could act. United States forces began arriving in Lebanon by mid- 
afternoon of July 15 and played a symbolic rather than an active 
role. In the Gourse of the 1958 Civil War, in which United States 
forces were not involved, between 2,000 and 4,000 casualties oc- 
curred, primarily in the Muslim areas of Beirut and in Tripoli. 
At the end of the crisis, the Chamber of Deputies elected General 
Fuad Shihab, then commander in chief of the Lebanese Army, to 
serve as president. 

The Rise of Shihabism, 1958-64 

President Shihab, having cultivated nonpartisanship during the 
1958 Civil War, enjoyed considerable support from the various po- 
litical factions. However, his initial appointment to the cabinet of 
a large number of Muslim leaders, such as Rashid Karami, Sunni 
leader from Tripoli, whom he asked to form a reconciliation govern- 
ment, led to sharp reactions by the Phalange Party. Shihab was 
obliged to reapportion the balance in the cabinet on the basis of 
"no victors, no vanquished." He instituted electoral reform and 
increased the membership of the Chamber of Deputies from sixty- 
six to ninety-nine, thus enabling leaders of the various factions in 
the civil war to become active members of the legislature. He was 
determined to observe the terms of the National Pact and to have 
the government serve Christian and Muslim groups equally. This 
policy, combined with Shihab 's concept of an enlightened presi- 
dent as one who strengthened the role of the executive and the 
bureaucracy at the expense of the zuama (sing., zaim — see Glos- 
sary), or traditional leaders, was later referred to as "Shihabism." 
Shihab also concentrated on improving Lebanon's infrastructure, 
developing an extensive road system, and providing running water 
and electricity to remote villages. Hospitals and dispensaries were 
built in many rural areas, although there was difficulty in staffing 
them. 

In foreign affairs, one of Shihab 's first acts was to ask the United 
States to withdraw its troops from Lebanon starting on Septem- 
ber 27, 1958, with the withdrawal to be completed by the end of 
October. He pursued a neutral foreign policy with the object of 
maintaining good relations with Arab countries as well as the West. 
Many observers agree that his regime brought stability and 



24 



Historical Setting 



economic development to Lebanon and that it demonstrated the 
need for compromise if the Lebanese confessional system of govern- 
ment were to work. At the same time, however, it showed that in 
times of crisis the only solution might be to call on an outside power 
to restore equilibrium. 

The Hilu Era, 1964-70 

Shihab was succeeded by Charles Hilu (also seen as Helou), who 
was selected president by the Chamber of Deputies on August 18, 
1964. President Hilu, a journalist, jurist, and diplomat, was known 
for his high moral and intellectual qualities. Despite his efforts to 
promote Lebanon's development, during his tenure the Arab-Israeli 
June 1967 War, in which Lebanon did not participate, had seri- 
ous repercussions on all aspects of Lebanese life. The most signifi- 
cant impact was the increased role of Palestinian guerrilla groups 
in the struggle against Israel and the groups' use of Lebanon as 
a base of operations. The Palestinian presence impinged on the 
effort to maintain the confessional balance, for it tended to pit Mus- 
lim Lebanese against Christian Lebanese. On the whole, the former 
group initially viewed the Palestinian guerrillas as upholding a 
sacred cause that deserved full-scale support. The latter, who 
strongly favored Lebanese independence, tended to be more con- 
cerned with the effects of unrestricted guerrilla activity on Lebanese 
security and development. They feared both Israeli reprisals and 
the general undermining of governmental authority within Leba- 
non if curbs were not imposed on the guerrillas. The Hilu govern- 
ment did its best to satisfy the conflicting demands made on it by 
guerrillas, Arab governments, Israel, and the internal political and 
religious elements. 

The Chamber of Deputies elections of 1968 and the subsequent 
disagreements over forming a cabinet had already receded into the 
background when Israel launched a raid on Beirut International 
Airport on December 28, 1968. This attack set the stage for the 
government crises that marked Lebanese life for the next five years, 
until the Arab-Israeli October 1973 War. Moreover, it highlighted 
the delicate balance of internal political forces in Lebanon and the 
connection between that balance and the extent to which Lebanese 
identified with the Arab position in the Arab-Israeli conflict. 

Periodic clashes between the guerrillas and the Lebanese Army 
continued throughout the late spring, summer, and fall of 1969. 
In the late summer of 1969, several guerrilla groups moved to new 
bases, better located for attacks against Israel. Israel regularly raided 
these bases in reprisal for guerrilla raids on its territory. In October 
the Lebanese Army attacked some guerrilla camps in order to 



25 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

restrict their activity, an action that led to several demonstrations 
in support of the guerrillas. 

On November 2, 1969, the Lebanese commander in chief and 
Yasir Arafat, the head of Al Fatah, the leading faction within the 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), agreed in Cairo to a 
cease-fire. The secret Cairo Agreement set limits on Palestinian 
guerrilla operations in Lebanon and helped to restore calm. 

The Lebanese government's efforts to curtail guerrilla activities 
continued through late 1969 and 1970. Migration from southern 
Lebanon, particularly of large numbers of Shias, increased, pri- 
marily because of inadequate security against Israeli shelling and 
raids along with lack of economic opportunity. In Beirut the 
migrants, estimated to exceed 30,000, often could not find ade- 
quate shelter and met with indifference on the part of predominantiy 
Christian military leaders. These problems resulted in occasional 
clashes between the migrants and government forces. 

To deal with the problems caused by the fighting in the south, 
a governmental committee was formed, and funds were allocated 
for Al Janub Province (see fig. 1). On January 12, 1970, the govern- 
ment announced a plan to arm and train Lebanese civilians in 
southern villages and to fortify the villages against Israeli raids. 
This action was apparently the result of an intentional government 
policy to avoid committing the army to action in southern Leba- 
non, presumably for fear of polarizing the religious groups that 
composed the army — mainly Christian Maronite officers and Mus- 
lim or Druze enlisted personnel. But the problem was exacerbated 
by increasing activity by Palestinian guerrillas operating from 
southern Lebanon into Israel and by Israeli reprisals. 

On January 7, 1970, General Emil Bustani, the army com- 
mander, was replaced by General Jean Njaim, suggesting a govern- 
ment effort to take a harder line toward the guerrillas and to defend 
southern Lebanon more actively. Clashes between the army and 
the guerrillas recurred, but southern Lebanese villagers continued 
to protest governmental inaction. After several bloody clashes be- 
tween the guerrillas and the Lebanese Army and a nationwide 
general strike in May 1970, the government approved additional 
appropriations for the defense of the south, and it pressed the guer- 
rillas to abide by the Cairo Agreement and to limit their activity. 

The Franjiyah Era, 1970-76 

By the summer of 1970, attention turned to the upcoming 
presidential election of August 17. Sulayman Franjiyah (also seen 
as Franjieh), who had the backing of the National Bloc Party and 
the center bloc in the Chamber of Deputies, was elected president 



26 



President 
Sulayman Franjiyah 
Courtesy Mokhless Al-Hariri 
The Georgetown 
Design Group, Inc. 




One of Franjiyah 's 
prime ministers, 
Rashid Karami 
Courtesy Mokhless Al-Hariri 
The Georgetown 
Design Group, Inc. 




Lebanon: A Country Study 

by one vote over Ilyas Sarkis, head of the Central Bank, who had 
the support of the Shihabists (those favoring a strong executive with 
ties to the military). Franjiyah was more conservative than his 
predecessor, Hilu. A Maronite leader from northern Lebanon, he 
had a regional power base resulting from clan allegiance and a pri- 
vate militia. Although Franjiyah had a parochial outlook reflect- 
ing a lack of national and international experience, he was the choice 
of such persons as Kamal Jumblatt, who wanted a weaker presi- 
dent than Sarkis would have been. Franjiyah assumed office on 
September 23, 1970, and in the first few months of his term the 
general political atmosphere improved. 

The expulsion of large numbers of Palestinian guerrillas from 
Jordan in late 1970 and 1971 , as a result of severe clashes between 
the Jordanian army and the PLO, had serious repercussions for 
Lebanon, however. Many of the guerrillas entered Lebanon, see- 
ing it as the most suitable base for launching raids against Israel. 
The guerrillas tended to ally themselves with existing leftist 
Lebanese organizations or to form various new leftist groups that 
received support from the Lebanese Muslim community and caused 
further splintering in the Lebanese body politic. Clashes between 
the Palestinians and Lebanese right-wing groups, as well as demon- 
strations on behalf of the guerrillas, occurred during the latter half 
of 1971 . PLO head Arafat held discussions with leading Lebanese 
government figures, who sought to establish acceptable limits of 
guerrilla activity in Lebanon under the 1969 Cairo Agreement. 

The Chamber of Deputies elections in April 1972 also were ac- 
companied by violence. The high rate of inflation and unemploy- 
ment, as well as guerrilla actions and retaliations, occasioned 
demonstrations, and the government declared martial law in some 
areas. The government attempted to quiet the unrest by taking 
legal action against the protesters, by initiating new social and eco- 
nomic programs, and by negotiating with the guerrilla groups. 
However, the pattern of guerrilla infiltration followed by Israeli 
counterattacks continued throughout the Franjiyah era. Israel 
retaliated for any incursion by guerrillas into Israeli territory and 
for any action anywhere against Israeli nationals. An Israeli in- 
cursion into southern Lebanon, for example, was made in retalia- 
tion for the massacre of Israeli Olympic athletes in Munich in 
September 1972. Of particular significance was an Israeli com- 
mando raid on Beirut on April 10, 1973, in which three leaders 
of the Palestinian Resistance Movement were assassinated. The 
army's inaction brought the immediate resignation of Prime 
Minister Saib Salam, a Sunni Muslim leader from Beirut. 



28 



Historical Setting 



In May armed clashes between the army and the guerrillas in 
Beirut spread to other parts of the country, resulting in the arrival 
of guerrilla reinforcements from Syria, the declaration of martial 
law, and a new secret agreement limiting guerrilla activity. 

The October 1973 War overshadowed disagreements about the 
role of the guerrillas in Lebanon. Despite Lebanon's policy of non- 
involvement, the war deeply affected the country's subsequent his- 
tory. As the PLO's military influence in the south grew, so too 
did the disaffection of the Shia community that lived there, which 
was exposed to varying degrees of unsympathetic Lebanese con- 
trol, indifferent or antipathetic PLO attitudes, and hostile Israeli 
actions. The Franjiyah government proved less and less able to 
deal with these rising tensions, and by the onset of the Civil War 
in April 1975, political fragmentation was accelerating. 

The Civil War, 1975-76 

The spark that ignited the war occurred in Beirut on April 13, 
1975, when gunmen killed four Phalangists during an attempt on 
Pierre Jumayyil's life. Perhaps believing the assassins to have been 
Palestinian, the Phalangists retaliated later that day by attacking 
a bus carrying Palestinian passengers across a Christian neighbor- 
hood, killing about twenty-six of the occupants. The next day fight- 
ing erupted in earnest, with Phalangists pitted against Palestinian 
militiamen (thought by some observers to be from the Popular Front 
for the Liberation of Palestine). The confessional layout of Beirut's 
various quarters facilitated random killing. Most Beirutis stayed 
inside their homes during these early days of battle, and few im- 
agined that the street fighting they were witnessing was the begin- 
ning of a war that was to devastate their city and divide the country. 

Despite the urgent need to control the fighting, the political 
machinery of the government became paralyzed over the next few 
months. The inadequacies of the political system, which the 1943 
National Pact had only papered over temporarily, reappeared more 
clearly than ever. For many observers, at the bottom of the con- 
flict was the issue of confessionalism (see Glossary) out of balance — 
of a minority, specifically the Maronites, refusing to share power 
and economic opportunity with the Muslim majority. 

The government could not act effectively because leaders were 
unable to agree on whether or not to use the army to stop the blood- 
letting. When Jumblatt and his leftist supporters tried to isolate 
the Phalangists politically, other Christian sects rallied to Jumayyil's 
camp, creating a further rift. Consequently, in May Prime Minister 
Rashid as Sulh and his cabinet resigned, and a new government 
was formed under Rashid Karami. Although there were many calls 



29 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

for his resignation, President Franjiyah steadfastly retained his 
office. 

As various other groups took sides, the fighting spread to other 
areas of the country, forcing residents in towns with mixed sectar- 
ian populations to seek safety in regions where their sect was 
dominant. Even so, the militias became embroiled in a pattern of 
attack followed by retaliation, including acts against uninvolved 
civilians. 

Although the two warring factions were often characterized as 
Christian versus Muslim, their individual composition was far more 
complex. Those in favor of maintaining the status quo came to be 
known as the Lebanese Front. The groups included primarily the 
Maronite militias of the Jumayyil, Shamun, and Franjiyah clans, 
often led by the sons of zuama. Also in this camp were various 
militias of Maronite religious orders. The side seeking change, 
usually referred to as the Lebanese National Movement, was far 
less cohesive and organized. For the most part it was led by Kamal 
Jumblatt and included a variety of militias from leftist organiza- 
tions and guerrillas from rejectionist Palestinian (non-mainstream 
PLO) organizations (see Appendix B). 

By the end of 1975, no side held a decisive military advantage, 
but it was generally acknowledged that the Lebanese Front had 
done less well than expected against the disorganized Lebanese Na- 
tional Movement. The political hierarchy, composed of the old 
zuama and politicians, still was incapable of maintaining peace, ex- 
cept for occasional, short-lived cease-fires. Reform was discussed, 
but little headway was made toward any significant improvements. 
Syria, which was deeply concerned about the flow of events in 
Lebanon, also proved powerless to enforce calm through diplomatic 
means. And, most ominous of all, the Lebanese Army, which gener- 
ally had stayed out of the strife, began to show signs of factionaliz- 
ing and threatened to bring its heavy weaponry to bear on the 
conflict. 

Syrian diplomatic involvement grew during 1976, but it had little 
success in restoring order in the first half of the year. In January 
it organized a cease-fire and set up the High Military Committee, 
through which it negotiated with all sides. These negotiations, 
however, were complicated by other events, especially Lebanese 
Front-Palestinian confrontations. That month the Lebanese Front 
began a siege of Tall Zatar, a densely populated Palestinian refu- 
gee camp in East Beirut; the Lebanese Front also overran and 
leveled Karantina, a Muslim quarter in East Beirut. These actions 
finally brought the main forces of the PLO, the Palestine Libera- 
tion Army (PLA), into the battle. Together, the PLA and the 



30 



Historical Setting 



Lebanese National Movement took the town of Ad Damur, a 
Shamun stronghold about seventeen kilometers south of Beirut. 

In spite of these setbacks, through Syria's good offices com- 
promises were achieved. On February 14, 1976, in what was 
considered a political breakthrough, Syria helped negotiate a 
seventeen-point reform program known as the Constitutional Docu- 
ment. Yet by March this progress was derailed by the disintegra- 
tion of the Lebanese Army. In that month dissident Muslim troops, 
led by Lieutenant Ahmad Khatib, mutinied, creating the Lebanese 
Arab Army. Joining the Lebanese National Movement, they made 
significant penetrations into Christian-held Beirut and launched 
an attack on the presidential palace, forcing Franjiyah to flee to 
Mount Lebanon. 

Continuing its search for a domestic political settlement to the 
war, in May the Chamber of Deputies elected Ilyas Sarkis to take 
over as president when Franjiyah' s term expired in September. 
But Sarkis had strong backing from Syria and, as a consequence, 
was unacceptable to Jumblatt, who was known to be antipathetic 
to Syrian president Hafiz al Assad and who insisted on a "mili- 
tary solution." Accordingly, the Lebanese National Movement 
successfully pressed assaults on Mount Lebanon and other 
Christian-controlled areas. 

As Lebanese Front fortunes declined, two outcomes seemed 
likely: the establishment in Mount Lebanon of an independent 
Christian state, viewed as a "second Israel" by some; or, if the 
Lebanese National Movement won the war, the creation of a rad- 
ical, hostile state on Syria's western border. Neither of these pos- 
sibilities was viewed as acceptable to Assad. To prevent either 
scenario, at the end of May 1976 Syria intervened militarily against 
the Lebanese National Movement, hoping to end the fighting 
swiftly. This decision, however, proved ill conceived, as Syrian 
forces met heavy resistance and suffered many casualties. Moreover, 
by entering the conflict on the Christian side Syria provoked out- 
rage from much of the Arab world. 

Despite, or perhaps as a result of, these military and diplomatic 
failures, in late July Syria decided to quell the resistance. A drive 
was launched against Lebanese National Movement strongholds 
that was far more successful than earlier battles; within two weeks 
the opposition was almost subdued. Rather than crush the resistance 
altogether, at this time Syria chose to participate in an Arab peace 
conference held in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on October 16, 1976. 

The Riyadh Conference, followed by an Arab League meeting 
in Cairo also in October 1976, formally ended the Lebanese Civil 
War; although the underlying causes were in no way eliminated, 



31 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

the full-scale warfare stopped. Syria's presence in Lebanon was 
legitimated by the establishment of the Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) 
by the Arab League in October 1976. In January 1977, the ADF 
consisted of 30,000 men, of whom 27,000 were Syrian. The re- 
mainder were token contingents from Saudi Arabia, the small Per- 
sian Gulf states, and Sudan; Libya had withdrawn its small force 
in late 1976. Because of his difficulties in reforming the Lebanese 
Army, President Sarkis, the ADF's nominal commander, requested 
renewal of the ADF's mandate a number of times. 

Thus, after more than one and one-half years of devastation, 
relative calm returned to Lebanon. Although the exact cost of the 
war will never be known, deaths may have approached 44,000, 
with about 180,000 wounded; many thousands of others were dis- 
placed or left homeless, or had migrated. Much of the once- 
magnificent city of Beirut was reduced to rubble and the town 
divided into Muslim and Christian sectors, separated by the so- 
called Green Line (see Glossary). 

The Sarkis Administration, 1976-82 

In December 1976 Sarkis appointed as prime minister Salim al 
Huss (also seen as Hoss), who chose a cabinet of technocrats that 
was authorized to rule by decree for six months (later extended). 
One of the first tasks this government faced was the reorganiza- 
tion of the army, most of whose members had deserted during the 
Civil War to join one of the various factions. Although the inten- 
tion of the Cairo Agreement was to station Lebanese military units 
in southern Lebanon, instead the ADF controlled the area only 
to the Litani River, leaving the region south of it in the hands of 
the Palestinians. So strong was their presence that certain areas 
became known as Fatahland, after the main PLO grouping. Rela- 
tions with Syria and the problem of the Palestinians in southern 
Lebanon remained central concerns for Lebanon throughout the 
period from 1976 to 1982. 

The degree of cooperation between the Sarkis administration and 
Syrian authorities varied, depending on external circumstances in 
the region. Initially, recognizing its dependence on Syria and Syrian 
military forces to preserve the peace, the Lebanese government 
generally cooperated. By late 1977, however, as a result of the 
Egyptian-Israeli peace negotiations and Syria's consequent rap- 
prochement with the PLO, Lebanese-Syrian relations cooled. In 
its own role and in its use of the ADF, Syria found itself in an awk- 
ward position because it could not fully exert its authority in 
Lebanon unless it succeeded in disarming both the Lebanese Chris- 
tian militias and the PLO. However, it was not prepared to pay 



32 



The remains of Tall Zatar, a Palestinian refugee camp on the 
outskirts of Beirut, after it was besieged by Christian militiamen 
Courtesy UNRWA (Myrtle Winter Chaumany) 

the political and military price for doing so and consequently was 
obliged to maintain a large army in Lebanon, causing a serious 
drain on Syria's economy. 

Relations between Lebanon and Syria deteriorated further when 
fighting occurred between the ADF and the Lebanese Army in East 
Beirut in February 1978, followed by a massive ADF bombard- 
ment of Christian sectors of Beirut in July. President Sarkis resigned 
in protest against the latter action but was persuaded to reconsider. 
Syrian bombardments of East Beirut ended in October 1978 as a 
result of a UN Security Council cease-fire resolution that indirectly 
implicated Syria as a party to the Lebanese Civil War. To strengthen 
its influence over the Sarkis government, Syria threatened several 
times, in late 1978 and early 1979, to withdraw its forces from 
Lebanon. But after a relatively cordial meeting between presidents 
Sarkis and Assad in Damascus in May 1979, Syria stated that the 
ADF — which by then had become a totally Syrian force — would 
"remain in Lebanon as long as the Arab interests so require." 

From early 1980 onward, Syria became increasingly preoccupied 
with its domestic difficulties, leaving the Sarkis administration with 
a freer hand. However, significant ADF action against the Phalange 
Party militia, headed by Bashir Jumayyil, took place around Zahlah 
(fifty kilometers east of Beirut) in late 1980 and April 1981. This 



33 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

military threat to its Christian ally caused Israel to intervene, and 
it shot down two Syrian helicopters over Lebanon. Syria, in turn, 
introduced SA-2 and SA-6 surface-to-air missiles into Lebanon; 
the resulting "missile crisis" threatened to cause a regional war, 
but this possibility was averted through the mediation efforts of 
other Arab nations and the United States (see The Missile Crisis, 
ch. 5). 

Relations with the Palestinians were complex and interrelated 
with influences in southern Lebanon. In the early days of the Civil 
War, the relative peace in southern Lebanon had attracted Lebanese 
refugees from other areas. After the Palestinians left the area to 
fight elsewhere, Christian militias, led by Lebanese Army officers 
supported by Israel, took control of a large part of the south. Israel 
had forged this link in 1977 with Lebanese officers as part of its 
"Good Fence" policy to prevent a Palestinian presence near Israel's 
northern border (see Operation Litani, ch. 5). 

However, conflicting interests were at work in southern Leba- 
non. On the one hand, the Sarkis government saw an opportunity 
to regain control of the area. On the other hand, the Palestinians, 
who objected to Syrian efforts to confiscate their heavy weapons 
and control their activities in the rest of Lebanon, felt they would 
have greater freedom to operate in the south. For their part, the 
Syrians wished to eliminate Israeli influence there, while the Israelis 
wanted direct contact with the population of southern Lebanon and 
wished to keep both the Syrians and the Palestinians out of the area. 

As early as 1977, fighting occurred in the south between the 
Christian militia under Major Saad Haddad and the Palestinians, 
who had reinfiltrated the area and were receiving Syrian assistance. 
The resulting large-scale destruction in the southern area, which 
Haddad had renamed "Free Lebanon" and which was inhabited 
mainly by Shia Muslims and Maronite Christians, caused the 
migration of approximately 200,000 people, or one-third of the 
population. 

To clarify the provisions of the October 1976 Cairo Agreement 
(preceded by an earlier 1969 agreement) concerning Palestinian 
activity in southern Lebanon, representatives of Lebanon, Syria 
(in the guise of the ADF), and the Palestinians held a conference 
at Shtawrah in July and August 1977. The resulting Shtawrah 
Accord basically endorsed the Syrian position, which called for the 
Palestinians to withdraw fifteen kilometers from the Israeli border, 
with this area to be occupied by the Lebanese Army, and charged 
the ADF with protecting the southern coastal area. Execution of 
the agreement, however, was difficult because neither the 



34 



The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon was set up 
following the 1978 Israeli incursion into southern Lebanon. 

Courtesy United Nations 

Palestinians nor the Lebanese Army wished to make the first move, 
and Israel was apprehensive of increased Syrian influence in the 
area. 

The situation in the south was exacerbated by the entry of the 
Israel Defense Forces (IDF) into southern Lebanon in retaliation 
for a March 1 1 , 1978, Palestinian guerrilla attack on an Israeli bus 
near Tel Aviv, in which several people were killed. The IDF staged 
an all-out attack, and more than 25,000 troops occupied positions 
as far north as the Litani River and remained in Lebanon for three 
months. The UN called on Israel to withdraw, and the United 
Nations Interim Force in Lebanon was sent to replace the Israelis, 
who withdrew in stages. When Israel withdrew from southern 
Lebanon in June, Haddad's South Lebanon Army (SLA — formerly 
the Free Lebanon Army) took over most of the areas Israel had 
previously controlled. 

Throughout the Sarkis administration, various shifts were also 
occurring in domestic politics. Prime Minister Huss, a moderate 
Sunni Muslim, was unable to form a national unity government, 
as requested by Sarkis in the spring of 1978, but remained in office 
for two more years. In October 1980, Shafiq al Wazzan, another 
moderate Sunni and chairman of the Supreme Islamic Council, 
became prime minister. His government experienced even greater 



35 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

difficulties in holding office, with more than half of the Chamber 
of Deputies refusing to endorse his cabinet. The inability of the 
Lebanese Army to maintain any effective control over the country 
was a major factor contributing to the weakness of these Lebanese 
governments. 

Additional shifts occurred among Lebanese military and politi- 
cal groups. The Shias continued to grow in importance, and in 
1980 clashes broke out in the south between Amal, the Shia mili- 
tary arm, which was becoming increasingly a political instrument, 
and Al Fatah, a part of the PLO (see Sectarian Groups, ch. 4). 
On the Christian side, the Lebanese Front experienced severe 
internal disagreements. In July 1980 Bashir Jumayyil and his 
Phalangist militia scored a resounding triumph over the Tigers, 
the militia of the National Liberals under Camille Shamun and 
his son Dani. This victory paved the way for Jumayyil' s subse- 
quent prominence. Israeli support of the Lebanese Front was cur- 
tailed in 1981, as a condition set by the Lebanese National 
Movement and by Syria for any attempt at an overall resolution 
of the Lebanese situation. 

Lebanon's security deteriorated significantly in late 1981 and 
the first half of 1982. There were continuous clashes in West Beirut, 
Tripoli, and southern Lebanon during this period. In September 
automobile bombings occurred in West Beirut, Sidon, and Tripoli, 
along with a campaign of terror against foreign diplomats. These 
violent incidents were followed by terrorist attacks against Mus- 
lim and Christian religious leaders in April 1982. The result of these 
large-scale breaches of the peace was a growing disillusionment on 
the part of Lebanese Muslims with the ability of the Lebanese Na- 
tional Movement, the PLO, or Syria (through the ADF) to con- 
trol matters in areas where they were nominally in charge. As a 
consequence, more moderate and conservative Sunni and Shia 
figures gained leadership opportunities; a number of them overtly 
favored the Lebanese government's reestablishing its authority over 
the country. Shaykh Muhammad Mahdi Shams ad Din (also seen 
as Chamseddine), vice chairman of the Higher Shia Islamic Coun- 
cil, for example, requested that the Lebanese Army be sent in to 
quell fighting between the Shia Amal and the PLO in the south, 
the Biqa Valley, and parts of West Beirut. Clashes in Tripoli, the 
largest Sunni city, during this period also resulted in requests that 
the Lebanese Army enter the area. 

The general discontent with the situation on the part of various 
elements of the population provided a favorable opportunity for 
the Phalange Party's efforts in the 1982 presidential campaign. 
Bashir Jumayyil saw himself as a leading candidate because the 
Phalange Party had established its political power by overwhelming 



36 



The Economy 



the Shamun militia in 1980 and had the largest Lebanese militia, 
by that time called the Lebanese Forces (see Sectarian Groups, 
ch. 4). However, Bashir's close ties to Israel and his proposals for 
eliminating both the ADF and the PLA from the Lebanese scene 
understandably met with sharp opposition from Assad and Arafat, 
both of whom considered Jumayyil's brother Amin more accept- 
able. This, then, was the situation in Lebanon when Israel invaded 
on June 6, 1982, purportedly in retaliation for the assassination 
attempt on the Israeli ambassador to London (see The 1982 Israeli 
Invasion and Its Aftermath, ch. 5). 

There are several important scholarly works on Lebanon. Philip 
K. Hitti's Lebanon in History remains the best single source for the 
ancient and medieval periods. The modern period is well covered 
in David C. Gordon's The Republic of Lebanon, John B. Christopher's 
Lebanon: Yesterday and Today, Don Peretz's The Middle East Today, 
and Middle East Contemporary Survey (volumes 1-7). An excellent 
account of the Mandate period is found in Stephen H. Longrigg's 
Syria and Lebanon under French Mandate. The latest unrest and civil 
war in Lebanon is covered in David Gilmour's Lebanon: The Fractured 
Country, Helena Cobban's The Making of Modern Lebanon, and Itamar 
Rabinovch's The War for Lebanon, 1970-1983. (For further infor- 
mation and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



37 



Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 




A street scene showing a church and a mosque, houses of worship for 
two dominant religions in Lebanon 



SINCE THE MID-1970S, Lebanon has been convulsed by the pro- 
tracted tragedy of civil strife among the numerous segments and 
factions of its multiethnic and multisectarian society. The violent 
civil war of the mid-1970s was followed by incursions, invasions, 
and occasional occupation by the armed forces of foreign powers 
and organizations. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s scores of thou- 
sands of Lebanese fled their homeland, thousands more were killed, 
and the warring communities tended to become ever more intran- 
sigent in their demands for social autonomy. In the late 1980s, the 
social systems remained severely fragmented, and a national soci- 
ety could not be said to exist. Prior to the 1975 Civil War some 
features of social change reflected an underlying trend toward 
modernization. Decline of kinship ties, social differentiation, rapid 
urbanization, and an improvement in living standards were all at 
play, but only within a fragmented social context in which the 
process of modernization lacked national uniformity. Furthermore, 
the tension between the forces of continuity and change retarded 
the pace of modernization, especially when the Lebanese political 
system did not adapt by expanding the scope of political represen- 
tation and expression. 

Generally speaking, Lebanese society was a traditional one that 
was exposed to forces of modernization in its urban centers. While 
some parts of the capital, Beirut, were undergoing a rapid process 
of modernization, a great influx of villagers to the cities created 
a "ruralizing" effect. Not only were the forces of change weakened 
by the value systems of the newcomers, but migration also led to 
social alienation in the so-called "belt of misery." This area was 
inhabited mostly by Shias (see Glossary) who were driven out of 
southern Lebanon in the 1960s by the deteriorating political and 
security conditions resulting from the Israeli-Palestinian war of 
attrition. Moreover, the prosperity of Beirut and prospects of jobs 
lured skilled and unskilled laborers. 

Lebanon did not come into existence until 1920, when the 
French — governing the region under a League of Nations man- 
date — annexed the peripheral coastal area, the Biqa Valley, the 
northern region, and Jabal Amil (southern Lebanon) to the mutasar- 
rifiyah (district) of Mount Lebanon (see Glossary) to create Greater 
Lebanon. Before the creation of the republic, Lebanon was politi- 
cally and socially fragmented among the various Ottoman vilayets 



41 



Lebanon: A Country Study 



(provinces) and the confessional (see Glossary) communities that 
sought refuge in its rugged mountains to avoid persecution. 

Lebanese society is divided into numerous sects that are sepa- 
rated from each other by recognizable geographical lines of demar- 
cation and perhaps even more by fear and suspicion. Some 
communal groups have resisted the changes associated with secular- 
ization and modernity by identifying more closely with their own 
sects and by vehemently opposing the existing political system. In 
1987, after twelve years of civil war, Lebanon continued to be con- 
fessionally organized. Furthermore, the military battles had rein- 
forced the distances between sects by causing demographic changes 
through the eviction of members of a whole sect from one region 
to another. This movement has not only affected Christian-Muslim 
relations but also sects of the same faith. 

Finally, the war had weakened the loose bonds of national loyalty 
and the feeling of belonging to one society. Although some Lebanese 
still believed in the efficacy of restoring the unity of a society that 
would comprise all sects, voices of religious fanaticism and self- 
interest rejected national and political integration within a system 
of mutual tolerance. This lack of consensus on national issues partly 
accounted for the continuation of war and conflict in Lebanon in 
the late 1980s. 

Geography 

Lebanon's mountainous terrain, proximity to the sea, and stra- 
tegic location at a crossroads of the world were decisive factors in 
shaping its history. The political, economic, and religious move- 
ments that either originated in the region or crossed through it to 
leave an imprint upon Lebanese society give form to that history. 

The country's role in the region, as indeed in the world at large, 
was shaped by trade. The area, formerly part of the region known 
as Greater Syria (see Glossary), served as a link between the 
Mediterranean world and India and East Asia. The merchants of 
the region exported oil, grain, textiles, metalwork, and pottery 
through the port cities to Western markets. The linkage role of 
Lebanon was further enhanced by the nomads of the Syrian and 
Arabian deserts who visited the cities of Syria to trade. The cara- 
vans developed limited routes that often led to the coastal cities 
of Tripoli, Beirut, Sidon, or Tyre. This created a merchant class 
and brought wealth to the inhabitants of the region. The trade be- 
tween East and West led to the development of a cosmopolitan cul- 
ture in Lebanon's port cities, whose inhabitants became known 
for their multilingualism, flexibility, moderation, and commercial 
acumen. 



42 



The Society and Its Environment 



Lebanon was also affected by regional political conflicts and so- 
cial movements. The wealth of the region attracted powerful rulers 
who coveted its resources. The strategic location was also attrac- 
tive; it was used either as a defensive position against enemies ap- 
proaching the Arab hinterland or as a stepping-stone toward 
Lebanon's neighbors. Over the centuries, members of the nomadic 
tribes of the Arabian Peninsula sought a more prosperous life in 
Lebanon. To this day, many Lebanese families take pride in trac- 
ing their descent to ancient tribes of Arabia. Moreover, refugees 
belonging to minority sects have settled in its virtually inaccessi- 
ble mountain valleys. Hence, the region became a melting pot of 
cultural and social interaction among diverse groups. In a social 
culture where blood lineage assumed primacy as a source of iden- 
tification and affiliation, the contrast between the new Arab im- 
migrant tribes and the settled inhabitants of the land frequently 
produced conflicts. 

Land 

The area of Lebanon is approximately 10,452 square kilometers. 
The country is roughly rectangular in shape, becoming narrower 
toward the south and the farthest north. Its widest point is eighty- 
eight kilometers, and its narrowest is thirty-two kilometers; the aver- 
age width is about fifty-six kilometers. 

The physical geography of Lebanon is influenced by natural sys- 
tems that extend outside the country. Thus, the Biqa Valley is part 
of the Great Rift system, which stretches from southern Turkey 
to Mozambique in Africa. Like any mountainous country, Leba- 
non's physical geography is complex. Land forms, climate, soils, 
and vegetation differ markedly within short distances. There are 
also sharp changes in other elements of the environment, from good 
to poor soils, as one moves through the Lebanese mountains. 

A major feature of Lebanese topography is the alternation of 
lowland and highland that runs generally parallel with a north-south 
orientation. There are four such longitudinal strips between the 
Mediterranean Sea and Syria: the coastal strip (or maritime plain), 
western Lebanon, the central plateau, and eastern Lebanon (see 
fig. 3). 

The extremely narrow coastal strip stretches along the shore of 
the eastern Mediterranean. Hemmed in between sea and moun- 
tain, the sahil, as it is called in Lebanon, is widest in the north near 
Tripoli, where it is only 6.5 kilometers wide. Fifty kilometers south 
at Juniyah the approximately 1 .5-kilometer- wide plain is succeeded 
by foothills that rise steeply to 750 meters within 6.5 kilometers 
from the sea. For the most part, the coast is abrupt and rocky. The 



43 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

shoreline is regular with no deep estuary, gulf, or natural harbor. 
The maritime plain is especially productive of fruits and vegetables. 

The western range, the second major region, is the Lebanon 
Mountains, sometimes called Mount Lebanon, or Lebanon proper 
before 1920. Since Roman days the term Mount Lebanon has en- 
compassed this area. Anti-Lebanon was the term used to designate 
the eastern range. Geologists believe that the twin mountain ranges 
once formed one range. The Lebanon Mountains are the highest, 
most rugged, and most imposing of the whole maritime range of 
mountains and plateaus that start with the Amanus Mountains, 
or Nur Mountains, in northern Syria and end with the towering 
massif of Sinai. The mountain structure forms the first barrier to 
communication between the Mediterranean and Lebanon's eastern 
hinterland. The mountain range is clearly defined and has natural 
boundaries on all four sides. On the north it is separated from the 
Nusayriyah Mountains of Syria by the Nahr al Kabir (the Great 
River); on the south it is bounded by the Litani River, giving it 
a length of 169 kilometers. Its width varies from about 56.5 kilo- 
meters near Tripoli to 9.5 kilometers on the southern end. It rises 
to alpine heights southeast of Tripoli, where Al Qurnat as Sawda 
(The Black Nook) reaches 3,360 meters. Of the other peaks that 
rise east of Beirut, Jabal Sannin (2,695 meters) is the highest. Ahl 
al Jabal (People of the Mountain), or simply jabaliyyun, has referred 
traditionally to the inhabitants of western Lebanon. Near the 
southern end, the Lebanon Mountains branch off to the west to 
form the Shuf Mountains. 

The third geographical region is the Biqa Valley. This central 
highland between the Lebanon Mountains and the Anti-Lebanon 
Mountains is about 177 kilometers in length and 9.6 to 16 kilo- 
meters wide and has an average elevation of 762 meters. Its mid- 
dle section spreads out more than its two extremities. Geologically, 
the Biqa is the medial part of a depression that extends north to 
the western bend of the Orontes River in Syria and south to Jor- 
dan through Al Arabah to the Gulf of Aqaba, the eastern arm of 
the Red Sea. The Biqa is the country's chief agricultural area and 
served as a granary of Roman Syria. The word Biqa is the Arabic 
plural of buqaah, meaning a place with stagnant water. 

Emerging from a base south of Horns in Syria, the eastern moun- 
tain range, or Anti-Lebanon Mountains, is almost equal in length 
and height to the Lebanon Mountains. This fourth geographical 
region falls swiftly from Mount Hermon to the Hawran Plateau 
in Syria, whence it continues through Jordan south to the Dead 
Sea. The Barada Gorge divides the Anti-Lebanon Mountains. In 
the northern section, few villages are on the western slopes, but 



44 



The Society and Its Environment 



in the southern section, featuring Mount Hermon (286 meters), 
the western slopes have many villages. The Anti-Lebanon Moun- 
tains are more arid, especially in the northern parts, than the 
Lebanon Mountains and are consequentiy less productive and more 
thinly populated. 

Climate 

Lebanon has a Mediterranean climate characterized by a long, 
hot, and dry summer and cool, rainy winter. Fall is a transitional 
season with a gradual lowering of temperature and little rain; spring 
occurs when the winter rains cause the vegetation to revive. 
Topographical variation creates local modifications of the basic cli- 
matic pattern. Along the coast, summers are hot and humid, with 
little or no rain. Heavy dews form, which are beneficial to agricul- 
ture. The daily range of temperature is not wide, although tem- 
peratures may reach above 38°C in the daytime and below 16°C 
at night. A west wind provides relief during the afternoon and eve- 
ning; at night the wind direction is reversed, blowing from the land 
out to sea. 

Winter is the rainy season, with major precipitation falling after 
December. Rainfall is generous but is concentrated during only 
a few days of the rainy season, falling in heavy cloudbursts. The 
amount of rainfall varies greatly from one year to another. Occa- 
sionally, there are frosts during the winter, and about once every 
fifteen years a light powdering of snow falls as far south as Beirut. 
A hot wind blowing from the Egyptian desert called the khamsin 
(Arabic for fifty) may provide a warming trend during the fall but 
more often occurs during the spring. Bitterly cold winds may come 
from Europe. Along the coast the proximity to the sea provides 
a moderating influence on the climate, making the range of tem- 
peratures narrower than it is inland, but the temperatures are cooler 
in the northern parts of the coast, where there is also more rain. 

In the Lebanon Mountains, the gradual increase in altitude 
produces colder winters with more precipitation and snow. The 
summers have a wider daily range of temperatures and less hu- 
midity. In the winter, frosts are frequent and snows heavy; in fact, 
snow covers the highest peaks for much of the year. In the sum- 
mer, temperatures may rise as high during the daytime as they 
do along the coast, but they fall far lower at night. Inhabitants of 
the coastal cities, as well as visitors, seek refuge from the oppres- 
sive humidity of the coast by spending much of the summer in the 
mountains, where numerous summer resorts are located. Both the 
khamsin and the north winter wind are felt in the Lebanon Moun- 
tains. The influence of the Mediterranean Sea is abated by the 



45 



Lebanon: A Country Study 




Figure 3. Topography and Drainage 

altitude, and, although the precipitation is even higher than it is 
along the coast, the range of temperatures is wider and the winters 
more severe. 

The Biqa Valley and the Anti-Lebanon Mountains are shielded 
from the influence of the sea by the Lebanon Mountains. The result 
is considerably less precipitation and humidity and a wider variation 



46 



The Society and Its Environment 



in daily and yearly temperatures. The khamsin does not occur in 
the Biqa Valley, but the north winter wind is so severe that the 
inhabitants say it can "break nails." Despite the relatively low 
altitude of the Biqa Valley (the highest point of which, near Baalbek, 
is only 1,100 meters), more snow falls there than at comparable 
altitudes west of the Lebanon Mountains. 

Because of their altitudes, the Anti-Lebanon Mountains receive 
more precipitation than the Biqa Valley, despite their remoteness 
from maritime influences. Much of this precipitation appears as 
snow, and the peaks of the Anti-Lebanon Mountains, like those 
of the Lebanon Mountains, are covered with snow for much of 
the year. Temperatures are cooler than in the Biqa Valley. 

Rivers and Lakes 

Although the country is well watered and there are many rivers 
and streams, there are no navigable rivers, nor is any one river 
the sole source of irrigation water. Drainage patterns are deter- 
mined by geological features and climate. Although rainfall is 
seasonal, most streams are perennial. Most rivers in Lebanon have 
their origins in springs, which are often quite large. These springs 
emerge from the permeable limestone strata cropping out at the 
915- to 1 , 524-meter level in the Lebanon Mountains. In the Anti- 
Lebanon Mountains few springs emerge in this manner. Other 
springs emerge from alluvial soil and join to form rivers. Whatever 
their source, the rivers are fast moving, straight, and generally cas- 
cade down narrow mountain canyons to the sea. 

The Biqa Valley is watered by two rivers that rise in the watershed 
north of Baalbek: the Orontes flowing north (in Arabic it is called 
Nahr al Asi, the Rebel River, because this direction is unusual), 
and the Litani flowing south into the hill region of the southern 
Biqa Valley, where it makes an abrupt turn to the west. The 
Orontes continues to flow north into Syria and eventually reaches 
the Mediterranean in Turkey. Its waters, for much of its course, 
flow through a channel considerably lower than the surface of the 
ground. The Barada River, which waters Damascus, has as its 
source a spring in the Anti- Lebanon Mountains. 

Smaller springs and streams serve as tributaries to the principal 
rivers. Because the rivers and streams have such steep gradients 
and are so fast moving, they are erosive instead of depository in 
nature. This process is aided by the soft character of the limestone 
that composes much of the mountains, the steep slopes of the moun- 
tains, and the heavy rainstorms. The only permanent lake is 
Buhayrat al Qirawn, about ten kilometers east of Jazzin. There 
is one seasonal lake, fed by springs, on the eastern slopes of the 



47 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

Lebanon Mountains near Al Yammunah, about forty kilometers 
southeast of Tripoli. 

Population 

The lack of official statistics makes a demographic analysis of 
Lebanese society a difficult task. Because of the precarious and deli- 
cate sectarian arrangement in the body politic, the government has 
deliberately avoided conducting a comprehensive update of the 1932 
census. Christian communities, primarily the Maronites (see Glos- 
sary), fear that the numerical preponderance of Muslims would 
eventually strip them of their privileges by changing the founda- 
tions of political representation. When the French Mandate govern- 
ment conducted the 1932 census, it enumerated 861 ,399 Lebanese, 
including those living abroad, most of whom were identified as 
Christians. The distribution of parliamentary seats among the con- 
fessions was based on the findings of the 1932 census; the ratio of 
six Christians to five Muslims, including Druzes (see Glossary), 
has been retained. 

The government has published only rough estimates of the popu- 
lation since 1932. The estimate for 1956, for example, showed that 
in a total population of 1,411,416, Christians accounted for 54 per- 
cent and Muslims, 44 percent. The estimate was seriously contested 
because it was based on figures derived from a government wel- 
fare program that tended not to include Muslims in areas distant 
from Beirut. After the 1950s, the government statistical bureau pub- 
lished only total population estimates that were not subdivided 
according to sect. Consequently, the census became a highly 
charged political issue in Lebanon because it constituted the osten- 
sible basis for communal representation (see The National Pact, 
ch. 4). 

Conducting a census during the 1970s and 1980s was clearly 
impossible because of the war. The United States Department of 
State 1983 estimate for the population of Lebanon was 2.6 mil- 
lion. The figures included Lebanese nationals living abroad and 
excluded Palestinian refugees, of whom there were nearly 400,000. 
A 1986 estimate by the United States Central Intelligence Agency 
of the confessional distribution of the population showed 27 per- 
cent Sunnis (see Glossary), 41 percent Shias, 7 percent Druzes, 
16 percent Maronites, 5 percent Greek Orthodox, 3 percent Greek 
Catholics, and many smaller groups. However, these data were, 
at best, informed estimates subject to revision. 

In the absence of a reliable countrywide population census, the 
most useful information on population came from a 1984 survey 
conducted in the Greater Beirut region by a team of specialists from 



48 



The Society and Its Environment 



the American University of Beirut. An examination of the age com- 
position of the resident population of Beirut in the 1983-84 period 
revealed a relatively young population in which 41.5 percent were 
less than 20 years of age. There appeared to be a decline in fertil- 
ity over the last decade for the resident population of Beirut. 

The sex distribution of the 1983-84 Beirut resident population 
indicated an overall sex ratio of 95.5 males per 100 females. The 
extreme deficiency observed for males in the age- group twenty 
through forty-nine may be the result of two factors: the large emigra- 
tion of men in these ages, mostly to Persian Gulf countries, and 
a high rate of war-related mortality. 

A 1983 World Health Organization study contained some statis- 
tics on the demographic characteristics of Lebanon for the period 
1960 through 1981, the last year for which figures were available 
in 1987. Although the reliability of the figures could not be estab- 
lished, the figures revealed some interesting trends. During this 
period, the crude birth rate declined perceptibly, as did the crude 
death rate. Surprisingly, life expectancy rose despite the war. The 
fertility rate continued to decline during the war, but there was 
little change in the age structure of the population. Total popula- 
tion increased, although at a slower rate than in the prewar period, 
and there was a dramatic increase in urban population because 
of the continued influx to the cities. The rate of increase of popu- 
lation density slowed, however, as a result of the war and the con- 
sequent emigration of large numbers of Lebanese. 

Although accurate figures of Beirut's population in the mid-1980s 
were lacking, the city's dominant demographic position was un- 
questioned. Beirut has featured prominently in Lebanese society 
as a port city throughout its history and as the major population 
center of the country since at least the beginning of the Mandate 
period in 1920. Its role in maritime trade brought prosperity to 
its inhabitants. The creation of the state of Israel in 1948 bene- 
fited Beirut, which replaced the Israeli port of Haifa as a center 
for Arab trade with the West. Until the 1950s, Beirut was inhab- 
ited primarily by non-Maronite Christians and Sunni Muslims. 
In the 1950s, a wave of immigrants from all parts of Lebanon and 
from all sects sought the lure of economic prosperity and the read- 
ily available government services of Beirut. The civil strife that 
began in the 1970s has reinforced the sectarian demographic divi- 
sions in the city. 

Other major cities in Lebanon include Tripoli, Sidon, Tyre, 
Baalbek, and Zahlah. Tripoli, the capital of Ash Shamal Province, 
has a majority Sunni population and a Christian minority. Sidon, 
the capital of Al Janub Province, also has a Sunni majority, with 



49 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

a sizable Christian community. Tyre, in Al Janub Province, has 
a diverse sectarian composition. Although the majority of its 
inhabitants are Shias, the city has always included Christians of 
various sects. Baalbek, in Al Biqa Province, has a Shia majority 
and a Christian minority. Zahlah, the capital of Al Biqa Province, 
has a predominantly Christian population. 

Migration 

An important characteristic of the Lebanese is their migratory 
spirit, which can be traced back to the Phoenicians, who were known 
for their exploratory expeditions. Substantial emigration occurred 
between 1860 (after some 10,000 Christians were slain in a con- 
flict with Druzes) and 1914. During this period, approximately 
330,000 Lebanese emigrated from what is now Syria and Leba- 
non. Between 1900 and 1914, the annual rate was about 15,000. 
The rate dropped sharply during World War I and immediately 
thereafter but resumed a net annual emigration rate of about 3,000 
between 1921 and 1939. Those who had emigrated by 1932 included 
123,397 Maronites, 57,031 Greek Orthodox, and 26,627 Melchites, 
but only 36,865 Muslims and Druzes. Following World War II, 
the rate decreased somewhat until 1975; thereafter the Civil War 
caused the emigration of hundreds of thousands of Lebanese. In 
much of the pre-Civil War period, the proportion of Christian 
Lebanese emigrants to Muslims and Druzes was as high as six to 
one. 

Rural to urban migration has also been a strong social force 
within Lebanon. Villagers have moved to the cities, Beirut in par- 
ticular, to seek improved living conditions or to escape the hor- 
rors of war and poverty. The new city dwellers were known for 
maintaining ties to their home villages. Because of Lebanon's small 
size and short travel distances, many could continue to spend 
vacations and weekends in their villages, especially during harvest 
time. The newcomer to Beirut usually took up residence near fel- 
low villagers and coreligionists. In the case of many Shias, the mas- 
sive movement to the so-called "belt of misery," which denoted 
the southern and, until 1976, the eastern suburbs of Beirut, led 
to deep social resentment since affluent Maronite districts were 
adjacent to poor Shia districts. In fact, one of the first fronts of 
the war in 1975 was that between the Shia neighborhood of Shay ah 
and the Christian neighborhood of Ayn ar Rummanah. The road 
that separated these neighborhoods became known as the Green 
Line (see Glossary), which in the 1980s designated the line separat- 
ing Christian East Beirut from predominantiy Muslim West Beirut 
(see fig. 9). 



50 



Palestinian refugees on a 
pathway in Ar Rashidiyah camp 
Courtesy UNRWA 
(George Nehmeh) 




warn 



More than twelve years of turmoil have resulted in considera- 
ble compulsory and voluntary displacement of ordinary people. 
Hundreds of thousands of Lebanese left their country, some as per- 
manent emigrants, others for what they hoped would be temporary 
exile. How many left is not known, but Lebanon has the dubious 
distinction of being the only developing country that the World 
Bank (see Glossary) believes has actually witnessed a negative popu- 
lation growth rate in recent years. Lebanon's inability to hold a 
proper census, even in time of peace, means there are only esti- 
mates for the country's population. Whereas the population was 
thought by World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF — 
see Glossary) sources to have grown by around 70 percent to 2.77 
million over the 25 years to 1975, by 1984 the population was 
thought to have declined to 2.64 million. 

There has been considerable internal migration as well. Again, 
it is not possible to quantify this precisely. But the repeated redraw- 
ing of militia lines of control, and the repeated fears of members 
of one community living in enclaves dominated by people of a differ- 
ent religious, national, or political persuasion, make it not un- 
reasonable to suppose that as much as a third of the country's 
inhabitants in late 1987 had moved to new homes since 1975. It 
might also be argued that as many as half the people have at some 
stage moved away from their family homes for a while to escape 
the persistent violence. Such developments have had profound 



51 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

socioeconomic consequences. A disproportionate number of males 
have emigrated, while men presumably also account for the majority 
of those who have died in the years of conflict. Thus there has been 
a steady increase in the number of women entering the work force 
and in female-headed households. 

The War and Displacement in Beirut 

On the eve of the Civil War in 1975, it was evident that the demo- 
graphic expansion of Beirut and its suburbs had occurred at the 
expense of the rest of the country. Between 1960 and 1975, the 
population of Greater Beirut almost tripled, from 450,000 to 
1,250,000. In 1959, about 28 percent of all Lebanese lived in Beirut, 
but this figure ballooned to more than 50 percent in 1975. Leba- 
non's service-based economy acted as an agent for Western indus- 
tries and Arab markets alike, leading to the centralization of firms 
and resources in Beirut, which served as a transit point. 

Two factors changed the demographic composition of Beirut in 
the 1970s. The first was the dramatic growth, starting in 1973, of 
labor emigration to the Persian Gulf countries. At one point, the 
outflow included about half the entire work force of Beirut. The 
second was the series of battles that engulfed the city in a ferocious 
war. As for the levels of internal migration of various sectarian and 
ethnic groups at different times during the Civil War, three pat- 
terns can be discerned in terms of scope and duration: heavy migra- 
tion, fast and temporary (the exodus from Beirut when it was 
besieged by the Israeli Army in 1982); heavy migration, fast and 
permanent (the eviction of Palestinians and Shias from East Beirut 
in 1976 and the eviction of Christians from the Shuf Mountains 
in 1983); and the slow and intermittent migration of individuals 
and families. 

The Palestinian Element 

After the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, between 100,000 
and 170,000 Palestinian refugees entered Lebanon. They were 
mostly Muslims and nearly all Arabs, but they also included some 
Armenians, Greeks, and Circassians. During their first two de- 
cades in Lebanon, the Palestinian refugees emerged as politically 
powerful players (see The Hilu Era, 1964-70, ch. 1). The number 
of Palestinians in Lebanon swelled as a result of the war between 
the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Jordanian 
Army and the subsequent expulsion of several thousand Palestinian 
guerrillas from Jordan in 1970. 

In 1987 a large number of Palestinians still lived in or around 
camps administered by the United Nations Relief and Works 



52 



The Society and Its Environment 



Agency (UNRWA) for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. In 
1975 there were sixteen officially designated UNRWA camps in 
Lebanon, but in 1975-76 the Maronite militias evicted thousands 
of Palestinians from the suburbs of East Beirut and demolished their 
camps. By 1986 there were only thirteen camps in Lebanon (see 
fig. 4). Many relatively well-off Palestinians lived outside the camps. 
In 1984 the United States Department of State estimated that 
400,000 Palestinians were living in Lebanon, whereas the PLO 
claimed the figure to be as high as 600,000. 

Sectarianism 

In 1987 the dominant culture among the various communities 
was an Arab culture influenced by Western themes. Lebanon's 
shared language, heritage, history, and religion with its Arab neigh- 
bors, however, tended to minimize the distinctiveness of the 
Lebanese culture. Ethnically, most Lebanese are Arabs, many of 
whom can trace their lineage to ancient tribes in Arabia. This eth- 
nic majority constitutes more than 90 percent of the population. 
Muslim and Christian Lebanese speak Arabic, and many of their 
families have lived in what is now Lebanon for centuries. Moreover, 
the difference in dialects in Lebanon is a function of geographical 
location and not of confessional affiliation. Minority non-Arab eth- 
nic groups include Armenians, Kurds, and Jews, although some 
members of these groups have come to speak the language and iden- 
tify with the culture of the majority. 

Despite the commonalities in Lebanese society, sectarianism (or 
confessionalism — see Glossary) is the dominant social, economic, 
and political reality. Divisiveness has come to define that which 
is Lebanon. Sects should not be viewed as monolithic blocs, 
however, since strife within confessional groups is as common as 
conflict with other sects. Even so, the paramount schismatic ten- 
dency in modern Lebanon is that between Christian and Muslim. 

Sectarianism is not a new issue in Lebanon. The disintegrative 
factors in society preceded the creation of modern Lebanon in 1920. 
Before that date, historical Lebanon, or Mount Lebanon, was 
shared primarily between the Druzes and the Maronites. The two 
communities, distinguished by discrete religious beliefs and separate 
cultural outlooks, did not coexist in peace and harmony. Rather, 
the Druzes and Maronites often engaged in fierce battles over issues 
ranging from landownership, distribution of political power, for- 
eign allegiances, and petty family feuds. At least twice in the last 
two centuries, the conflicts between the two confessional commu- 
nities developed into full-scale civil wars, which were only ended 
by the intervention of foreign powers. The Lebanese sectarian 



53 




54 



The Society and Its Environment 



problem became more acute in 1920, when the French authorities 
annexed territories to Mount Lebanon to form Greater Lebanon. 
Although the new state comprised diverse confessional communi- 
ties, a political system favoring the majority Christians was estab- 
lished by the French (see The Mandate Period, ch. 1). 

Lebanese Confessional "Societies" 

The Lebanese confessional "societies" reflect the tensions at the 
heart of Lebanese society. Although Muslims and Christians have 
lived together in Lebanon for centuries, their deep disagreements 
over the Lebanese political formula and state make it unrealistic 
to treat all Lebanese as members of one social unit. 

Since the creation of the republic, the Lebanese have disagreed 
over the identity of the new state. Although Muslims, specifically 
the Sunnis, were inclined toward a close association with Greater 
Syria and the Arab world, Christians, particularly the Maronites, 
opted for linking Lebanon culturally and politically to the Western 
world. Christians were not opposed to economic cooperation with 
Arab countries, to which Lebanon exported most of its products, 
but they insisted on distinguishing Lebanon's foreign policy from 
that of its Arab neighbors. The question was not whether Leba- 
non should be Arab, since as early as 1943 the National Pact (the 
governing formula) declared Lebanon as having "an Arab face." 
Rather, the postindependence debate was really over how Arab 
Lebanon should be. This debate was exacerbated in the 1950s by 
Egyptian president Gamal Abdul Nasser's pan-Arab activism on 
the one hand and Lebanese president Camille Shamun's (also seen 
as Chamoun) pro- Western administration on the other hand. 

The controversy over the identity of Lebanon extended beyond 
the political realm to encompass questions of culture and litera- 
ture as these were presented in school textbooks. Muslims in gen- 
eral, as well as the Greek Orthodox, insisted that Arab and Islamic 
culture and literature should be emphasized, whereas Uniate Chris- 
tians (those in full communion with the Holy See in Rome but 
separately organized and adhering to an Eastern Rite) refused to 
commit Lebanese education to what they considered an inferior 
culture. The Maronite political movement viewed Lebanon's cul- 
ture as distinctively Lebanese in its origins and values. 

Regardless of sectarian affiliation, Lebanon has no civil code for 
personal matters. Lebanese citizens therefore live and die accord- 
ing to sectarian stipulations. Each sect has its own set of personal 
status laws that encompass such matters as engagement, marri- 
age, dowry, annulment of marriage, divorce, adoption, and in- 
heritance. These laws are binding on the individual, whether the 



55 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

individual is a practicing member of the sect or not. The confes- 
sional system of personal status laws strengthens the role of com- 
munal religious leaders and impedes the evolution of Lebanese 
nationalist or universalist secular ideas. 

The economic history of Lebanon has been marred by an un- 
equal distribution of national income and misallocation of benefits 
and funds. The central government tended to regard the regions 
that were annexed to what was Mount Lebanon in 1920 as margi- 
nal parts of Lebanon. Furthermore, the centralization of govern- 
ment in Beirut worsened the conditions of the rural areas, luring 
many Lebanese to crowded, confessional-community, poverty belts 
around the metropolitan center. The central government's neglect 
of southern Lebanon, particularly, contributed to a feeling of 
humiliation by the Shias, who in 1987 constituted the largest sec- 
tarian community. 

The economic situation in peripheral Lebanon, which geographi- 
cally comprises Al Janub Province, Al Biqa Province, and the Akkar 
region in Ash Shamal Province, differed sharply from that around 
Beirut. Economic exploitation was more evident in these areas, 
where feudalistic production patterns dominated. The land was 
divided among a small elite, and working conditions on the large 
estates were harsh. In addition, state services were scarce outside 
the capital. Beirut and its suburbs became politically and socially 
explosive when people from the impoverished periphery migrated 
to the city and came in contact with the affluent city dwellers. 

Sectarian and Clan Consciousness 

Lebanon's somewhat peculiar political system has reinforced sec- 
tarian identification and consciousness. The tendency of the in- 
dividual to identify with his or her sect as the major political unit 
has characterized the sectarian composition of political parties (see 
Sectarian Groups, ch. 4). That most militias in the 1980s were 
organized along purely sectarian lines, or that the army's brigades 
were also divided among the sects, indicated the primacy of sec- 
tarian consciousness (see The Army, ch. 5). 

In the late 1980s, there were other associational affiliations in 
Lebanon. Shia families in the Biqa Valley were organized into clans 
(as hair) that have existed for centuries. The politics of the region 
entailed typical clan feuds, alliances, and themes of revenge, which 
local politicians exploited. The rise in sectarian consciousness among 
Lebanese generally did not necessarily conflict with clan solidarity. 

Another pervasive primordial tie that characterized the Lebanese 
was their fealty to a group of traditional leaders (zuama; sing., 
zaim — see Glossary). The system of fealty involves utmost allegiance 



56 



The Society and Its Environment 



and loyalty (including support in election times) by a certain family 
to a certain zaim in return for services and access to power brokers 
(see Zuama Clientelism, ch. 4). The relationship between the two 
parties is maintained by a system of obligations and political com- 
mitment. This system, a vestige of feudal Lebanon, fostered a bond 
of fidelity between peasants and the feudal lord. Zuama clientelism 
provides the individual zaim with undisputed leadership of a local 
community, which sometimes encompasses a whole sect (such as 
the zuama of Al Assad in southern Lebanon in the first half of the 
twentieth century). In the 1980s, the zuama were in many cases 
the direct descendants of the great feudal families of the past. 

A new development in Lebanon after 1975 was the rise of an 
elite that included a new stratum of emerging street leaders who 
enjoyed power by virtue of sheer military force, individual cha- 
risma, or even direct descent from zuama families. All three charac- 
teristics applied to the late Bashir Jumayyil (also seen as Gemayel) 
(see The Ascendancy of Bashir Jumayyil, ch. 5). This stratum typi- 
cally included young and dynamic sons of zuama, street thugs, and 
a rising elite of Muslim religious clerics. 

Religion 

Divisions within the Christian and Muslim faiths were consider- 
able, but most observers accepted the Christian-Muslim dichotomy 
as the most salient in Lebanese society. Even so, identification by 
religious affiliation often blurs subtle social and economic consider- 
ations. 

Religion in Lebanon is not merely a function of individual prefer- 
ence reflected in ceremonial practice of worship. Rather, religion 
is a phenomenon that often determines social and political iden- 
tification. Hence, religion is politicized by the confessional quota 
system in distributing power, benefits, and posts (see The Basis 
of Government, ch. 4). 

A sectarian group binds its members together on the basis of 
their professed allegiance to the teaching of the faith and their com- 
mon location within the sectarian social and political map (see 
fig. 5). Ethnicity does not strictly apply to Lebanon's confessional 
communities, since more than 90 percent of all Lebanese are eth- 
nically and linguistically Arabs. But the distinctiveness of Leba- 
non's confessional communities approximates the notion of sect 
to that of ethnicity. The exceptions are Kurds, Armenians, and 
Jews, who constitute ethnic groups in the classical sense. In sum, 
an understanding of the Lebanese mosaic requires an awareness 
of ethnicity and confessionalism because the similarity between the 
two concepts has become clearer in present-day Lebanon, where 



57 



Lebanon: A Country Study 




Juniyah i 
BEIRUT 



-SHUl 




Baal 



Sidon 



Marj 



Tyre 



Boundary representation not necessarily authoritative 



□ 

m 



m 
m 



Maronite 
Greek Orthodox 
Greek Catholic 
Mixed Maronite 
and Greek Catholic 
Shia Muslim 
Sunni Muslim 
Druze 

Mixed Druze 
and Greek Orthodox 



Population shifts caused by the June 
1982 Israeli invasion are not depicted. 



Figure 5. Distribution of Religious Sects, 1983 



58 



The Society and Its Environment 



each sectarian group has its own agenda, political culture, and 
leaders. 

The exact number of Lebanon's sects has always been disputed. 
In 1936 the French Mandate established the first official law regard- 
ing sects in Syria and Lebanon. The sects were enumerated as fol- 
lows: nine patriarchal sects, one Latin church, the Protestant sect 
(including eleven Christian denominations), and five Muslim sects 
(Sunni, Shia, Druze, Alawi, and Ismaili). At that time, the Mus- 
lims rejected their division into separate sects, and consequently 
they were excluded from the appendix of the law that recognized 
sects. 

Following independence, only non-Muslims were included in a 
1951 law enumerating officially recognized sects in the following 
order: Maronites, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholics, Armenian 
Orthodox (Gregorian), Armenian Catholics, Syrian Orthodox 
(Jacobites), Syrian Catholics, Chaldean Catholics, Nestorian 
Assyrians, Latins (Roman Catholics), Protestants, and Jews. The 
law specified that each sect was free to manage its waqf (religious 
endowment) properties, as well as its personal status laws for its 
members. The Alawi and Ismaili sects were considered numeri- 
cally insignificant, which left them without legally sanctioned 
institutions. Other Muslim sects — Sunnis, Shias, and Druzes — 
were considered still covered by the provisions of Ottoman law. 

Tenets of Islam 

In A.D. 610 Muhammad (later known as the Prophet), a mer- 
chant belonging to the Hashimite branch of the ruling Quraysh 
tribe in the Arabian town of Mecca, began to preach the first of 
a series of revelations granted him by God through the angel 
Gabriel. A fervent monotheist, Muhammad denounced the poly- 
theism of his fellow Meccans. Because the town's economy was 
based largely on the thriving pilgrimage business to the Kaabah 
shrine and numerous other polytheist religious sites located there, 
this vigorous censure eventually earned him the bitter enmity of 
the town's leaders. In 622 he and a group of followers were invited 
to the town of Yathrib, which came to be known as Medina (from 
Madinat an Nabi — The Prophet's City). The move, or hijra (known 
in the West as the Hegira), marks the beginning of the Islamic era 
and of Islam as a force in history. The Muslim calendar, based 
on the lunar year, begins in 622. In Medina, Muhammad con- 
tinued to preach, eventually defeated his detractors in battle, and 
consolidated both the temporal and the spiritual leadership of all 
Arabia in his person. He entered Mecca in triumph in 630. 



59 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

After Muhammad's death in 632, his followers compiled those 
of his words regarded as coming directly and literally from God 
as the Quran, the holy scripture of Islam. His other sayings and 
teachings and precedents of his personal behavior, recalled by those 
who had known him during his lifetime, became the hadith. 
Together they form the sunna, a comprehensive guide to the spir- 
itual, ethical, and social life of the orthodox Muslim. The shahada 
(literally, testimony or creed) succinctly states the central belief of 
Islam: "There is no god but God [Allah], and Muhammad is the 
Prophet of God." This simple profession of faith is repeated on 
many ritual occasions, and its recital in full and unquestioning sin- 
cerity designates one a Muslim. 

Like Judaism and Christianity, Islam is a monotheistic religion 
that acknowledges the absolute sovereignty of God. The word Islam 
means submission (to God), and one who submits is a Muslim. 
Muhammad is the "seal of the prophets"; his revelation is said 
to complete for all time the series of revelations received by Jews 
and Christians. 

The duties of the Muslim form the five pillars of the faith. These 
are the recitation of the creed (shahada), daily prayer (salat), alms- 
giving (zakat), fasting (sawm), and pilgrimage (hajj). These reli- 
gious obligations apply to all Muslims, although there are slight 
variants in the beliefs of Shias as opposed to Sunnis (see Muslim 
Sects, this ch.). The believer is to pray in a prescribed manner after 
purification through ritual ablutions each day at dawn, midday, 
midafternoon, sunset, and nightfall. Prescribed body movements 
accompany the prayers, which the worshiper recites while facing 
toward Mecca. Whenever possible, men pray in congregation at 
the mosque under a prayer leader or imam, and on Friday, the 
holy day, they are obliged to do so. In the early days of Islam, 
the authorities imposed zakat as a tax on personal property propor- 
tionate to one's wealth; this was distributed to the mosques and 
to the needy. The fourth pillar occurs in the ninth month of the 
Muslim calendar, Ramadan, a period of obligatory fasting through- 
out the daylight hours in commemoration of Muhammad's receipt 
of God's revelation, the Quran. Finally, all Muslims at least once 
in their lifetime should if possible make the hajj to the holy city 
of Mecca to participate in special rites held there during the twelfth 
month of the lunar calendar. 

A Muslim stands in a personal relationship to God; there is no 
clergy in orthodox Islam. Those who lead prayers, preach sermons, 
and interpret the law do so by virtue of their superior knowledge 
and scholarship rather than because of any special prerogative con- 
ferred by ordination. 



60 



The Society and Its Environment 



Sunni and Shia Muslims differ over the fundamental issue of 
succession. The Prophet neither designated his successor nor 
decreed how a successor should be chosen. Some members of the 
Muslim community (umma) believed Muhammad's successor 
should be a close blood relative of the Prophet, i.e., Ali, who was 
a member of the Hashimite line, the Prophet's cousin, and the hus- 
band of Fatima, Muhammad's sole surviving daughter. Other Mus- 
lims believed, such kinship was not a necessary prerequisite and 
held that the caliph (from khalifa — successor) should be chosen by 
the community. A split in the ideally egalitarian and harmonious 
umma developed over this issue. The rift subsequently generated 
the two major divisions of Islam: Shia, from Shiat Ali (the party 
of Ali); and Sunni, from men of the sunna and jamaa, meaning 
community (those who favored a leader chosen by the community). 

Muslim Sects 

Sunnis 

Orthodox Sunni Muslims are those who regard the Quran, sup- 
plemented by the traditions of the Prophet, as the sole and suffi- 
cient embodiment of the Muslim faith. They do not recognize the 
need for a priesthood to mediate the faith to the community of 
believers. Thus, Sunnis have no "church" and no liturgy. The 
Sunnis, especially the Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia, stand for the origi- 
nal simplicity of Islam and its practices against later innovations. 

Religious leadership of the Sunni community in Lebanon is based 
on principles and institutions deriving partly from traditional Islam 
and partly from French influence. Under the Mandate, the French 
established the Supreme Islamic Council at the national level, 
headed by a grand mufti, and the national Directorate of Waqfs; 
these institutions continued to exist in the mid-1980s. The French 
also established local departments of waqfs, which staffed and main- 
tained hospitals, schools, cemeteries, and mosques. In addition, 
the waqfs managed the funds that supported these operations. The 
funds were obtained partly from direct donations and partly from 
income derived from real property given to the community as an 
endowment. 

Shaykh is an honorary title given to any Muslim religious man 
in Lebanon. As a result of the 1975 Civil War and the intensifica- 
tion in sectarian mobilization and identification, the religious leaders 
of the Sunni community assumed a more political role, especially 
with the advent of Islamic fundamentalism in Lebanon. As of 1987, 
the Sunni mufti, Shaykh Hasan Khalid, was the most powerful 
Sunni leader; he headed what was called the Islamic Grouping, 



61 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

which was composed of all Sunni traditional leaders (see Sectarian 
Groups, ch. 4). The Sunni ulama (learned religious men) of 
Lebanon emulated the Shia practice of combining temporal and 
religious power in the person of the imam. 

In 1987 the majority of Lebanese Sunnis resided in urban centers. 
It is estimated that more than two-thirds of them lived in Beirut, 
Sidon, and Baalbek. The few rural Sunnis lived in the Akkar region, 
the western Biqa Valley, around Baalbek, and in the Shuf Moun- 
tains. Their typical occupations were in trade, industry, and real 
estate. Large Sunni families enjoyed political and social significance. 
The most prominent of them were the Sulhs, Bayhums, Dauqs, 
Salams, and Ghandurs in Beirut; the Karamis, Muqaddams, and 
Jisrs in Tripoli; and the Bizris in Sidon. It is estimated that 702,000, 
or 27 percent, of the Lebanese population as of 1986 were Sunnis. 

Non-Arab Sunnis include the Kurds, of whom there are only 
a few in Lebanon, concentrated mainly in Beirut. They originated 
in the Taurus and Zagros mountains of Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and 
Syria. The Kurds of Lebanon tended to settle there permanently 
because of Lebanon's pluralistic society. Although they are Sunni 
Muslims, Kurds speak their own language. 

Shias 

Leadership of the Shia community is held by the imam, a lineal 
male descendant of Ali. A son usually inherited the office from his 
father. In the eighth century, however, succession became confused 
when the imam, Jafar as Sadiq, first named his eldest son, Ismail, 
his successor, then changed his mind and named a younger son, 
Musa al Kazim. Ismail died before his father and thus never had 
an opportunity to assert his claim. When Jafar died in 765, the 
imamate devolved on Musa. Those Shia who followed Musa are 
known to Western scholars as the Twelver Shias or Imami Shias. 
The part of the community that refused to acknowledge Musa's 
legitimacy and insisted on Ismail's son's right to rule as imam 
became known as Ismailis. The appellation Twelver derives from 
the disappearance of the twelfth imam, Al Mahdi al Muntazar, 
in about 874. He was a child, and after his disappearance he became 
known as a messianic figure, Al Mahdi, who never died but re- 
mains to this day hidden from view. The Twelver Shias believe 
his return will usher in a golden era. 

In the mid-1980s, the Shias generally occupied the lowest stra- 
tum of Lebanese society; they were peasants or workers except for 
a small Shia bourgeoisie. The Shias were concentrated chiefly in 
the poor districts of southern Lebanon and the Biqa Valley. From 
these rural areas, stricken by poverty and neglected by the central 



62 



The Society and Its Environment 



government, many Shias migrated to the suburbs of Beirut. Some 
Shias emigrated to West Africa in search of better opportunities. 
As of 1986, the Shias constituted the single most numerous sect 
in the country, estimated at 1,066,000, or 41 percent of the popu- 
lation. 

Shias of Lebanon, most of whom were Twelver Shias, lacked 
their own state-recognized religious institutions, independent of 
Sunni Muslim institutions, until 1968, when Imam Musa as Sadr, 
an Iranian-born cleric of Lebanese ancestry, created the Higher 
Shia Islamic Council in Lebanon. Sadr was elected chairman of 
the council, which was supposed to represent Lebanese Shias both 
at the political and at the religious levels. The council included as 
members all Shia clerics, as well as deputies, state employees, 
ministers, writers, professionals, and most noted Shias residing in 
Lebanon. Sadr, as chairman for life, continued to head the coun- 
cil until 1978, when he "disappeared" in Libya while on a state 
visit. He reportedly was kidnapped and killed by Libyan authori- 
ties for unknown reasons. Shia leaders in Lebanon as of 1987 still 
refused to acknowledge Sadr's death. While the chairmanship of 
the council was preserved for Sadr's awaited "return," in 1987 
Shaykh Muhammad Mahdi Shams ad Din (also seen as Chams- 
eddine) was the vice chairman of the Higher Shia Islamic Coun- 
cil. Moreover, a new Shia leader emerged in the early 1980s in 
Lebanon. Shaykh Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, the spiritual 
guide of Hizballah (Party of God), became the most important re- 
ligious and political leader among Lebanon's Shias (see Sectarian 
Groups, ch. 4). 

Ismailis 

In the late 1980s, there were only a few hundred Ismailis in var- 
ious parts of Lebanon. The Ismailis are Shias known as Seveners 
because they believe Ismail was the seventh imam. 

The Ismaili sect is divided into two branches: the Mustalian 
branch is found primarily in the Yemen Arab Republic (North 
Yemen), and the Nizari branch is found in the Iranian district of 
Salamiya, Afghanistan, Soviet Central Asia, India, the Chitral and 
Gilgit areas of Pakistan, and East Africa. The Ismailis split into 
two branches over a succession dispute. The current Nizari imam 
is a revealed ruler and is well known, even in the West, as the Agha 
Khan. 

Ismaili beliefs are complex and syncretic, combining elements 
from the philosophies of Plotinus, Pythagoras, Aristotle, gnosti- 
cism, and the Manichaeans, as well as components of Judaism, 
Christianity, and Eastern religions. Ismaili tenets are unique among 



63 




Shias during ashura, the commemoration of the martyrdom of Husayn 

Courtesy As'ad AbuKhalil 



Muslims. Ismailis place particular emphasis on taqiyya, the prac- 
tice of dissimulation about one's beliefs to protect oneself from 
harassment or persecution. Ismaili beliefs about the creation of the 
world are idiosyncratic, as is their historical ecumenism, tolera- 
tion of religious differences, and religious hierarchy. Furthermore, 
the secrecy with which they veil their religious beliefs and prac- 
tices (together with the practice of taqiyya) makes it extremely difficult 
to establish what their actual religious beliefs are. Their concep- 
tions of the imamate also differ greatly from those of other Muslims. 

Alawis 

Several thousand Alawis were scattered throughout northern 
Lebanon in 1987. Lebanese Alawis have assumed more significance 
since the rise to power of the Alawi faction in Syria in 1966, and 
especially since the Syrians established a military presence in Le- 
banon in 1976. 

The Alawis are also known as "Nusayris' ' because of their con- 
centration in the Nusayriyah Mountains in northwestern Syria. 
They appear to be descendants of people who lived in this region 
at the time of Alexander the Great. When Christianity flourished 
in the Fertile Crescent, the Alawis, isolated in their little commu- 
nities, clung to their own pre-Islamic religion. After hundreds of 
years of Ismaili influence, however, the Alawis moved closer to 



64 



The Society and Its Environment 



Islam. Furthermore, contacts with the Byzantines and the Crusaders 
added Christian elements to the Alawis' new creeds and practices. 
For example, Alawis celebrate Christmas, Easter, and the Epipha- 
ny, and they use sacramental wine in some ceremonies. For several 
centuries, the Alawis enjoyed autonomy within the Ottoman Em- 
pire, but in the mid-nineteenth century the Ottomans imposed 
direct rule. Regarding the Alawis as infidels, the Ottomans con- 
sistently persecuted them and imposed heavy taxation. During the 
French Mandate, the Alawis briefly gained territorial autonomy, 
but direct rule was reimposed in 1936. 

Alawis claim they are Muslims, but conservative Sunnis do not 
recognize them as such. In the early 1970s, however, Imam Sadr 
declared the Alawi sect a branch of Shia Islam. Like Ismaili Shias, 
Alawis believe in a system of divine incarnation. Unlike Ismailis, 
Alawis regard Ali as the incarnation of God. Because many of the 
tenets of the faith are secret, Alawis have refused to discuss their 
faith with outsiders. Only an elect few learn the religion after a 
lengthy initiation process; youths are initiated into the secrets of 
the faith in stages. Alawis study the Quran and recognize the five 
pillars of Islam. 

Alawis do not set aside a particular building for worship. In the 
past, Sunni government officials forced them to build mosques, 
but these were invariably abandoned. Only the men take part in 
worship. 

Druzes 

In 1987 more than half of Lebanese Druzes resided in rural areas. 
Druzes were found in the Shuf, Al Matn, Hasbayya, and Rashayya 
regions; those who chose to live in an urban setting resided in Beirut 
and its suburbs in confessionally marked neighborhoods. The Druze 
elite consisted of large landowning families. 

The religion of the Druzes may be regarded as an offshoot of 
Ismaili Islam. Historically it springs from the Fatimid caliph of 
Egypt, Al Hakim (996-1021 A.D.), who considered himself the 
final incarnation of God. His close associates and followers Hamza 
and Darazi (hence the name Druze) spread the new doctrine among 
the inhabitants of southern Lebanon and founded among them a 
sect that non-Druzes called "Druze" and Druzes called "Unitar- 
ian." The Druzes believe that Al Hakim is not dead but absent 
and will return to his people. Like the Ismailis, they also believe 
in emanations of the deity, in supernatural hierarchies, and in the 
transmigration of souls. 

The Druzes are religiously divided into two groups. Those who 
master the secrets and teaching of the sect and who respect its 



65 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

dictates in their daily life are referred to as uqqal (the mature) and 
are regarded as the religious elite. Believers who are not entitled 
to know the inner secrets of the religion and who do not practice 
their religion are called juhhal (the ignorant). 

The leadership of the Druze community in Lebanon tradition- 
ally has been shared by two factions: the Jumblatt (also seen as 
Junblatt) and the Yazbak family confederations. The community 
has preserved its cultural separateness by being closely knit socially. 
The Druzes constituted about 7 percent of the population (182,000) 
in 1986. Shaykh Muhammad Abu Shaqra was the highest Druze 
religious authority in Lebanon in 1987, holding the title of Shaykh 
al Aql. 

Christian Sects 

There are several Christian sects in Lebanon, of which a few 
are non-Arab. Each Christian sect has its own cultural distinctive- 
ness, and many claim patriarchs. 

Maronites 

The Maronites are the largest Uniate, or Eastern, church in 
Lebanon and represent an indigenous church. Maronite commu- 
nion with the Roman Catholic Church was established in 1182, 
broken thereafter, and formally reestablished in the sixteenth cen- 
tury. In accordance with the terms of union, they retain their own 
rites and canon law and use Arabic and Aramaic in their liturgy 
as well as the Karshuni script with old Syriac letters. Their origins 
are uncertain. One version traces them to John Maron of Antioch 
in the seventh century A.D.; another points to John Maron, a monk 
of Horns in the late fourth and early fifth centuries. The words 
maron or marun in Syriac mean "small lord." 

In the late seventh century, as a result of persecutions from other 
Christians for the heterodox views they had adopted, the Maronites 
withdrew from the coastal regions into the mountainous areas of 
Lebanon and Syria. During the Ottoman era (1516-1916) they re- 
mained isolated and relatively independent in these areas. In 1858 
the Maronite peasants revolted against the large landowning fam- 
ilies. The revolt was followed by a further struggle between the 
Druzes and Maronites over landowner ship, political power, and 
safe passage of community members in the territory of the other. 
The conflict led France to send a military expedition to the area 
in 1860. The disagreements diminished in intensity only after the 
establishment of the Mandate in 1920 and a political formula 
whereby all sects achieved a degree of political representation. 



66 



A woman in a Christian 
village works at home to 
help support her family. 
Courtesy United Nations 



(B. Cirone) 




j 



The Maronite sect has been directed and administered by the 
patriarch of Antioch and the East. Bishops are generally nominated 
by a church synod from among the graduates of the Maronite Col- 
lege in Rome. In 1987 Mar Nasrallah Butrus Sufayr (also seen 
as Sfeir) was the Maronite patriarch. 

Besides the Beirut archdiocese, nine other archdioceses and 
dioceses are located in the Middle East: Aleppo, Baalbek, Cairo, 
Cyprus, Damascus, Jubayl-Al Batrun, Sidon, Tripoli, and Tyre. 
Parishes and independent dioceses are situated in Argentina, Brazil, 
Venezuela, the United States, Canada, Mexico, Cote d 'I voire, and 
Senegal. There are four minor seminaries in Lebanon (Al Batrun, 
Ghazir, Ayn Saadah, and Tripoli) and a faculty of theology at Holy 
Spirit University at Al Kaslik, which is run by the Maronite Monas- 
tic Order. The patriarch is elected in a secret ceremony by a synod 
of bishops and confirmed by the pope in Rome. 

In 1986 it was estimated that there were 416,000 Maronites in 
Lebanon (including an unknown number abroad), or 16 percent 
of the population. Most Maronites have historically been rural peo- 
ple, like the Druzes; however, unlike the Druzes, they are scat- 
tered around the country, with a heavy concentration in Mount 
Lebanon. The urbanized Maronites reside in East Beirut and its 
suburbs. The Maronite sect has traditionally occupied the highest 
stratum of the social pyramid in Lebanon. Leaders of the sect have 
considered Maronite Christianity as the "foundation of the 



67 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

Lebanese nation." The Maronites have been closely associated with 
the political system of independent Lebanon; it was estimated that 
in pre-Civil War Lebanon members of this sect held 20 percent 
of the leading posts. 

Greek Catholics 

Greek Catholics are the second largest Uniate community in 
Lebanon. They emerged as a distinct group in the early eighteenth 
century when they split from the Greek Orthodox Church. Although 
they fully accept Catholic doctrines as defined by the Vatican, they 
have generally remained close to the Greek Orthodox Church, 
retaining more of the ancient rituals and customs than have the 
Maronites. They use Arabic and follow the Byzantine rite. In 
Lebanon, when one speaks of Catholics, one is referring to this 
group, not to Roman Catholics or Maronites. 

The highest official of the church since 1930 has been the patri- 
arch of Antioch, who resides at Ayn Traz, about twenty-four kilo- 
meters southeast of Beirut. The patriarch is elected by bishops in 
a synod and confirmed by the pope in Rome, who sends him a 
pallium (a circular band of white wool worn by archbishops) in 
recognition of their communion. Greek Catholic churches, like those 
of the Greek Orthodox, contain icons but no statues. 

The Greek Catholics live primarily in the central and eastern 
parts of the country, dispersed in many villages. Members of this 
sect are concentrated in Beirut, Zahlah, and the suburbs of Sidon. 
They have a relatively higher level of education than other sects. 
Proud of their Arab heritage, Greek Catholics have been able to 
strike a balance between their openness to the Arab world and their 
identification with the West, especially the United States. Greek 
Catholics constituted 3 percent of the population (78,000) in 1986. 

Roman Catholics 

Catholics who accept the full primacy of the Holy See and fol- 
low the Latin rite comprised less than 1 percent of the population 
in the 1980s. The Lebanese refer to them as Latins to distinguish 
them from Uniate groups. The Latin community is extremely varie- 
gated, since both laity and clergy, including large numbers of 
foreigners, are mainly Europeans. As Roman Catholics, they 
acknowledge the supreme authority of the pope in Rome, vener- 
ate the Virgin Mary and the saints, and recognize the seven sacra- 
ments of baptism, confirmation, the Eucharist (the sacrament of 
the Lord's Supper), confession and penance, ordination, matri- 
mony, and extreme unction (given when facing the danger of 
death). Members of the clergy are celibate. 



68 



The Society and Its Environment 

Greek Orthodox 

The Greek Orthodox adhere to the Eastern Orthodox Church, 
which is actually a group of autocephalous churches using the 
Byzantine rite. Historically, these churches grew out of the four 
Eastern patriarchates (Jerusalem, Antioch, Alexandria, and Con- 
stantinople), which, beginning in the fifth century, diverged from 
the Western patriarchate of Rome over the nature of Christ. The 
final split took place in 1096. From that time, with the exception 
of a brief period of reunion in the fifteenth century, the Eastern 
Church has continued to reject the claim of the Roman patriarchate 
to universal supremacy and has also rejected the concept of papal 
infallibility. Doctrinally, the main point at issue between the Eastern 
and Western churches is that of the procession of the Holy Spirit. 
There are also divergences in ritual and discipline. 

Originally a peasant community, the Greek Orthodox include 
many freeholders, and the community is less dominated by large 
landowners than are other Christian denominations. In present- 
day Lebanon, the Greek Orthodox have become increasingly 
urbanized, and they form a major part of the commercial and 
professional class of Beirut and other cities. Many are also found 
in the southeast, the Shuf Mountains, and the north, near Tripoli. 
They are both highly educated and well versed in finance. The sect 
has become known for its pan- Arab orientation, possibly because 
it exists in various parts of the Arab world. The church has often 
served as a bridge between Lebanese Christians and the Arab coun- 
tries. Members of the sect constituted 5 percent of the population, 
or about 130,000, in 1986. 

Jacobites 

The Jacobites, or Syrian Monophysites, often referred to as 
Syrian Orthodox, take their name from Jacob Baradeus, who spread 
the teachings of the church throughout Syria in the sixth century. 
The doctrinal position of the Jacobites is that after the incarna- 
tion, Christ had only one divine nature. This is contrary to the 
orthodox Christian position that states Christ had both a human 
and a divine nature. The church follows the Syriac liturgy of St. 
James and has an independent hierarchy under the patriarch of 
Antioch, whose seat was formerly at Mardin in Turkish Kurdistan 
and is now at Horns in Syria. As of 1986, there were only a few 
thousand Jacobites in Lebanon. 

Armenian Orthodox or Gregorian 

The Gregorian Church was organized in the third century and 
became autocephalous as a national church in the fourth century. 
In the sixth century, it modified the formulations of the Council 



69 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

of Chalcedon of 451 that confirmed the dual nature of Christ in 
one person. Instead, the Gregorian Church adopted a form of 
Monophysitism that believes in the single divine nature of Christ, 
a belief that is slightly different from the belief of the Copts and 
the Syrian Orthodox. The Armenian Orthodox Church has five 
patriarchs, of whom the catholicos of Etchmiadzin in the Armenian 
Soviet Socialist Republic is the most revered. It also has an Arme- 
nian liturgy. 

The Armenians in Lebanon were refugees who had fled Turkey 
during and after World War I. In 1987 they resided in Beirut and 
its northern suburbs, as well as in Anjar in the Biqa Valley. They 
are admired for their skills as craftsmen and for their diligence, 
characteristics which have enabled them to gain prominent eco- 
nomic positions. Politically, Armenians advocate compromise and 
moderation. 

Assyrian or Nestorian Church 

The Assyrians are the remnants of the Nestorian Church that 
emerged with the Christological controversies in the fifth century. 
The Nestorians, who have a Syriac liturgy, stressed that Christ 
consisted of two separate persons, one human and one divine, as 
opposed to having two natures in one person. Their doctrine was 
condemned by the Council of Ephesus in A.D. 431 . Subsequently, 
those Nestorians who accepted this doctrine formed an indepen- 
dent church, which has only a few thousand members in Lebanon. 

Protestants 

The Protestants in Lebanon were converted by missionaries, 
primarily British and American, during the nineteenth and twen- 
tieth centuries. They are divided into a number of denomina- 
tions, the most important being Presbyterian, Congregational, and 
Anglican. Typically, Lebanese Protestants are well educated and 
belong to the professional middle class. They constitute less than 
1 percent of the population and live primarily in Beirut. 

Jews 

Lebanese Jews historically have been an integral part of the 
Lebanese fabric of confessional communities. In 1947 they were 
estimated to number 5,950. After the creation of the state of Israel 
in 1948, Lebanese Jews did not feel compelled to emigrate because 
they enjoyed a prosperous status in Lebanese society and had been 
granted equal rights by law with other citizens. Moreover, they 
suffered no harm during the anti-Zionist demonstrations of 1947 
and 1948. However, the intensification of the Arab-Israeli conflict 



70 



The Society and Its Environment 



politicized attitudes toward local Jews, who were often associated 
with the policies of Israel. In the early 1950s, their synagogue in 
Beirut was bombed, and the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies wit- 
nessed heated debates on the status of Jewish officers in the Lebanese 
Army. The discussions culminated in a unanimous resolution to 
expel and exclude them from the Lebanese Army. 

During the June 1967 War, Lebanese authorities stationed guards 
in Jewish districts when hostility toward Lebanese Jews became 
overt. Several hundred chose to leave the country; until 1972 Jews 
were free to leave the country with their money and possessions. 
During the 1975 Civil War, the PLO and Lebanese leftist-Muslim 
forces posted militia in the Jewish neighborhood of Wadi Abu Jamil, 
which housed what remained of the dwindling Jewish community, 
estimated to number fewer than 3,000. Nevertheless, the rise of 
Muslim fundamentalists, especially in the aftermath of the Israeli 
invasion of 1982, constituted a real threat to Lebanese Jews. Or- 
ganizations such as the Khaybar Brigades and the Organization 
of the Oppressed of the Earth claimed responsibility for kidnap- 
ping and killing several Lebanese Jews between 1984 and 1987. 
As of 1986, it was estimated that only a dozen Jews remained in 
West Beirut and some seventy others in East Beirut. 

Others 

In addition to the above-mentioned sects, in 1987 there were 
a number of small religious and ethnic communities that numbered 
only in the hundreds. Such groups comprised Chaldean Catho- 
lics, Bahais, Armenian Catholics, Copts, Turkomans, and Cir- 
cassians. 

Languages 
Arabic 

Arabic is the official language, as well as the religious language 
for Muslims, Druzes, and some Christian communities. Like 
Hebrew and Aramaic, it is a Semitic language. One of the earliest 
recorded instances of Arabic is found in an Assyrian account of 
a war fought with Arabs between 853 and 626 B.C. Arabic inscrip- 
tions in various alphabets have been found in the Arabian Penin- 
sula. By the time of the Prophet Muhammad, Arabic had developed 
into a refined literary language. The Arab conquest brought it to 
Lebanon. 

In Lebanon, as elsewhere in the Arab world, there are essen- 
tially two forms of Arabic — colloquial, of which there are many 
dialects, and classical. Classical Arabic, uniform throughout the 



71 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

Arab world, is chiefly a written language. It is also used for public 
speeches, poetry recitations, and radio and television broadcasts. 
Modern Standard Arabic has been developed from the classical lan- 
guage of the Quran, the Islamic scripture; the syntax has been 
slightly simplified, the vocabulary considerably expanded, and the 
literary style made less complex. 

The classical Arabic language is the principal unifying factor in 
the Arab world. It is revered by Arabs as the symbol of their unity, 
as a sacred language, and as the vehicle of a great literature. They 
think of it as their original language and of their spoken dialects 
as corruptions. 

Lebanese colloquial Arabic developed from the Syrian Arabic 
dialect, which includes the Arabic spoken by Jordanians, Pales- 
tinians, Syrians, and Lebanese. It has been influenced by Aramaic, 
which preceded it in the area. Within Lebanon, the dialect changes 
from region to region, and the dialect of the Druzes is regarded 
as distinctive. 

Colloquial dialects are seldom written, except for some novels, 
plays, and humorous writings. However, a call for the adoption 
of the spoken language to replace the classical as the national 
language emerged in the 1960s among Maronite political and intel- 
lectual circles. The movement, which was championed by the prom- 
inent Lebanese poet and political activist Said Aql, attracted a 
number of supporters by 1975, with the rise of a right-wing trend 
to dissociate Lebanon from its Arab ties. Nevertheless, few took 
the movement seriously, apart from a handful of writers who wrote 
in colloquial Arabic. 

Proposals also exist for improving the Arabic alphabet and for 
updating Arabic vocabulary to include scientific and technologi- 
cal terms. In written Arabic, short vowels and doubled consonants 
are not indicated but must be supplied from the context. 

Scholars tend to adopt foreign words without changing them and 
use them in both Arabic and Roman alphabets. The language 
academies in Cairo and Damascus, apprehensive of this practice, 
have achieved a certain amount of success in forming new words 
from old Arabic roots. 

Other Languages 

Armenian is an Indo-European language, distantly related to 
English, although a large part of its vocabulary is derived from 
Arabic and Turkish. When the Armenians were converted to Chris- 
tianity in the fifth century, they acquired an alphabet based on 
Greek and developed a classical literature, which differed con- 
siderably from modern Armenian. Modern Armenian literature 



72 



The Society and Its Environment 



flourishes today in the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic and to 
a lesser degree in Lebanon, where a printing and publishing in- 
dustry is active. Armenians are strongly attached to their language, 
which is important as a means of maintaining their identity. 

Assyrian, a Semitic language, is a modern spoken form of an- 
cient Syriac, a dialect of Aramaic. The Assyrians increasingly use 
Arabic as their spoken language, but Syriac continues to be used 
for religious purposes. 

French and English are the most widely used Western languages. 
Although French is not an official language, almost all government 
publications appear in French as well as in Arabic. Since World 
War II, United States influence, and consequently the importance 
of English, has increased. Some Lebanese authors choose to write 
in French or English, and fluency in these languages generally marks 
the educated man and woman. The Lebanese Arabic dialect, par- 
ticularly in Beirut, has acquired some French words. Arabic liter- 
ary style, especially in poetry, has also been influenced by the style 
of Western languages. 

Structure of Society 

In 1987 Lebanese society was riddled with deep social, economic, 
political, and sectarian divisions. Individual Lebanese were primar- 
ily identified with their family as the principal object of their loyalty 
and the basis of marriage and social relationships as well as the 
confessional system. This, in turn, tended to clash with national 
integration and cohesion. Society was divided not only into diverse 
sectarian communities but also into socioeconomic strata that cut 
across confessional lines. 

The Family 

The primacy of the family manifests itself in all phases of 
Lebanese life, including political, financial, and personal relation- 
ships. In the political sphere, families compete with each other for 
power and prestige, and kin combine forces to support family mem- 
bers in their quest for leadership. In business, employers give prefer- 
ence to hiring relatives, and brothers and cousins often consolidate 
their resources in operating a family enterprise. Wealthy family 
members are expected to share with less prosperous relatives, a 
responsibility that commonly falls to expatriate and urban relatives 
who help support their village kin. 

In the personal sphere, the family has an equally pervasive role. 
To a great extent, family status determines an individual's access 
to education and chances of achieving prominence and wealth. The 
family also seeks to ensure an individual's conformity with accepted 



73 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

standards of behavior so that family honor will be maintained. An 
individual's ambitions are molded by the family in accordance with 
the long-term interests of the group as a whole. Just as the family 
gives protection, support, and opportunity to its members, the in- 
dividual member offers loyalty and service to the family. 

The traditional form of the family is the three-generation 
patrilineal extended family, consisting of a man, his wife or wives, 
their unmarried children of both sexes, and their married sons, 
together with the sons' wives and children. Some of these groups 
live under one roof as a single household, which was the norm in 
earlier generations, but most do not. 

The family commands primary loyalty in Lebanese society. In 
a study conducted by a team of sociologists at the American Univer- 
sity of Beirut in 1959, loyalty to the family ranked first among both 
Christians and Muslims, among both males and females, and 
among both politically active and noncommitted students. Next 
to the family in order of importance were religion, nationality or 
citizenship, ethnic group, and finally the political party. The results 
of this study probably reflected the attitudes of the Lebanese in 
1987. If anything, primordial ties appear to have increased dur- 
ing the 1975 Civil War. The rise of Islamic and Christian fun- 
damentalism encouraged the development of ethnic and familial 
consciousness. Among Maronites, there has always been an em- 
phasis on the family; for example, the motto of the Phalange Party 
is "God, the Fatherland, and the Family." 

The family in Lebanon has been a means through which politi- 
cal leadership is distributed and perpetuated. In the Chamber of 
Deputies of 1960, for example, almost a quarter of the deputies 
"inherited" their seats. In the 1972 Chamber of Deputies, Amin 
Jumayyil (who became president in 1982) served with his father, 
Pierre Jumayyil, after inheriting the seat of his uncle Maurice 
Jumayyil. Because "political families" have monopolized the 
representation of certain sects for over a century, it has been argued 
that family loyalty hinders the development of a modern polity. 

Sex Roles 

The family in Lebanon, as elsewhere in the region, assigns differ- 
ent roles to family members on the basis of gender. The superior 
status of men in society and within the narrow confines of the 
nuclear family transcends the barriers of sect or ethnicity. Lebanese 
family structure is patriarchal. The centrality of the father figure 
stems from the role of the family as an economic unit, in which 
the father is the property owner and producer on whom the rest 
of the family depend. This notion prevails even in rural regions 



74 



The Society and Its Environment 



of Lebanon where women participate in peasant work. Although 
the inferior status of women is undoubtedly legitimized by vari- 
ous religious texts, the oppression of women in Arab society pre- 
ceded the advent of Islam. The roles of women have traditionally 
been restricted to those of mother and homemaker. However, since 
the 1970s Arab societies have allowed women to play a more ac- 
tive role socially and in the work force, basically as a result of the 
manpower shortage caused by heavy migration of men to Persian 
Gulf countries. In Lebanon the percentage of women in the labor 
force has increased, although the Islamic religious revival that swept 
Lebanon in the 1980s reasserted traditional cultural values. As a 
consequence, veils and abas (cloaks) have become more common 
among Muslim women. Among Christians, the war enabled women 
to assume more independent roles because of the absence of male 
family members involved in the fighting. 

Notwithstanding the persistence of traditional attitudes regard- 
ing the role of women, Lebanese women enjoy equal civil rights 
and attend institutions of higher education in large numbers (for 
example, women constituted 41 percent of the student body at the 
American University of Beirut in 1983). Although women have 
their own organizations, most exist as subordinate branches of the 
political parties. 

Marriage 

In the past, marriage within the lineage, especially to first cou- 
sins or other close paternal kin, was the rule. This provided the 
woman the security of living among the people with whom she had 
been raised and also tended to keep property inheritance within 
the family. Among Muslims, there is traditional preference for mar- 
riage to a patrilineal first cousin; in some conservative Muslim vil- 
lages, the choice is considered obligatory. In Roman Catholic canon 
law the marriage of persons within the same bloodline or of per- 
sons within the third degree of collateral relationship is explicitly 
forbidden. In Lebanon a dispensation for such marriages can be 
obtained, and they are not uncommon. 

Although permitted under Muslim law, polygyny is generally 
regarded as both impractical and undesirable because of the addi- 
tional economic burden it places upon the household and because 
of the personal complications it entails. Polygynous families con- 
sist of a man, up to four wives, and their children. A man rarely 
has more than two wives, one of whom is sometimes much younger 
than the other, and is married after the children of the first wife 
are almost fully grown. The two wives may live with their chil- 
dren in different rooms of the same house, or they may reside in 



75 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

separate abodes. A survey of families in Beirut, made in the early 
1960s, indicated that there was more than one wife in only 3 per- 
cent of the Muslim families interviewed. 

Other than the marriage of close relatives, such as first cousins, 
a factor that often enters into the choice of a marriage partner is 
interest in expanding family resources. A man from the leading 
family of a particular lineage, especially an influential and wealthy 
lineage, is apt to choose a wife from another such lineage within 
his own religious community to improve the position of his im- 
mediate family group. 

The general practice in both Christian and Muslim villages is 
to find a partner within the village, preferably the closest eligible 
relative within the family. This practice has been considerably 
weakened in villages close to cities, where marriages outside the 
family and outside the village occur more often and where first cou- 
sin marriage occurs only occasionally. 

Marriage is more a matter of recognizing adult status and of 
joining interests than of romantic attachment. Men marry to have 
sons who will continue their lineage, work their land, and do honor 
to their house. Women marry to attain status and to bear sons for 
protection in their old age. Most women marry. 

Age at marriage varies. In some villages girls tend to marry in 
their late teens; boys, in their early twenties. Urban youths marry 
somewhat later. Among educated families, young men frequently 
postpone marriage for many years, some of them waiting until their 
late thirties or early forties. 

Christians and Druzes do not enter into a formal marriage con- 
tract; Muslims, however, do. After the announcement of the en- 
gagement of a Muslim couple, and before the wedding takes place, 
a formal contract is drawn up. The marriage is legal once the con- 
tract is signed. The contract notes the consent of the couple to marry 
and specifies the bride-price, a payment by the young man to his 
fiancee's family. In traditional Muslim society, the bride-price 
represented a substantial amount of money, or its equivalent in 
land, or a combination of both. In the 1980s, however, except in 
remote villages, only a token gift was made. The bride is expected 
to provide a dowry, usually in the form of furnishings for a new 
household. 

Premarital and extramarital sexual relations are frowned upon 
throughout society. In the village there are strong sanctions against 
sexual relations outside marriage, and such relationships are rare 
because every potential female partner is enmeshed in the network 
of kinship ties that reinforce these sanctions. Improper conduct 
toward an unmarried woman damages the honor of her lineage. 



76 



The reversion to traditional 
values in the 1980s 
affected the dress 
of many Shia women. 
Courtesy As' ad AbuKhalil 



Her father and brothers will seek redress, which can take the form 
of killing the woman and the man involved, killing the man or driv- 
ing him from the village, or a settlement between the two lineages. 
If redress is not obtained, open strife between the two lineages may 
occur. 

Child-Rearing Practices 

The major reason for marrying is procreation. A wife without 
children, or even one without male children, is an object of sym- 
pathy. Also, among those Christians not under the Holy See and 
among Muslims, she is threatened with divorce. The importance 
placed on having sons is reflected in the festivities attendant upon 
birth. At the birth of a child, the father will give a feast; if the child 
is a boy, the feast will be more lavish and the guests more numer- 
ous. It is always made clear within the family that male children 
are preferred and are given special privileges. 

When the first boy is born to a married couple, friends no longer 
address them by their given names alone but call them by the name 
of their son; for instance, "father of x" and "mother of x." They 
continue to be addressed by the name of their firstborn son, even 
in the event of his death. With respect to naming children, tradi- 
tionally one male in every generation is given the name of his grand- 
father to pay respect to the older man and to honor his memory 
after his death. 



77 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

Child-rearing practices in Lebanon are characterized by the 
severe discipline imposed by the father and overprotection by the 
mother, who strives to compensate for the rigidity of the father. 
In Arab society parental control does not stop at age eighteen (when 
a child is considered independent in most Western societies) but 
continues as long as the child lives in the father's residence or until 
the child marries. Furthermore, the practice of the father and 
mother making major decisions on behalf of their offspring per- 
tains to marriage, especially the son's marriage; the daughter comes 
under the control of her in-laws. Arranged marriages are still prac- 
ticed widely across the socioeconomic and sectarian spectrum. 

Children are not trained to be independent; they expect their 
father to care for them as long as they are loyal and obedient. 
Punishment can be in the form of intimidation (takhjil, literally to 
incite fear and shame) or physical punishment. A study of the 
impact of the war noted a decline in parental authority because 
of the extensive involvement of young men in armed militias. 

Impact of War on the Family 

The protracted Civil War has made the task of conducting em- 
pirical research on marriage habits almost impossible. Available 
statistics indicate that familial and marital habits differ among sects. 
Christian families tend to be smaller than Muslim — particularly 
Shia — families. According to a 1970 survey, the average Lebanese 
Christian family excluding Maronites had 3.57 children, the Sun- 
ni 4.38, and the Shia 5.01. A striking aspect of marriage habits 
in Lebanon, especially after 1975, was the impact of recession on 
marriage. The high cost of living and housing and the difficulty 
in finding employment caused men to marry later. In the past, 
Lebanese men and women married at an early age, but in the 1980s 
in Beirut the average age for marriage was 31 years for men and 
22.5 for women. Economic difficulties also forced more families 
to resort to birth control, so that the size of the average Lebanese 
family has declined appreciably. 

A study conducted in 1983 indicated, however, that marriage 
was common among the population of Greater Beirut, with only 
10 percent or less of the population remaining single at ages above 
40. A majority of females age twenty-five or older were married; 
a majority of males age thirty or older were also married. Moreover, 
very few adult males or females were separated or divorced. The 
percentage of widows forty years of age or younger was consider- 
ably higher than that for males of the same age. Marriages based 
on personal choices of the spouses as opposed to family-arranged 
marriages increased with the gradual elimination of traditional 



78 



The Society and Its Environment 



boundaries between the sexes. However, family-arranged marriages 
continued to be practiced across geographical and social bound- 
aries. They were preferred among the economic elite of the cities 
as a means of preserving wealth and status within the same extended 
family or within the same social group. 

One study conducted in the early 1980s on the impact of the 
war on family structure concluded that there was a clear decline 
in divorce. This probably occurred because of the huge costs 
involved: payment of deferred dowry, alimony for children, and 
support of the woman during the prescribed period during which 
she may not remarry. 

Living Conditions 
Prewar Conditions 

On the eve of the 1975 Civil War, Lebanon's general standard 
of living was comfortable and higher than that in any other Arab 
country. Regional variations existed in housing standards and sani- 
tation and in quality of diet, but according to government surveys 
most Lebanese were adequately sheltered and fed. Known for their 
ingenuity and resourcefulness in trading and in entrepreneurship, 
the Lebanese have shown a marked ability to create prosperity in 
a country that is not richly endowed with natural resources. Eco- 
nomic gain was a strong motivating force in all social groups. 

Many problems affecting the general welfare before the war 
stemmed from high prices and the massive rural exodus to the cities. 
This exodus has been linked to unproductive farms, fragmented 
landholdings, and a distinct preference of most Lebanese for urban 
living and for urban occupations. The population increase in the 
cities, especially in Beirut, created severe housing shortages for those 
unable to pay the high rents for modern apartments. It also ag- 
gravated the problems of urban transportation and planning. The 
high cost of living, which had been steadily rising since the 1950s, 
further diminished the purchasing power of small rural incomes 
and threatened the consumption patterns of low- and middle-income 
groups in the cities. Of special concern were high rents, school fees, 
and the price of food and clothing. Many urban households lived 
on credit, and indebtedness was widespread in some parts of the 
countryside. 

In urban centers, where the Western influence was most appar- 
ent in the 1980s, there had been a tremendous increase in modern 
apartment buildings that had almost erased the scenes of traditional- 
style houses with red-tiled roofs. The government did not take action 
during the construction boom of the early 1970s to protect these 



79 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

remnants of Lebanon's culture. In rural Lebanon, houses with flat 
earthen roofs were the most common. The size and shape of the 
house indicated one's economic status. 

Wartime Conditions 

The disruption of Lebanon's modernization by the war has not 
been adequately measured. A social data sheet on Lebanon pre- 
pared by the World Bank in 1983, however, illustrated some trends. 
Women's share of the labor force progressed very slowly from 3.4 
percent in 1960 to 19.9 percent in 1981, probably because of strong 
traditionalist resistance within the family. The same data indicated 
a sharp decline in the percentage of the labor force employed in 
agriculture, from 38 percent in 1960 to only 11 percent in 1980. 
There was no corresponding rise in industrial activity, however; 
the industrial labor force only increased from 23 percent to 27 per- 
cent. Most of the labor force was still employed in the service sec- 
tor. Other indexes such as energy consumption, automobiles per 
thousand population, radios and television sets per thousand popu- 
lation, and newspaper circulation also documented Lebanon's pace 
of modernization. What these figures did not indicate was the dis- 
proportionate levels of modernization among various communi- 
ties and regions. 

As for the impact of the war in general on public life, radical 
adjustments had to be made by inhabitants of neighborhoods that 
were subjected to intense fighting. The people of Beirut, in partic- 
ular, adjusted to shortages of all kinds: water, electricity, food, and 
fuel. The wartime living situation started to deteriorate in the spring 
of 1975. During lulls in the fighting, remnants of the central govern- 
ment attempted to resume services to the population, but the task 
was impossible because of the harassment by militia members. The 
government then resorted to rationing water and electricity. It was 
particularly hampered by the sharp decline in the payment of bills 
by consumers. According to one employee in the Beirut electric 
company, only 10 percent of all customers paid their bills. The 
rest either declined to pay or simply hooked up to utility supply 
cables. 

One of the most difficult periods in the struggle for survival 
among Lebanese and Palestinians occurred during the siege of 
Beirut by Israel in 1982. To pressure the PLO to surrender, the 
Israeli Army, aided by the Christian Lebanese Forces, ensured that 
no food or fuel entered the city. 

The war scarcely left a house or building in Beirut intact or free 
from shrapnel damage. The Lebanese, however, soon adjusted to 
the new situation either by living in bombed-out apartments or 



80 



The Society and Its Environment 



by fixing damaged parts of their residence. Some displaced people 
from southern Lebanon who could not afford to rent in Beirut or 
even in its suburbs chose to live in deserted apartments and hotels 
in areas close to the Green Line, which separated West Beirut from 
East Beirut. The situation in many Palestinian refugee camps was 
particularly oppressive. Some camps along the coastal road had 
come under Israeli fire during the invasion of 1982, and others in 
the Beirut area had been destroyed by Christian militias during 
the war or had come under Shia attack in the mid-1980s (see Chaos 
in Beirut and Syrian Peacemaking Efforts, ch. 5). 

Education 

The Lebanese, along with the Palestinians, had one of the highest 
literacy rates in the Arab world. The rate was estimated at nearly 
80 percent in the mid-1980s, but like most other spheres of Lebanese 
life, communal and regional disparities existed. In general, Chris- 
tians had a literacy rate twice that of Muslims. Druzes followed 
with a literacy rate just above that of Sunnis. Shias had the lowest 
literacy rate among the religious communities. 

The war adversely affected educational standards. Many private 
and public school buildings were occupied by displaced families, 
and the state was unable to conduct official examinations on several 
occasions because of intense fighting. Furthermore, the departure 
of most foreign teachers and professors, especially after 1984, con- 
tributed to the decline in the standards of academic institutions. 
Admissions of unqualified students became a standard practice as 
a result of pressures brought by various militias on academic 
institutions. More important, armed students reportedly often 
intimidated — and even killed — faculty members over disputes 
demanding undeserved higher grades. 

In the 1980s, there were three kinds of schools: public, private 
tuition-free, and private fee-based. Private tuition-free schools were 
available only at the preprimary and primary levels, and they were 
most often sponsored by philanthropic institutions. Many private 
fee-based schools were run by religious orders. 

Public schools were unevenly distributed among Lebanon's dis- 
tricts. The Beirut area had only 12.9 percent of the country's public 
schools, but a large number of Lebanon's private fee-based schools 
were concentrated in or near Greater Beirut (see table 2, Appen- 
dix A). 

Primary Education 

In 1987 five years of primary education were mandatory and 
available free to all Lebanese children. The curriculum of grades one 



81 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

through five was mostly academic, and Arabic was the major lan- 
guage of instruction. French and English were also major languages 
of instruction in private schools, although foreign languages were 
taught in public schools as well. No certification was awarded upon 
completion of the primary cycle. At the end of the fifth grade, the 
student qualified for admission to the four-year intermediate cycle 
or to the seven-year secondary cycle. 

Intermediate Education 

Intermediate education was a four- year cycle, consisting of grades 
six through nine for intermediate schools and one through four for 
vocational schools. Three different tracks were offered at this level: 
lower secondary was a four-year academic course designed to pre- 
pare the student for the baccalaureate examination; the upper 
primary track consisted of three years similar to lower secondary 
and a fourth year of preparation for entering vocational schools 
or teacher training institutes; and vocational study was a three- 
year practical course for less skilled trades. At the end of this cycle, 
students received an academic, technical, or professional certificate. 

Secondary Education 

Secondary education consisted of grades eleven through thirteen 
for academic programs or years one through three for vocational 
programs. Three tracks were available at this level. The secondary 
normal track consisted of three-year training programs for prospec- 
tive primary and intermediate school teachers. A teaching diploma 
was awarded to students of teacher training schools who passed 
examinations at the end of the twelfth school year. The secondary 
vocational track prepared students for careers in such fields as 
business, commerce, tourism, hotel management, electronics, con- 
struction, advertising, nursing, telecommunications, automobile 
mechanics, and laboratory technology. Finally, the secondary aca- 
demic track offered concentrations in philosophy (liberal arts 
curriculum), mathematics, and experimental sciences. The Bac- 
calaureate I certificate was awarded to students who passed the offi- 
cial examination given at the end of the twelfth school year, and 
the Baccalaureate II was awarded to students who passed official 
examinations at the end of the thirteenth school year. The Bac- 
calaureate II was necessary for admission to institutions of higher 
education in Lebanon. Many of the courses taken during the year 
were comparable to those at the college freshman level. 

Technical and Vocational Education 

In 1987 around 130 technical and vocational training institutes 
existed in Lebanon. Seventeen of these were state run, and the 



82 



The Society and Its Environment 



remaining 113 were private. Eighty-six of the private institutes were 
in the Greater Beirut area. Major public institutes included the 
Industrial Technical Institute, the Technical Institute for Tourism, 
and the Technical Teachers Institute. 

Higher Education 

In 1987 there were sixteen colleges and universities in Lebanon, 
and all but the Lebanese University were privately owned (see table 
3, Appendix A). The Lebanese University, established in 1952, 
was under the Ministry of Education. It had two main branches — 
one in East Beirut and the other in West Beirut — and smaller 
branches in the provinces of Ash Shamal, Al Janub, and Al Biqa. 
University faculties (departments) included law, political science 
and management, engineering, literature and humanities, educa- 
tion, social sciences, fine arts, journalism and advertising, busi- 
ness administration, and agriculture. The language of instruction 
was Arabic, and one foreign language was required by all faculties. 

Beirut Arab University was established in 1960 and was offi- 
cially an Egyptian-sponsored institution under the auspices of the 
Maqasid Society of Beirut. All affairs were controlled by Alexan- 
dria University in Egypt. Approximately 85 percent of the students 
enrolled at Beirut Arab University in the 1980s were non-Lebanese, 
coming primarily from Persian Gulf countries. Arabic was the 
primary language of instruction. 

St. Joseph's University, established in 1875, was administered 
by the Society of Jesus and had strong ties to the University of Lyons 
in France. St. Joseph's University had branches in Tripoli, Sidon, 
and Zahlah. French was the primary language of instruction, 
although some courses were offered in English. Faculties in 1987 
included theology, medicine, pharmacy, dentistry, engineering, law 
and political science, economics and business administration, and 
letters and humanities. 

The American University of Beirut (AUB) was initially estab- 
lished in 1866 by the Evangelical Mission to Syria. In 1987 final 
authority over the affairs of AUB rested with the board of trustees, 
whose permanent office was in New York City. The university was 
incorporated under the laws of the state of New York. The faculty 
of arts and sciences awarded bachelor's and master's degrees; the 
faculty of medicine awarded bachelor's and master's degrees in 
science, master's degrees in public health, and certificates in un- 
dergraduate nursing and basic laboratory techniques; the faculty 
of engineering and architecture awarded bachelor's and master's 
degrees in engineering as well as bachelor's degrees in architec- 
ture; the faculty of agriculture and food sciences awarded master's 



83 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

degrees in all departments, as well as doctorates in agronomy. 
English was the language of instruction at AUB. 

Health 

Before 1975 Lebanon boasted advanced health services and med- 
ical institutions that made Beirut a health care center for the en- 
tire Middle East region. The war, however, caused enormous 
problems. Emergency medicine and the treatment of traumatic 
injury overwhelmed the health care sector during the 1975 Civil 
War. Indeed, the problems in health care continued into the 1980s. 
A World Health Organization study conducted in 1983 found that 
the private sector dominated health care services and that public 
sector health organizations were in chaos (see table 4, Appendix A). 
The weakened Ministry of Public Health maintained little coordi- 
nation with other public sector health agencies, and over two-thirds 
of the ministry's budget (US$58.5 million in 1982) flowed to the 
private sector through inadequately monitored reimbursements for 
private hospital services. As of 1983, there were about 3.2 hospi- 
tal beds (0.23 of them public) for every 1,000 persons, but control 
over the quality of hospital and medical services was minimal, and 
many public and private hospital beds were unoccupied. There was 
about 1 doctor for every 1,250 inhabitants, but nurses and middle- 
level technical personnel were scarce. Furthermore, health personnel 
were concentrated in Beirut, with minimum care available in many 
outlying areas. The Ministry of Public Health, as well as other 
government and private agencies, operated small clinics and dis- 
pensaries, but few such centers existed in Beirut. Nowhere in 
Lebanon was there a health center that delivered a full range of 
primary health care services. 

Although epidemiology is central to public health programs, the 
WHO delegation found that government health services in Lebanon 
lacked appropriate epidemiological reporting techniques. At the 
local or community level, health personnel, especially doctors, rarely 
reported diseases to the health department, although they were 
legally obliged to do so for some diseases. A similar situation existed 
with respect to health establishments such as clinics, dispensaries, 
and hospitals. Consequently, not only was there a conspicuous 
absence of health records but, where available, they were often in- 
complete. 

Because of the lack of adequate data, only cautious inferences 
based on partial data and observations and interviews by the WHO 
mission can be made concerning the incidence of disease. Respira- 
tory infections and diarrheal diseases headed the list of causes of 
morbidity, and infectious diseases were endemic. 



84 



The American University 
of Beirut campus 
Courtesy Aramco World 



Malnutrition was reported to be restricted to groups living in 
particularly difficult situations, such as the Palestinian and Lebanese 
refugees. Studies on the growth and illness patterns of Lebanese 
children, initiated in 1960, indicated a stable 5 to 10 percent of 
undernutrition (defined as low weight and height for age) in chil- 
dren under five. Various sources reported a high incidence of mental 
retardation among children, with cases occurring in clusters and 
seemingly related to consanguineous marriages in certain commu- 
nities. 

* * * 

Rare are the books that are devoted exclusively to the study of 
Lebanese society. The small collection of such books includes Nura 
Alamuddin and Paul Starr's Crucial Bonds, Halim Barakat's Lebanon 
in Strife, Joseph Chamie's Religion and Fertility, Dominique Che val- 
uer's La Societe du Mont Liban a L'epoque de la Revolution Industrielle 
en Europe, Anne Fuller's Buarij: Portrait of a Lebanese Moslem Village, 
Samir Khalaf's Lebanon's Predicament and Persistence and Change in 
19th Century Lebanon, Fuad I. Khuri's From Village to Suburb, Sami 
Nasib Makarem's The Druze Faith, Huda Zurayk and Haroutune 
Armenian's Beirut 1984: A Population and Health Profile. Salim 
Nasr and Claude Dubar's At Tabaqat al Ijtima 'iyyah fi Lubnan (Social 
Classes in Lebanon), and Pierre Rondot'sy4/ Tawa'iffi ad Dawlah al 



85 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

Lubnaniyyah (Sects in the Lebanese State) are two valuable Arabic 
sources. Albert H. Hourani's Minorities in the Arab World is a clas- 
sic treatment of this subject, and Robert C. Betts's Christians in 
the Arab East gives a useful account of Christian denominations. 

Also useful are some general works on Lebanon that contain rele- 
vant information. These include Helena Cobban's The Making of 
Modern Lebanon, David C. Gordon's Lebanon: The Fragmented Na- 
tion and The Republic of Lebanon, Albert H. Hourani's Syria and 
Lebanon, Michael C. Hudson's The Precarious Republic, and Kamal 
S. Salibi's The Modern History of Lebanon. (For further information 
and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



86 



Chapter 3. The Economy 




An olive press, symbolizing the agricultural productivity of Lebanon 



AS THE LEBANESE state fragmented, so too did the national 
economy. Many observers have argued that because of this frag- 
mentation, there was not one economy in the late 1980s, but several. 
Areas held by some militia groups, most notably the Maronite (see 
Glossary) Christian heartland controlled by the Lebanese Forces, 
appeared well on their way to becoming de facto ministates. These 
militias were successfully usurping basic functions of government 
such as taxation and defense. 

Despite the fragmentation, there were still some shreds of the 
official economy. In late 1987 the main port of Beirut and Beirut 
International Airport were subject to intermittent government regu- 
lation. The Central Bank (also cited as Bank of Lebanon or Banque 
du Liban) maintained sizable financial reserves, although these 
declined sharply in the mid-1980s. There were spiraling budget 
deficits as the government attempted to reestablish the credibility 
of its security forces and maintain at least some social services. 

Measuring the government's impact, however, was another mat- 
ter. Although the government's financial role in the economy was 
growing, its role in the daily economic affairs of the Lebanese people 
was declining. The importance of the official economy in the late 
1980s depended on where one lived and how one felt politically. 
But the economic collapse could not be separated from the human 
tragedy. For example, two of the most salient facts of life in Beirut 
in February 1987 were the collapse of the Lebanese pound to less 
than one-hundredth of a United States dollar and the request by 
Palestinian religious authorities for a ruling on whether or not it 
would be permissible for the besieged refugees in the camps at Burj 
al Barajinah and Shatila to eat their dead. In a country where vio- 
lence had become endemic, where some 130,000 people had been 
killed and a further 1 million — a third of the population — had been 
injured, calculating the impact of the central government on the 
economy would be impossible. 

In the years that followed the outbreak of the 1975 Civil War, 
political developments dominated economic affairs. Improved secu- 
rity conditions — such as from late 1976 to early 1978, or from Sep- 
tember 1982 to January 1984 — yielded considerable economic 
benefits, as relative peace enabled the recovery of commerce. Peace- 
keeping forces — Syrian, Israeli, United Nations, United States, and 
West European — brought with them favorable economic conditions 
in the communities where they were stationed. But the positive 



89 



Lebanon: A Country Study 



effects were frequently shortlived. For example, when Syrian troops 
entered Beirut in February 1987 (the first time a recognized power 
had attempted to enforce its authority in the capital since the Febru- 
ary 1984 collapse of the Lebanese Army), there was a brief flurry 
of guarded economic optimism. The upswing of the Lebanese 
pound lasted only three weeks. But overall instability was the norm 
from 1975 to mid- 1987, and it became clear that nothing short of 
a total change in the country's political and security structure — in 
effect, the end of sectarian partitions and militia rule — would lead 
to any sustained revival of what had once been one of the world's 
most vibrant economies. 

By 1987 Lebanon had entered an era where reliable statistics 
on the state of the economy were usually absent. Lebanese 
economists were sometimes able to compile a few indicators, but 
the numbers were often based on incomplete data. But even with- 
out complete statistics, the downward trend of the national econ- 
omy was obvious. 

Bearing testimony to this trend, the Lebanese National Social 
Security Fund reported in May 1986 that 40 percent of the 
500,000-strong private sector work force was unemployed. Indus- 
try was running at barely 40 percent of capacity, and per capita 
income was down to around US$250 a year in 1986, five times 
lower than eleven years earlier. 

In 1985 estimates of the gross domestic product (GDP — see Glos- 
sary) varied from L£30 billion to as high as L£48.3 billion (for value 
of the Lebanese pound — see Glossary). In either case, GDP was 
no more than half of what it was in real terms in 1974. 

Although the collapse of GDP began with the start of the Civil 
War, the fall of the Lebanese currency began much later. On the 
eve of the war, it required only L£2.3 to buy a United States dol- 
lar. Currency values declined over the next several years, but it 
was not enough to destroy the basic Lebanese confidence in the 
pound, which was backed by substantial holdings of gold and for- 
eign exchange. Whereas in 1981 the exchange rate had averaged 
L£4.31 to the dollar, by the end of 1982, with the new govern- 
ment of President Amin Jumayyil (also seen as Gemayel) in office, 
the exchange rate was back to L£3.81 to the dollar. 

The pound, however, began depreciating rapidly in the after- 
math of further Beirut clashes in early 1984 and the withdrawal 
of the Multinational Force (MNF) of peacekeeping troops from 
the capital. Although there was widespread currency speculation, 
the Central Bank could do little to investigate this problem became 
of Lebanon's tough banking secrecy laws. 



90 




The economic prosperity of Beirut can be seen 
in this photograph taken before the 1975 Civil War. 

Courtesy Aramco World 



91 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

Between January and December 1984, the pound lost just under 
half its value against the dollar, while in 1985 the trend gained 
speed, resulting in a further 60-percent erosion in value. The Cen- 
tral Bank was widely criticized, especially by the commercial banks, 
for failing to act decisively to halt the pound's slide. But even greater 
criticism was directed against commercial bankers and leading poli- 
ticians, who were constantly accused of speculating against the na- 
tional currency. 

By 1986 the country was on the verge of hyperinflation as the 
pound lost almost 85 percent of its already shrunken value during 
the course of the year. On February 11, 1987, the currency crashed 
through the psychologically important barrier of L£100 to the dol- 
lar and continued its fall. By August the pound was trading at more 
than L£250 to the dollar. Compounding the problem was that these 
events occurred after a year in which the dollar had fallen sharply 
against most major international currencies. 

The fundamental principle of the Lebanese banking system had 
been a freely convertible pound. Citizens were free to hold foreign 
currency accounts in their banks, and remittances received from 
friends and family living abroad could be processed with relative 
ease through banking channels. As the pound began its decline, 
the importance of foreign currencies (particularly the United States 
dollar) grew, and a "twin currency" economy emerged. Complex 
systems were soon set up to circumvent the banking system, not 
for fear of governmental interference but to prevent the loss of 
deposits or of letters of credit through bank robberies. In the twin 
currency economy, foreign cash and drafts on bank accounts held 
outside the country became increasingly common. It became 
impossible, however, to calculate how much foreign cash was enter- 
ing the country once transfers began to bypass the banking sys- 
tem. But it was clear that most people were not receiving enough 
to retain their pre- 1975 living standards. 

By 1987 ordinary Lebanese were living in a very strange econ- 
omy. Public services functioned according to the ability of the 
government to pay staff, the ability of different groups to tap into 
utilities (with or without official permission) and the ability of local 
groups (with or without official help) to keep services operational. 
The costs of basics, such as gasoline, home fuel oil, and cooking 
gas were all subject to government price restraints, yet prices could 
double or triple in times of shortages, as roads between refineries, 
gasoline pumps, and fuel depots were cut. People found the govern- 
ment price controls ineffective, and the struggle to secure vital 
goods and commodities reflected not so much a free market as a 



92 



The Economy 



free-for-all. By 1987 a dozen years of conflict had shown that 
economic control, as well as political power, came from the barrel 
of a gun. 

By the late 1980s, years of conflict had distorted the economy. 
Total GDP was down, but the proportion of GDP contributed by 
the government was up. The national currency collapsed, and the 
country began sustaining balance of payments deficits. One com- 
mentator noted that 1986 marked the first time since the Civil War 
started in 1975 that Lebanon had suffered economic hardship to 
such an extent that it had affected the middle classes as well as the 
traditional urban poor. Another observer argued that Lebanon, 
once the model of modernity in the Middle East, was being threat- 
ened with "de-development." 

Recent Economic History 

Civil War and Partial Recovery, 1974-82 

Lebanon traditionally has had a dynamic economy. In the years 
leading up to the Civil War, the country enjoyed high growth rates, 
an influx of foreign capital, and steadily rising per capita income. 
Although imports were often five or six times greater than exports, 
earnings from tourism, transit trade, services, and remittances from 
abroad counterbalanced the trade deficit. 

In 1973 (the last prewar year for which detailed figures were avail- 
able in late 1987), GDP at current prices totaled US$2.7 billion, 
compared with just US$1.24 billion in 1966. In 1974 GDP rose 
to around US$3.5 billion because of an increase in the value of 
the Lebanese pound. Per capita GDP rose from around US$560 
in 1966 to US$1,023 in 1973 because productivity increased faster 
than population growth and because the Lebanese pound gained 
ground against the dollar. 

The Lebanese economy was healthy in the years leading up to 
the Civil War. The service sector grew fastest during this period. 
Commerce grew at almost the same rate and by 1973 accounted 
for almost one-third of GDP. The growth of commerce had im- 
portant implications because customs duties were a major part of 
government revenues, sometimes amounting to nearly half of the 
government's total income. The Lebanese pound was strong, credit 
was easy, and there was a balance of skilled and unskilled labor. 
Internal markets were protected, and Lebanese industry was find- 
ing increasingly useful outlets abroad, notably in the Persian Gulf 
countries. 

The petrodollar boom that followed oil price increases by 
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries after the 



93 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

Arab-Israeli October 1973 War led to a period of expansion for 
Lebanon. Lebanese banks became major channels for soaring Arab 
oil revenues. In addition, Arab, West European, and American 
bankers bought shares in Lebanese financial institutions to secure 
a share of the profits. 

Economic development, however, was uneven. The government 
was so wedded to free enterprise that it essentially failed to reduce 
economic and social inequities in various communities. President 
Fuad Shihab (also seen as Chehab) made some effort to remedy 
these inequities by pursuing development projects in the tradition- 
ally neglected south and north (see The Rise of Shihabism, 1958-64, 
ch. 1). But the center of the country — Beirut and the central Biqa 
Valley — was riding a seemingly never-ending economic boom. 

The impetus for socially oriented economic development declined 
under Shihab' s successor, Charles Hilu (also seen as Helou), and 
disappeared entirely under President Sulayman Franjiyah (also seen 
as Franjieh) (see The Hilu Era, 1964-70; The Franjiyah Era, 
1970-76, ch.l). The consequences of economic neglect were felt 
in the late 1970s and the 1980s, as Shias (see Glossary), who had 
migrated from the south and the outlying reaches of the Biqa Valley, 
made their increasingly militant presence felt in Beirut, transform- 
ing the southern half of the city into a new, Shia canton, to rank 
alongside overwhelmingly Christian East Beirut and predominantly 
Muslim (i.e., Sunni and Druze — see Glossary) West Beirut (see 
Sectarianism, ch. 2). 

The first nineteen months of the Lebanese Civil War (April 
1975-November 1976) witnessed widespread destruction of infra- 
structure and services, mostly in Beirut. Industry sustained direct 
damage valued at between L£5 and L£7 billion. Indirect damage 
was valued at between L£972 million and L£2.23 billion. Some 
250 industries, capitalized at L£l billion, were destroyed, and as 
much as one-fifth of industry's fixed capital was lost. After the first 
nineteen months of fighting, losses amounted to L£7.5 billion (L£6.2 
billion sustained by the private sector and L£1.3 billion by the public 
sector), according to the Beirut Chamber of Commerce and In- 
dustry. 

Post- 1976 recovery was limited, with industrial production ap- 
proaching only two-thirds of prewar levels. Further clashes in 1978 
again hampered production. Although in 1980 industrial output 
in current financial terms appeared to exceed prewar levels, infla- 
tion had rendered such comparisons almost meaningless. In 1979 
the newly established Council for Development and Reconstruc- 
tion (CDR) unveiled a L£22 billion reconstruction program to span 
five years, backed by Arab aid (see Aid and Reconstruction, 



94 



The Economy 



this ch.). Only some of the proposed reconstruction work was ini- 
tiated, however. 

Instability ruined the tourist industry. The Civil War included 
the notorious battle of the hotels, in which the Phoenicia, St. 
Georges, and Holiday Inn — all major luxury hotels — became 
fiercely contested militia strongpoints (see The Early Stages of Com- 
bat, ch. 5). A score of smaller establishments suffered the same 
fate, as fighting ripped through the heart of the capital. Because 
the hotels were close to the Green Line (see Glossary), which divided 
the warring factions, they were forced to remain closed for busi- 
ness when the fighting stopped (see fig. 9). 

After the war, there were indications that a less centralized in- 
dustrial economy might emerge. The cities of Zahlah, Sidon, and 
Tripoli, for example, enjoyed a boom. But growth in these cities 
reflected fragmentation of the country as much as economic revival. 

Lebanon's ability to export industrial goods was damaged by 
internal unrest and external pressures. The good reputation once 
enjoyed by Lebanese clothing manufacturers was undermined by 
imports of cheaper garments that were relabeled and reexported 
as "Lebanese." By the end of 1981, Iraq had halted all imports 
of Lebanese garments, and Egypt had frozen preferential terms 
for Lebanese industrial exports because of false labeling. Although 
the Egyptian and Iraqi measures were rescinded in 1 982 , they were 
symptomatic of the pressures that Lebanon faced throughout the 
1980s. 

Events elsewhere in the region also had an impact on Lebanon. 
A tripling of world fuel prices between 1973 and 1981 reduced the 
country's competitive edge. When Syria imposed restrictions on 
transit trade, freight forwarders found it increasingly uneconomic 
to ship goods to Persian Gulf destinations via Beirut. The prices 
of imported raw materials were higher than ever, while export mar- 
kets were increasingly restricted. Thus, even before the Israeli in- 
vasion of 1982, the Lebanese economy was in bad shape. 

Invasion and Trauma, 1982-87 

Lebanon, torn by its sectarian and political disputes, was fur- 
ther cursed by invasion and a seemingly endless intermingling of 
internally and externally inspired conflict from 1982 onward. Beirut 
suffered grievously between June 6, 1982, when Israeli troops first 
crossed the Lebanese border, and September 16, when they com- 
pleted their seizure of West Beirut. Normal economic activity was 
brought to a standstill. Factories that had sprung up in the southern 
suburbs were damaged or destroyed, highways were torn up, and 
houses were ruined or pitted by artillery fire and rockets. Close 



95 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

to 40,000 homes — about one-fourth of all Beirut's dwellings — were 
destroyed. Eighty-five percent of all schools south of the city were 
damaged or destroyed. The protracted closure of Beirut's port and 
airport drastically affected commerce and industry. By 1984 the 
World Bank (see Glossary) and the CDR agreed that Beirut would 
require some US$12 billion to replace or renovate damaged facili- 
ties and to restore services that had not been properly maintained 
since 1975. 

In a December 31, 1982, national broadcast, President Amin 
Jumayyil called for the world to launch a new "Marshall Plan" 
to help reconstruct Lebanon. A series of conferences were held with 
major potential aid donors. A number of reconstruction projects 
were launched with support from the World Bank, the United 
States, and France. Roads began to be repaired, ports were cleared 
of debris, and schools and hospitals were built or rebuilt. But noth- 
ing was done on the grandiose scale Jumayyil had originally en- 
visaged. 

It became clear that Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf coun- 
tries were not prepared to provide Lebanon with major reconstruc- 
tion funds until the World Bank and other Western financial 
institutions had taken the lead in the reconstruction effort. And 
repeated breakdowns of fragile truces meant that from 1984 to 1987 
there were no real opportunities for large-scale reconstruction 
efforts. 

Still, financial and business circles were optimistic between Sep- 
tember 1982 and January 1984 because Western-backed reconstruc- 
tion plans seemed attainable under the presidency of Amin 
Jumayyil. But the mood did not last. Economic progress was in- 
sufficient to override the recurrence of sectarian strife, and the 
government seemed ineffective in reconstruction and reconcilia- 
tion. When Beirut was again divided in February 1984, and the 
troops of the ill-fated MNF evacuated, a turning point was reached. 
From that point on, it became impossible to ignore the downward 
spiral of the Lebanese economy. 

Foreign banks began selling and moving out. The decline of the 
Lebanese pound intensified, and hyperinflation set in. Public debt 
soared, and only drastic cutbacks in government purchases, which 
were virtually restricted to oil, ensured an overall balance of pay- 
ments surplus in 1985. 

By 1986 the inflation rate was well over 100 percent. Govern- 
ment revenues from taxation and customs duties continued to erode. 
And one account declared that at the end of 1986 "currency specu- 
lation and black marketeering have become the principal areas of 
business activity." Economic control was falling into the hands of 



96 



The Economy 



those who possessed hard currency. The militias' tight grip on cus- 
toms revenues gave them increasing control over what was left of 
the national economy; and their strength increased as the central 
government's control over national finances weakened. Although 
the Central Bank was still the guardian of one of the highest volumes 
of per capita foreign assets in any developing country, the govern- 
ment's ability to use these assets to reconstruct the country's shat- 
tered financial system or national economy was doubtful. 

The Official Economy in the Mid-1980s 
Balance of Payments 

Before the early 1900s, Lebanon generally had a balance of pay- 
ments surplus. After that, however, the balance of payments situ- 
ation fluctuated considerably. In 1983 the Central Bank reported 
a deficit of US$933 million; a year later, the deficit was set at about 
US$1.4 billion. But in 1985 there was an overall current account 
surplus of US$381 million as Central Bank foreign assets rose and 
the government purchased fewer weapons. Progress was not main- 
tained, however; by the end of May 1986, the Central Bank esti- 
mated a US$407 million deficit, comprising a US$583 million 
Central Bank shortfall and a US$176 million surplus at the com- 
mercial banks. Central Bank governor Edmond Nairn complained 
that the shortfall was caused by pressure from the government to 
finance runaway public expenditure and a failure to do anything 
about the state's withering revenue base. 

Public debt soared as the government's formal revenue sources — 
taxes and customs receipts — dried up. In 1984 the government spent 
about US$1 .6 billion more than it obtained in revenues. The deficit 
had to be financed by borrowing US$840 million from the Central 
Bank and by selling treasury bonds. In 1985 the situation deterio- 
rated even further, and by August the Chamber of Deputies had 
approved a budget based on US$611 million in government 
revenues. However, state revenues that year amounted to only 
US$224 million. The principal reason for the deficit was the per- 
sistent failure to secure receipts from customs duties. Public debt 
reached US$931 million by the end of 1986, and by the end of 
March 1987 it had increased even more. 

Government Revenues 

In the pre-Civil War days, receipts from customs duties accounted 
for nearly half of total government income. In 1984 customs receipts 
fell to US$69.4 million, barely one-third their 1983 level. The 
Ministry of Finance stated that customs receipts should be ten times 



97 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

higher than they were in 1984 to meet its targets for this revenue 
source. Instead, they fell further— to US$24.3 million in 1985. In 
1986 total government spending was estimated at US$413 million 
against income of barely US$23 million. Of this already paltry sum, 
customs receipts amounted to just US$9.7 million. 

In the mid-1980s, the government still had assets to cover its 
financial obligations. A November 1985 report listed as the nation's 
principal assets its gold reserves (about US$10 billion in foreign 
exchange reserves) and holdings in its Intra Investment Company 
(see Banking and Finance, this ch.). In addition, the report said, 
there were more than US$440 million in public sector deposits with 
the Central Bank, about US$200 million in secured debts owed 
to the state, and about US$86 million in various Central Bank 
assets. Against this, however, domestic public debt totaled US$2.5 
billion, while foreign debt totaled US$200 million. 

Some of the government's assets were unusual. By virtue of its 
Intra Investment Company holdings, the government had an im- 
portant stake in the Casino du Liban, a famed nightclub at Juniyah. 
The casino also epitomized the way in which government had be- 
come dependent on militia deals to secure financing. In 1986 the 
casino reached an agreement with the Lebanese Forces (LF) militia 
under which the LF would close all illegal gambling houses under 
its control in exchange for a monthly income of US$1.2 million. 
At that time the casino's earnings were about US$2 million a month, 
of which 40 percent was paid in royalties to the government. 

External Debt and Foreign Exchange 

Lebanon had many economic problems in the 1980s, but for- 
eign debt was not one of them. As late as 1986, the total official 
foreign debt was estimated at no more than US$250 million. The 
Bank of International Settlements put the country's external bank 
indebtedness at US$1.7 billion at the end of 1985, a decline from 
US$1.78 billion in 1984 and US$1.8 billion in 1983. Of the 1986 
total, US$356 million was short-term (one-year) debt. The Organi- 
zation for Economic Co-operation and Development put total 
external debt, excluding International Monetary Fund (IMF — 
see Glossary) credits, at US$938 million at the end of 1984. Long- 
term debt amounted to US$481 million, and total debt servicing, 
excluding IMF credit, amounted to US$268 million. 

Total foreign reserves greatly exceeded debt. Throughout the 
1980s, the Central Bank maintained a tight grip on the country's 
gold reserves and tried to do the same with its foreign currency 
reserves. The government held 9,222,000 ounces of gold, officially 
valued on the bank's books at US$42.23 an ounce and ostensibly 



98 



Business in Beirut, in one form or another, 
managed to continue throughout years of civil strife. 
Courtesy Mokhless Al-Hariri/The Georgetown Design Group, Inc. 

worth only US$389 million. In reality, however, it was worth at 
least US$3 billion. 

In 1984 foreign exchange reserves, valued at US$1.9 billion in 
1983, declined to US$652 million. In 1985 the reserves fell further 
to around US$300 million early in the year but recovered sharply 
to US$945 million in November. Then, at the start of 1986, there 
was a run on the Lebanese pound, and reserves plunged to US$300 
million in March. The Central Bank attempted to counter falling 
reserves by forcing banks to increase their statutory reserves and 
take up subscriptions of treasury bills. 

Inflation 

Statistics from the General Labor Federation of Lebanon (Con- 
federation Generale des Travailleurs du Liban) showed that for 
the first three months of 1985, there was a cost of living increase 
of 30 percent. The statistical directorate at the prime minister's 
office, however, put the increased cost for a single person living 
at subsistence level at 100 percent over the same period. The fed- 
eration's statistics showed an 86-percent inflation rate in the 12 
months ending June 1986, with food prices showing the highest 
increases. At the end of 1986, the federation estimated that dur- 
ing the first 10 months of 1986, the cost of living for a family of 



99 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

5 had risen by 150 percent. Monthly expenditure on basic items — 
excluding education, rent, and medical expenses — had risen from 
L£5,652 to L£14,083. Overall, the federation estimated that 1986 
had witnessed a 226-percent increase in prices. By March 1987, 
the federation was reporting a 250-percent inflation rate, with food 
prices having increased 300 percent over the previous 12 months. 

Periodically, the government ordered wage increases, such as 
the 25-percent increase for all state employees enacted on January 
1, 1986, but the increases did not keep up with inflation. In the 
anarchic circumstances of Lebanon, no amount of governmental 
action could resolve the underlying problem of inflation. 

The Budget 

The government of Amin Jumayyil had to face the seemingly 
insuperable problem of securing revenues and curtailing expendi- 
tures in 1987. Sectarian politics made the problem even more com- 
plicated. On the revenue side, the government lost its power to 
collect customs receipts because the militia forces controlled the 
unofficial, or illegal, ports. (Illegal ports are those not under the 
control of the Lebanese government; no official customs duties are 
collected at these ports.) Militia activity also hampered the govern- 
ment's ability to collect direct taxes and even to collect utility fees 
for electricity, water, and telecommunications. During good years, 
however, the government was successful at collecting revenues in 
some areas around Beirut. But in other parts of the country, and 
sometimes in the Beirut area, the militias were the only revenue 
collectors, imposing their own tax systems on areas under their con- 
trol. This situation was extensive in the area controlled by the LF. 
The LF set up an organization in 1980 to supervise revenue col- 
lection from approximately eight illegal ports under its control. The 
LF also imposed levies on a variety of private retail establishments, 
from hotels and restaurants to gasoline stations and shops. 

On the sending side, the biggest problem confronting the 
government throughout the 1980s was subsidies. It had long sub- 
sidized bread and sugar, and it was reluctant to remove these sub- 
sides, which benefited the poorest groups. Instead, the government 
targeted fuel subsidies. In November 1985, Minister of Finance 
Camille Shamun (also seen as Chamoun) issued a decree abolish- 
ing state subsidies on gasoline. Prices at the pump almost doubled 
but were still less than US$1 per gallon. (The ministry still faced 
a cumulative deficit of US$365 million for fuel imports at the end 
of 1985, equivalent to about half the national budget. Actual fuel 
imports that year cost US$509 million.) The price increases trig- 
gered one-day general strikes throughout the country, but the 



100 



The Economy 



collapse of international oil prices a few weeks later helped bring 
prices back down. 

The question of fuel subsidies, however, remained unresolved. 
In 1986 the IMF told the government that raising local petroleum 
prices would be the most effective way of curbing the runaway 
budget deficit. The Central Bank also pushed to abolish fuel sub- 
sidies, and it informed the Ministry of Industry and Petroleum that 
it would stop payments for oil imports unless the ministry took 
action to reduce the deficit on its oil account, which the bank pre- 
dicted would reach US$55 million that year. 

In January 1987, the government increased fuel prices by 72 
percent, but prices were still far from realistic. Before the price in- 
crease, consumers paid about seven cents per liter for gasoline. After 
the increase, they paid twelve cents per liter — still less than half 
the price commonly found in the United States, a country with 
one of the lowest gasoline prices in the world. In effect, such prices 
meant that gasoline was rationed and that when it was available, 
there would be an illegal surcharge. The pricing system also fostered 
a flourishing trade in illegal petroleum exports. Nonetheless, in June 
1987 the government again rejected the possibility of terminating 
state subsidies on petroleum products. 

Banking and Finance 
Domestic Banking 

Banking was one of the great strengths of the Lebanese econ- 
omy before civil strife began in 1975. Between 1920 and 1964, the 
Bank of Syria and Lebanon, a French private bank and primarily 
a commercial enterprise, performed the central banking functions 
of being the sole issuer of notes and the holder of the government's 
accounts. The bank's charter expired in March 1964. 

Until 1964 banks were totally unregulated. There were no spe- 
cial banking laws, no central bank, and no restrictions on the open- 
ing of new banks. No rules governed minimum reserve ratios, and 
banks were not even asked to produce regular balance sheets. This 
situation led to the creation of many small banks. 

In April 1964, the Central Bank was established and given 
responsibility for controlling the Lebanese pound, for issuing notes, 
and for acting as the government's banker. Although prohibited 
from engaging in normal commercial banking, it had the author- 
ity to regulate commercial banks. 

In 1966 the Lebanese-owned Intra Bank collapsed, precipitat- 
ing a banking crisis. Intra Bank accounted for about 10 percent 
of total bank deposits and about 40 percent of deposits with 



101 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

Lebanese-owned banks. (Observers believed that the Intra Bank 
crisis was brought on by Lebanese politicians who had manipu- 
lated fiscal affairs to their own gain.) 

Intra Bank's collapse was followed by its restructuring, with the 
Central Bank and the Lebanese government taking major share- 
holdings. The successor organization, officially called the Intra 
Investment Company but often referred to as "Intra," became 
a major shareholder in various institutions, notably Middle East 
Airlines, the national flag carrier. The main banking arm was Bank 
Al Mashrek, in which Intra held an 84-percent share following 
Intra' s acquisition early that year of a 42-percent share held previ- 
ously by the J. P. Morgan Overseas Capital Corporation. 

By 1985 the Central Bank held the biggest single share in 
Intra — 27.75 percent. The government of Kuwait held 19 percent; 
the government of Lebanon, 10 percent; the National Bank of 
Kuwait, 3.75 percent; the government of Qatar, 3.25 percent; and 
various private shareholders (many of them from the Persian Gulf), 
36.25 percent. The value of the Central Bank and Lebanese govern- 
ment shares in the Intra Investment Company in late 1985 was 
estimated at more than US$116 million. 

Throughout the mid-1980s, however, the Central Bank was en- 
gaged in disputes with the Intra Investment Company's manage- 
ment, a wrangle that sometimes appeared to be almost a personal 
feud between Central Bank governor Nairn, a guardian of finan- 
cial orthodoxy, and Roger Tamraz, arguably Lebanon's most con- 
troversial and daring entrepreneur. Tamraz had been elected 
chairman of Intra following the company's August 1983 general 
meeting. He had a highly personal managerial style and had 
engaged in questionable business ventures in 1983 and 1984. The 
Central Bank became concerned and challenged Intra' s policy on 
foreign bank acquisitions. The Central Bank wanted a new board 
of directors elected and wanted Intra run by Central Bank represen- 
tatives and Persian Gulf shareholders. In August 1986, when 
Tamraz 's three-year term was due to expire, the government 
demanded a shareholders meeting and initiated legal proceedings 
against him over his chairmanship. Tamraz responded by calling 
a shareholders meeting for December 29, 1986, the first to be con- 
vened since he became chairman. 

At the meeting, which was held in East Beirut without represen- 
tatives from 80 percent of the stockholders or Persian Gulf represen- 
tatives, a new board was elected, with Tamraz at the helm. The 
outcome should have been a moment of triumph for Tamraz, but 
it was not. His tactics aroused concern from Intra' s staff and the 
Central Bank, which claimed that Tamraz had pressured some 



102 



The Economy 



representatives to miss the election meeting. Two weeks later, 
Tamraz resigned. In losing his position at Intra, Tamraz also lost 
much of his official influence with Middle East Airlines (see Trans- 
portation and Communications, this ch.). Nevertheless, he did hold 
onto one very important position: chairmanship of Bank Al 
Mashrek. Although the events of early 1987 were a major setback 
to Tamraz in his quasi-public roles, his own business interests 
remained substantial, and he was still a very potent force on the 
financial and commercial scene. Tamraz was replaced by Jamil 
Iskandar, a businessman who had been on Intra' s board in 1983. 

In the face of the Intra-Central Bank controversy, domestic banks 
fared poorly and were plagued by nonperforming loans. One local 
banker claimed that at the end of 1985 nonperforming loans 
accounted for 45 percent of his bank's total loan portfolio, com- 
pared with 25 percent a year earlier. Banking costs rose while fierce 
competition in a depressed market resulted in excessively high in- 
terest rates. In addition, there were more than 50 bank robberies 
in 1985, entailing known losses of US$800,000. 

To overcome the problem, some domestic banks increased their 
overseas activities. The Intra Investment Company, for example, 
bought commercial interests of the Paris-based Banque Stern and 
a small Swiss bank, the Banca di Particepiazioni e Investimenti. 
In 1986 it also sought to purchase the four Egyptian branches of 
the local Jammal Trust Bank. 

On paper, however, the banks did not appear to be doing too 
badly. Total assets of the commercial banks rose from about L£100 
billion at the end of 1984 to about L£162 billion a year later. About 
70 percent of these holdings were believed to be in foreign cur- 
rency, which meant that in December 1984 assets amounted to 
about US$11.3 billion and almost US$9 billion a year later. 

The Central Bank 

Throughout years of the most appalling political, economic, and 
social suffering, the Central Bank was the only institution that 
preserved its reputation for essentially sound management. Since 
1964 the Central Bank had been the guardian of the country's finan- 
cial orthodoxy. It embodied the business beliefs common to a vari- 
ety of Lebanese citizens, from merchants and bankers to the 
traditional Christian and Muslim political leaders. 

From 1974 onward, successive bank governors constantly had 
to determine how much the Central Bank should squeeze commer- 
cial banks in order to secure revenue for the government through 
the sale of treasury bills. Securing revenue this way provided the 
bank with some of its more anxious movements as it saw its 



103 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

share of public debt climb steadily, particularly in the mid- 
1980s. 

The Central Bank's activities eventually became controversial, 
and key issues needed to be addressed. There was the question of 
whether the bank should use the country's still considerable reserves 
for reconstruction and development projects (see Aid and Recon- 
struction, this ch.). There was also the issue of the extent to which 
the bank should continue propping up the Lebanese pound in the 
face of currency speculation, widely believed to involve leading 
Lebanese politicians. 

Still, the Central Bank functioned with surprising efficiency, 
despite its location in the middle of the West Beirut battleground 
and despite the vicissitudes of the 1970s and 1980s. It reported a 
L£1.2 billion profit for 1984, essentially from domestic lending oper- 
ations. In 1985 the profits were L£2.6 billion and in 1986, L£4.9 
billion. As customary, the bank kept 20 percent of its profits for 
reserves and sent 80 percent to the treasury. Although profits ap- 
peared respectable when measured in United States dollars, they 
showed that the bank was losing the battle to maintain its own real 
income or that of the government. Thus profits, calculated at year- 
end rates, were US$137.5 million in 1984, US$124.2 million in 
1985, and just US$56.4 million in 1986. 

Although the Central Bank was keeping the government solvent, 
it eventually reached a watershed in 1986. At the start of the year, 
public debt totaled L£53.4 billion (about US$3 billion), of which 
the bank's share was 25 percent. By May, however, its share had 
ballooned to 44 percent. Bank loans to the state rose by 41 percent 
in the first 10 months of 1986 to total L£22 billion, compared with 
L£15.6 billion at the start of the year. Concern over the bank's 
funding of public debt grew, causing undersubscription of trea- 
sury bills. At the same time, the Central Bank imposed new regu- 
lations that angered the commercial banks. 

Prime Minister Rashid Karami intervened in May 1986 by help- 
ing to negotiate a new agreement in which the size of commercial 
banks' statutory reserves was reduced, as was the amount of deposits 
that they had to keep in the form of treasury bills. The agreement, 
unfortunately, came at a time of renewed clashes between Shia Amal 
militiamen and Palestinians in the southern Beirut refugee camps. 
The clashes pushed down the value of the pound even further at 
a time when the Central Bank accord with the commercial banks 
had been expected to strengthen the currency (see Chaos in Beirut 
and Syrian Peacemaking Efforts, ch. 5). 

The measures negotiated by Karami proved insufficient either 
to restore faith in the currency or to end the dispute between the 



104 



The Economy 



commercial banks and the Central Bank. The Central Bank im- 
posed tighter controls in December 1986. It raised the statutory 
reserve to 13 percent, increased the volume of bank deposits to be 
kept in treasury bills, and banned loans in local currency to non- 
residents (unless they were for trade purposes). The bank also for- 
bade nonresident banks from receiving deposits, providing credits, 
or opening accounts in Lebanese pounds. Understandably, the com- 
mercial banks opposed the new rules. Before the announcement, 
only nine of the eighty-two commercial banks then operating were 
in violation of regulations. But under the new measures, sixty- three 
banks would have to increase reserves and treasury bill purchases 
to be in compliance. 

The commercial banks protested. They believed that the Cen- 
tral Bank's attempts to force them to cover the budget deficit were 
preventing them from undertaking more profitable activities. In 
January 1987, the Central Bank softened its position. Its new policy 
meant that the largest banks were obliged to keep no less than 45 
percent of their deposits in treasury bills, on top of the 13 percent 
required as statutory reserves. This left the banks with limited funds 
for productive lending. 

The Central Bank's actions did little to improve the national cur- 
rency, boost the economy, or ease relations with the commercial 
banks. Just a few weeks later, on February 1 1 , 1987, it took L£100 
to buy a single United States dollar. The subsequent deployment 
of Syrian Army units in West Beirut temporarily reversed the sit- 
uation, improving the rate to L£85 to US$1, but on March 3 the 
pound lost 20 percent of its value in a single day's hectic trading. 
The Central Bank accused commercial banks of attempting to hoard 
foreign currency and of acting in league with speculators. But the 
Lebanese Bankers' Association blamed the Central Bank for fail- 
ing to stabilize the market when the dollar began to move and for 
selling dollars too late. 

International Banking 

Many international banks pulled out of Beirut in the 1980s. For 
example, the First National Bank of Chicago sold its local interests 
to local investors for US$7.5 million in 1982. But the replacement 
institution, First Phoenician Bank, ran into liquidity problems in 
1984, when the managing director, Waji Muawad, allegedly ab- 
sconded with US$13 million of the bank's funds. Bank Al Mashrek 
initiated takeover proceedings in 1985. 

In 1985 Bank Al Mashrek also bought two branches of the Brit- 
ish Standard Chartered Bank. Banque Libano-Francaise bought 
the Toronto-based Bank of Nova Scotia's local operation. The 



105 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

Moscow Narodny Bank closed its branch, handing over its local 
business to Bank Handlowy for the Middle East, the local subsidi- 
ary of Warsaw's Bank Handlowy. The Chase Manhattan Bank 
and Bank of America both closed their Beirut operations, the former 
handing over its business to Banque Sabbag et Francaise pour le 
Moyen Orient. By the end of 1986, only two United States banks 
were still operating in Lebanon — Citibank and American Express 
International. 

The British Bank of the Middle East (BBME), the second larg- 
est foreign bank in Lebanon, resisted the trend as long as possi- 
ble. In 1976 the bank's headquarters in Bab Idris had been the 
target for one of the biggest heists in history. Losses of cash and 
contents of safe-deposit boxes amounted to about US$24 million. 
BBME recovered and maintained operations, however, and opened 
branches in East Beirut as that part of the city became a distinct 
entity. At the start of Amin Jumayyil's presidency, BBME's fu- 
ture appeared promising. Its assets stood at L£1.3 billion (about 
US$315 million). But the growing insecurity of 1984, the kidnap- 
ping of two senior managers, and a robbery in West Beirut in 1985 
prompted the management to close down four of its six branches 
in the Greater Beirut area at the end of 1985. Thereafter, the bank 
maintained a single branch in West Beirut, another in East Beirut, 
and a third in Tripoli. 

Transportation and Communications 

Lebanon's mountainous terrain limits transportation between 
different parts of the country. Transportation has also been lim- 
ited by warfare in the 1970s and 1980s; by militia control of key 
ports, highways, and access points; by the destruction of the coun- 
try's former railroad network; and by the near-destruction of its 
aviation links with the rest of the world. 

Roads 

In 1987 Lebanon had some 8,000 kilometers of roads and a high- 
way network, most of which was in various states of disrepair. There 
were three routes of overwhelming importance, each radiating from 
Beirut. To the north was the road to Tripoli, Lebanon's second 
largest city, a route that also passed through such major towns as 
Juniyah and Jubayl. To the east, crossing the Lebanon Mountains, 
was the highway to Damascus, passing through the key town of 
Shtawrah. And to the south was the road to Sidon and Tyre (see 
fig. 6). Lebanon possessed a second north-south road axis, run- 
ning along the length of the Biqa Valley. Roads in the northern 
valley converged on the Beirut-Damascus highway at Shtawrah and 



106 



The Economy 



linked the important market towns of Baalbek and Zahlah with the 
primary road network. The southern valley's local road network 
also centered on Shtawrah at its northern end. 

Cross-mountain routes, which linked the northern Biqa Valley 
with Juniyah and Tripoli and the southern valley with Sidon, were 
of relatively little importance in times of peace. In the 1980s, 
however, ordinary travelers have used these routes to circumvent 
roadblocks on the major roads, and drug dealers have used them 
for transport (see Crop Production, this ch.). Private militias have 
also used them to secure lines of communication between the coast 
and outlying areas. Minor cross-border routes into Syria have also 
been important entry routes from time to time for Palestinian and 
sometimes Iranian fighters entering Lebanon. These roads have 
also served as exit points for produce funneled via Lebanon onto 
the Syrian black market. 

After its establishment in 1961, the Executive Council for Major 
Projects (Conseil Executif des Grands Projets) drew up a plan for 
a 241 -kilometer highway network. The plan was to transform the 
three main routes from Beirut into four-lane, divided highways 
through the construction of new roads or the expansion of existing 
ones. But because of bureaucratic delays, little was done before 
the outbreak of the Civil War in 1975, although some roads were 
upgraded. A drive to complete the project was undertaken in 1980; 
the US$1.6 billion program continued, well into the mid-1980s, 
albeit somewhat haphazardly in view of the uncertain security con- 
ditions. 

By 1987 most of the sixty-five kilometers of the Lebanon sec- 
tion of the Beirut-Damascus highway, including a difficult stretch 
through the Lebanon Mountains, approximated international high- 
way standards. The government hoped to be able to implement 
plans drawn up by consultants from the Federal Republic of Ger- 
many (West Germany) for a full highway link between Beirut and 
the Syrian border. Likewise, most of the northern coastal high- 
way to Tripoli was complete, except for the final section from Tripoli 
to the Syrian border. Work on the southern coastal highway lagged, 
however. Some sections between Beirut and Sidon had been com- 
pleted, but there was little progress on the stretch between Sidon 
and Tyre. 

The existence of new highways did not necessarily mean they 
were available for use. For example, during much of the early 1980s 
stretches of the northern coastal highway were blocked off by local 
Christian militias who found it easier to regulate traffic on the old 
coast road. 



107 



Lebanon: A Country Study 



35^30' 

Mediterranean 

-34°3o- Sea 



i - 



'k\ Qubayya? 



'k\ Minyah 



Al MinaV 



jripoli 
.Zgharta 



Shikka^f- 
Ras Sttata vL^ 
Al Batrun 



Jubayfw i 
Haiat/frl 



Ad Dubayyah4,^ Ju ^'y ah 

_ ^Bikfayya 



Al Hirmil ^> 

?M C 



.Baalbek 



AwzaiJUjj 
Khaldah^ 

Ad Damur/ 



Bayt 
ad Dirv 



Al Jiyah 



Sidon/ 
Az Zahrani. 



[Zahlah 
.Shtawralv 



\lubb Jannin 
"Al Qirawn 



J 



3 



An Nabatiyah. 



aDatiyan 
at Tahta 



Marj Uyun 



Rive, 



SYRIA 



DAMASCUS 



\ UNITED NATIONS DISENGAGEMENT 
) /OBSERVER FORCE ZONE 



/An Naqurah 
C^ 5 



iint 
^Jubayl/ 
J 



ISRAEL 




,J GOLAN 

' v HEIGHTS U 
/ \\ 

' (Israeli \ / 

i Occupied) /I 



Boundary representation not necessarily authoritative 



± 
+ 



International boundary 
Armistice line, 1949 
Major road 

Standard-gauge railroad 

Narrow-gauge railroad 

Official port 

Major unofficial port 

Major airport 

Airstrip 

5 10 15 Kilometers 



10 15 Miles 



Figure 6. Transportation System, 1987 



108 



The Economy 



Although the government traditionally allotted high priority to 
road building and maintenance, the rehabilitation of the country's 
network has been badly hampered by war. Some roads, however, 
have been repaired at the behest of Syrian military authorities. In 
the south, in the area in which United Nations (UN) troops were 
stationed, roads were built and renovated. And along the Israeli 
border, but within Lebanon itself, Israel constructed a series of earth 
roads in the late 1970s and early 1980s designed to facilitate troop 
deployments. 

The collapse of the central government necessitated the develop- 
ment of ad hoc transportation systems. Successive attempts to revive 
Beirut's public bus system after the 1975-76 fighting failed as a 
new fleet of French-built buses were turned into barricades in sub- 
sequent conflicts, including the 1982 Israeli invasion. In some parts 
of the country, business enterprises ran buses or trucks to ferry 
their employees to work, but there was no coherent national trans- 
portation system. Shared taxis became the most common form of 
public transport. Taxis could be hired to carry travelers from one 
town to another, but taxi service might not be available if militia 
groups declared a blockade along a particular route. Such block- 
ades also affected deliveries of key products, such as food supplies, 
fuel, and goods intended for import or export. Travel became pro- 
hibitively expensive for ordinary Lebanese when roads were closed. 
Keeping the roads open became the responsibility of a series of 
armed forces: the militias, the Lebanese government forces, the 
UN forces, and, repeatedly, the Syrian Army. From time to time, 
responsibility lay with Israeli, Palestinian, United States, and West 
European troops. 

Railroads 

Lebanon used to have a patchwork railroad system. From the 
central Syrian railroad depot of Horns, two standard-gauge lines 
entered Lebanon. One line passed down the coast to Tripoli and 
Beirut and ended just north of the southern oil terminal at Az 
Zahrani; the other came down the Biqa Valley to Riyaq, near 
Shtawrah. A narrow-gauge, mountain railroad running from 
Beirut through Riyaq to Damascus linked these two lines. The 
coastal line was still being used for occasional fuel shipments from 
the Tripoli refinery to Beirut in the late 1970s, but the line's 
southern section to Az Zahrani was cut in several places just south 
of Beirut. French companies had begun limited repairs on the 
damaged line but had to stop as renewed violence erupted in Febru- 
ary 1984. The Biqa Valley line, antiquated already in the 1960s, 
finally went out of commission during fighting in 1975-76. Finally, 



109 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

the Beirut-Damascus line was verging on obsolescence even before 
the outbreak of war. 

By 1987 it was believed that no trains were functioning anywhere 
on Lebanon's 40 7 -kilometer system, and the prospects for the rail 
system's recovery were poor. Canadian consultants studied a pos- 
sible revival of the coastal line in 1983, but security conditions made 
rehabilitation impossible. If the railroads are ever revived, the 
coastal line will get priority. 

Shipping 

There are no navigable rivers in Lebanon, but there is some 
coastal shipping. Before 1975 the port of Beirut was a major en- 
trepot for the Middle East, especially for goods bound for Damas- 
cus and Amman. In 1974 approximately 3.4 million tons of goods 
were unloaded at the Beirut docks, 668,000 tons were loaded, and 
932,000 tons of transit goods were handled. When the Civil War 
began, however, the port became a major battleground. Battles 
also took place there in subsequent clashes between 1978 and 1987. 
Despite strenuous efforts to restore the port to full working order, 
by 1987 it had yet to regain anything like its former prominence. 

Between the start of the Civil War in 1975 until 1983, the port's 
best year was 1980, when some 2.7 million tons of cargo were un- 
loaded, 248,056 tons were loaded, and 209,080 tons were handled 
in transit. The Israeli siege of Beirut led to a drastic drop in port 
activity in 1982, when goods handled fell to less than two-thirds 
of the 1980 level. 

The shipping industry did not fare well in 1983, the last full year 
in which the central government could claim to control both halves 
of the national capital. Although cargo unloaded recovered some- 
what to about 2.5 millions tons, cargo loaded was only 105,640 
tons, and transit cargo dwindled to a mere 87,415 tons. 

The port was closed for five months following the division of the 
city in February 1984, resulting in lost revenues of around US$30 
million. The closure was the longest in the port's history. When 
the port reopened in July, the Jumayyil government tried to im- 
prove conditions by taking over the port's fifth basin, previously 
controlled by the LF, and closing another LF-controlled illegal port 
at Ad Dubayyah. These gains were purely temporary, however. 
In 1986 the LF regained control of the fifth basin, which the govern- 
ment allowed to be run by a new company owned partly by the 
LF. The government also allowed the company to run the illegal 
port at Ad Dubayyah and the official port of Juniyah. The estab- 
lishment of the new company was really little more than legalization 



110 



The Economy 



of an essentially illegal operation since the LF already controlled 
the ports and was denying the government customs revenues. 

Illegal, or unofficial, ports — those not under the control of the 
government — developed in the 1970s. By the 1980s, they had be- 
come Lebanon's principal purveyors of imports. These ports, 
mainly controlled by the principal militia groups, were used for 
a wide variety of imports, ranging from basic necessities to mili- 
tary supplies from Israel and Libya. As of 1987, as many as twenty 
illegal ports, mostly controlled by militias, were in operation. 

The volume of goods discharged at the illegal ports cannot be 
measured exactly. Nevertheless, two prominent Lebanese econ- 
omists, Marwan Iskandar and Elias Baroudi, noted in a 1983 analy- 
sis of Lebanese port activity that the 19-percent drop in cargo 
unloaded at the legal Beirut port in 1981 did not necessarily reflect 
a drop in total imports — a large proportion of imports came through 
illegal ports. Observers believed an extremely effective central 
government would be needed to transfer or return revenues from 
the ports to the national treasury. 

With rival militias flanking the port of Beirut and periodically 
forcing its closure, Lebanon's other ports might have been expected 
to pick up some of the slack (see table 5, Appendix A). Traffic at 
Tripoli did rise steadily from 1975 to 1979 but declined thereafter. 
It suffered from fighting in 1983 between Palestinian and Syrian 
forces in the northern section of the port of Tripoli and because 
of the increasing effectiveness of Lebanon's illegal ports. In late 
1985, however, after Syrian forces had imposed calm, traffic at 
Tripoli grew to 50,000 tons per month by January 1986. 

Lebanon's other traditional ports at Tyre and Sidon also have 
had troubled histories. Tyre suffered during the Civil War, dur- 
ing the Israeli invasions of 1978 and 1982, and during other Israeli 
military actions. Sidon was similarly afflicted, escaping only the 
1978 assault. Both ports have also witnessed some internal con- 
flict. After Israel's 1984 pullout from much of Lebanon, however, 
Tyre appeared to enjoy a revival of its local economy. Although 
Sidon suffered from further Shia-Palestinian conflict, it recovered 
modestly, and its export trade increased in early 1987. 

Israel has persistently intervened in Lebanese maritime affairs. 
Its actions ranged from dispatching gunboats to positions off Beirut, 
a fairly common occurrence, to closing ports under Israeli control, 
such as Tyre and Sidon in 1984. From time to time, Israeli forces 
searched ships bound to or from Lebanese ports. In 1984, late 1986, 
and early 1987, Israel also stopped several ships ferrying passengers 
between Larnaca in Cyprus and Juniyah, the principal port of the 
Maronite heartland. Israel claimed that the ships were being used 



111 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

to infiltrate Palestinian guerrillas into Lebanon and warned that 
the Larnaca-Juniyah link would be closed altogether if the vessels 
continued to carry Palestinian fighters. 

Aviation 

For years, Middle East Airlines (ME A) was the star of Lebanese 
international communications. It had bought out two other pri- 
vate airlines, Air Liban and Lebanese International Airlines, and 
developed a style and service second to none. By the early 1970s, 
despite the loss of ten of its airplanes during an Israeli commando 
raid on Beirut International Airport in December 1968, it had be- 
come a model for oil-rich Arab states seeking to establish their own 
national carriers. 

MEA represented the best of Lebanon. It reflected close Franco- 
Lebanese relations: Air France had a 30-percent stake in the ven- 
ture, and Intra Investment Company held the principal 62.5-percent 
shareholding. Its chairman from 1952 to 1978, Shaykh Najib 
Alamuddin, scorned sectarianism and ran MEA as a socially and 
religiously integrated operation. This tradition of integration con- 
tinued after 1978. 

By 1975 MEA had become the country's largest employer, 
providing work for 5,600 people. Although the airline survived the 
Civil War, it was unable to regain the ebullience that had charac- 
terized its prewar operations. MEA survived the 1975-76 fighting 
by leasing many of its aircraft and flight crews to other Arab airlines 
and by operating on routes between the Persian Gulf and Western 
Europe that did not require refueling in Beirut. Nonetheless, losses 
were heavy, totaling US$12.8 million during the first 10 months 
of the Civil War. As fighting intensified in 1976, hope for full recov- 
ery diminished. During the quieter years of the late 1970s, however, 
the airline regained momentum. Old routes were reestablished, 
although in April 1977 MEA lost the right to fly to Damascus, as 
Syrian-Lebanese relations became strained. (The Damascus right 
was finally reinstated in August 1985.) 

The airline was almost back to normal in the late 1970s and 
posted a US$2.4 million profit in 1980. But fresh fighting closed 
Beirut International Airport in the spring of 1981, and passenger 
traffic dropped. At the same time, an important long-term leasing 
agreement with Saudia, the national air carrier of Saudi Arabia, 
came to an end. MEA's revenues fell 32 percent, and fuel bills rose 
21.6 percent; the net result was a massive US$19 million loss. 
Nonetheless, the airline's ambitions remained undimmed, and in 
October 1981 MEA signed an order to buy five Airbus A3 10 air- 
craft, with options on another fourteen. 



112 




The result of an Israeli attack 
on a Middle East Airlines jetliner 
Courtesy United States Navy (Robert Feary) 

Then came the 1982 Israeli invasion, and Beirut International 
Airport was closed for 115 days. Five MEA Boeing 707s were 
damaged so badly they had to be written off; six others were also 
damaged, but less severely. Company hangars and offices, occupied 
by the Israelis, were also hit. Passenger volume plunged from 
936,618 million in 1981 to 634,919 million in 1982. Losses for the 
year reached US$49.2 million. 

There was little improvement in 1983. The airport was closed 
for thirty-two days in August and September and for another seven- 
teen days in December. Faced with the prospect of a record US$54.6 
million loss, in November the airline terminated its agreement to 
buy the Airbuses. Airport closures persisted in Beirut, grounding 
the airline, and in August 1985 a Boeing 720 was destroyed and 
a 707 badly damaged by gunfire. The airline's all-Boeing fleet was 
depleted to just three 747s, five 707s, and nine 720s. In January 
1987, another 707 was destroyed when the airport came under 
artillery fire. The aircraft was not insured because of the high war- 
risk premium, and MEA had to absorb the loss. 

By October 1985, MEA had become the only airline serving 
Beirut, and passenger traffic was down to only 1,200 to 1,300 
daily — the lowest level since 1953. Despite falling passenger volumes 
and a 50-percent reduction in the airline's route network, MEA 



113 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

still held out hopes for recovery and negotiated in 1985 with Boe- 
ing, McDonnell-Douglas, and Airbus Industrie for new aircraft. 
High fuel costs meant that the airline needed a new generation of 
fuel-efficient aircraft, but the company lacked the funds to pur- 
chase them outright and could not borrow money to pay for them 
because lenders did not have confidence in the airline. 

Between 1965 and 1975, Lebanese entrepreneur Munir Abu 
Haydar had turned a small freight carrier called Trans Mediter- 
ranean Airways (TMA) into the largest all-cargo airline in the Mid- 
dle East. But instability at Beirut International Airport forced TMA 
to shift operations to Sharjah in the United Arab Emirates in the 
1970s and 1980s. TMA suffered a blow, however, in mid-1985 
when Saudi Arabia forbade TMA and several other airlines to over- 
fly the kingdom. Iraq, too, had banned TMA from entering its 
airspace, and the airline was effectively grounded. TMA formally 
suspended services in August 1985, and began selling off its fleet, 
which, at the start of the year, had consisted of eight Boeing 707s. 
The airline, however, was able to sell only one of its aircraft. 

The airline asked the government for a US$10.6 million bail- 
out loan, but the government was slow to respond, and bankruptcy 
became a distinct possibility. Discussions on a merger with MEA 
began as TMA's financial position steadily deteriorated; its routes 
were cut, and competition from state-subsidized airlines mounted. 
The MEA board responded cautiously to merger suggestions and 
waited to see if the government favored the idea. Then in mid- 1986, 
Jet Holdings, a company with which Intra Investment Company 
chairman Tamraz was closely involved, effectively took control of 
TMA and assumed responsibility for its US$7.5 million debt. 

Aviation politics in Lebanon were increasingly partisan in the 
1980s. Maronite concern about access to Beirut International Air- 
port had prompted efforts to develop an alternative airstrip at Halat, 
a military airfield twenty kilometers north of Beirut, to serve East 
Beirut and the Maronite heartland. The project was carried out 
under the supervision of Jet Holdings. By early 1986, the Halat 
runway had been extended to 2,600 meters. Tamraz sought to 
involve MEA in the venture, which he believed might begin with 
charter service to Larnaca and Athens. But MEA refused to oper- 
ate flights from Halat because the Ministry of Transport had delayed 
recognition of the airfield's civilian status. After the government 
set up a committee to study a plan to turn military airfields, as 
well as Halat, into civilian airports, Beirut International Airport 
reopened in May 1987. But without resolution of the Halat dis- 
pute, the outlook for MEA — an airline that had once set world stan- 
dards for service — was in doubt. 



114 



The Economy 



Telecommunications 

The country's telecommunications system suffered severely from 
the violence that occurred after 1975. Damage to equipment from 
1975 to early 1982 was estimated at about US$150 million. At the 
time of the Israeli invasion of 1982, the Directorate of Posts, Tele- 
phone, and Telegraph was in the middle of a US$325 million 2 -year 
rehabilitation project aimed at installing 32 new electronic exchanges 
and adding 220,000 new lines. Although new telex facilities had 
become operational in February 1982, only a few of the new tele- 
phone exchanges were in operation when Israel began its siege of 
Beirut in June. The invasion froze improvements in the telecom- 
munications system, although Lebanese authorities, with United 
States financial assistance, were able to carry out extensive repair 
work during the comparative calm of 1 983 . The Republic of Korea 
(South Korea) financed and repaired some 81,700 telephone lines 
around Beirut in 1983 during that period, and a local subcontrac- 
tor carried out extensive repair work in East Beirut for the United 
States Federal Electric Corporation until funds dried up in 1984. 

Agriculture 

The variety of Lebanon's agricultural lands, from the interior 
plateau of the Biqa Valley to the narrow valleys sweeping down 
to the sea, enables farmers to grow both European and tropical 
crops. Tobacco and figs are grown in the south, citrus fruits and 
bananas along the coast, olives around the Shuf Mountains and 
in the north, and fruits and vegetables in the Biqa Valley (see fig. 7). 
More exotic crops include avocados, grown near Jubayl, and 
hashish, a major crop in the Biqa Valley. Local wines, even those 
produced in times of war, have won international prizes. Since 1975, 
however, Lebanon's fertile land has not been fully exploited be- 
cause of almost constant warfare. In addition, the livestock produc- 
tion, which had made up a significant part of total agricultural 
production before the war, fell off drastically, especially after the 
1982 Israeli invasion. 

Land and Irrigation 

Almost one-fourth of Lebanon's land is cultivable — the highest 
proportion in the Arab world. Most of these 240,000 hectares are 
rain fed, but in 1982 some 85,000 hectares were reported to be 
under irrigation, 20 percent more than in 1970. Another source 
estimated that in the mid-1980s 400,000 hectares (including mar- 
ginal land) were cultivable, with about one-fourth of this irrigated. 
In 1981 the UN's Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 



115 



Lebanon: A Country Study 



A 


Textiles 


■ 


Cement 


□ 


Petroleum refining 


▲ 


Electric power 




Oil pipeline 



from Iraq and Syria 



.Halba 



TripoNJ 
Shikkaj 
Al Batrun 



Bsharri 



Jubayl' 



Juniyahj 
Zuq Musbih/££ : : 
BEIRUT 

AC 



[Babda 
'.Alayh 



# Afqa 



Baalbek, 



'Zahtar 



Al JiyahJ 



Sidon/fe^ n 



Az ZahranL 



iBayt ad Din. 



A # Sadd al Qirawn, 
* azzin Rashayya* 



Tyre 



An Nabatiyam 
at Tahta- 



Bint Jubayl': 



# Marj Uyun 



from Dhahran, 
Saudi Arabia 
(TAPLINE) 



INTENSIVE COMMERCIAL CROPS 

Olives ffl Tobacco 
£3 Fi 9 s 19 Grapes 



AGRICULTURAL LAND USE 

| r J\ Citrus fruits and bananas on 
coastal plains 

Grapes, olives, figs, mixed 
with grain and feed crops 
on highland slopes 



m 
□ 

□ 



Deciduous fruits with grapes, 
figs, vegetables, ana grains 
in high valleys 

Truck crops; grapes, sugar 
beets, grain and feed crops 
in low valleys 



Figure 7. Economic Activity, 1987 



116 



The Economy 



estimated that around 108,000 hectares were permanently culti- 
vated and that 19,300 hectares had been reclaimed for cultivation 
since the inception of the 1963 Green Plan, a project designed to 
reclaim 15,000 hectares over 10 years. The FAO estimated that 
no fewer than 280,000 hectares of land in various parts of the coun- 
try were reclaimable for agricultural production. 

In the early 1980s, the government prepared plans to irrigate 
an additional 60,000 hectares, and by 1984 studies were under way 
on 6 major irrigation projects, all designed to be carried out as part 
of the 1982-91 reconstruction plan. The biggest project, to be im- 
plemented by the Litani Water Authority, was for irrigation of some 
15,000 hectares of high land (between 500 and 800 meters above 
sea level) in southern Lebanon over an 8-year period, scheduled 
to start in 1990. Observers reported in 1986 that the government 
planned to increase the amount of irrigated land, through various 
dam and irrigation schemes, from 65,000 hectares to 125,000 
hectares. 

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Lebanese officials reported 
that small tributaries of the Hasbani River were being diverted into 
Israel near the northern town of Metulla (see fig. 3). Independent 
water analysts stated that after the 1982 invasion, Israel engaged 
in a much more serious diversion of Lebanese waters by attaching 
stopcocks at a pumping station on the Litani River. The stopcocks 
were designed to switch at least part of the flow — which is gener- 
ated entirely within Lebanon — to Israel via a specially constructed 
pipeline. 

Lebanon's land tenure system is characterized by many small 
holdings, but the number has declined over the years. In 1961 about 
127,000 farms were reported operating. The partial census of 1970, 
however, recorded some 75,000 farm holdings, of which 46 per- 
cent were smaller than 2 hectares while only 12 percent had 10 
hectares or more. In 1981-82 there were some 64,000 active farms, 
with only 50 in the 100- to 1 ,000-hectare range. 

Landholding patterns were also affected by massive population 
movements in the 1970s and 1980s. Lebanon's internal refugees 
strove assiduously to maintain title to their lands, many of which 
came to be controlled by rival sectarian or political groups. A case 
in point was in southern Lebanon. After the 1978 Israeli invasion, 
many Muslim landholders fled to other parts of Lebanon, hoping 
to reclaim their land following Israel's withdrawal. But instead of 
handing the land over to the United Nations Interim Force in 
Lebanon (UNIFIL), as was expected, Israel turned it over to the 
Christian South Lebanon Army (SLA). The effect was to dispos- 
sess many of the former landholders. 



117 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

Two important socioeconomic trends made it difficult to evalu- 
ate the farming structure in the 1980s. The first trend was consoli- 
dation of holdings, as Beirut-based professionals began buying up 
small farms before the 1975 fighting. The war may have slowed 
this development, however, because it complicated long-distance 
supervision of land. At the same time, the trend toward large fam- 
ilies, especially in the south, made the old system of dividing hold- 
ings among male offspring less feasible, although in many cases 
this factor was offset by the migration of males to the city or emigra- 
tion abroad. Even elderly farmers acknowledged that the old land 
inheritance system had to be changed. But the pace of such change 
could not be monitored easily in the troubled conditions of the 
1980s. 

The number of farms dropped during the war, resulting in more 
tracts of untilled land rather than in more ownership transfers. Small 
freeholders who chose to continue farming often lived in poverty. 
Even before the 1975 Civil War, the average annual income for 
the head of an agricultural household was estimated at L£500, com- 
pared with L£l,100 for a counterpart working in industry or 
L£8,060 in the services sector. One report noted that 56 percent 
of those engaged in agriculture in southern Lebanon, most of whom 
were landowners, also had second jobs in the late 1960s. 

Crop Production 

The impact of war and sectarian politics on Lebanese agricul- 
ture was unclear. It is obvious, however, that the Civil War did 
take its toll on the production of most crops (see table 6, Ap- 
pendix A). 

Although there was a recovery from 1979 to 1981, it was not 
sustained, as the 1982 Israeli invasion disrupted production in the 
southern half of the country, especially along Israel's so-called 
"security zone. ' ' Even in the relative calm between 1978 and 1981 , 
about 1,100 hectares of tobacco were destroyed, 300 hectares of 
agricultural land were abandoned because of land mines, and 51 ,000 
olive trees and 70,000 fruit trees were destroyed, according to the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 

Regional politics also played a major role in the fortunes of 
Lebanon's crop production. For example, in 1984 fruit exports 
reached their lowest level since 1962, in part because Syria had 
restricted imports of Lebanese produce. Syria imposed these re- 
strictions not only to prevent the sale in Syria of Israeli produce 
available in Al Janub Province but also to pressure the Lebanese 
government to abrogate its May 1983 peace agreement with Israel 
(see The May 17 Agreement, ch. 5). Indeed, Israel's flooding of 



118 



The Economy 



the market in Al Janub Province with various agricultural products, 
especially bananas, caused some to claim that Israel was "dump- 
ing" surplus produce on a market that could not afford produce 
imported from any other country. 

The collapse of the Lebanese pound in 1984-85 also had a major 
impact on crop production. On the one hand, the collapse improved 
Lebanon's ability to compete in foreign markets; indeed, exports 
of agricultural products, notably fruits and vegetables, increased 
in 1985. On the other hand, local consumption slumped as fruit 
and vegetable prices rose an average 85 percent during the year. 
The fall of the pound also sparked price increases for seeds, fer- 
tilizers, feeds, and insecticides. 

Tobacco played a major role in the economy of southern Lebanon 
before the Civil War. The Administration for Tobacco and Tom- 
bacs (Regie des Tabacs et Tombacs), a state monopoly, dominated 
tobacco marketing. Claiming that the marketing arrangements 
benefited only the largest tobacco growers, in 1973 about 10,000 
small planters demonstrated in Sidon against the low prices being 
paid for their crops. Economic conditions thus helped alienate from 
the state the predominantly Shia south, a factor that contributed 
to the troubles of the later 1970s and 1980s. Henceforth, restruc- 
turing of the monopoly became a persistent demand of the southern 
Lebanese, Shia and Christian alike. 

The Israeli invasion of 1978 badly affected tobacco production 
for several years, as dividing lines between militia groups ham- 
pered gathering and marketing of the crop. Planters found it difficult 
to get their crops to the reception sheds set up by the Administra- 
tion of Tobacco and Tombacs in Bint Jubayl because the sheds 
were in the center of the border strip from which Israeli forces had 
declined to withdraw following their pullout from southern Lebanon 
on June 13, 1978. According to some sources, SLA leader Saad 
Haddad, to whom Israel had formally handed over control of the 
border strip in 1979, sometimes seemed deliberately to hinder farm- 
ers from getting crops to market in areas controlled by the UNIFIL 
or Muslims. 

The purchase prices of the Administration for Tobacco and Tom- 
bacs failed to keep pace with inflation. In 1985, for example, the 
government raised prices by only 10 percent, although production 
costs rose by at least 40 percent and the increase in the cost of liv- 
ing was even higher. 

Citrus crops also suffered from years of fighting. Citrus fruits 
are grown on the coast, particularly in the southern half of the coun- 
try. Between 1965 and 1972, yields rose steadily from 19 to 27.4 
tons per hectare. Citrus played a vital role in agriculture, accounting 



119 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

for as much as half of total agricultural output. But the Civil War 
destroyed some 4,000 hectares of orchards around Ad Damur, and 
urban sprawl led to the loss of orchards around Tyre and Sidon. 
Nonetheless, production increased to a record 365,000 tons in 1981 . 
A three-year decline in production followed in the wake of the 1982 
Israeli invasion and the loss of more citrus-growing land. 

The Biqa Valley, with 40 percent of the country's cultivable land, 
is the most productive agricultural region. It, too, has suffered from 
war and foreign occupation. By 1987 Syrian troops had been in 
the Biqa Valley for more than eleven years. During that time, they 
clashed with Palestinians, Christians, Israelis, and Shias. The 1982 
Israeli invasion and the arrival of the Iranian Pasdaran (Revolu- 
tionary Guards) also brought economic hardship to the valley. 

Declining wheat production was one indication of the collapse 
of traditionally productive agriculture in the Biqa Valley. In an- 
cient times, the valley had been part of Rome's Syrian granary, 
providing wheat for the empire's eastern provinces and for Rome 
itself. But as time went by, with arable land limited, pressure grew 
for intensive, high-value cropping. In modern times the amount 
of land devoted to wheat decreased — from 68,000 hectares in 1968 
to around 50,000 hectares between 1972 and 1975. Still, some two- 
thirds of the field crop acreage in the Biqa Valley was devoted to 
grains, primarily wheat and barley. 

The 1975 Civil War prompted drastic changes in wheat produc- 
tion. From 1977 to 1979, the Lebanese devoted 45,000 hectares 
to wheat. In 1982 the amount fell to 23,000 hectares, in 1983 to 
20,000 hectares, in 1984 to 17,000 hectares, in 1985 to 14,000 hec- 
tares, and in 1986 to 13,000 hectares. Production plummeted from 
a record 76,000 tons in 1974 to 9,000 tons in 1987. A major rea- 
son for declining wheat production was an increase in the produc- 
tion of more profitable crops: hashish and opium poppies. 

Hashish had long been grown in the region around Al Hirmil 
in the northern Biqa Valley. Before the Civil War, the govern- 
ment had encouraged local farmers to grow sunflowers instead, but 
these efforts were blunted by the onset of civil strife and by wealthy 
zuama (sing., zaim — see Glossary) and politicians who controlled 
the illegal export market. Hashish became a major cash crop in 
the 1970s and 1980s. Annual production rose from about 30,000 
tons at the start of the Civil War to around 100,000 tons in the 
early 1980s, when hashish was grown on an estimated 80 percent 
of agricultural land around Baalbek and Al Hirmil. 

By the mid-1980s, Lebanon had became one of the world's most 
prominent narcotics trafficking centers. Before 1975 much of this 
trade was exported by air from small airstrips in the Biqa Valley. 



120 



Goats are used for their milk, meat, and hair. 
Courtesy United Nations (J.K. Isaac) 
A large poultry farm near Beirut 
Courtesy United Nations 



121 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

After the valley came under Syrian control, the drug crop left the 
country by sea through Christian-controlled ports to Cyprus or it 
went overland to Syria; sometimes it went through Israel to Egypt, 
reputed to be the world's largest hashish consumer. 

The production and sale of hashish undoubtedly brought some 
prosperity to the Biqa Valley, but financial benefits and overall 
gains to the economy were not easily quantifiable. Before the 1982 
Israeli invasion, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was 
believed to have been earning about US$300 million annually from 
hashish trafficking. Christian middlemen were profiting, as were 
Shia growers and Syrian smugglers. And one reporter argued that 
the crop was worth "billions of dollars to the worldwide Lebanese 
underworld network." 

Growers not only planted more drug-producing crops but also 
sought to increase the value of their crop. By March 1987, according 
to a report prepared by the United States House of Representa- 
tives Foreign Affairs Committee, the high profitability of opium 
had caused extensive replanting in the Biqa Valley. The report 
stated that "with the breakdown of law and order in Lebanon, 
production, processing, and trafficking are on the rise, and a great 
deal of hashish production in the [Biqa] Valley has been supplanted 
by opium, in recognition of the more lucrative heroin trade. It is 
estimated that up to half the land available for drug cultivation in 
the [Biqa] Valley is now being used for opium, where previously 
only marijuana was grown for hashish, largely destined for the 
Egyptian market. Numerous processing labs are known to exist, 
both in Lebanon and to a lesser extent in Syria." The report did 
not estimate the magnitude of production but said, "It is clear that 
opium production in the [Biqa] Valley has increased dramatically 
while hashish production has dropped sharply." 

Industry 

The State of Industry 

Lebanese industry expanded rapidly in the late 1960s and early 
1970s. By 1974 industry accounted for an estimated 20 percent of 
GDP, up from 13 percent in 1968, and industrial exports amounted 
to 75 percent of total exports. This growth was characterized by 
a proliferation of small industries and was fueled by easy credit, 
a strong local currency, abundant and cheap supplies of skilled and 
unskilled labor, subsidized electric power, and trade protection at 
home and expanding markets abroad, particularly in the Persian 
Gulf countries. 



122 



The Economy 



By 1974 an estimated 130,000 people were employed in indus- 
try, and the total nominal capital of industrial establishments stood 
at around US$1 . 1 billion. The textile industry alone employed some 
50,000 people. A further 20,000 were employed in the furniture 
and wood products industry and some 15,000 in the leather products 
industry. 

Years of strife changed all this. In 1981 the Lebanese Industri- 
alists Association reported a 25-percent decline in industrial ca- 
pacity, and more than 70 percent of all industrial capacity was 
believed to have been idle for at least 500 days during the previ- 
ous 6 years. Layoffs were heavy, with industrial employment in 
1981 about half of what it was in 1974. The Union of Textiles 
Manufacturers estimated that in 1981 the industry employed only 
12,000 workers and that less than half of the 1,200 prewar facto- 
ries were still in business. One of the country's biggest factories, 
a knitting plant in the Beirut port duty-free zone that had once 
employed 10,000 workers, was destroyed. National Cotton Mill 
(Filature Nationale du Coton), the biggest weaving and spinning 
factory in the Middle East, laid off all but 450 of its workers. In 
Tripoli, Lebanon's largest compressed wood factory was closed in 
1981, with the loss of 600 jobs. One of its problems was that it 
could not compete with the import of wooden products through 
the illegal ports. 

Following the 1975-76 fighting, the government could no longer 
afford to try to revive the economy through export subsidies. Even 
when capital was available, industries were reluctant to use it to 
expand capacity or modernize machinery. One commentator noted 
that producers tended to concentrate on improving profits rather 
than productivity. 

Civil strife and disorder continually hampered production, and 
the financial climate was rarely conducive to investment. The com- 
parative calm of 1977-82 allowed considerable decentralization of 
Lebanese industry, and Zahlah, Shtawrah, Sidon, and the coastal 
strip under the control of the Phalange Party (see Glossary) all en- 
joyed a limited economic boom. In the far north, remote villages 
in the Akkar region began to prosper because of their distance from 
the country's principal areas of conflict. 

The collapse of business confidence that accompanied the polit- 
ical debacles of 1984 closed hopes for sustained recovery. The Cen- 
tral Bank's tight fiscal attitude limited the money available for 
investment (see Banking and Finance, this ch.). Capital investment 
in industry shrank rapidly in both real and nominal terms, which 
reflected pessimism over the future of Lebanese industry. For ex- 
ample, investment fell from US$147.4 million in 1980 to US$94 



123 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

million in 1983. By 1984 investment was down to a meager US$34.9 
million and to only US$10.6 million in 1985. In addition, indus- 
trial production fell 3.7 percent to US$250 million in 1984. 

In April 1986, Central Bank governor Nairn offered to allow the 
statutory reserves and treasury bonds held by specialized banks 
to be used as credit for industry. Although some industrial credits 
appeared to be available at reduced interest rates, it was clear that 
economic measures alone would not revitalize the nation's frag- 
mented industries. 

Cement 

Cement was Lebanon's biggest single industrial export in 1980, 
accounting for 15.5 percent of industrial exports. Sales to Syria 
at that time accounted for about 40 percent of all cement exports. 
In early 1981, however, exports to that country came to a com- 
plete standstill because the Syrians, then in the middle of a major 
program to construct their own cement works, could not reach 
agreement with the two principal Lebanese cement works on the 
terms and conditions of cement sales. Thus cement exports to Syria 
in 1981 totaled only L£34 million, down from L£l 19 million a year 
earlier. Overall cement exports dropped to L£201 million but reco- 
vered to L£227 million in 1982 as alternative export markets were 
found. Lebanon's principal cement works in 1982 were situated 
in the north, away from the fighting around Beirut, so the indus- 
try could continue exporting by sea from Tripoli and over land 
by truck. 

In early 1983, when the country's political status showed signs 
of stabilizing, the Lebanese Cement Company (Societe des Ciments 
Libanaises — SCL) secured a US$36 million syndicated loan to 
finance a planned US$79.3 million expansion program. Produc- 
tion was expected to increase to 250,000 tons a year, and unit costs 
were expected to decrease through a change in power supply from 
oil to coal (with the company running its own generating stations). 
The reported purchase of a 30-percent stake in the company's par- 
ent, Eternit Libanaise, by Prince Abdallah al Faisal, eldest son of 
the former king of Saudi Arabia, heightened international confi- 
dence in the industry's prospects. 

But Syria's decision to terminate Lebanese cement imports, the 
return of instability, and difficulties in finding fresh export mar- 
kets destroyed prospects for the revival of the cement industry. In 
July 1983, SCL laid off 300 workers at its Shikka works as it be- 
came clear that the industry faced disaster. By the end of 1983, 
the scope of the disaster was starkly apparent: total cement exports 
amounted to only L£27.5 million — an 88-percent drop from the 
1982 level. 



124 



The Economy 



In the early 1980s, the Jumblatt family established the Siblin 
Cement Company, building a factory near Sidon to provide ce- 
ment for the local construction industry. The Siblin plant, built 
with Romanian technical assistance and with a production capac- 
ity of 300,000 tons per year, was formally opened just before the 
Israeli invasion of June 1982. The plant was badly damaged dur- 
ing the fighting, and it was not until 1986 that work to get the plant 
back into commission could begin in earnest. A fresh injection of 
L£15 million in capital from local entrepreneur Rafiq Hariri made 
the company Lebanon's largest shareholding venture. 

Electric Power and Petroleum Refining 

There were widespread problems confronting the power and 
refining industries in the mid-1980s. The two industries are closely 
related because Lebanon relies primarily on oil-fired stations for 
electricity. By 1984 approximately 71 percent of the country's elec- 
tric power output came from oil. Although the overburdened power 
stations suffered continual maintenance problems, the country 
managed an impressive recovery in this sector following the 1975-76 
fighting. 

Before the Civil War, eleven major power stations, linked in a 
common distribution network, supplied most of the country's elec- 
tricity. In 1974 Electricity of Lebanon (Electricite du Liban — EDL), 
the state power organization, produced 1.7 billion kilowatt-hours 
of electricity, while smaller power companies produced a further 
296 million kilowatt-hours. In this period, 41.5 percent of power 
was hydroelectric. 

Heavy fighting in 1976 damaged several thermal power stations 
and transmission lines, so that hydroelectric power accounted for 
70 percent of the country's total power output of 1 billion kilo- 
watt-hours that year, 2.25 billion kilowatt-hours in 1980, 2.4 bil- 
lion kilowatt-hours in 1982, and 2.8 billion kilowatts-hours in 1983. 
But this impressive increase masked severe strains on the system. 

Israeli strikes against southern Lebanon in July 1981 damaged 
the Az Zahrani refinery, which provided fuel for Al Jiyah, the na- 
tion's biggest power plant. Electricity had to be purchased from 
Syria, but by then this was not a serious problem because most 
of the major Lebanese and Syrian power grids had been united 
under a project launched in 1977. Lebanon's ability to import elec- 
tricity from Syria proved especially important after the 1982 Israeli 
invasion. During the invasion and siege of Beirut, the lines from 
Al Jiyah were completely cut. On several occasions after that, fight- 
ing in the Israeli-controlled area interrupted power transmission. 
At the end of 1983, all eight high-tension lines connecting the Al 



125 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

Jiyah and Litani power stations (at Jun and Sadd al Qirawn) with 
the national grid were out of service. The Zuq Musbih power sta- 
tion, located north of Beirut, had to fill the gap, but the supply 
had to be rationed. 

Lebanon had long sought to expand power generation capac- 
ity. The European Investment Bank financed the installation of 
three 60-megawatt units at Al Jiyah and two 125-megawatt tur- 
bines at Zuq Musbih under a 1977 program. A 1981 expansion 
program, assisted by the European Community (EC), achieved 
additional increases in capacity at both stations. In late 1985, Austria 
agreed to finance construction of a new 75-megawatt steam tur- 
bine power station south of Tripoli. The plants, however, were fre- 
quently overloaded in the mid-1980s, especially when even one of 
them was out of service. Constant operation of the Zuq Musbih 
plant during troubled times in the south meant that regular main- 
tenance could not be carried out. 

EDL estimated in 1986 that the annual cost of meeting Lebanon's 
electricity demand for the next 7 years would be US$150 million. 
It was not clear where this money would come from. Throughout 
the Civil War, EDL had suffered from financial problems and had 
found it difficult to collect current and overdue payments from its 
customers. Illicit tapping of power lines cut into revenues, and the 
transmission and distribution system badly needed updating. 
Nonetheless, EDL continued to supply power to most of the coun- 
try most of the time. 

The government's problems in financing oil imports caused 
problems for the country's petroleum refineries at Tripoli and 
Az Zahrani. Oil supplies came primarily from Iraq and Saudi 
Arabia, but deliveries were erratic, coming sometimes by pipeline, 
sometimes by ship. Political considerations forced the line from Iraq 
to close in the early 1970s. The latter reopened but closed again 
in 1981. The Saudi Trans- Arabian Pipeline (Tapline) to Az Zahrani 
closed down in the mid-1980s. 

Deliveries by ship posed problems. Refineries seldom had more 
than a few weeks' supply in stock and often they had only a few 
days' supply. The oil storage tanks in the East Beirut suburb of 
Dawra caught fire on at least two occasions in the 1980s during 
clashes. Some petroleum and products, however, entered the coun- 
try through the illegal ports. 

The Az Zahrani refinery, owned by a United States consortium, 
the Mediterranean Refining Company (Medreco), a joint venture 
between Mobil and Caltex, suffered from Israeli assaults and from 
its exposed position in Al Janub Province. It was on the fringe of 
Syrian-controlled territory and did not enjoy the protection of 



126 



The Economy 



UNIFIL troops stationed nearby. Operating conditions of the 
refinery, located in guerrilla-held territory, were already difficult 
but became untenable as the area switched from Palestinian to 
Israeli control in 1982. The flow of oil from Saudi Arabia was con- 
stantly interrupted, largely because the Lebanese government failed 
repeatedly to pay its oil bills promptly. After years of problems, 
the company ended operations on September 30, 1986, handing 
over its assets to the Lebanese government without compensation. 

In 1973 the" Lebanese government nationalized the oil refinery 
at Tripoli, formerly owned by the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC). 
But unlike many Third World nationalizations, this move did not 
reflect any change in the country's fundamentally capitalist approach 
to business in general and foreign investment in particular. It was 
administratively necessary after Baghdad had nationalizated the 
much more important IPC installations within Iraq itself and after 
Syria had taken over IPC's trans-Syrian pipeline and terminal at 
Baniyas, Syria. IPC disputed the Tripoli takeover, and the Lebanese 
government offered compensation. The matter was referred to arbi- 
tration but remained unresolved in the late 1980s. 

The Tripoli Oil Installation, as the new state concern was called, 
comprised a 35,000 barrel per day (bpd — see Glossary) refinery and 
a small spur of the old IPC pipeline through Syria. Until 1976 Iraqi 
crude continued to reach Tripoli via the refinery and was used 
primarily to meet domestic oil requirements. Normally, the refinery 
met about one- third of the country's gasoline requirements and about 
half of its other fuel needs. But in 1976, the Iraqis ceased pumping 
crude to the main Syrian export terminal at Baniyas and thus halted 
direct supplies to Lebanon. With the start of the Iran-Iraq War in 
September 1980, the pipeline was reactivated. Although Lebanon 
reached an agreement with Baghdad in November 1981 to reacti- 
vate the Tripoli spur, the deal collapsed when Syria announced the 
following April that it would not allow Iraq to use the pipeline. The 
Iraqis agreed, instead, to pipe 3,000 bpd of crude to Dortyol in Tur- 
key and then ship it to Tripoli by tanker. Heavy fighting between 
rival Palestinian groups in late 1983 badly damaged the refinery. 
It was not until August 1984 that repairs were completed and produc- 
tion was resumed at an initial rate of 20,000 bpd. Iraq again agreed 
to provide crude by tanker, and between 1984 and 1987 the refinery 
ran on varying mixtures of Iraqi and Saudi crude. 

Aid and Reconstruction 

Reconstruction and Hope, 1976-82 

After nineteen months of fighting in 1975 and 1976, reconstruction 
was necessary but the prospects for reconstruction were seemingly 



127 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

hopeless. The Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) 
was founded after the war and entrusted with preparing and im- 
plementing a comprehensive reconstruction plan. The government 
gave it authority to negotiate with foreign governments for eco- 
nomic assistance and to implement reconstruction projects or autho- 
rize other government agencies to do so. Its creation was a bold 
step, and the CDR worked hard to honor its mandate. 

In December 1978, the CDR produced a US$7.4 billion recon- 
struction plan, designed to rebuild the country's shattered infra- 
structure over an 8-year period. The program was to be largely 
financed by external assistance, with the government providing only 
10 to 25 percent of the total. But it was not until November 1979 
that the Arab states, at a summit meeting in Tunis, agreed to fur- 
nish Lebanon with US$2 billion in aid over a 5-year period. 

The CDR produced its first annual work plan, which spelled 
out the program's implementation schedule. Projected spending 
for the project in 1980 was just over US$296 million, well below 
what would be necessary if the entire plan were to be completed 
within its supposed eight-year time frame. In conformity with Arab 
donor state wishes, half was earmarked for the south, divided 
equally between infrastructure development (such as port, road, 
hospital, and housing repairs) and social projects. 

Nevertheless, the CDR was at least able to make a brisk start 
on reconstruction. At the end of April 1981, it reported that about 
half of the US$741 million in available funding was being used, 
with 32.3 percent going for loans to the public sector, 29.1 per- 
cent designated as liquid resources for projects being implemented, 
and 17.3 percent for expenditures on projects under way. 

Lebanon was receiving reconstruction aid fairly regularly in 1981 , 
although some donors were behind in some of their disbursements. 
Other international sources also provided assistance. The United 
States Agency for International Development (AID) provided 
approximately US$5.7 million for a variety of projects that year, 
including technical assistance for the CDR, housing repair grants, 
housing authority loans, and various health projects. And as far 
back as October 1980, Lebanon had signed an agreement with 
the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund 
(UNICEF) to carry out US$43.5 million worth of social projects 
in the south, using reconstruction funds channeled through the 
CDR. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) also 
provided around US$4 million worth of reconstruction projects. 

Arab Reconstruction Aid 

The Arab aid approved at the 1979 Tunis summit meeting was 
the key to Lebanon's reconstruction program. During the five-year 



128 



A father and son make brass trays in a shop near Tripoli. 

Courtesy United Nations (B. Cirone) 

period from 1980 through 1984, the seven Arab members of the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries were to provide 
specific sums annually. The program got under way late, so that 
in 1980 just US$168.2 million of an intended US$400 million was 
actually disbursed. The pace quickened in 1981, however, with the 
arrival of US$202.9 million. The cease-fire in southern Lebanon 
from July 1981 until the Israeli invasion the following June provided 
an opportunity to step up disbursements, but, in fact, they declined. 
During the first half of 1982, only the United Arab Emirates made 
any effort to meet its commitment, paying some US$13 million, 
presumably its regular first-quarter payment. 

The Arab states reacted to the Israeli invasion by virtually dis- 
continuing aid. By November 1982, almost three years into the 
program, the Ministry of Finance had reported receiving just 
US$384.2 million of an expected US$1.2 billion. Some aid did 
trickle in during late 1982 or in 1983, but the highest figure reported 
for total aid deliveries agreed to in Tunis in 1979 was around 
US$420 miUion. 

By far the most reliable of the donors was the UAE. It had 
pledged US$45.7 million a year and met its 1980 and 1981 com- 
mitments in full, in addition to the US$13 million first-quarter con- 
tribution in 1982. At the opposite extreme was Libya, which had 
pledged US$62.84 million a year but had provided nothing by the 



129 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

end of 1982 (except covert arms deliveries to pro-Libyan militia 
groups). Algeria, which had pledged US$28 million a year, later 
declared that it could not comply because of financial difficulties. 
The remaining donors agreed to meet Algeria's commitments, but 
there is no evidence that they ever provided the funds. 

Saudi xArabia, with the largest annual commitment — US$1 14.3 
million — began its disbursements late. In 1980 it provided one- 
third of the amount due and in 1981 two-thirds. The Saudis made 
no further payments before the 1982 invasion. Iraq met its 1980 
annual commitment of US$59.4 million but made no further con- 
tributions because of its war with Iran. Kuwait furnished US$25 
million in 1980 and then in 1981 provided US$67.8 million— US$5 
million more than what was due. But it, too, failed to pay any- 
thing in the first half of 1982. Qatar provided no assistance in 1980 
and in 1981 provided only half of its pledged US$26.8 million. 

After the Israeli invasion, the Arab donors provided about US$40 
million. They indicated that they would contribute more funds to 
the reconstruction effort as funds from the World Bank and the 
industrialized countries became available. In July 1983, a US$229 
million aid package was put together by representatives of major 
donor countries and organizations. Attending the meeting in Paris 
were officials from Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, West Ger- 
many, Italy, the Netherlands, Japan, Britain, the United States, 
and Sweden. Participating donor agencies included the World Bank, 
the IMF, the Saudi Development Fund, the UNDP, and the EC 
and its principal financial arm, the European Investment Bank. 

Specific aid agreements were subsequently reached with most, 
if not all, of the participants at the Paris meeting, which marked 
the high point in Lebanon's search for orthodox sources of recon- 
struction finance. But Arab aid was given neither on the scale 
envisaged at the Tunis summit nor on the more limited scale sup- 
plied in 1980 and 1981 . Falling oil prices in 1983 caused producers 
to cut back production to maintain prices. The cutbacks resulted 
in lost revenue, not only for themselves but indirectly for Lebanon. 
Some Saudi money did arrive in Lebanon, but only on an ad hoc 
basis. Some of it, reputedly from King Fahd, was given to chari- 
ties and for education. Organized financial assistance, however, 
dried up by the mid-1980s. In early 1985, President Jumayyil 
appealed to the Saudis for US$500 million in economic aid, but 
the response did not match the request. The Arab nations, in 
essence, had lost interest in Lebanon. 

Still, the Tunis aid pledge led Lebanon to believe that it could 
mobilize reconstruction funds if it could come up with practical 
projects. The CDR viewed the aid pledged as encouragement to 



130 



The Economy 



intervene in the economy. The CDR's interventionist attitude ran 
counter to the Lebanese government's long-standing commitment 
to free-market principles. As a result, the CDR was criticized in 
government and financial circles for pursuing too interventionist 
a policy. Thus, in the months before the Israeli invasion, the old 
politics that had so bedeviled Lebanon were threatening to destroy 
the new economics on which those who opposed Lebanon's con- 
fessional (see Glossary) structure were placing considerable hope 
After the 1982 Israeli invasion, however, the argument became 
academic. Damage to Beirut and the devastation of communities 
in the south ushered in a new acceptance of greater state involve- 
ment in the reconstruction of the country. 

Post-Israeli Invasion Reconstruction, 1982-84 

When Amin Jumayyil took office in 1982, he assumed leader- 
ship of a country that, although stunned and paralyzed by the Israeli 
invasion, still had some positive economic forces at work. The Arab 
states were still providing financial assistance, although not as much 
as they had promised or as much as Lebanon needed. The four 
powers (Britain, France, Italy, and the United States) whose troops 
comprised the Multinational Force (MNF) in Beirut, created after 
the invasion, were all eager to see Lebanon regain its commercial 
prominence. International financial institutions, most notably the 
World Bank, believed that comprehensive reconstruction was pos- 
sible. Even though the central government controlled only about 
a fifth of the national territory — Israel and Syria controlled the 
rest — there was an air of energy and determination in Beirut in 
the midst of apparently insuperable obstacles. 

It was in this atmosphere that the CDR was to fashion its most 
ambitious reconstruction program. The program was projected in 
late 1982 to cost US$16.3 billion for the 9-year period 1982-91 
(a revised 1983-92 version was estimated at US$17 billion in the 
spring of 1983). Once again, the plan proved overambitious. The 
CDR initially proposed that US$1.1 billion be spent in 1983, the 
first full year of reconstruction. In March 1983, however, the CDR 
proposed a much more modest start, entailing expenditure of just 
US$594 million during the year. 

Housing was to get the largest share of reconstruction funds — 
about 35 percent of all spending. The emphasis on Al Janub 
Province was to be maintained, although the previous "50 per- 
cent rule" no longer seemed to apply following the devastation of 
other parts of the country by the Israeli assault and continuing 
occupation. UNICEF was to administer US$15.8 million in project 
funds for rehabilitation of 200 schools. 



131 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

In November 1982, a World Bank team visited Lebanon and 
presented a US$6.7 billion reconstruction program. But because 
of doubts about how much of the program could be implemented, 
in February 1983 the World Bank proposed a more limited recon- 
struction project designed to cover only the Greater Beirut area 
in which government or international forces were deployed. 

The World Bank's program differed considerably from that of 
the CDR. The CDR emphasized that housing would account for 
29.4 percent of all funding under the US$17 billion plan, whereas 
telecommunications would account for just 5.1 percent. Under the 
World Bank's US$6.4 billion program, housing was to get only 
14.8 percent of all funds, while telecommunications would receive 
16.3 percent. The World Bank's emphasis proved more relevant, 
and since 1982 there has been extensive repair, renovation, and 
replacement work on the country's shattered telecommunications 
systems. 

There was a renewed emphasis on water management. Beirutis 
have long dug deep into the soil for fresh water. Digging acceler- 
ated during the bitter rounds of fighting in 1975-76 and in 1982. 
Sea water began seeping into the city's fresh water, and as Beirut's 
sanitary system disintegrated during the violence, unpurified water 
entered the drinking water system, resulting in considerable health 
hazards at times. 

In 1982, before the Israeli invasion, the National Waste Manage- 
ment Plan was drawn up to provide the residents of 542 cities, 
towns, and villages — covering 83 percent of the population — with 
solid and liquid waste treatment and disposal plants by the year 
2000. This plan was incorporated into both reconstruction pro- 
grams, with priority being given to the construction of main sewers 
in the principal cities. Foreign consultants were hired to get the 
program off the ground, but progress was much slower then ex- 
pected because of fresh waves of conflict. 

Considerable efforts to reopen Beirut's port were supported by 
a World Bank loan of US$50 million and funds from Arab nations 
and the United States. Transit sheds and warehouses were erected 
and old and damaged ones repaired. In 1983 work started on a 
new container terminal and on the expansion of the eastern end 
of the port. In the city center, the Oger Liban Company boosted 
morale in the autumn of 1982 as its trucks carted away months 
of refuse. The company also performed restoration work in 1983 
and early 1984 on the old suqs (markets) in the commercial dis- 
trict. But the heavy fighting that accompanied the renewed parti- 
tion of Beirut in February 1984 destroyed much of this work. 



132 



The Economy 



Reconstruction and Chaos, 1984-87 

Western indulgence with Lebanon ended in February 1984. The 
bombing of the United States Marines barracks in Beirut on 
October 23, 1983, with the loss of 241 American lives, and the death 
of some 59 French peacekeeping troops in a similar blast that day, 
proved how unstable the reconstruction environment was (see 
Internal Security and Terrorism, ch. 5). Fighting in the Shuf Moun- 
tains during the autumn of 1983 illustrated the difficulty of assert- 
ing government control even when occupying forces pulled back. 
Most of the MNF troops pulled out with the partition of Beirut 
and the renewed fragmentation of the Lebanese Army, although 
the French and Italians delayed their departure for humanitarian 
reasons. 

The MNF withdrawal was accompanied by the effective termi- 
nation of United States economic and military assistance programs. 
The AID program was frozen, and US$130 million in aid was sus- 
pended. One effect of the aid suspension was a halt in work on 
an AID-financed telecommunications rehabilitation project in 
Beirut. Officials from the United States embassy said, however, 
that the United States would honor its US$18 million development 
aid commitment. 

Despite persistent instability, the CDR pressed ahead over the 
next three years with efforts to secure external financing for the 
country's reconstruction. Some L£4.3 billion was spent between 
1982 and early 1986 on reconstruction (equivalent to between 
US$500 million and US$700 million). 

In 1985 the CDR's new chief, Malak Salam, confirmed that Italy 
would make US$130 million available for reconstruction assistance, 
of which US$30 million would be on concessionary terms. The EC 
was to consider about US$15 million in funding and France around 
US$54 million. Some US$5 million was pledged by Belgium. 
Whereas United States and Arab aid rose and fell according to po- 
litical circumstances and the vagaries of the international oil mar- 
ket, West European aid, usually given on a more modest basis, 
was fairly steady. 

Between 1978 and 1985, Lebanon secured about US$76 million 
in grants and interest-free or low-rate loans from the EC's Euro- 
pean Investment Bank and some US$85.5 million in special recon- 
struction aid. In March 1986, it secured a further US$15.4 million 
to upgrade schools. In April 1987, the EC agreed to provide 
Lebanon with US$84 million under a five-year protocol to run from 
1987 to 1991, of which US$23 million would be grants and the 
balance concessionary loans. 



133 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

President Jumayyil periodically urged the industrialized nations 
to draw up a "Marshall Plan" for Lebanon's reconstruction. He 
traveled extensively to Western capitals to secure assistance but 
generally received negative responses. EC officials noted in 1987 
that their attempts to disburse existing aid funds had sometimes 
proved unsuccessful. 

The CDR did not confine its efforts to the developed world's 
principal financial institutions. In 1982 the CDR held talks on 
reconstruction assistance with Hungary and in 1986 with Beijing's 
China Harbors Engineering Company on a possible US$500 mil- 
lion protocol for construction work. In 1985 Czechoslovakia 
promised US$50 million, mainly in tied aid, and Romania said 
it was willing to lend US$100 million in trade credits. Aid also trick- 
led in from other sources. Iranian social relief funds were disbursed 
to largely Shia areas. The Pasdaran in Baalbek, their Martyr Foun- 
dation, and affiliated groups furnished health and social services. 

The EC provided emergency food aid and funds for school 
repairs. The Netherlands pledged aid for a factory to make artifi- 
cial limbs. Canada lent money for water projects in Beirut and 
Tripoli. Britain gave the Red Cross money for humanitarian as- 
sistance. In the southern border strip, Israeli forces provided some 
humanitarian assistance. The FAO provided emergency food aid. 
The UNIFIL provided extensive medical, social, and, in some 
cases, even infrastructure services during the years following the 
1982 invasion. Overall, the relief effort was just as much a patch- 
work as Lebanon itself. 

By late 1987, there were few signs of centralized reconstruction 
efforts. The assassination of Prime Minister Rashid Karami on 
June 1 , 1987, led to the reappointment as prime minister of Salim 
al Huss (also seen as Hoss), a Lebanese politician with a reputa- 
tion for personal and public integrity. Huss, an economist, moved 
immediately to develop a radical financial reform package, including 
the abolition of fuel subsidies and the pledging of 20 percent of 
the country's gold reserves as security for an international loan. 
His efforts were largely undermined by Minister of Finance Camille 
Shamun, who demanded that reductions in government spending 
include a reduction of the bread subsidy. Huss renewed his reform 
efforts after Shamun' s death in August, but he and Nairn were un- 
successful at getting banks to increase deposits with the Central 
Bank. 

The reform spirit was clearly alive, but the government was un- 
able to negotiate agreements with key sectors of Lebanese political 
and economic life or impose its will on any part of the country. 
As Jumayyil' s unhappy period of office drew closer to its September 



134 



The Economy 



1988 termination date, there were still a few who hoped that a new 
president might be able to forge ahead with reconstruction effort. 
But in late 1987, reconstruction seemed unlikely. 

* * * 

The most important sources available in 1987 were Marwan 
Iskandar and Elias Baroudi's The Lebanese Economy in 1981-82 and 
The Lebanese Economy in 1982-83. The Middle East Economic Digest 
has been equally vital. Both these sources, it should be noted, de- 
pend on a wide range of information furnished by Lebanese jour- 
nals, newspapers, banks, and institutions. The original sources, 
such as Le Commerce du Levant and the quarterly and annual reports 
of the Central Bank, should receive much of the credit for attempt- 
ing to portray a coherent picture of the Lebanese economy during 
more than twelve years of civil and international strife. The data 
used originated in Lebanon itself; the analysis is written from safety 
outside. 

Reporters such as Nora Boustany of the Washington Post and Peter 
Kemp of the Middle East Economic Digest, directly or indirectly, have 
furnished a mass of useful information under extremely trying cir- 
cumstances. The work of the Centre for Lebanese Studies in Ox- 
ford, United Kingdom, also should be noted. (For further 
information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



135 



Chapter 4. Government and Politics 




A Muslim, a Druze, and a Christian, 
representing the three major sects in Lebanon 



IN LATE 1987, after more than a dozen years of civil strife dur- 
ing which as many as 130,000 people may have died, Lebanese 
politics had become synonymous with bloodshed, and political 
power had come to be equated with firepower. Within this con- 
text, it was sometimes difficult to recall that Lebanon was once 
considered by some to be a model of pluralistic democracy in the 
Arab world. 

Despite the widespread erosion of law and order and the reduced 
effectiveness of the central authorities, in 1987 some vestiges of the 
traditional political system persisted. The president, as provided 
for in the Constitution, had been elected by the legislature, or 
Chamber of Deputies. He presided over a carefully selected cabi- 
net, commanded the Lebanese Armed Forces, and supervised the 
civil service. But at this point, much of the resemblance between 
this framework and the pre- 1975 Civil War national-level politi- 
cal structure ceased. In 1987 the president controlled only a small 
portion of the country. The members of the Chamber of Deputies 
had been elected in 1972 — as of 1987 the latest election — and some 
of the deputies no longer even lived in Lebanon. Many of the tradi- 
tional zuama (sing., zaim — see Glossary) of the various sects who 
had formerly participated in Lebanon's many cabinets were dead. 
The confessionally split Lebanese Armed Forces were only the sixth 
or seventh most powerful military organization in the nation. And 
the civil service, which still collected taxes and provided services 
to some parts of the country, did so at greatly diminished levels. 

Lebanon's political traditions — including its internal 
contradictions — can be traced back several centuries. Under 
Ottoman rule (1516-1916) Lebanon's multisectarian character was 
already in evidence as powerful Druze (see Glossary), Muslim, and 
Maronite (see Glossary) feudal lords extended their control over 
certain tracts of land in Mount Lebanon (see Glossary). They en- 
joyed a high degree of autonomy as long as taxes were paid to the 
Ottoman authorities. Likewise, under the short period of Egyp- 
tian control (1832-40), rule was relatively tolerant, both within the 
region and toward outside powers. It was during this era that 
European penetration helped Maronite Christians make gains 
against Druze landlords, and after the British and the Ottoman 
Turks drove out the Egyptians, Druze-Maronite antipathy turned 
violent. At the urging of the European powers, in 1842 the Otto- 
man Empire divided Mount Lebanon administratively, creating 



139 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

a Christian district in the north and an area under Druze control 
in the south. But this system, called the Double Qaimaqamate, 
did not change the fact that portions of the various populations 
were still integrated. For example, Maronite peasants worked for 
Druze overlords. In 1860, in response to peasant revolts, Maronite- 
Druze animosities again boiled over. Although both sides suffered, 
about 10,000 Maronites were massacred at the hands of the Druzes. 
As a result, at the instigation of the European powers, the Otto- 
mans reunited trie two sections of Mount Lebanon, this time under 
a single, non- Lebanese, Christian mutasarrif (governor) , appointed 
by the Ottoman Sultan. The mutasarrif 'was assisted by a multisec- 
tarian council. 

After World War I and the defeat of the Ottomans by the Allied 
Powers, the League of Nations granted France mandate authority 
over Greater Syria (see Glossary), an area that included present- 
day Lebanon. As a result of Lebanon's years under the French 
Mandate (1920-43), the Constitution enacted in 1926 is fashioned 
after that of the French Third Republic. Article 95, however, is 
unique in that it provides for "balanced" confessional (see Glos- 
sary) representation in government. In 1943 the provisions of this 
article were spelled out more clearly by unwritten agreements be- 
tween Maronite and Sunni (see Glossary) leaders. These agree- 
ments came to be known as the National Pact. The balancing 
advocated in the National Pact was meant to be provisional and 
was to be discarded as the nation moved away from confessional- 
ism (see Glossary). 

This movement, however, never occurred; in fact, in the years 
between the National Pact and the start of the 1975 Civil War, 
sectarianism became even more entrenched, and the principle of 
balancing, which created multiple power centers, frequently inhibit- 
ed the political process. Basic philosophical differences on politi- 
cal outlook often separated the various parties. Bickering among 
elites was common, not only between Christians and Muslims but 
also among sects within each religious group. Also during this 
period, the political system of zuama clientelism, whereby power- 
ful heads of families (similar to the feudal warlords of the Otto- 
man era) who wielded considerable political influence and dispensed 
patronage, became institutionalized. As a consequence, loyalty to 
subnational entities, such as family or sect, took precedence over 
allegiance to the state. 

Other problems impeded the smooth operation of government. 
Chief among them was that the National Pact was based on the 
1932 census, which enumerated Christians (including even those 
who had emigrated) to Muslims in a six-to-five ratio. Because this 



140 



Government and Politics 



census was never updated officially, the growing number of Mus- 
lims, especially Shias (see Glossary), was not taken into account, 
thus giving Christians disproportionate political power. Many 
observers believe that it was the inability of Lebanon's leaders to 
agree on a new power-sharing formula in line with demographic 
realities that led to the 1975 Civil War. 

Although it no longer monopolized the means of coercion, the 
government survived this conflict. The destruction and brutality 
wrought by both sides were catastrophic, but, except for a few small 
extremist groups, none of the armed militias demanded the aboli- 
tion of the state or the abrogation of the Constitution; instead, many 
of them called for meaningful reform. 

To some extent, the state and governmental institutions were 
able to survive through the direct intervention of external powers. 
In 1976 Ilyas Sarkis was elected president while much of the coun- 
try was subject to Syrian presence. Then, in 1982 Bashir Jumay- 
yil (also seen as Gemayel) was elected president, largely under 
pressure from Israel, whose forces occupied most of southern 
Lebanon and Beirut. Because of the presence of a variety of armed 
militias throughout the country and the resulting "cantonization" 
of the state, in 1987 the term government had relevance only within 
the context of sectarian politics. 

The Basis of Government 

The Constitution and National Pact together form the frame- 
work of Lebanon's parliamentary democracy. The Constitution 
provides for three branches of government: an executive, a legis- 
lature, and an independent judiciary. The president of the repub- 
lic, who appoints the prime minister, is elected by the Chamber 
of Deputies, the legislative body. Although this system resembles 
that of a Western democracy, because of the National Pact and 
its legitimization in the Constitution, the president, ministers, and 
deputies act as members of their respective confessional commu- 
nities and not as at-large representatives (see Lebanese Confessional 
"Societies," ch. 2). " 

The Constitution 

In the early 1920s, the League of Nations requested that the 
French Mandate authorities devise a law for Lebanon in coopera- 
tion with the native leaders and in harmony with the wishes and 
interests of the diverse religious sects. Accordingly, in July 1925 
the French government appointed a commission, which by May 15, 
1926, had prepared a draft constitution. The Representative 



141 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

Council, an elected body of Lebanese leaders sitting as a consti- 
tuent assembly, adopted the draft constitution on May 23. 

Although many Lebanese historians and politicians have claimed 
that the Constitution was designed primarily by local leaders to 
reflect purely Lebanese interests, the minutes of the constituent 
assembly reveal the major role of the French representative. He 
had the power to veto any modification to the draft, and he also 
controlled the agenda. In reaction to France's dominance, Mus- 
lim representatives made it clear during the meetings that they were 
against the very idea of expanding the limits of mostly Christian 
Mount Lebanon to create Greater Lebanon incorporating Mus- 
lim areas and insisted that the record show their reservations. 

When completed, the Constitution was divided into six parts, 
one of which contained four articles relating to the French Man- 
date and the League of Nations. By these articles, France retained 
full political control over the country. In theory, France's high com- 
missioner was charged with advisory and supervisory functions in 
normal times; in practice, he exercised supreme power. Army troops 
under French control were stationed throughout the country. 
Although their ostensible role was to keep the high commissioner 
informed of the local political situation, in fact they exerted a great 
deal of influence on the local administration. Thus, between 1926, 
when the Constitution was adopted, and 1946, when the French 
finally handed over all functions of state, France, not local offi- 
cials, exercised control over implementation of the Constitution. 
The high commissioner, in fact, suspended the Constitution several 
times during the 1932-37 period and again at the beginning of 
World War II. 

The Constitution stresses freedom and equality, although with 
some limitations. All Lebanese are guaranteed the freedoms of 
speech, assembly, and association "within the limits established 
by law." There are also provisions for freedom of conscience and 
the free exercise of all forms of worship, as long as the dignity of 
the several religions and the public order are not affected. 

Clearly, there are inherent contradictions within the Constitu- 
tion. Even though articles 7 and 12 provide for equality of civil 
and political rights and equal access to public posts based on merit, 
Article 95 affirms the state's commitment to confessionalism, but 
without setting forth how it is to be applied. Article 95, in effect, 
legitimizes the National Pact. 

Amendments to the Constitution may be initiated by the presi- 
dent of the republic or by a resolution of at least ten members of 
the Chamber of Deputies. The Chamber of Deputies, by a two- 
thirds majority, can recommend an amendment. However, the 



142 



Government and Politics 



president and his cabinet, who together constitute the Council of 
Ministers, have veto powers, which can be overridden only by a 
complex procedure of the Chamber of Deputies. The most signifi- 
cant amendments were promulgated in 1943, when all references 
to the French Mandate were expunged and Arabic was designated 
the nation's official language. 

Attempts to amend the Constitution have met with both favor 
and controversy. In 1949 the Constitution was amended to allow 
President Bishara al Khuri (also seen as Khoury) to succeed him- 
self. Nine years later, however, when unpopular president Camille 
Shamun (also seen as Chamoun) sought an amendment that would 
allow him to succeed himself, vigorous opposition throughout the 
country prevented him from doing so. 

The National Pact 

The National Pact (al Mithaq al Watani), an unwritten agree- 
ment, came into being in the summer of 1943 as the result of numer- 
ous meetings between Khuri (a Maronite), Lebanon's first 
president, and the first prime minister, Riyad as Sulh (also seen 
as Solh), a Sunni. At the heart of the negotiations was the Chris- 
tians' fear of being overwhelmed by the Muslim communities in 
Lebanon and the surrounding Arab countries, and the Muslims' 
fear of Western hegemony. In return for the Christian promise not 
to seek foreign, i.e., French, protection and to accept Lebanon's 
"Arab face," the Muslim side agreed to recognize the indepen- 
dence and legitimacy of the Lebanese state in its 1920 boundaries 
and to renounce aspirations for union with Syria. The pact also 
reinforced the sectarian system of government begun under the 
French Mandate by formalizing the confessional distribution of 
high-level posts in the government based on the 1932 census' six- 
to-five ratio favoring Christians over Muslims. Although some 
historians dispute the point, the terms of the National Pact were 
believed to have been enunciated by the first cabinet in a state- 
ment to the legislature in October 1943. 

As noted, the confessional system outlined in the National Pact 
was a matter of expediency, an interim measure to overcome 
philosophical divisions between Christian and Muslim leaders at 
independence. It was hoped that once the business of governance 
got under way, and as national spirit grew, the importance of con- 
fessionalism in the political structure would diminish. Over the 
years, the frequent political disputes — the most notable of which 
were manifested in the 1958 Civil War, the Palestinian controversy 
of the 1960s and 1970s, and the 1975 Civil War— bear stark 



143 



Lebanon: A Country Study 



testimony to the failure of the National Pact as a means toward 
societal integration. 

Moreover, some observers claim that the National Pact merely 
perpetuated the power of the privileged. The pact, combined with 
the system of zuama clientelism, guaranteed the maintenance of the 
status quo and the continuation of privilege for the sectarian elites. 

The Practice of Government 
Zuama Clientelism 

In pluralistic societies, patronage is often a common feature of 
the political process; the promotion of the interests of a particular 
sect is frequently widespread. Although patronage is prevalent in 
developed and lesser developed countries alike, clientelism may be 
more entrenched in Lebanon than in most other nations. The per- 
vasiveness of this system in Lebanon is easily traced to feudal times, 
wherein the overlord allowed peasants and their families the use 
of land in exchange for unquestioned loyalty. In more recent times, 
this social system has been translated into a political system; the 
overlord has become a political leader, or zaim, the peasants have 
become his constituents, and, instead of land, favors are exchanged 
for electoral loyalty. And although clientelism has its roots in the 
rural areas, it now pervades towns and large cities down to the 
neighborhood level. 

A zaim is a political leader, and rather than being exclusively 
an officeholder, he may be a power broker with the ability to 
manipulate elections and the officials he helps elect. Accordingly, 
wastah — the ability to attain access to a power broker — is widely 
sought, but only achieved at some price. 

There are those who believe that at the local level zuama clien- 
telism may have reduced sectarian strife. Often, political competi- 
tion was intrasectarian, rather than with members of different 
groups. And because only some of Lebanon's electoral districts were 
confessionally homogeneous (although most had a certain sectari- 
an preponderance), a candidate often could not be elected unless 
he were supported by other confessional groups within his district. 
Once elected, however, the opportunity to augment his power was 
great. To ensure that constituents continued their support, zuama 
have been known to employ qabadayat, or enforcers, whose job it 
was to see that their chiefs were warmly supported at the polls or 
to discourage opponents from voting. In fact, in the post-World 
War II years, many zuama developed their own militias to safeguard 
their interests, often against rivals within their own sect. The de- 
velopment of these militias led to tragedy during the 1975 Civil 



144 



Some of Lebanon's most powerful zuama in the mid-1980s 
Courtesy Lebanese Information and Research Center 

War when these private armies were turned loose on members of 
opposing sects. 

Another component of the Lebanese patronage system is the im- 
portant role of family. The position of zaim is frequently heredi- 
tary, and politics is often treated like a family business. For example, 
almost one-fourth of the members of the 1960 Chamber of Deputies 
were the descendants of men who had been appointed to the legis- 
lative assemblies under the French Mandate. Furthermore, it was 
not uncommon for more than one member of the same family to 
hold office in the same government; for example, four different 
members of the Sulh family have held the position of prime minister. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, Amin Jumayyil (the Phalange Party — see 
Glossary), Dani Shamun (the National Liberal Party), and Walid 
Jumblatt (the Progressive Socialist Party) inherited their fathers' 
political mantles. Occasionally, the family of a zaim would control 
an entire sect, as the Asad clan did over the Shias of southern 
Lebanon in the first half of the twentieth century. 

Thus, in 1987 Lebanon's constitutionally based political system 
had to be viewed through the overlay of clientelism, a system that 
had persisted in one form or another for over a hundred years. 
Even so, this system, although unlikely to disappear in the near 
term, perhaps was being challenged by a post- 1975 Civil War 
development: the rise of the militias. Although some militias were 
still controlled by descendants of traditional zuama, others, like 
Amal, Hizballah (Party of God), and the Lebanese Forces, were 
led by figures who had arrived relatively late on the political scene 
(see Political Parties and Groupings, this ch.). These militias were 
not just military organizations; through military force they often 
gained control of revenues that formerly went to government coffers 
(see The Budget, ch. 3). In this way, by controlling armed might 



145 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

and the purse, the militias were appropriating the basic stock-in- 
trade of the traditional zaim system. The patron-client relationship, 
therefore, rather than dying out may merely have taken one more 
turn along an evolutionary track. 

The Presidency 

As might be expected because of the significance of the family 
with its strong father figure and the influential role of the zaim, 
Lebanese have come to accept a powerful national leader. Indeed, 
the Constitution consigns to the president vast authority. He is com- 
mander in chief of the army and security forces; he can appoint 
and dismiss his prime minister and cabinet; he promulgates laws 
passed by the Chamber of Deputies and may also propose laws, 
enact "urgent" legislation by decree, and veto bills; he can dis- 
solve the Chamber of Deputies; and he exercises considerable in- 
fluence throughout the bureaucracy. 

His constitutional powers notwithstanding, the president is con- 
strained by the necessity of obtaining cooperation from at least a 
majority of the zuama of the various confessional communities. In 
addition, he must accommodate an array of other competing in- 
terests, including those of religious, business, and labor leaders. 
Moreover, the president, who by custom is a Maronite, must try 
to work in harmony with the prime minister, who by custom is 
a Sunni Muslim. Together, they are the most eminent members 
of the executive and wield a direct and personal influence over the 
deputies and other political leaders. 

The president is elected by the Chamber of Deputies, not by 
the general public. He is selected for a six-year term and may not 
succeed himself; he may serve any number of nonsuccessive terms, 
however. A sitting president steps down on September 23 of his 
sixth year in office. Thirty to sixty days before this, the speaker 
of the Chamber of Deputies calls for a special session to elect a 
new president. A quorum of two-thirds of the deputies is required 
to hold a special session. A two-thirds majority of deputies attend- 
ing is needed to be elected on the first ballot; failing that, a simple 
majority is required on subsequent ballots. 

In theory, anyone who meets the eligibility requirements for elec- 
tion to the Chamber of Deputies can be elected president; in real- 
ity, before the 1975 Civil War powerful Maronite zuama usually 
were elected. Exceptions were Fuad Shihab (also seen as Chehab) 
and Charles Hilu (also seen as Helou), leaders who unsuccessfully 
sought to diminish the power of the zuama (see The Rise of Shi- 
habism, 1958-64; The Hilu Era, 1964-70, ch. 1). At times, polit- 
ical maneuvering and interconfessional wrangling have been 



146 



Government and Politics 



intense; nonetheless, the reality has usually been that no one could 
be elected president without the support of a wide spectrum of con- 
fessional blocs. 

Although the Constitution grants the president wide latitude in 
conducting the affairs of state, it is questionable whether the 
Lebanese leaders who negotiated the National Pact envisioned the 
growth in power that occupants of the office assumed in later years. 
For many Lebanese, especially Muslims, the presidency came to 
symbolize political tyranny and sectarian hegemony. In domestic 
matters involving regional interests, the powers of the local zuama 
always held sway. But on broader, national-level issues, the 
Maronite presidents tended to safeguard Maronite interests. This 
was certainly true with regard to the pan-Arab question and the 
events that led to the 1958 Civil War, with respect to the Palestin- 
ian controversy, and in response to any call for fundamental polit- 
ical reform, especially musharaka, i.e., a more equitable distribution 
of power between the president and prime minister. 

Some presidents have viewed the office as a means for aggran- 
dizement. Sulayman Franjiyah (also seen as Franjieh), for instance, 
a zaim from Zgharta who was elected through the efforts of tradi- 
tional zuama by the margin of a single vote, is commonly regarded 
as having used his office to reward his family and constituency (see 
The Franjiyah Era, 1970-76, ch. 1). Many observers believe that 
nepotism and corruption — routine features of Lebanese politics — 
reached an intolerable level under Franjiyah' s tenure. 

The 1975 Civil War has left an indelible mark on the institution 
of the presidency. In the 1980s, the office no longer was viewed 
as a product of intersectarian consensus. The rise in sectarian con- 
sciousness has forced each president (and prime minister, for that 
matter) to be more accountable to the demands of his narrow com- 
munity. At the same time, as external actors such as Syria and 
Israel have influenced elections, and as the power of the militias 
has increased, the status of the presidency has declined at home 
and abroad. In 1987 the authority of the president did not extend 
much farther than the confines of the Presidential Palace at Babda. 

The Prime Minister and the Cabinet 

As noted, the president is constitutionally empowered to appoint 
the prime minister and the cabinet. Although a prime minister need 
not be a member of the Chamber of Deputies, this has usually been 
the case, particularly because the president must consult with the 
deputies before naming a prime minister. The president and the 
prime minister deliberate over the composition of the cabinet and 



147 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

present the nominees to the Chamber of Deputies to solicit a vote 
of confidence. 

As the highest Muslim political official, the prime minster can 
bring a significant amount of authority to his position, and indeed 
this may have been the intent of Lebanon's "founding fathers." 
In practice, however, the power of the prime minister has varied 
according to his personality, his base of support, and the prefer- 
ences of the president he served. A distinguished prime minister 
can enhance the prestige of the president, and the office has been 
held by some fairly capable politicians, including Riyad as Sulh, 
Saib Salam, and Rashid Karami. 

Clearly, a prime minister's constitutionally mandated power is 
small, and over the years his most effective methods of action have 
been informal. His resignation could embarrass a president, in- 
fluence popular opinion, and increase Muslim opposition. He could 
induce the Chamber of Deputies to voice a vote of no confidence 
and force the president to reappoint a new list of ministers, there- 
by stalling for a time governmental operations. In the end, however, 
these informal weapons were virtually inconsequential in compar- 
ison with the arsenal at the president's disposal. If a prime minister's 
actions caused a president dismay, the minister could be dismissed 
and replaced with a more pliable individual. For example, in 1973 
when Salam resigned as prime minister to protest the government's 
refusal to oppose Israeli attacks with force, President Franjiyah 
nominated a political unknown to the post. Although the nomina- 
tion was defeated, the eventual replacement was decidedly less resis- 
tant than Salam. Since the 1975 Civil War, the president has been 
forced to treat his prime minister with greater deference, but in 
the late 1980s the balance of political power in what remained of 
the official government was essentially unchanged from the prewar 
status. 

In theory, the cabinet is the vehicle through which the country 
is administered. It is supposed to set policy, prepare legislative bills, 
and appoint or dismiss top members of the bureaucracy. Histori- 
cally, however, ministers have often used their positions to increase 
their patronage within their constituencies and to add to their per- 
sonal wealth. 

Unlike some other nations, in which the president appoints a 
group of like-minded officials to the cabinet, in Lebanon cabinets 
are often intricately formed bodies, designed to accommodate 
diverse sectarian interests. Consequently, they sometimes have de- 
generated into arenas for political sniping and backroom machi- 
nations, with ever-changing coalitions and factions being formed. 
It has not been uncommon for intracabinet antipathies to paralyze 



148 



Government and Politics 



the business of government. In the late 1980s, some members of 
the cabinet were not even on speaking terms, and the Muslim mem- 
bers boycotted the president for more than a year. 

Any Lebanese can be appointed as a minister, but most often 
influential zuama have held these positions. Less frequently, for ex- 
ample during the 1975 Civil War, technocrats have been called 
upon to serve as ministers. And, for a few days in 1975, military 
officers held ministerial slots (see The Military Cabinet, ch. 5). 
In general, certain ministries have been reserved for the various 
sects; as a consequence, cabinets have not been noted for their ef- 
ficiency. One example of the anomalies that can develop because 
of these circumstances is the 1955 cabinet in which a Sunni ex- 
diplomat headed the Ministry of Public Works, while a Maronite 
engineer became the foreign minister. 

There is no set number of ministries, but historically it has fluc- 
tuated between four and twenty-two, expanding and contracting 
according to political exigencies. Sometimes a minister has held 
more than one portfolio; as of early 1987, there were ten ministers 
holding among them sixteen portfolios. And, as with much of 
Lebanese politics, members of the same privileged families have 
tended to hold cabinet positions. As an indication of postwar re- 
form, however, and in recognition of the growing Shia population, 
in 1984 the Ministry of State for the South and Reconstruction 
was created. 

Typically, because of constant political pressures, cabinets have 
been ephemeral. Between 1926 and 1964, the average life of each 
cabinet was less than eight months. Even though cabinets were in 
an almost constant state of dissolution and reformation, the same 
men tended to be reappointed to the same or other posts. For ex- 
ample, 333 ministerial posts were occupied by only 134 individu- 
als from 1926 to 1963. 

The Legislature 

The Chamber of Deputies (sometimes called the parliament) has 
many responsibilities, but electing the president is its most impor- 
tant. Despite its legislative role, traditionally the Chamber of 
Deputies seldom has been involved in law making or policy for- 
mulation. The Constitution details the duties and procedures of 
the Chamber of Deputies and grants it considerable authority in 
such matters as budgetary oversight and amending the Constitu- 
tion. But because of the strength of the presidency and the power 
of the zuama, the Chamber of Deputies generally has been a frag- 
mented, inefficient body, playing an insignificant part in Lebanese 



149 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

politics. In effect, it has merely been an extension of the executive, 
rather than a separate, co-equal branch of government. 

Deputies are elected every four years by popular vote, but only 
within the strictures of the confessional system. Each slot is assigned 
to one sect or another according to its size in any district. It should 
be noted, however, that party politics have played almost no part 
in Lebanon and candidates campaign as part of a "list" sponsored 
by a local zaim. In other words, competition within districts is in- 
trasectarian, in which, for example, a Greek Catholic from one 
list would campaign against Greek Catholics from other lists. Even 
though it is possible to vote across lists, typically lists have been 
elected in toto. To ensure the success of his list, a zaim often enters 
into complex alliances with zuama supporting other lists in other 
districts. As a result, one zaim may support another zaim in a neigh- 
boring district but oppose him in another district. 

Because of the 1975 Civil War and the subsequent political dis- 
integration, as of late 1987 there had been no election since 1972. 
Elections have been somewhat chaotic, often characterized by the 
strong-arm tactics of qabadayat, vote buying, and general disrup- 
tions. Elections have been conducted in stages, as much to allow 
voters to return to their home towns to cast ballots as to permit 
the redeployment of security forces to limit disturbances. 

Money, of course, has been at the core of this system. Regard- 
less of confessional association, candidates have tended to be men 
of wealth, often landlords, lawyers, or businessmen with family 
connections to the local zaim. Not surprisingly, candidates have 
frequently spent large sums to win elections. Once in office, 
although he was still beholden to the zaim, a deputy could further 
his accumulation of wealth. In addition, this system has perpetu- 
ated the promotion of parochial interests over the national welfare. 

Despite its obvious unrepresentativeness, little reform to this sys- 
tem has occurred. One important factor maintaining the system 
has been the government's voting regulations, which encourage 
an individual to vote in his home town or village, regardless of how 
long he may have lived elsewhere. This policy reinforced the political 
hold of the zaim and, at the same time, discouraged the emergence 
of modern political parties (see Political Parties and Groupings, 
this ch.). 

Several other features characterized the Chamber of Deputies 
in 1987. By custom, its speaker (also referred to as its president), 
who was selected by the deputies, was a Shia Muslim. He presid- 
ed over a body of fairly well-educated men, many of whom were 
related to one another. To be eligible for election, an individual 
had to be at least twenty-five years of age; still, most members of 



150 



An example of the devastation of the 1975 Civil War 
Courtesy United States Navy (Robert Feary) 

the Chamber of Deputies were over fifty years old. Only one 
woman, Mirna Bustani, had ever served in the Chamber of 
Deputies, and this was under unusual circumstances. Her father, 
Emile Bustani, a deputy, died in office, and, being an only child, 
Mirna was appointed to complete Emile 's term in the 1960 Cham- 
ber of Deputies. 

To accommodate the six-to-five formula for representation of 
Christians to Muslims, the number of deputies has always been 
a multiple of eleven, although the number has varied over time. 
In 1951 the Chamber of Deputies was increased from fifty-five to 
seventy-seven members, in 1957 it was reduced to sixty-six, and 
in 1960 it was raised to ninety-nine. In the latter year, the Cham- 
ber of Deputies was made up of thirty Maronites, twenty Sunnis, 
nineteen Shias, eleven Greek Orthodox, six Druzes, six Greek 
Catholics, four Armenian Orthodox, and three members of minor- 
ity groups (see Lebanese Confessional "Societies," ch. 2). 

Rather than trying to hold elections amid the chaos of the 1970s 
and 1980s, the Chamber of Deputies chose to renew its members' 
terms every two years until "appropriate conditions" would allow 
a free election. Moreover, it had not even been possible to hold 
by-elections to fill seats of deceased members. In the mid-1980s, 
government officials discussed appointing new deputies to these 
seats. In addition, during this time a national consensus developed 



151 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

to modify the formula of representation so that seats would be evenly 
distributed. Furthermore, some officials proposed that the size of 
the Chamber of Deputies be increased to 120. Nonetheless, by 1987 
none of these ideas had been implemented, and, as a consequence, 
of the ninety-nine deputies elected in 1972, only seventy-seven 
remained. 

The Judiciary 

As with other branches of government, the judiciary suffered 
as a result of the 1975 Civil War and the ensuing disruptions. Prior 
to the war, the Lebanese justice system mirrored many features 
common to West European systems, especially that of France. The 
Ministry of Justice had official authority over the judicial system, 
but the Supreme Council of Justice, a body consisting of eleven 
judges appointed by the president in consultation with leaders of 
the sects, exercised actual jurisdiction over the various courts. It 
appointed judges to the several courts and could transfer or remove 
them. There were fifty-six courts of first instance, with seventeen 
in Beirut alone, and each was presided over by a single magistrate. 
Cases from these courts could be appealed to one of eleven courts 
of appeal, each of which had a three-judge panel. Above these were 
four courts of cassation, on which sat three judges each. Three of 
these courts adjudicated civil cases, and one heard criminal com- 
plaints. 

Several other courts existed outside this general framework. The 
six-member Council of State functioned as an appeals court for 
administrative matters, and the Judicial Council, which included 
the most senior judge of the courts of cassation and four other judges 
appointed by the government, ruled on cases of public security. 
In addition, there were a few other special courts that heard ques- 
tions relating to the military, the press, and business affairs. 

Matters of personal status, dealing with such issues as marriage 
and inheritance, were in the domain of the various sects (see 
Lebanese Confessional "Societies," ch. 2). These cases sometimes 
involved complex layers of appeal. Maronites and Greek Catho- 
lics, for example, could appeal to the Vatican, whereas Greek 
Orthodox could look to the Patriarchal Court in Damascus for relief. 
Shias and Sunnis, in contrast, often dealt with appeals locally and 
based decisions on sharia (see Tenets of Islam, ch. 2). 

As might be expected in a society based on patronage, political 
interference injudicial affairs was not uncommon, and pressures 
from zuama on judges often influenced rulings. Observers noted 
that confessionalism also marred the judicial system, not only in 



152 



Government and Politics 



the selection of judges, some of whom were mediocre jurists, but 
also in the determination of criminal penalties. 

As of 1987, the Ministry of Justice was an active portfolio, but 
there was little evidence that the judiciary resembled its prewar 
status; only a few government-run courts seemed to be in opera- 
tion. These apparently handled only minor civil and criminal cases 
and ultimately were circumscribed by the desires of the local militias. 

The Bureaucracy 

In 1987 there were skeletal remains of the prewar bureaucracy. 
For example, although there were still many interruptions, tele- 
phone and postal service continued to function in many areas, and 
electric power and piped water still flowed to many users. But with 
the central authorities in a shambles, the bureaucracy was often 
more heavily influenced by the local militias than by the cabinet 
ministries. 

Before the 1975 Civil War the bureaucracy, bloated by patronage, 
was noted for its slowness, inefficiency, and corruption. Favored 
clients of zuama often held important positions and, regardless of 
their competence, could not be fired. Given the low pay of many 
positions, it was not surprising that government employment did 
not attract the most capable people. Moreover, to make ends meet, 
many civil servants were prone to accepting bribes and spending 
only a few hours at the office so they could work at a second job. 

Sectarianism has perhaps been stronger in the bureaucracy than 
in any other Lebanese political institution. President Shihab, one 
of the few national-level politicians to introduce reforms to the sys- 
tem, in 1959 enacted the Personnel Law. This statute technically 
abolished the practice of appointing officers on the basis of the six- 
to-five formula; instead, Christians and Muslims were to be ap- 
pointed on an equal basis. Shihab also created the Civil Service 
Council to examine, train, and certify new appointees, and he es- 
tablished a school to provide such training. 

But as with other reform measures that threatened the hold of 
the zuama, these efforts were largely ignored. An estimate of sec- 
tarian representation in 1955 among higher ranking civil servants 
put Maronites at 40 percent, Sunnis at 27 percent, and Shias at 
a mere 3.6 percent. Furthermore, by the start of the Civil War 
in 1975, these ratios remained relatively unchanged. 

In the aftermath of the violence of the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
observers were uncertain of the exact functioning of local adminis- 
tration. As noted earlier, it was believed that, like much of Lebanese 
politics, local affairs had become the domain of the militias. In 1987 
the country was divided into five provinces (muhqfazat): Bayrut, 



153 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

Al Biqa, Jabal Lubnan, Al Janub, and Ash Shamal (see fig. 1). 
A sixth province, Jabal Amil, was created in the 1980s. It was to 
be carved out of Al Janub Province, with its capital at An Nabatiyah 
at Tahta. In 1987, however, its exact boundaries could not be de- 
termined. All provinces except Bayrut were subdivided into dis- 
tricts. Prior to 1975, local administration was highly centralized, 
with the Ministry of Interior having oversight and fiscal responsi- 
bilities. The governor, who was appointed by the president with 
cabinet approval, was the highest-ranking official in each province. 
He headed the Provincial Council, which included a representa- 
tive of the Ministry of Finance, and the deputy governors (qaim 
maqams), who were appointed in the same manner as the gover- 
nor. Despite the elaborate infrastructure of the local administra- 
tion, by virtue of its control over the purse strings, the Ministry 
of Interior exercised considerable authority. 

Political Parties and Groupings 

Historically, political parties in Lebanon have lacked traits com- 
mon to parties in most Western democracies. Lebanese parties often 
have had no ideology, have devised no programs, and have made 
little effort at transcending sectarian support. In fact, despite their 
claims, most parties have been thinly disguised political machines 
for a particular confession or, more often, a specific zaim. Although 
nondescript, broad titles have been applied, such as National Bloc 
Party or Progressive Socialist Party, with the exception of a hand- 
ful of left-wing movements, most parties have been the organiza- 
tional personification of a few powerful politicians. Even Kamal 
Jumblatt (also seen as Junblatt), the most ideologically oriented 
of the zuama, derived his constituents' support principally because 
he was a Druze leader, not because of his political beliefs. For this 
reason, any one party could count on only a few votes in the Cham- 
ber of Deputies. This situation brought about a continuous stream 
of coalitions, each often created to represent a point of view on 
a particular issue. In this system, leaders could not even rely on 
the support of their coreligionists; in fact, some of the most severe 
acrimony has been intrasectarian. Nonetheless, in the face of 
challenges to fundamental issues — such as the six-to-five formula 
or the pan- Arab question — the various confessionally based par- 
ties generally closed ranks. 

Before and during the 1975 Civil War, other political group- 
ings were formed (see Appendix B). Although ideology played some 
role in their formation, for the most part these alliances — the 
Lebanese National Movement and the Lebanese Front — tended 
to be temporary associations of politically motivated militias under 



154 



Government and Politics 



the leadership of powerful zuama, and divisions generally followed 
sectarian lines. So ephemeral were these associations, however, that 
after the heaviest fighting of the mid- and late 1970s ceased, several 
of the groups in these coalitions turned their guns on each other 
(see The Interwar Years, ch. 5). 

Nonetheless, ideology, rather than the power and charisma of 
a zaim, has been the basis for the formation of a small number of 
political parties. These multisectarian groups have espoused causes 
ranging from Marxism to pan-Arabism. To a limited extent, several 
of these essentially leftist parties also participated in the fighting 
of the 1970s. 

By 1987 political parties, in the sense of constitutionally legiti- 
mate groups seeking office, had almost become an anachronism. 
By virtue of armed strength, the various militias, surrogate armies, 
and foreign defense forces that controlled the nation had divided 
Lebanon into several semiautonomous "cantons," each having its 
own political, social, and economic structure (see fig. 8). 

Sectarian Groups 

Phalange Party 

Formed in 1936 as a Maronite paramilitary youth organization 
by Pierre Jumayyil (who modeled it on the fascist organizations 
he had observed while in Berlin as an Olympic athlete), the 
Phalange, or Phalanxes (Kataib in Arabic), was authoritarian and 
very centralized, and its leader was all powerful. It quickly grew 
into a major political force in Mount Lebanon. After at first ally- 
ing itself with the French Mandate authorities, the Phalange sided 
with those calling for independence; as a result, the party was dis- 
solved in 1942 by the French high commissioner (it was restored 
after the French left Lebanon). Despite this early dispute, over the 
years the Phalange has been closely associated with France in par- 
ticular and the West in general. In fact, for many years the party 
newspaper, Al Amal, was printed in Arabic and French. 

Consistent with its authoritarian beginnings, Phalangist ideol- 
ogy has been on the right of the political spectrum. Although it 
has embraced the need to "modernize," it has always favored the 
preservation of the sectarian status quo. The Phalange Party motto 
is "God, the Fatherland, and the Family," and its doctrine em- 
phasizes a free economy and private initiative. Phalangist ideolo- 
gy focuses on the primacy of preserving the Lebanese nation, but 
with a "Phoenician" identity, distinct from its Arab, Muslim neigh- 
bors. Party policies have been uniformly anticommunist and anti- 
Palestinian and have allowed no place for pan- Arab ideals. 



155 



Lebanon: A Country Study 




Figure 8. The Cantons of Lebanon, 1986 



156 



Government and Politics 



Unlike many zuama who achieved their status by virtue of in- 
heriting wealth, Jumayyil ascended because of his ability to instill 
discipline in his organization and, by the mid-1950s, through the 
accumulation of military might. By the outbreak of the 1958 Civil 
War, the Phalange Party was able to further its growing power 
by means of its militia. In that year, when President Shamun was 
unable to convince the army commander, Fuad Shihab, to use the 
armed forces against Muslim demonstrators, the Phalange militia 
came to his aid (see The 1958 Civil War, ch. 5). Encouraged by 
its efforts during this conflict, later that year, principally through 
violence and the success of general strikes in Beirut, the Phalange 
achieved what journalists dubbed the "counterrevolution." By their 
actions the Phalangists brought down the government of Prime 
Minister Karami and secured for their leader, Jumayyil, a posi- 
tion in the four-man cabinet that was subsequently formed. 

The 1958 Civil War was a turning point for the Phalange Party. 
Whereas in 1936, the year of its formation, it had a following of 
around 300, by 1958 its membership had swelled to almost 40,000. 
Meanwhile, the French newspaper L'Orient estimated that the 
Phalange Party's nearest rival, the Syrian Socialist Nationalist 
Party, had a membership of only 25,000 (see Multisectarian Par- 
ties, this ch.). In addition, although until 1958 it had been able 
to elect only 31 percent of its candidates to the Chamber of Deputies, 
from 1959 through 1968 the Phalange placed 61 percent of its can- 
didates in office. Moreover, by the start of the disturbances in 1975, 
the party's rolls may have included as many as 65,000 members, 
including a militia approaching 10,000 men. 

Throughout the 1975 Civil War, the Phalange Party was the most 
formidable force within the Christian camp, and its militia shoul- 
dered the brunt of the fighting. As part of the Lebanese Front, the 
mostly Christian, rightist coalition, the power of the Jumayyil fa- 
mily increased considerably (see Appendix B). Ironically, as Pierre 
Jumayyil' s son, Bashir, ascended as a national figure, the role of 
the Phalange Party diminished (see The Ascendancy of Bashir 
Jumayyil, ch. 5). This was true primarily because the relevance 
of political entities declined as the importance of armed power grew. 
Through a series of violent intrasectarian battles, Bashir seized con- 
trol of the Lebanese Forces (not to be confused with the Lebanese 
Front), a conglomeration of the Phalange Party's military wing 
and some other Christian militias. 

During the 1980s, the Phalange lost much of its credibility and 
political stature. In 1982, under pressure from Israel, which 
occupied a good deal of Lebanon, Bashir was elected president. 
Later that year, before talking office, Bashir was assassinated. 



157 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

Subsequently, his brother Amin was elected president, again not 
so much for his Phalange Party connection as because of his sup- 
port from Israel. With the death of Pierre Jumayyil in 1984, the 
role of the party declined further. When the deputy leader of the 
party, Elie Karamah, a Greek Catholic, was named as its new head, 
many Maronite members became disaffected. Maronite George 
Saadah succeeded Karamah in 1987 and strove to resuscitate the 
flagging Phalange by holding party meetings and by improving 
ties to the Lebanese Forces. The party, however, was factional - 
ized, and many prominent members had left. 

National Liberal Party 

Established in 1958 by Camille Shamun after he left the presi- 
dency, the National Liberal Party (NLP) was a predominantly 
Maronite organization, although it had some non-Maronites and 
non-Christians in its leadership. More or less a political vehicle 
for Shamun, perhaps the most charismatic of all Christian lead- 
ers, the NLP lacked a coherent ideology or program. Although the 
NLP never matched the organizational efficiency of the Phalange 
Party, they shared many views, including favoring a free-market 
economy, anticommunism, close association with the West, and, 
most important, the continuation of Christian political advantage. 
In the early 1970s, the NLP claimed 60,000 to 70,000 members 
and controlled as many as 11 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, 
and Shamun had occupied several ministerial posts after his term 
as president. 

During the 1975 Civil War, the NLP and its militia, the Tigers 
(Namur in Arabic), participated in the Lebanese Front, and 
Shamun, who was driven from his home district in the Shuf Moun- 
tains, was an active leader in the alliance. When, in July 1980, 
Bashir Jumayyil launched a surprise attack, defeating the Tigers, 
the political and military significance of the NLP declined. The 
party again suffered a severe setback in August 1987 when Shamun 
died. His son Dani assumed the chairmanship of the party, which 
still harbored hopes for the presidential election scheduled for 1988. 

Lebanese Forces 

The Lebanese Forces (LF) emerged as a political power in 1976 
under the leadership of Bashir Jumayyil. At that time various Chris- 
tian militias joined forces to bring about the destruction of the Pales- 
tinian refugee camp at Tall Zatar. In August of that year, a joint 
command council was established to integrate formally the several 
militias, but also to achieve a higher degree of independence from 
the traditional political leaders, whom many of the LF rank and 



158 



During a visit to 
Washington in 1983, 
President Amin Jumayyil meets 
with President Ronald Reagan. 

Courtesy Lebanese 
Information and 
Research Center 



file regarded as too moderate. Jumayyil first took control of the 
military wing of his father's Phalange Party and then proceeded 
to incorporate other Christian militias. Those who resisted were 
forcibly integrated. In 1978 Jumayyil subjugated the Marada 
Brigade, the militia of former president Sulayman Franjiyah, kill- 
ing Franjiyah's son, Tony, in the process. In 1980 the same fate 
befell Camille Shamun's Tigers militia. 

Thus, by the early 1980s the LF controlled East Beirut and 
Mount Lebanon, and Jumayyil was its de facto president. But 
Jumayyil did not confine the LF to the military realm only; he 
created committees within the LF structure that had responsibil- 
ity for health, information, foreign affairs, education, and other 
matters of public concern. Jumayyil established links with Israeli 
authorities, and he consistently battled with Syrian forces (see The 
Ascendancy of Bashir Jumayyil, ch. 5). Important features of the 
LF's operations were its legal (official) and illegal (unofficial) ports 
and the revenues generated by the transit trade (see The Budget, 
ch. 3). In this way, the LF took over the traditional role of the state 
as a provider of public services. 

Following the 1982 assassination of Bashir Jumayyil, the LF 
suffered serious organizational cleavages. After numerous suc- 
cession struggles, Elie Hubayka (also seen as Hobeika) — notorious 
for his role in the Sabra and Shatila massacres of 1982 — as- 
sumed the leadership of the LF. But when Hubayka signed the 



159 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

Syrian-sponsored Tripartite Accord in December 1985 against the 
wishes of President Amin Jumayyil, LF chief of staff Samir Jaja 
(also seen as Geagea) launched an attack on Hubayka and his 
loyalists and defeated them. Interestingly, Hubayka, who was once 
noted for his close ties to Israel, in late 1987 was headquartered 
in Zahlah, where he headed a separate pro-Syrian "Lebanese 
Forces" (see Chaos in Beirut and Syrian Peacemaking Efforts, 
ch. 5). 

In 1987 the LF was one of the most important political and mili- 
tary actors on the Lebanese scene. As leader of the LF, Jaja wielded 
power rivaling that of President Jumayyil. Jaja embraced a hard- 
line, anti-Syrian position and revived ties with Israel. The LF oper- 
ated television and radio stations and published a weekly magazine. 

Amal 

The Amal movement was established in 1975 by Imam Musa 
as Sadr, an Iranian-born Shia cleric of Lebanese ancestry who had 
founded the Higher Shia Islamic Council in 1969. Amal, which 
means hope in Arabic, is the acronym for Afwaj al Muqawamah 
al Lubnaniyyah (Lebanese Resistance Detachments) and was ini- 
tially the name given to the military arm of the Movement of the 
Disinherited. This latter organization was created in 1974 by Sadr 
as a vehicle to promote the Shia cause in Lebanon. 

Sadr, who at first established his own militia, later resisted a mili- 
tary solution to Lebanon's problems, refusing to engage Amal in 
the fighting during the 1975 Civil War. This reluctance discredited 
the movement in the eyes of many Shias, who chose instead to sup- 
port the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) or other leftist 
parties. Amal was also unpopular for endorsing Syria's interven- 
tion in 1976. 

Nonetheless, several factors caused the movement to undergo 
a dramatic resurgence in the late 1970s. First, Shias became disil- 
lusioned with the conduct and policies of the PLO and its Lebanese 
allies. Second, the mysterious disappearance of Sadr while on a 
visit to Libya in 1978 rendered the missing imam a religious sym- 
bol; the significance attached to Sadr's disappearance was not un- 
like the significance attached to the occultational absence of the 
twelfth Shia Imam (see Muslim Sects, ch. 2). Third, the Iranian 
Revolution revived hope among Lebanese Shias and instilled in 
them a greater communal spirit. In addition, when the growing 
strength of Amal appeared to threaten the position of the PLO in 
southern Lebanon, the PLO tried to crack down on Amal by sheer 
military force. This strategy backfired and rallied even greater num- 
bers of Shias around Amal. 



160 



Government and Politics 



By the early 1980s, Amal was the most powerful organization 
within the Shia community and perhaps was the largest organiza- 
tion in the country. Its organizational strength lay in its extension 
to all regions of the country inhabited by Shias. 

Amal's ideology had evolved somewhat since Sadr's disappear- 
ance, when Husayn Husayni (also seen as Husseini) assumed 
leadership from April 1979 to April 1980 and was then followed 
by Nabih Birri (also seen as Berri). Although its charter considers 
the Palestinian cause a central issue for all Arabs, in the mid-1980s 
the Amal militia laid siege to Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut, 
in retribution for years of abuses at the hands of Palestinian liber- 
ation groups that operated in southern Lebanon. Amal stressed 
resistance to Israel, and Amal's leadership was perceived by many 
as being pro-Syrian. The Amal platform called for national unity 
and equality among all citizens and rejected confederation schemes. 
Amal was linked less closely to Iran than some other Shia organi- 
zations, and it did not propose the creation of an Islamic state in 
Lebanon. 

Its broad geographical base notwithstanding, neither Amal's rank 
and file nor its leadership was especially cohesive. Amal's various 
geographic branches did not embrace a single position but were 
subject to particularist tendencies. Moreover, its two leading 
bodies — the Politburo, headed by Birri, and the Executive Com- 
mittee, led by Daud Daud — appeared to effect a balance between 
two competing socioeconomic groups. The members of the first 
group, personified by Birri, were educated, upper middle class, 
and secularly oriented (in relative terms). The second, exempli- 
fied by Daud, was composed of members who had been in the move- 
ment since its inception, who generally were of peasant origins, 
and who were religiously oriented. In late 1987 the first group was 
in control of most of the movement, its radio and television sta- 
tions, and its weekly magazine. 

Hizballah 

Established in 1982 at the initiative of a group of Shia clerics 
who were adherents of Shaykh Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, by 
1987 Hizballah (Party of God) was the second most important Shia 
organization. Fadlallah, who was born in southern Lebanon but 
educated in An Najaf, Iraq, moved to East Beirut, where he wrote 
books on Islamic jurisprudence. Having been evicted by Chris- 
tian forces during the fighting in 1976, he relocated in Beirut's 
southern suburbs. Fadlallah continued his work and developed a 
following, which later evolved into Hizballah. 



161 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

In 1987 Hizballah followed strictly the theological line of Iran's 
Ayatollah Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini and called for the 
establishment in Lebanon of Islamic rule modeled on that of Iran. 
In pursuit of this goal, the party had developed close ties with Ira- 
nian representatives in Lebanon and Syria. In terms of secular poli- 
cies, Hizballah rejected any compromise with Lebanese Christians, 
Israel, and the United States. This hardline approach appealed to 
many Shias, who abandoned the mainstream Amal movement to 
join Hizballah. These members tended to be young, radical, and 
poor. 

The party's internal structure revolved around the Consultative 
Council (Majlis ash Shura), a twelve-member body, most of whom 
were clerics. The council divided among its members responsibil- 
ities that covered, among other matters, financial, military, judi- 
cial, social, and political affairs. The party's, operations were 
geographically organized, with branches in Al Biqa and Al Janub 
provinces and in West Beirut and its southern outskirts. Among 
prominent Hizballah leaders in late 1987 were Shaykh Ibrahim al 
Amin, Shaykh Subhi at Tufayli, Shaykh Hasan Nasrallah, Shaykh 
Abbas al Musawi, and Husayn al Musawi; Fadlallah insisted that 
he had no formal organizational role but was merely Hizballah's 
inspirational leader. 

Hizballah gained international attention in 1983 when press 
reports linked it to attacks against United States and French facili- 
ties in Lebanon, to the abduction of foreigners, and to the hijack- 
ing of aircraft (see Internal Security and Terrorism, ch. 5). 
Nonetheless, Fadlallah (who was himself a target of a terrorist as- 
sassination attempt) and Hizballah spokesmen continued to deny 
any involvement in anti- American attacks. 

Islamic Amal 

Based in Baalbek in the Biqa Valley, Islamic Amal was led by 
Husayn al Musawi, who was also a leading figure in Hizballah. 
The movement got its start in June 1982 when Nabih Birri, the 
head of Amal, agreed to participate in the Salvation Committee, 
a body set up by President Ilyas Sarkis following the Israeli inva- 
sion. The committee included Bashir Jumayyil, the much-despised 
Maronite commander of the LF. Musawi considered Birri's ac- 
tions "treasonous" and Amal's orientation too secular. In response, 
Musawi broke from Amal and set up his own faction, which ob- 
servers believed was organized primarily along family lines. 

Islamic Amal was backed by officials in the Iranian government, 
and it coordinated with units of Iran's Pasdaran (Revolutionary 
Guards) stationed around Baalbek. Even so, in 1986 when Iranian 



162 



A demonstration by members of Amal 
Courtesy As' ad AbuKhalil 

officials pressured Musawi to dissolve his organization, he refused. 
He agreed, however, to remain part of Hizballah, and he report- 
edly served as a member of its Consultative Council. Press reports 
linked Islamic Amal, like Hizballah, to anti-Western violence in 
Lebanon (see Internal Security and Terrorism, ch. 5). Although 
Musawi' s rhetoric was vehemently anti-Western, as of late 1987 
he had not claimed any violence in the name of Islamic Amal. 

Islamic Grouping 

Founded during the 1975 Civil War by Lebanon's Sunni mufti, 
Shaykh Hasan Khalid, the Islamic Grouping (At Tajammu al 
Islami) was a loose confederation of Sunni political and religious 
notables. At one time it included most former or current Sunni 
prime ministers, ministers, deputies, and lesser politicians. It met 
weekly under the chairmanship of the mufti, it issued statements 
on current issues, and it was responsible for nominating Sunni 
representatives to fill official government posts. In 1987, with poli- 
tics almost moribund and in the absence of a significant militia, 
the Islamic Grouping by default was the most important organi- 
zation of the Sunni community. 

Union of Muslim Ulama 

The Union of Muslim Ulama emerged in 1982, when West 
Beirut was under siege by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). It 



163 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

included Sunni and Shia clerics who shared the view that the ap- 
plication of sharia would solve Lebanon's problems and would end 
the IDF's occupation of Arab land. The union's fundamentalist 
line reflected its identification with the policies and objectives of 
Iran. 

The Union of Muslim Ulama, which was unique because of its 
combined Sunni- Shia membership, strove to eliminate tensions be- 
tween the two communities. For that reason, it organized mass ral- 
lies to propagate its views to the broadest audience possible. In 1987 
the union was led by Shaykh Mahir Hammud (a Sunni) and Shaykh 
Zuhayr Kanj (a Shia). 

Independent Nasserite Movement 

The Independent Nasserite Movement (INM) was the oldest of 
several organizations in Lebanon that embraced the ideas of the 
late Egyptian president, Gamal Abdul Nasser. Despite its claims 
of nonsectarianism, the membership of the INM has been over- 
whelmingly Muslim; 1987 reports estimated it to be about 
45-percent Sunni, 45-percent Shia, and 10-percent Druze. Its ideol- 
ogy was reflected by its motto: "Liberty, Socialism, and Unity." 

The INM came to prominence in the 1958 Civil War and re- 
mained a strong force throughout the 1970s. At the height of the 
1958 conflict, its militia, the Murabitun (Sentinels), clashed with 
the forces of pro- Western president Shamun. Consistent with its 
pan- Arab ideals, the INM was a firm supporter of the Palestinian 
movement in Lebanon in the late 1960s. During this time, it reen- 
forced the Murabitun. When the 1975 Civil War began, it was 
well positioned to play an active part. The Murabitun engaged 
Phalangist fighters in the most severe combat during the early stages 
of the war, and absorbed many casualties (see Appendix B). 

In the 1980s, the INM weathered difficult times. It fought with 
the Palestinians against the Israelis during the invasion of 1982 and 
with the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) against the Lebanese 
Army in the Shuf Mountains in 1983. Its alliance with the PSP 
was short-lived, however. In 1985 a joint PSP-Amal campaign vir- 
tually eliminated the Murabitun as an important actor in Lebanon 
and forced INM leader, Ibrahim Kulaylat, into exile. 

Progressive Socialist Party 

Founded in 1949 by members of various sects who were propo- 
nents of social reform and progressive change, the Progressive So- 
cialist Party (PSP) has been represented in the Chamber of Deputies 
since 1951. The party flourished under the leadership of Kamal 
Jumblatt, a charismatic — albeit somewhat enigmatic — character. 



164 



Government and Politics 



Jumblatt appealed to Druzes because of his position as zaim, to 
other Muslims who were disenchanted with the traditional politi- 
cal system, and to members of some other sects who were attracted 
by his secular and progressive rhetoric. By 1953 the PSP claimed 
some 18,000 adherents, and in the 1964 Chamber of Deputies it 
could count on as many as 10 deputies. 

Despite its nonsectarian beginnings and secular tide, by the early 
1950s the party began taking on a confessional cast. By the 1970s, 
this tendency was unmistakably Druze; this point was demonstrated 
in 1977 when, after Kamal Jumblatt was assassinated (perhaps by 
pro-Syrian agents), his son, Walid, assumed the party leadership, 
continuing Druze control of the party. 

Over the years the PSP has alternately cooperated with and op- 
posed many of the same parties. For example, in 1952 it helped 
Camille Shamun unseat Bishara al Khuri as president; then, six 
years later, it was in the forefront of groups calling for Shamun' s 
ouster. Moreover, from 1960 to 1964, when Jumblatt and Pierre 
Jumayyil served in the same cabinet, they spent much of their time 
vilifying each other in their respective party newspapers; yet in 1970, 
both Jumblatt and Jumayyil supported Franjiyah's candidacy for 
president, albeit for different reasons. 

A reformer willing to work within the system, Kamal Jumblatt 
played an active role in politics, serving in the Chamber of Deputies 
and in several cabinets. Although philosophically opposed to vio- 
lence, Jumblatt was not reluctant to pursue a military course when 
such action seemed necessary. The stalwart PSP militia was in- 
volved against the government during the 1958 Civil War, took 
a modest part in the Lebanese National Movement throughout the 
1975 Civil War, and fought against Phalangist troops and the 
Lebanese Army in the 1983 battles in the Shuf Mountains (see The 
Israel Defense Forces Withdrawal and the Mountain War, 
ch. 5). 

The Jumblatt family shared leadership of the Druze community 
with the Yazbak clan, led by Majid Arslan. Although divisions 
between these two branches have sometimes been wide, the coor- 
dinated Druze defense of the Shuf Mountains in 1983 and 1984 
helped close the rift. In addition, the Yazbaks suffered several set- 
backs that drew them closer to the Jumblatt confederation. First, 
Arslan' s son, Faysal, became discredited when he allied with Bashir 
Jumayyil and the LF before and during the 1982 Israeli invasion. 
Then, they lost their traditional leader, Arslan, who died in 1983. 
Consequently, by 1987 most Druze were united behind Walid 
Jumblatt as leader of the PSP and its formidable militia. 



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Lebanon: A Country Study 

Minority Parties 

Armenian Parties 

In general, Armenian groups have supported whatever govern- 
ment was in power. They have tended to focus on issues of interest 
to the larger Armenian world community and not strictly domes- 
tic politics. The three most important Armenian parties have been 
the Tashnak Party, the Hunchak Party, and the Ramgavar Party. 
Of these the Tashnak Party has had the greatest political impact. 

Founded in 1890 in Russian Armenia, the Tashnak Party sought 
to coordinate all Armenian revolutionary groups seeking to im- 
prove their conditions under Ottoman rule. Although the interna- 
tional Tashnak Party movement advocates socialism, the Lebanese 
branch of the party prefers capitalism. Since 1943 most of the Arme- 
nian deputies in the Chamber of Deputies (four in the election of 
1972) have been members or supporters of the Tashnak Party. Prior 
to the 1975 Civil War, the mostly Christian Tashnak Party was 
an ally of the Phalange Party. 

On the international level, the party has tended to be pro- 
Western, and during the 1950s and 1960s it took an anti-Nasser 
stance. As has been typical of Lebanon's Armenian community, 
the Tashnak Party has avoided sensitive and controversial domes- 
tic issues and has attempted to play a moderating role in politics. 
Like other Armenian groups, the Tashnak Party refrained from 
military activity during the 1975 Civil War. Because the party re- 
fused to come to the Christians' side, many Armenian quarters 
in Lebanese towns were subsequently attacked by Bashir Jumay- 
yil's LF. 

The Hunchak Party was organized in Geneva, Switzerland, in 
1887. It has promoted the dual objective of liberating Turkish 
Armenia and establishing a socialist regime in a unified Armenian 
homeland. The Hunchak Party in Lebanon has advocated a 
planned economy and a just distribution of national income. In 
1972, for the first time in its history, the Hunchak Party ran jointly 
for election to the Chamber of Deputies with the Tashnak Party. 

Founded in 1921, the Ramgavar Party's ultimate goal was the 
liberation of Armenia. It has oriented its activities toward preserving 
Armenian culture among Armenian communities throughout the 
world. After a period of dormancy, the party was revived in the 
1950s in the wake of increasing conflicts between the Tashnak Party 
and Hunchak Party. The Ramgavar Party presented itself as an 
alternative that avoided issues divisive to the Armenian commu- 
nity. The Ramgavar Party, sometimes considered the party of 



166 



Government and Politics 



Armenian intellectuals, also opposed what it considered the right- 
wing policies of the Tashnak Party. 

The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia 
(ASALA) was not a political party but rather a highly secret or- 
ganization that used violence to harm its political enemies, prin- 
cipally the government of Turkey. Established in 1975, ASALA 
used the Lebanese Civil War as an opportunity to put into prac- 
tice without government interference its belief in armed struggle. 
Adhering to Marxism-Leninism, ASALA aligned with radical 
Lebanese and Palestinian groups against rightist forces during the 
fighting in the late 1970s. 

Kurdish Parties 

Kurdish parties have exerted little influence on Lebanese poli- 
tics. In general, Kurds have been more concerned with interna- 
tional Kurdish matters than with internal Lebanese issues. In 
addition, Kurdish groups in Lebanon have been characterized by 
a high degree of factionalism. 

Jamil Mihhu established the Kurdish Democratic Party in 1960, 
but it was not licensed until 1970. Mihhu, however, supported the 
Iraqi government against Kurdish rebels fighting in that country, 
and he was captured and imprisoned by the Kurdish resistance in 
Iraq. Consequently, the leadership of the party passed to Jamil's 
son, Riyad. Another son, Muhammad, disagreed with his fam- 
ily's position on several issues and therefore in 1977 started his own 
movement, the Kurdish Democratic Party — Temporary Leader- 
ship. 

Riz Kari was another Kurdish group dissatisfied with the leader- 
ship of the Kurdish Democratic Party. Established in 1975 by Faysal 
Fakhu, Riz Kari supported the Kurdish forces fighting against the 
Iraqi regime. For a brief period during the 1975 Civil War, 
however, Riz Kari joined forces with the Kurdish Democratic Party 
to form the Progressive Kurdish Front in an effort to eliminate 
differences in the ranks of Lebanese Kurds. Riz Kari was weakened 
in the mid-1970s by the defection of part of its organization, which 
called itself the Leftist Riz Kari, or Riz Kari II. This organiza- 
tion, led by Abdi Ibrahim, a staunch ally of Syria, rejected the for- 
mation of the Progressive Kurdish Front because it included the 
"right-wing" leadership of Mihhu. 

Multisectarian Parties 

Multisectarian political groups have been primarily left-wing 
movements. Some groups have argued against the inertia of the 
zuama clientele system, while others espoused Marxist causes. Small 



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Lebanon: A Country Study 

parties sometimes have been externally controlled. In the 1970s, 
for example, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, 
under the leadership of George Habash, controlled the Arab So- 
cialist Action Organization, which also fought on the side of the 
Lebanese National Movement during the 1975 Civil War. In 1987 
the Baath (Arab Socialist Resurrection) parties in power in Syria 
and Iraq each had a faction operating in Lebanon. The late Egyp- 
tian president Nasser left a strong legacy in Lebanon. Many 
essentially pan- Arab parties have borne his name in their titles. 

Although these groups have been characterized as multisectarian, 
this label may not be entirely accurate. In fact, over the years most 
have taken on narrower confessional patterns. For instance, Shias 
were dominant in the Lebanese Communist Party and Organiza- 
tion of Communist Action, whereas the Syrian Socialist Nation- 
alist Party has been heavily represented by Greek Orthodox and 
Druze (of the Yazbak clan) members. 

Lebanese Communist Party 

One of the oldest multisectarian parties in Lebanon, the Lebanese 
Communist Party (LCP) was formed in 1924 by a group of in- 
tellectuals. Over the years, the LCP has had very little impact on 
Lebanese politics and has been unwavering in its support for 
Moscow. The party was declared illegal by the French Mandate 
authorities in 1939, but the ban was relaxed in 1943. For about 
twenty years, this single organization controlled communist polit- 
ical activity in both Lebanon and Syria, but in 1944 separate par- 
ties were established in each country. 

During the first two decades of independence, the LCP enjoyed 
little success. In 1943 the party participated in the legislative elec- 
tions but failed to win any seats in the Chamber of Deputies. The 
LCP again ran for election in 1947, but all of its candidates were 
defeated; in 1948 it was outlawed. During the 1950s, the party's 
inconsistent policies on pan-Arabism and the Nasserite movement 
cost it support and eventually isolated it. Surviving underground, 
the LCP in 1965 decided to end its isolation and became a mem- 
ber of the Front for Progressive Parties and National Forces, which 
later became the Lebanese National Movement under Kamal 
Jumblatt. 

The 1970s witnessed something of a resurgence of the LCP. In 
1970 Minister of Interior Kamal Jumblatt legalized the party. This 
allowed many LCP leaders, including Secretary General Niqula 
Shawi, to run for election in 1972. Although they polled several 
thousand votes, none of them succeeded in claiming a seat. But 
the LCP's importance grew with the arrival of the civil disturbances 



168 



Government and Politics 



of the mid-1970s. The LCP, which had established a well-trained 
militia, participated actively in the fighting of 1975 and 1976. 

Throughout the 1980s, the LCP has generally declined in power. 
In 1983 the Sunni fundamentalist movement in Tripoli, Tawhid 
(Islamic Unification Movement), reportedly executed fifty Com- 
munists. In 1987, in union with the PSP, the LCP fought a week- 
long battle with Amal militants in West Beirut, a conflict that was 
finally stopped by Syrian troops. Also in 1987, the LCP held its 
Fifth Party Congress and was about to oust George Hawi, its Greek 
Orthodox leader, and elect Karim Murrawwah, a Shia, as secre- 
tary general when Syrian pressure kept Hawi in his position. Hawi, 
who had been a close ally of Syria, was reportedly unpopular for 
his lavish life-style and for spending more time in Syria than in 
Lebanon. Murrawwah was probably the most powerful member 
of the LCP and was on good terms with Shia groups in West Beirut. 
Nevertheless, between 1984 and 1987 many party leaders and mem- 
bers were assassinated, reportedly by Islamic fundamentalists. 

Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party 

The Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party (SSNP) has been one of 
the most influential multisectarian parties in Lebanon. Its main 
objective has been the reestablishment of historic Greater Syria, 
an area that approximately encompasses Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, 
and Israel. Over the years the SSNP has often resorted to violence 
to achieve its goals. 

The SSNP was founded in 1932 by Antun Saadah, a Greek 
Orthodox, as a secret organization. His party, very much influenced 
by fascist ideology and organization, grew considerably in the years 
after independence. In fact, in a survey taken in 1958 by the French 
newspaper L 'Orient, the SSNP was said to have 25,000 members — at 
the time, second only to the Phalange Party. Concerned by its 
strength, the government cracked down on the SSNP in 1948, 
arresting many of its leaders and members. In response, SSNP mili- 
tary officers attempted a coup d'etat in 1949, following which the 
party was outlawed and Saadah was executed. In retaliation, the 
SSNP assassinated Prime Minister Riyad as Sulh in 1951. 

In the 1950s, although still banned, the SSNP renewed its ac- 
tivities fairly openly. During the 1958 disturbances, the SSNP 
militia supported President Shamun, who rewarded it by authoriz- 
ing it to operate legally. But in December 1961, when another at- 
tempted coup by SSNP members failed, it was again outlawed and 
almost 3,000 of its members imprisoned. In prison, the party 
underwent serious ideological reform when certain Marxist and 



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Lebanon: A Country Study 

pan- Arab concepts were introduced into the party's formerly right- 
wing doctrine. 

Since the 1960s, the party has become more leftist. Most of its 
members joined the Lebanese National Movement and fought 
alongside the PLO throughout the 1975 Civil War. But during this 
period the party suffered internal divisions and defections, and since 
then party unity has been elusive. In 1987 there were at least four 
separate factions claiming to be the authentic inheritors of Saadah's 
ideology. The two most important were led by Issam Mahayri, 
a Sunni, and Jubran Jurayj , a Christian. Each faction was trying 
to settle disputes by means of violence. 

Organization of Communist Action 

In 1970 two minor extreme left-wing groups, the Organization 
of Socialist Lebanon and the Movement of Lebanese Socialists, 
merged to form the Organization of Communist Action (OCA). 
The organization, led since its inception by Muhsin Ibrahim, in- 
corporated former cells of the Arab Nationalist Movement, which 
ceased to exist in the late 1960s. The OCA represented itself as 
an independent, revolutionary communist party and, in the early 
1970s, strongly criticized the LCP, accusing its leaders of "refor- 
mist" tendencies. Differences between the LCP and OCA, how- 
ever, shrank somewhat by the mid-1970s, but, although there was 
talk of unity between the LCP and the OCA, such a union never 
materialized. Ibrahim played an important role in the 1975 Civil 
War by virtue of his position as the executive secretary of the 
Lebanese National Movement and because his organization par- 
ticipated in the fighting. In 1987, however, the OCA was operat- 
ing underground because Ibrahim refused to go along with the 
Syrian policy of opposition to PLO head Yasir Arafat. The OCA 
was also known to have a special relationship with the Democratic 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine. 

Foreign Relations 

For Lebanon's first three decades or so of independence, the out- 
standing feature of its foreign policy was its amicable relations with 
numerous countries. In the early 1970s, about eighty diplomatic 
representatives were accredited to Beirut. Not surprisingly, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs was one of the largest and most im- 
portant ministries in the Council of Ministers. 

Before the 1975 Civil War, foreign relations were based to a large 
extent on the National Pact. Under this covenant, Lebanon had 
to walk a thin line between the desires of the Christian communi- 
ties to associate more closely with the West and the wishes of the 



170 



Government and Politics 



Muslim communities to underscore Lebanon's Arab identity. In- 
deed, when major crises struck, as they did in 1958 and in the late 
1960s, they were primarily generated by these sensitive foreign pol- 
icy issues. Try though Lebanon did to walk this line, its geographic 
location near the center of the Arab-Israeli dispute has prevented 
it from striking what, for a pluralistic society, was a very difficult 
balance. 

During the 1975 Civil War and afterward, the central govern- 
ment was only one of many domestic actors involved in the mak- 
ing of foreign policy. It shared this role with the various alliances 
and militias that were formed. In the late 1970s and throughout 
the 1980s, as central authority deterioriated, external actors, in- 
cluding Syria, Israel, Iran, and the Palestinians, also seized foreign- 
policy-making roles, although the first two were by far the most 
influential. 

Syria 

Historically under a variety of rulers, Syria and Lebanon (as 
well as some other countries) were considered one territory — 
Greater Syria. It was only in 1920, while under the French Man- 
date, that Greater Lebanon, which approximates the modern state, 
was separated from the larger entity. As a consequence, Lebanon 
and Syria traditionally have had strong bonds. Following World 
War II, after both had become independent, they shared a com- 
mon currency and customs union and discussed economic union. 
In fact, the two had always been active trading partners, and when 
political disputes arose, each country often used economic means 
to pressure the other. 

On a political level, the more powerful Syrian state has some- 
times been viewed with suspicion in Lebanon. But because of intra- 
sectarian feuds, no generalizations can be made in this regard; at 
one time or another, Syria has developed or dissolved friendships 
with a number of factions, Christian as well as Muslim. 

In the 1950s and 1960s, Syria was wrestling with its own inter- 
nal problems and was unable to focus on Lebanon's domestic ills. 
Even so, some sources have ascribed to Syria a prominent role in 
aggravating the 1958 disturbances, claiming that it worked to un- 
seat the Shamun regime. Then, in the late 1960s the rise of Pales- 
tinian guerrilla activity in southern Lebanon contributed to tense 
relations with Syria. Although the Syrian government was reluc- 
tant to permit guerrilla attacks to originate from Syrian soil (for 
fear of Israeli reprisals), it was much less reticent to see such activity 
occur in southern Lebanon. Thus, in 1973, when the Lebanese 



171 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

Army finally engaged in fighting against Palestinian guerrillas, Syria 
closed its borders in protest. 

Since the start of the 1975 Civil War, Syrian involvement in 
Lebanon has been substantial, if inconsistent. On the one hand, 
the regime of President Hafiz al Assad has opposed the perma- 
nent fragmentation of Lebanon, fearing that the creation of a 
Maronite ministate would amount to the establishment of "another 
Israel." On the other hand, Syria has resisted the notion of the 
formation of a radical, left-wing state on its western border. Fur- 
thermore, after having to deal with its own Muslim fundamentalist 
rebellion in the late 1970s and early 1980s, Syria was concerned 
that a radical Islamic state in Lebanon would have negative domestic 
implications. 

In the early stages of the Civil War, Syria acted as mediator, 
arranging several cease-fires. In February 1976 Syria helped for- 
mulate a political reform package, known as the Constitutional 
Document, that granted more power to Muslims; this compromise, 
however, was never implemented. When diplomacy failed, Syria 
intervened militarily (see Syrian Intervention, ch. 5). In March 
1976, as the battle was going badly for the largely Christian 
Lebanese Front, Syria moved to prevent its total collapse, using 
Palestinian units under its control. In May Syria was instrumen- 
tal in having Ilyas Sarkis, a pro-Syrian technocrat, elected presi- 
dent. By January 1977 about 27,000 Syrian troops were in 
Lebanon, technically as the largest part of the Arab Deterrent Force, 
set up by the League of Arab States (Arab League) in October 1976 
(see The Riyadh Conference and the Arab Deterrent Force, ch. 5). 

As the conflict wore on, the situation changed dramatically for 
Syria. In 1978 Bashir Jumayyil began his drive to incorporate all 
Christian militias under his LF (see Political Parties and Group- 
ings, this ch.; The Ascendancy of Bashir Jumayyil, ch. 5). He pro- 
voked Syria's animosity by decimating in June 1978 the Marada 
Brigade, the pro-Syrian Franjiyah militia, and by his increasingly 
close ties to Israel. In response, Syria began to attack vigorously 
its erstwhile allies, the Christian forces, in effect making a com- 
plete about-face. 

In the 1980s, Syria was the dominant external actor in Lebanon. 
It physically controlled much of the country, over which it imposed 
its will. At times, Syrian inaction, such as allowing one faction to 
war on another, had just as much impact as its active measures. 
Nonetheless, Syrian influence has had its limits. Its ability to im- 
pose stability — if, indeed, that was Assad's intention — has been 
frustrated by the multiplicity of factions, each with a different 
agenda. These limitations were visible during the 1982 invasion 



172 



Government and Politics 



when Syria — alone among the Arab nations — opposed the Israel 
Defense Forces (IDF) on Lebanese soil. Although it acquitted it- 
self well, the Syrian Army was unable to halt the IDF advance or 
to prevent its own ejection from Beirut. Later, the insertion of the 
Multinational Force (MNF) also reduced Syrian influence for a 
time. In 1983, when Israel pressured the government of Amin 
Jumayyil to sign an accord, called the May 17 Agreement, that 
normalized relations between the two countries, Syria vehemently 
objected. It sponsored the formation of the National Salvation 
Front, a coalition of pro-Syrian groups, both Christian and Mus- 
lim, to oppose the agreement. The Syrian effort eventually suc- 
ceeded, and on March 6, 1985, Jumayyil abrogated the May 17 
Agreement and Israel finally withdrew some of its forces from parts 
of Lebanon (see The May 17 Agreement, ch. 5). 

There were additional examples of the strengths and limitations 
of Syrian influence in Lebanon. Syria brokered the Tripartite Ac- 
cord, signed in late 1985 by the leaders of the main armed 
factions — Nabih Birri of Amal, Walid Jumblatt of the PSP, and 
Elie Hubayka of the LF. The accord's aim was to impose peace 
and to restructure the Lebanese Army (see Chaos in Beirut and 
Syrian Peacemaking Efforts, ch. 5). But when Jumayyil and anti- 
Syrian elements in the LF rebelled, the accord collapsed. 

As of late 1987, Syrian troops were back in Beirut trying to keep 
peace, and Syrian influence was again significant. Even so, a true 
Syrian-imposed stabilty had not been achieved. 

Israel 

Although Lebanon joined with other Arab nations in the armed 
resistance against the creation of Israel in 1948, because of the small 
size of its armed forces Lebanon's action had little effect. Nonethe- 
less, because of Lebanon's participation, in 1987 its southern border 
remained the line agreed to in the 1949 armistice (see fig. 1). 

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Lebanese politicians for the 
most part sought to insulate Lebanon from the Arab-Israeli dis- 
pute. With its booming economy and high standard of living, the 
Lebanese elite had much to lose. Lebanon, therefore, abstained 
from the conflicts of 1956, 1967, and 1973. 

Because Lebanon never presented a serious military threat, Israel 
has been mainly concerned about Palestinian guerrilla attacks 
launched from Lebanon, and, secondarily, about the presence of 
Syrian troops there. Since the 1960s, there has been a cyclical pat- 
tern of Palestinian guerrilla attacks on Israel and IDF attacks on 
Palestinian and Lebanese targets. After the 1975 Civil War, Pales- 
tinian guerrilla strength grew in southern Lebanon. At the same 



173 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

time, the breakdown of Lebanon's central government provided 
opportunities for Israel to act. Around 1975, Israel sponsored the 
creation of a surrogate force, led by Lebanese Christian Major Saad 
Haddad, based in a corridor along Lebanon's southern border. 
This force, which called itself the Free Lebanon Army (but was 
later renamed the South Lebanon Army [SLA] under leader 
Antoine Lahad), was intended to prevent infiltration into Israel 
of Palestinian guerrillas. In 1978 Israel invaded Lebanon, clear- 
ing out Palestinian strongholds as far north as the Litani River. 
Another consequence of the Israeli invasion was the establish- 
ment in southern Lebanon of the United Nations Interim Force 
in Lebanon, whose mission was to separate the various combat- 
ants. 

As serious as the 1978 incursion was, it paled in comparison with 
the 1982 Israeli invasion, which affected all of the southern half 
of Lebanon as far north as Beirut (see The 1982 Israeli Invasion 
and Its Aftermath, ch. 5). This action had several direct conse- 
quences. First, it resulted in the deaths of several hundred Pales- 
tinian fighters and the expulsion of several thousand more, not to 
mention several thousand Lebanese and Palestinian civilian casual- 
ties and massive destruction. For a time, the invasion and occupa- 
tion diminished Syrian influence, as the Syrian Army was forced 
north and east. The Israeli occupation promoted the creation of 
the MNF, made up of military units from Britain, France, Italy, 
and the United States, which supervised the Palestinian evacua- 
tion and later stayed to keep the peace. The IDF occupation also 
created an expedient climate for Bashir Jumayyil (and, subse- 
quently, for his brother Amin) to win the presidency. 

In addition, there were several less direct consequences. The oc- 
cupation of Muslim West Beirut allowed Christian forces, on Sep- 
tember 27-28, 1982, to enter the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra 
and Shatila, where they massacred several hundred civilians. 
Lebanese Shias, who were severely affected by the invasion and 
occupation, turned their enmity on the Israelis. As a show of sup- 
port for their coreligionists, the government of Iran, with Syrian 
approval, dispatched a contingent of the Pasdaran to the Biqa Val- 
ley. Anti-Israeli Shia opposition burgeoned during the occupation, 
and there were several suicide-bombing incidents perpetrated 
against IDF positions (see Suicide Bombings, ch. 5). 

In 1987 Israel's relations with Lebanon continued to revolve 
around the issue of security. Israel retained its support of the SLA's 
activities in southern Lebanon, maintained its ties to the LF, and 
perpetuated its policy of attacking Palestinian and Lebanese tar- 
gets that Israel labeled "terrorist" bases. 



174 



Government and Politics 



Palestinians 

Palestinians have been an integral part of the Lebanese polity 
since the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. At that time, many fled to 
Lebanon. This refugee population increased after the June 1967 
War and the 1970 eviction of the PLO from Jordan. By 1987 there 
were about 400,000 Palestinians in Lebanon (see The Palestinian 
Element, ch. 2). 

As Palestinian guerrilla activity launched from Lebanon against 
Israel increased in the late 1960s, it gave rise to serious security 
and political problems for the Lebanese government. The PLO 
forces in southern Lebanon created what amounted to a distinct 
Palestinian entity, outside the control of the central authorities. 
PLO transgressions (tajawuzat) against the Lebanese populace and 
Israeli military attacks made the situation critical. Political battles 
between Christians and Muslims centered on the role in Lebanon 
of Palestinian guerrillas, who were effectively conducting foreign 
policy that had deep repercussions for the Lebanese government. 
The 1969 Cairo Agreement, brokered by other Arab states, was 
an attempt to reduce tensions by limiting the scope of Palestinian 
actions in Lebanon; this arrangement, however, was never suc- 
cessful. 

During the 1975 Civil War, the Palestinian population in the 
Beirut area suffered extraordinarily, as urban refugee camps were 
besieged by Christian militias. In contrast, some Palestinian liber- 
ation groups were in the middle of the fiercest fighting and in- 
flicted considerable damage on the Lebanese Front. Furthermore, 
the PLO increased its dominance because its forces controlled areas 
out of the reach of the Lebanese Front. 

Throughout the 1980s, Palestinian fortunes in Lebanon dwin- 
dled. The Israeli invasion was a serious setback, followed closely 
by the Sabra and Shatila massacres (see The Siege of Beirut, ch. 5). 
In 1983 intra-Palestinian hostility was particularly pronounced, as 
factions battled near Tripoli; in the process, pro- Arafat forces were 
evicted by Syrian-backed elements. Moreover, the war of human 
attrition between Palestinians in the refugee camps of Beirut and 
the Amal militia that began in 1985 had not ceased by late 1987 
(see Chaos in Beirut and Syrian Peacemaking Efforts, ch. 5). This 
tragic situation illustrated the complexity of Lebanese political 
events, showing that hostility to the PLO was not confined to Chris- 
tian groups. Nonetheless, by late 1987 the PLO still enjoyed con- 
trol of much of the Sidon region and retained a strategic foothold 
in Lebanon. 



175 



Lebanon: A Country Study 
Iran 

The importance of Iran to Lebanon's foreign relations increased 
in the 1980s. Following the success of the 1979 Iranian Revolu- 
tion, the regime of Ayatollah Khomeini was anxious to spread its 
message to other Shias. This message found an audience in 
Lebanon's chronically downtrodden Shia community. Iran provid- 
ed financial and inspirational support to several Lebanese Shia or- 
ganizations in the early 1980s. Then, in 1982, as a show of solidarity 
against the Israeli invasion, a contingent of the Pasdaran arrived 
and established a base near Baalbek in the Biqa Valley. These units 
not only operated as a defense force but also set up medical facili- 
ties to serve the local populace. 

In the late 1980s, Iranian-sponsored groups stepped up efforts 
to gain support among Lebanese Shias by providing sorely needed 
economic relief and social services. These groups (in particular 
Hizballah, which was reported to be receiving substantial finan- 
cial aid from Iran) were able to use Iranian resources to run hospi- 
tals, pay families' school fees, remove refuse, and participate in 
housing reconstruction. These actions frequently drew supporters 
away from Amal, which for the most part was allied to Syria; Amal 
simply was unable to distribute the same level of aid as was Hizb- 
allah (see Sectarian Groups, this ch.). 

For Western nations, the most significant aspect of Iran's in- 
fluence in Lebanon has been the acceptance of the Islamic Repub- 
lic's "antiforeign" rhetoric. In accordance with this principle, some 
extremist Shias, many acting under the name of the Islamic Jihad 
Organization, have carried out violent acts against the foreign com- 
munity (see Internal Security and Terrorism, ch. 5). 

United States 

Before the 1975 Civil War, Lebanon enjoyed generally good offi- 
cial relations with the United States. In large measure, these ties 
were promoted by the sizable Lebanese- American community. One 
incident that weakened these relations was the United States role 
in the 1958 Civil War. At that time, the administration of Presi- 
dent Dwight D. Eisenhower dispatched a unit of United States Ma- 
rines to aid the government of President Shamun. Shamun's regime 
was under pressure from a part of the Lebanese community to 
strengthen ties to Egypt and Syria, which had just formed the 
United Arab Republic and were considered by some to be in 
the "radical Arab" camp. The Marines were never engaged in 
battle and were withdrawn soon after their arrival. Even so, many 



176 



Government and Politics 



Lebanese and other Arab states viewed the United States action 
as interference in Lebanon's internal affairs. 

In the early 1980s, following the worst fighting of the 1975 Civil 
War, the United States became involved in Lebanon in several 
ways. On the political level, it sought to bolster the presidency of 
Amin Jumayyil and to broker a treaty between Lebanon and Israel. 
On the military level, the United States hoped to keep peace as 
part of the MNF (see The Multinational Force, ch. 5). On the eco- 
nomic level, the United States planned to assist in Lebanon's recon- 
struction (see Aid and Reconstruction, ch. 3). These tasks were 
never completed, however. The United States support for the pro- 
Jumayyil, Christian brigades of the Lebanese Army during the 
1983-84 Mountain War turned into a fiasco (see The Lebanese 
Armed Forces in the 1980s, ch. 5). Not only did the United States 
lose two aircraft to ground fire, but the shelling of Druze and Shia 
population centers by the U.S.S. New Jersey convinced most 
Lebanese Muslims that the United States had taken the Christian 
side. Likewise, by 1984, in the face of renewed fighting, the busi- 
ness of reconstruction became a faint hope. The attacks on the 
United States embassy and annex, and on the MNF contingent, 
and the kidnapping of United States citizens eventually forced the 
administration of President Ronald Reagan to minimize United 
States involvement in the increasingly ungovernable Lebanese state. 

Soviet Union 

Lebanon's ties to communist nations have been amicable but 
lacking in depth. Its relations to the West and regional states have 
always been stronger. Although the Soviet Union maintained a visi- 
ble diplomatic presence in Lebanon both before and after the 1975 
Civil War, it has never exerted as much influence as has the United 
States or France. 

Two major factors have limited the Soviet Union's influence in 
Lebanon. First, socialism has had little appeal to those who have 
benefited from the free-market economy. Second, the antireligious 
nature of Soviet communism is repugnant to Christians and Mus- 
lims alike. 

During the 1975 Civil War, the Soviet Union kept a low pro- 
file, although it provided some military support to its leftist allies. 
When Syria intervened on the Christian side in 1976, the Soviet 
Union had the difficult task of trying to maintain good relations 
with Syria, its major regional ally, while at the same time sym- 
pathizing with the cause of the Lebanese left. 

Lebanon has had no lack of parties displaying leftist orientations 
and Soviet influence. In addition to secular movements, the Soviet 



177 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

Union has traditionally been involved with Palestinian groups. 
Perhaps its greatest influence has been in the LCP; but, as noted, 
the significance of this party has never been great (see Political Par- 
ties and Groupings, this ch.). 

* * * 

On the Lebanese political system and the events that provide 
the larger context of the 1975 Civil War, the following sources are 
the most useful: Michael C. Hudson's The Precarious Republic, 
Leonard Binder's Politics in Lebanon, Michael Suleiman's Political 
Parties in Lebanon, Enver M. Khoury's The Crisis in the Lebanese Sys- 
tem, John Entelis's Pluralism and Party Transformation in Lebanon, 
Tabitha Petran's The Struggle over Lebanon, Roger Owen's Essays 
on the Crisis in Lebanon, Augustus Richard Norton's Amal and the 
Shi' a, Samir Khalaf s Lebanon's Predicament, B.J. Odeh's Lebanon: 
The Dynamics of Conflict, Walid Khalidi's Conflict and Violence in 
Lebanon, Elie Salem Adib's Modernization Without Revolution, Fouad 
Ajami's The Vanished Imam, David C. Gordon's The Republic of 
Lebanon, David Gilmour's Lebanon: The Fractured Country, and Wade 
Goria's Sovereignty and Leadership in Lebanon, 1943-1976. 

For descriptions and discussions of the 1975 Civil War see Kamal 
S. Salibi's Crossroads to Civil War, Itamar Rabinovich's The War 
for Lebanon, 1970-1985, Marius Deeb's The Lebanese Civil War, P. 
Edward Haley and Lewis Snider' s Lebanon in Crisis, and Helena 
Cobban's The Making of Modern Lebanon. (For further information 
and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



178 



Chapter 5. National Security 




view of the Crusader Castle at Sidon 



BY THE LATE 1980s, Lebanon's national security system had 
broken down almost completely. To the extent that a state's via- 
bility is defined by its government's ability to safeguard its bor- 
ders against foreign incursions, enforce domestic security, and exert 
a monopoly on the use of armed force, Lebanon can no longer be 
considered a state. In 1987 the vestigial Lebanese government 
proved incapable of providing security to its citizens. Furthermore, 
most Lebanese do not identify themselves primarily with the state. 
A heterogeneous collection of mutually hostile religious and eth- 
nic minorities, the Lebanese population has traditionally pledged 
its allegiance to sects rather than to the state (see Sectarianism, 
ch. 2). The fractious nature of the population was reflected in a 
weak central government, which maintained only a token national 
army in an environment where neighboring states supported for- 
midable armed forces. 

Lebanon's Civil War, which began in 1975, was the culmina- 
tion of centuries of strife and conflict over sectarian issues and the 
resulting struggle for political and economic power. Over a decade 
of warfare took as many as 130,000 lives and caused an estimated 
US$100 billion in property damage. As of 1987, the basic issues 
had not been resolved; intermittent but chronic warfare continued. 
Because the numerous militias, each representing a sect, were ap- 
proximately equivalent in strength, the conflict had reached a stale- 
mate, with neither victor nor vanquished, only victims. And the 
overwhelming majority of victims in Lebanon's warfare have been 
civilians. 

The Civil War has often been depicted as pitting leftist Mus- 
lims against rightist Christians. But there was considerable am- 
biguity as to the issues of contention. Although there were two main 
sides in the Civil War — the leftist Muslim Lebanese National Move- 
ment versus the rightist Christian Lebanese Front — each of these 
umbrella organizations was an uneasy coalition composed of scores 
of smaller groups (see Appendix B). Neither side was monolithic, 
and when fighting between the two sides slackened ephemeral 
alliances broke down and internecine warfare broke out. The Civil 
War has always been a multilateral rather than a bilateral conflict, 
with numerous protagonists. 

By 1987 a dozen years of such conflict had fragmented the 
Lebanese polity. Lebanon has been divided since about 1976 into 
autonomous cantons and enclaves that function as small states 



181 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

within the matrix of the old state. Nevertheless, with near una- 
nimity Lebanese politicians opposed partition, less from optimism 
than from conviction that only a unified Lebanon could justify the 
devastation and decimation the Lebanese people have suffered. To 
support this conviction, many Lebanese cited the prophetic writ- 
ing of native poet Khalil Gibran: "Pity the nation divided into frag- 
ments, and each fragment deeming itself a nation." 

Furthermore, foreign forces have been drawn into the Lebanese 
vortex by this vacuum of power, further complicating Lebanon's 
internal balance of power. In the 1960s, Palestinian guerrillas were 
the first interlopers, and their presence hastened the Civil War. 
The Syrian armed forces were invited by the Lebanese government 
as peacekeepers in 1976, but they later came to be regarded by 
some as a Trojan horse that would bring permanent Syrian occu- 
pation or annexation. The Israel Defense Forces invaded in 1978 
and 1982 with the ostensible mission of expelling Palestinian guer- 
rillas who had ensconced themselves in Lebanon. The Israelis 
managed ultimately to evict most Palestinian fighters, but many 
in Israel believed the moral and material cost of the campaign had 
been too high, and they cited the Old Testament warning, "The 
violence you do to Lebanon shall overwhelm you." In the 1980s, 
the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon and also United 
States and West European contingents of the Multinational Force 
fought and died in Lebanon as peacekeeping troops invited by the 
government to enforce truces and cease-fires. Some Middle Eastern 
countries organized proxy forces or dispatched expeditionary forces 
into Lebanon for their own reasons. The Iranian Pasdaran (Revolu- 
tionary Guards), for example, entered Lebanon in 1982 as volun- 
teers invited by Lebanese Shia (see Glossary) Muslims. Lebanon, 
therefore, became an arena for conflict among foreigners, and these 
conflicts were superimposed on the domestic conflict. 

Searching for scapegoats, many Lebanese tended to attribute the 
war entirely to these foreign forces. As President Amin Jumayyil 
(also seen as Gemayel) said, "The current violence, while it is taking 
place in our country, is essentially a product of the interplay of 
foreign forces." The Lebanese Chamber of Deputies passed reso- 
lutions demanding the withdrawal of all foreign troops from 
Lebanon and insisting that the Civil War would end as foreigners 
evacuated the country. 

Although the Lebanese have tended to look abroad for its cause, 
the perennial violence appeared to be endemic and indigenous. This 
admission was a difficult one for the Lebanese, who have regarded 
themselves as more cosmopolitan and modern than their Arab 
neighbors. Nevertheless, as one of Lebanon's leading sociologists, 



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National Security 



Samir Khalaf, explained in 1986, the characteristics that account 
for the resourcefulness, prosperity, and cultural awakening in 
Lebanon were the same characteristics that fragmented the soci- 
ety and weakened its civic and national loyalties. 

The Creation of the Army 

Like most of the Middle East, Lebanon has a long history of 
conflict and conquest. Unlike other Middle Eastern nations, how- 
ever, Lebanon also has a long history of inviting, or at the least 
acquiescing in, foreign military intervention. Lebanese leaders have 
traditionally traded sovereignty for security. 

Prior to its establishment as a sovereign and independent state 
shortly after World War II, Lebanon had existed under centuries 
of foreign domination. Many Lebanese cities capitulated to the in- 
vasions of the Crusaders in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, 
and Lebanon's Christians collaborated with the French Crusaders. 
In the early seventeenth century, the Druze (see Glossary) ruler 
Fakhr ad Din II concluded a secret treaty with Ferdinand I, duke 
of Tuscany in Italy, to oppose the Ottomans. Italian mercenaries 
helped to organize and equip his army on the European model. 
In 1840 the British and the Ottoman Turks bombarded Beirut at 
the behest of the Maronites (see Glossary) and the Druzes, who 
had united to fight the invasion of the Egyptian Muhammad Ali. 
In the 1850s, the Druzes cultivated a special relationship with the 
British, while the French maintained their traditional role as pro- 
tectors of the Maronites. In 1860 European nations landed troops 
in Beirut to protect Christians and to end a massacre by the Druzes 
that had claimed over 10,000 Christian lives. And after World War 
I, Lebanese Christians supported the French Mandate. 

The Ottoman Empire ruled Lebanon indirectly for almost 400 
years (beginning in 1516) by delegating authority to local amirs 
(princes), who raised feudal armies consisting mainly of non- 
Lebanese mercenaries and some Lebanese conscripts. During this 
period, the amirs intentionally integrated their militia, and Chris- 
tian Maronites and Druzes served side by side. In the settlement 
that followed the Druze massacre of Christians in 1860, Lebanon 
was made an autonomous province of the Ottoman Empire ruled 
by a Christian mutasarrif (governor) appointed by the Sublime Porte, 
i.e., the Ottoman sultan, but subject to the approval of the European 
powers that had intervened to help stabilize the area (see Religious 
Conflicts, ch. 1). The mutasarrif was empowered to establish a small 
local militia, whose officers were apportioned from religious groups 
in the area. The provincial militia was a voluntary organization, 
and it disintegrated with the advent of World War I. 



183 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

After the establishment of the League of Nations mandate over 
Lebanon in April 1920, France formed the Troupes Speciales du 
Levant (Levantine Special Forces), which were composed of 
Lebanese and Syrian enlisted personnel but commanded 
predominantly by French officers. The percentage of Lebanese and 
Syrian officers in the force increased gradually, however, especially 
after the outbreak of World War II. By 1945 approximately 90 
percent of the officers in the Troupes Speciales du Levant were 
Arabs, and the force had attained its maximum strength of about 
14,000. 

During World War II, Lebanese troops fought effectively in 
Lebanon with the Vichy French forces against British and Free 
French forces. After the surrender of Vichy forces in the Middle 
East in July 1941, volunteers from the Troupes Speciales du Levant 
were enlisted in the Free French forces and participated in combat 
in North Africa, Italy, and southern France. 

In June 1943, the French reconstituted units of the Troupes 
Speciales du Levant, which were then attached to the British forces 
in the Middle East. In 1945, as the result of continuing pressure 
by Lebanese leaders for control of their own forces, the French 
turned over to them the Lebanese units of the Troupes Speciales 
du Levant. These units totaled about 3,000 men and became the 
nucleus of the Lebanese Army. 

Following independence, the government of Lebanon intention- 
ally kept its armed forces small and weak — a "toy army," as one 
expert described it. Christian politicians, aware of the ubiquity of 
military dictatorships in Arab nations, feared that Muslims might 
use the armed forces as a vehicle for seizing power in a military 
coup d'etat. Furthermore, as laissez-faire businessmen, the Chris- 
tians appeared unwilling to incur the cost of maintaining a large 
standing army. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Lebanon never 
spent more than 4 percent of its gross national product on the mili- 
tary budget. Furthermore, many Christian Lebanese feared that 
a large army would inevitably embroil Lebanon in the Arab- Israeli 
conflict. Muslim politicians, on the other hand, were wary that a 
strong army, because it would be commanded by Christians, might 
be used prejudicially against Muslim interests. At the same time, 
however, they tended to feel that the military should be strong 
enough to play a part in the Arab-Israeli struggle. Finally, promi- 
nent politicians of all religious denominations have tended also to 
be feudal warlords commanding their own private militias and fear- 
ing that a strong army would erode their personal power. 

Because of this disagreement over its role, the Lebanese Army 
has played little part in Lebanese politics. Furthermore, it has 



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National Security 



remained on the sidelines even with regard to issues within the scope 
of its mandate to preserve security. Consistent with this circum- 
scribed role, the Lebanese Army's most salient mission has been 
to supervise and referee Lebanon's traditionally violent elections, 
which even in relatively peaceful times have been a volatile mix- 
ture of ballots and bullets. 

The Lebanese Political-Military Situation: 
Independence to 1975 

The 1948 Arab-Israeli War 

Lebanon, alone among the Arab nations bordering Palestine, 
played no significant part in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War that led 
to the establishment of Israel. The Lebanese Army deployed four 
battalions along the border but withdrew them from combat, en- 
abling the Israeli Army to capture a strip of eastern Lebanon in 
October 1948. The new state of Israel occupied this area until 
March 23, 1949, when Lebanon signed an armistice. Under the 
agreement, Lebanon and Israel gave mutual assurances that they 
would not embark on military offensives against each other and 
would respect each other's territory. The old Palestine-Lebanon 
border was accepted as the new "armistice demarcation line" but 
was not recognized as a legal political or territorial boundary (see 
fig. 1). 

The Rosewater Revolution 

In 1952 President Bishara al Khuri (also seen as Khoury) ordered 
the Maronite army commander, General Fuad Shihab (also seen 
as Chehab), to break a national strike of a coalition of Muslim and 
Christian leaders demanding Khuri' s resignation. Shihab disobeyed 
Khuri's order to send the army into action, refusing, in his words, 
to order his troops to "shoot their fellow citizens. ' ' This paved the 
way for Khuri's resignation. Shihab was installed as prime minister 
in a caretaker government, and when Camille Shamun (also seen 
as Chamoun) was elected Lebanon's new president, Shihab charac- 
teristically relinquished his political position. In self-deprecation, 
Lebanese referred to the peaceful coup d'etat as the Rosewater 
Revolution (see The Khuri Era, 1943-52, ch. 1). 

The 1958 Civil War 

The 1958 Civil War was instigated by Lebanese Muslims and 
Druzes who were inspired by the February 1958 unification of Egypt 
and Syria and agitated to make Lebanon a member of the new 
United Arab Republic (see The Shamun Era, 1952-58, ch. 1). 



185 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

Although the war took a toll of some 2,000 to 4,000 lives, it was 
regarded by many as a comic opera, especially when 5,000 United 
States Marines were landed on the beaches near Beirut and waded 
ashore among sunbathers and swimmers. The Marines' role, in 
a situation described by the Department of Defense as "like war 
but not war, ' ' was to support the legal Lebanese government against 
any foreign invasion, specifically against Syria. The Marines were 
summoned because Shihab, believing that the army would mutiny 
and disintegrate if ordered into action, had disobeyed President 
Shamun's orders to send the army against Muslim rebels. Thus, 
Lebanon's army had once more proved unwilling to defend 
Lebanon's government. 

Nevertheless, Shihab' s reputation for evenhandedness was en- 
hanced by his refusal to commit the army to ending the Civil War, 
and he succeeded Shamun as president. Shihab pictured himself 
as a military statesman like Charles de Gaulle. Although he relied 
heavily on the Deuxieme Bureau (the military intelligence branch 
of the army) as his power base, he surrendered command of the 
Lebanese Army and did not rule as a military dictator. On the con- 
trary, he was a reformer who made significant concessions to Mus- 
lims in an attempt to heal the wounds of the 1958 Civil War. 

The Cairo Agreement and the Prelude to the 
1975 Civil War 

The army's inactivity continued under Shihab 's successor, 
Charles Hilu (also seen as Helou), who became president in 1964. 
Hilu and his army commander refused to commit Lebanese troops 
to the June 1967 War, enraging many Lebanese Muslims. In the 
aftermath of that war, the army and its Deuxieme Bureau turned 
a blind eye to Palestinian guerrillas infiltrating Lebanon from Syria, 
an attitude that angered Christians. But when the army did not 
interfere with commando raids and the Israelis launched attacks 
into Lebanon in retaliation against the Palestinian forces, the army 
and the Deuxieme Bureau were charged with collusion with Israel. 
In December 1968, the government was humiliated when Israeli 
commandos landed at Beirut International Airport and destroyed 
Middle East Airlines aircraft with impunity. 

In October 1969, the Lebanese Army took a more active role 
in fighting Palestinian forces. Nevertheless, it was clear that the 
army could decisively defeat the Palestinians only at the risk of split- 
ting the nation. Therefore, army commander General Emil Bustani 
signed the Cairo Agreement in November 1969 with Palestinian 
representatives (see The Hilu Era, 1964-70, ch. 1). The Cairo 
Agreement remains officially secret, but it apparently granted to 



186 



The tragedy of war 
is reflected in the face 
of this Lebanese. 
Courtesy United Nations 




the Palestinians the right to keep weapons in their camps and to 
attack Israel across Lebanon's border. By sanctioning the armed 
Palestinian presence, however, Lebanon surrendered full sover- 
eignty over military operations conducted within and across its 
borders and became a party to the Arab-Israeli conflict. 

A turning point in Lebanon's modern history occurred in 1970. 
In that year, Sulayman Franjiyah (also seen as Franjieh) was elected 
president. Franjiyah, who came from the Christian enclave of 
Zgharta in northern Lebanon, was accused of promoting his own 
power and catering to the interests of his clansmen instead of con- 
fronting Lebanon's growing security problems. Believing that the 
Deuxieme Bureau was staffed with Shihab loyalists, Franjiyah 
purged it and stripped it of its powers. But the Deuxieme Bureau 
had been the only governmental entity capable of monitoring and 
controlling the Palestinians, and Franjiyah' s action unintention- 
ally gave the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) more free- 
dom of action in Lebanon. Meanwhile, the PLO made a bid to 
topple Jordan's King Hussein, but it was crushed and evicted from 
the country — an event known in the Palestinian lexicon as "Black 
September." Therefore, the PLO leadership and guerrillas moved 
their main base of operations from Jordan to Lebanon, where the 
Cairo Agreement endorsed their presence. The influx of several 
hundred thousand Palestinians upset Lebanon's delicate confes- 
sional (see Glossary) balance and polarized the nation into two 



187 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

camps — those who supported and those who opposed the PLO 
presence. 

Public order deteriorated with daily acts of violence between 
Christians and Palestinians. Meanwhile, the Israeli Air Force 
launched raids against the Palestinian refugee camps in retaliation 
for PLO terrorist attacks in Western Europe. On April 10, 1973, 
Israeli commandos infiltrated Beirut in a daring raid and attacked 
Palestinian command centers in the heart of the capital, killing three 
prominent PLO leaders. Once again, the conspicuous absence of 
the Lebanese Army during the Israeli attack angered Lebanese 
Muslims. Prime Minister Saib Salam claimed that army com- 
mander General Iskandar Ghanim — a Maronite — had disobeyed 
orders by not resisting the Israeli raid, and he threatened to resign 
unless Ghanim were stripped of his rank. Because Ghanim was 
allowed to remain as army commander (until he was replaced by 
Hanna Said in September 1975), Salam did resign and was suc- 
ceeded by a series of weak prime ministers. 

When the Lebanese Army finally went into action, it was against 
the PLO. In May 1973, fierce combat raged around the refugee 
camps for two weeks. When the dust settled, it became clear to 
all Lebanese that their army was not strong enough to control the 
PLO. To end the fighting, the government negotiated the Melkart 
Agreement, which on the one hand obligated the PLO to respect 
the "independence, stability, and sovereignty" of Lebanon but on 
the other hand ceded to the PLO virtual autonomy, including the 
right to maintain its own militia forces in certain areas of Lebanon. 
These provisions of the Melkart Agreement differed greatly from 
the Cairo Agreement, which preserved the "exercise of full powers 
in all regions and in all circumstances by Lebanese civilian and 
military authorities. ' ' 

Lebanese Muslims believed that under the Melkart Agreement 
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon had been accorded a greater degree 
of self-determination than some Lebanese citizens. Inspired by this, 
they organized themselves politically and militarily and tried to wrest 
similar concessions from the central government. In 1974 Druze 
leader Kamal Jumblatt (also seen as Junblatt) established the 
Lebanese National Movement (formerly the Front for Progressive 
Parties and National Forces), an umbrella group comprising anti- 
government forces. 

The 1975 Civil War 

The fuse that ignited the Civil War was finally lit in February 
1975, when the Lebanese Communist Party and other leftists or- 
ganized violent demonstrations in Sidon on behalf of fishermen 



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National Security 



who were threatened economically by a state-monopoly fishing com- 
pany. The Lebanese Army was called in to restore order, but, in 
the volatile atmosphere, armed clashes erupted. Muslim politicians 
protested that use of the army was a violation of the demonstra- 
tors' democratic liberties and asked why the army was shooting 
at civilians rather than defending Lebanon's borders against Israeli 
incursions. Sunni leaders also faulted the channels used for order- 
ing the army into action. General Ghanim had assumed charge 
of the army's conduct and reported directly to President Franjiyah, 
ignoring Sunni (see Glossary) Muslim Prime Minister Rashid as 
Sulh (also seen as Solh). Meanwhile, thousands of students in 
mainly Christian East Beirut demonstrated in support of the army. 
These serious splits were exacerbated when Maruf Saad, a Sunni 
populist leader, died in March of wounds suffered during the Sidon 
clashes. Long-standing concerns that the army would disintegrate 
if it were called into action were vindicated when intense fighting 
broke out between Maronite and Muslim army recruits. 

The Military Cabinet 

During the first months of intermittent combat between Mus- 
lims and Christians, Franjiyah refused to commit the army to 
separate the combatants. On May 23, however, he took the unor- 
thodox and unprecedented step of appointing a military cabinet. 
Muslim Brigadier Nur ad Din Rifai, retired commander of the 
Internal Security Force, was named prime minister. Rifai selected 
the controversial Ghanim as his minister of defense; all other cabinet 
ministers except one were also military officers. 

Franjiyah' s motives were difficult to discern. Some believed his 
move was part of a plot to cement Maronite dominance of the 
government. Others believed he was attempting to force the recal- 
citrant army to intervene in the fighting. Perhaps Franjiyah sin- 
cerely thought that a strong interconfessional military government 
with unquestionable authority over the army could avert widespread 
conflict, although Lebanon's democracy would be sacrificed. In- 
deed, Syrian foreign minister Abdal Halim Khaddam reportedly 
warned Lebanese politicians that the Lebanese Army was capable 
of uniting its ranks, staging a coup d'etat, and imposing a mili- 
tary dictatorship. 

Nevertheless, Lebanon's first and last military government was 
short-lived, resigning two days after its inception. Even when in- 
stalled in the government, the army proved unwilling or incapa- 
ble of exerting authority in Lebanon. The resignation of the military 
government demonstrated the power vacuum in Lebanese politics 
and served as the catalyst to conflict. The rival military factions 
intensified their fighting, and full-fledged civil war began in earnest. 



189 



Lebanon: A Country Study 




Figure 9. Beirut During the Civil War 

The Early Stages of Combat 

To many Lebanese, the complex 1975 Civil War can be sum- 
marized in only a few words. These words are place-names, such 
as Ad Damur or Karantina, which evoke traumatic memories of 
massacres and atrocities and need no further explanation. A nar- 
rative of the Civil War is therefore more a translation of this vocabu- 
lary of suffering and pain than a chronology of campaigns. 

The Sarajevo of the Lebanese Civil War occurred on April 13, 
1975, when unidentified gunmen opened fire at a congregation out- 
side a Maronite church in Ayn ar Rummanah, a Christian suburb 
of Beirut (see fig. 9). In apparent retaliation, members of the Chris- 
tian Phalange Party (see Glossary) ambushed a bus filled with Pales- 
tinians and shot the passengers. These events initiated the escalating 



190 



National Security 



cycle of retaliation and revenge that came to characterize Lebanon 
for the next decade. 

The first six months of combat were desultory by subsequent 
Lebanese standards, with Phalangist and Palestinian forces exchang- 
ing small-arms and rocket-propelled grenade fire from their respec- 
tive strongholds of Al Ashrafiyah and Tall Zatar. The Phalangist 
strategy was predicated on forcing the army to intervene on its side. 
Although over 1 ,000 people were killed in the early fighting, many 
Lebanese still viewed the nascent Civil War as a transitory phe- 
nomenon that would soon abate, like past security crises. There- 
fore, when well-organized Muslim militias attacked the downtown 
Qantari district in late October 1975, causing heavy loss of life and 
massive property damage, many inhabitants of Beirut realized for 
the first time that the war was a serious affair. The Muslim side 
eventually took Qantari and occupied the forty- story Murr Tower, 
the highest building in Beirut. 

On December 6, 1975, ''Black Saturday," Phalangists set up 
roadblocks on city streets, seized an estimated 350 Muslims, and 
murdered them. Muslims had been easily identifiable because 
Lebanese identification cards indicated religious affiliation. This 
was the first major massacre of civilians in the Civil War and started 
a vicious cycle of revenge and retaliation. From this point on, after 
combatants of each faction conquered territory from their rivals, 
they routinely killed civilians. 

In late 1975 and early 1976, fierce fighting engulfed Beirut's high- 
rise hotel district. The hotels changed hands several times, with 
the Muslims ultimately securing control of the area. The expanded 
scope and intensity of the combat increased casualties greatly, with 
over 1,000 killed in the first weeks of the new year. 

It was at this juncture that the Lebanese Army disintegrated com- 
pletely. On January 16, 1976, Minister of Defense Shamun called 
in the mostly Christian-manned Lebanese Air Force to bomb leftist 
positions in Ad Damur. In response, Muslim troops rallied to the 
side of Lieutenant Ahmad Khatib, who split off and declared the 
creation of the Lebanese Arab Army (see Appendix B). In desper- 
ation, Beirut garrison commander Brigadier Aziz Ahdab seized 
Beirut's radio and television stations on March 1 1 and announced 
that the Lebanese Army was stepping in to take over the govern- 
ment and restore order. But Ahdab 's move came too late, and he 
was derisively nicknamed "General Television" by militia lead- 
ers, who commanded far more men. 

Karantina, a slum district named after the old immigration 
quarantine area, was the site of the next major episode in the war. 
Situated so that it controlled Christian access over the Beirut River 



191 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

bridge to the strategic port area, it became a military target. Karan- 
tina was populated primarily by poor Kurds and Armenians but 
was controlled by a PLO detachment. On January 18, 1976, Chris- 
tian forces conquered Karantina and massacred up to 1,000 
civilians. 

Two days later, revenge-seeking Palestinians and leftist Mus- 
lims attacked the Christian city of Ad Damur, located about 20 
kilometers south of Beirut, and murdered between 200 and 500 
Christians. The two consecutive massacres induced Muslims resid- 
ing in Christian-dominated areas to flee to Muslim-held areas, and 
vice versa. Whereas most Lebanese towns and neighborhoods previ- 
ously had been integrated, for the first time large-scale population 
transfers began to divide the country into segregated zones, the 
first step toward de facto partition. 

The Christians were losing the Civil War as the Muslim-leftist 
side forced them to retreat farther into East Beirut. The Christians 
felt it imperative to retain control of Beirut's port district and con- 
structed an elaborate barricade defense at Allenby Street. In May 
1976, as the Christians tried to stave off the Muslim assault on 
the port district, the Lebanese Army finally entered the fray. Chris- 
tian officers and enlisted men from the Al Fayadiyyah barracks 
outside Beirut came to the aid of their beleaguered coreligionists, 
bringing armored cars and heavy artillery. The Muslim advance 
was stopped, and the front at Allenby Street evolved into a 
no-man's-land, dividing Christian East Beirut from Muslim West 
Beirut. Vegetation that eventually grew in this abandoned area 
inspired the name Green Line (see Glossary), and in 1987 it still cut 
the city in two. 

Syrian Intervention 

The government of Syria, although in theory a socialist regime, 
feared that a leftist victory and the installation of a radical govern- 
ment in Lebanon would undermine Syrian security and provide 
Israel an excuse to intervene in the area. After repeated diplomatic 
efforts failed to quell the Lebanese Civil War, on June 1, 1976, 
Syria intervened on the side of the Christians. In the following 
months, the Syrian presence grew to 27,000 troops. By Novem- 
ber the Syrians had occupied most Muslim-held areas of Lebanon, 
including West Beirut and Tripoli. Most Muslim forces capitu- 
lated without firing a shot, overwhelmed by the Syrian show of 
force. In Sidon, however, Palestinian and leftist forces fought off 
the Syrians for nearly six months before relinquishing their 
stronghold. 



192 



National Security 



For nearly the entire first year of the Civil War, the Phalangists 
and the PLO had made a mutual attempt to avoid combat, even 
as smaller Christian and Palestinian splinter groups clashed. The 
PLO tried to enhance its reputation and credibility by playing the 
role of a neutral mediator between the Lebanese left and the Chris- 
tians. For its part, the Phalange Party avoided antagonizing the 
PLO because it feared that the Palestinians would intervene on 
the Muslim side. After Syria had subdued the Muslim threat, 
however, the Phalangists turned their full attention to the Pales- 
tinians. 

The battle for Tall Zatar was the final showdown of the Lebanese 
Civil War. Tall Zatar was a Palestinian refugee camp situated on 
the Christian side of the Green Line where about 1,500 Palestinian 
guerrillas defended a civilian population of roughly 20,000 against 
several thousand Christian militiamen. The Christians were sup- 
ported and advised in their siege by the Lebanese and Syrian armies; 
Israeli advisers were also present on the Christian side. 

Because Tall Zatar was honeycombed with bunkers and tunnels, 
the PLO was able to defend the camp from persistent Christian 
attacks for about six months, despite a nearly constant barrage of 
artillery fire that took a large toll. On August 12, Christian forces 
finally overran the camp and massacred many of the several thou- 
sand civilians who had remained there. 

The Riyadh Conference and the Arab Deterrent Force 

In October 1976, a League of Arab States (Arab League) sum- 
mit conference was convened in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, to resolve 
the Lebanese crisis. The conference did not address the underly- 
ing political and demographic problems, only the security situa- 
tion. The resulting multilateral agreement mandated a cease-fire 
and, at the Lebanese government's behest, authorized the crea- 
tion of the Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) to impose and supervise 
the cease-fire. In theory the ADF, funded by the Arab League, 
was to be a pan-Arab peacekeeping force under the supreme com- 
mand of the Lebanese president. In reality, only about 5,000 Arab 
troops from Saudi Arabia, the Persian Gulf states, Libya, and 
Sudan augmented the existing Syrian forces. Moreover, Syria would 
not relinquish actual command over its soldiers. Therefore, the 
agreement in effect legitimized and subsidized the Syrian occupa- 
tion of Lebanon. In the summer of 1977, Syria, the PLO, and the 
government of Lebanon signed the Shtawrah Accord, which detailed 
the planned disposition of the ADF in Lebanon and called for a 
reconstituted Lebanese Army to take over PLO positions in 
southern Lebanon. 



193 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

The Red Line Arrangement 

Meanwhile, Israel grew concerned over the Syrian military 
presence in Lebanon, particularly as the Syrian Army pursued 
retreating Palestinians and Muslim leftists into southern Lebanon. 
Israel believed that the Syrian forces, massed in southern Lebanon, 
might attack Israel across the unfortified Lebanese border and thus 
avoid the need to penetrate the heavily defended Golan Heights. 
Therefore, Israel enunciated its "Red Line" policy, threatening 
to attack Syria if it crossed a line identified geographically with 
the Litani River (see fig. 3). Thus, Syrian forces were generally 
precluded from moving south of the Litani. The Red Line was a 
geographic line, but it was also more subjective than a line on a 
map. Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin identified the Red Line 
as a guideline for gauging Syria's overall military behavior in 
Lebanon, and he described several criteria Israel would use: the 
objectives of Syrian forces and against whom they were operating, 
the geographical area and its proximity to Israel's borders, the 
strength and composition of Syrian forces, and the duration of their 
stay in a given area. 

The Interwar Years 

Israel had cultivated a relationship with Lebanon's Christian 
community almost from the advent of the Zionist movement. Some 
Zionist politicians had envisaged a Jewish-Maronite alliance to 
counterbalance Muslim regional dominance. After Israel's indepen- 
dence in 1948, some Israeli leaders advocated extending the north- 
ern border to encompass Lebanon up to the Litani River and to 
assimilate the Christian population living there. In 1955 Prime 
Minister David Ben-Gurion and General Moshe Dayan conceived 
a plan to intervene in Lebanon and install a Lebanese Christian 
president amenable to improving bilateral relations. 

The patriarchs of Lebanon's Christian community, particularly 
Pierre Jumayyil and Camille Shamun, were tempted by Israeli 
offers of assistance, but they nevertheless resisted entrusting the 
security of the Maronites to Israel and abjured close contact with 
Israel. But in 1976, threatened by the escalating Civil War, a new 
generation of Lebanese Christian leaders turned to Israel for mili- 
tary support against the ascendant PLO and the Muslim left. After 
a series of clandestine meetings between Mossad, the Israeli for- 
eign intelligence agency, and militia leaders Bashir Jumayyil and 
Dani Shamun, Israel began supplying US$50 million per year to 
arm and equip the Christian fighters. 



194 



The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon had the difficult task 
of trying to separate the various combatants in southern Lebanon. 

Courtesy United Nations 

Covert Christian-Israeli cooperation tapered off after Syria in- 
tervened on the Christian side in June 1976 and quelled the sec- 
tarian fighting. When the Syrian-dominated ADF began to act like 
an occupying army, however, the Maronites' fear of Muslim 
dominance was replaced by fear of Syrian dominance. Jumayyil, 
recognizing that only Israel was powerful enough to expel the 
Syrians, renewed contact with Israel; his initiative coincided with 
the victory of the Likud Party in Israel's 1977 elections. The new 
prime minister, Menachem Begin, was more inclined to support 
the Christians than his predecessor, both for ideological and for 
tactical reasons. Begin empathized with the Christians as a kindred, 
embattled religious minority and promised to prevent their ' ' geno- 
cide." At the same time, he perceived the Maronites as a fifth 
column in Lebanon to check the power of the Palestinians. Arms 
shipments were stepped up, hundreds of Phalangist and Tigers 
militiamen were trained in Israel, and Israeli intelligence and secu- 
rity advisers were dispatched to East Beirut (see Appendix B). 

Operation Litani 

Because it was skeptical about the willingness and capability of 
the Lebanese Army to implement the Shtawrah Accord by displac- 
ing the PLO in southern Lebanon and securing the border area, 



195 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

in 1977 Israel started to equip and fund a renegade Christian rem- 
nant of the Lebanese Army led by Major Saad Haddad. Haddad's 
force, which became known as the Free Lebanon Army, and later 
as the South Lebanon Army (SLA), grew to a strength of about 
3,000 men and was allied closely with Israel. Haddad eventually 
proclaimed the enclave he controlled "Free Lebanon." The insu- 
lation provided by this buffer area permitted Israel to open up its 
border with Lebanon. Under this so-called "Good Fence" policy, 
Israel provided aid and conducted trade with Lebanese living near 
the border. 

On March 1 1 , 1978, PLO terrorists made a sea landing in Haifa, 
Israel, commandeered a bus, and then drove toward Tel Aviv, firing 
from the windows. By the end of the day, the Israel Defense Forces 
(IDF) had killed the nine terrorists, who had murdered thirty- seven 
Israeli civilians. In retaliation, four days later Israel launched Oper- 
ation Litani, invading Lebanon with a force of 25,000 men. The 
purpose of the operation was to push PLO positions away from 
the border and bolster the power of the SLA. The IDF first seized 
a security belt about ten kilometers deep, but then pushed north 
and captured all of Lebanon south of the Litani River, inflicting 
thousands of casualties. 

Operations of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon 

The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was 
established by the United Nations (UN) Security Council with 
Resolution 425 on March 19, 1978, "for the purpose of confirm- 
ing the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restoring international peace 
and security, and assisting the government of Lebanon in ensur- 
ing the return of its effective authority in the area." Subsequent 
Resolution 426 defined UNIFIL 's rules of engagement and in- 
structed it to "use its best efforts to prevent the recurrence of fight- 
ing" and to ensure that its area of operation would not be used 
for hostile activities of any kind. UNIFIL consisted of approximately 
7,000 men from 14 UN member states and between 30 and 90 mili- 
tary observers from the United Nations Truce Supervision Organi- 
zation, headquartered in the town of An Naqurah. 

UNIFIL, however, encountered difficulty in performing its mis- 
sion. Resolution 425 made "full cooperation of all parties con- 
cerned" a prerequisite for UNIFIL 's deployment. Although Israel 
had agreed formally to take the necessary steps for compliance with 
the resolution, it did not believe that UNIFIL could stop PLO in- 
cursions across the border. Therefore, when Israel started to with- 
draw in late March, it refused to relinquish all of the territory it 
had conquered in southern Lebanon to UNIFIL. Instead, Israel 



196 



National Security 



turned over an enclave to its proxy force, the SLA, increasing the 
area under Major Haddad's control. This area included not only 
the ten-kilometer-deep security belt adjacent to the Israeli border 
but also a vertical north-south corridor running from the border 
to the Litani River and splitting the UNIFIL area into two non- 
contiguous zones (see fig. 10). 

Other parties frustrated the UNIFIL peacekeeping efforts. 
Although the PLO also had promised to cooperate with UNIFIL, 
it argued that the 1969 Cairo Agreement entitled it to operate in 
southern Lebanon, and it attempted to reoccupy areas after Israel 
withdrew. Furthermore, on the grounds that the IDF had not occu- 
pied Tyre, the PLO refused to allow UNIFIL to police the city, 
and Palestinian patrols attempted repeatedly to pass through 
UNIFIL lines. For its part, the SLA did not even make a pretense 
of cooperating with UNIFIL. Instead, it attacked UNIFIL per- 
sonnel and encroached on UNIFIL's perimeter. Nevertheless, 
UNIFIL restored order to the areas under its control and served 
as an effective buffer force insulating Israel from the Palestinians. 
It set up roadblocks, checkpoints, and observation posts, interdicting 
approximately ten guerrilla patrols per month heading toward 
Israel. When UNIFIL apprehended Palestinian guerrillas, it con- 
fiscated their weapons but usually returned them later to PLO 
leaders. UNIFIL paid a price for performing its mission, however; 
between 1978 and 1982, thirty-six UNIFIL members were killed 
in action. 

In late 1987 the future of UNIFIL was in doubt. Ironically, Israel, 
which had long considered UNIFIL a hindrance to its operations, 
changed its policy and in 1986 praised the positive role UNIFIL 
played in stabilizing the region. For its part, the government of 
Lebanon requested that UNIFIL be expanded to police almost the 
entire country. But at the same time, the Shias in southern 
Lebanon, who had traditionally supported UNIFIL, turned against 
the organization. In September 1986, Shia extremists started attack- 
ing UNIFIL's French contingent, and in five weeks of combat they 
killed four and wounded thirty. UNIFIL's casualty toll mounted 
and by mid- 1987 stood at 139 killed and over 200 wounded. In 
1986 the United States Congress cut the annual United States 
appropriation to UNIFIL from US$40 million to US$18 million, 
while France announced that it would withdraw its troops from 
UNIFIL in 1987. 

The Ascendancy of Bashir Jumayyil 

Emboldened by Israel's willingness to intervene militarily in 
Lebanon, Bashir Jumayyil exploited Israel's tacit guarantees to 



197 



Lebanon: A Country Study 



Mediterranean 



Shikka 




Ad Damur/ 



Stdon. 

Az 

Zahrani. 



DAMASCUS 



UNITED NATIONS DISENGAGEMENT 
OBSERVER FORCE ZONE 



Boundary representation not necessarily authoritative 



International boundary 
Armistice line, 1949 
Beirut-Damascus highway 

South Lebanon Army enclave 
United Nations Interim Force 

in Lebanon operational area 
Palestine Liberation 

Organization stronghold 
Christian forces 
Syrian-dominated areas 

10 15 Kilometers 



15 Miles 



Source: Based on information from Lebanese Center for Documentation and Research, 
Mufawazat al Lubnaniyyah al Isra'iliyyah, Antilyas, Lebanon, 1984. 



Figure 10. Lebanon on the Eve of the 1982 Israeli Invasion 



198 



National Security 



consolidate his position within the fractious Maronite community. 
On June 13, 1978, he launched a surprise attack that decimated 
the Marada Brigade, the pro- Syrian Christian militia led by Tony 
Franjiyah (son of the former president), who was killed in the attack, 
and provoked the Syrians with direct attacks. In pitting his meager 
force of a few thousand fighters against three divisions of the Syrian 
Army, Jumayyil was taking a calculated gamble that Israel would 
come to his rescue and evict the Syrians. Syria rushed forces to 
Beirut and unleashed a devastating artillery attack on East Beirut, 
particularly the Phalangist stronghold of Al Ashrafiyah, in prepa- 
ration for taking over the area. But Jumayyil' s brinkmanship was 
vindicated. The IDF massed forces on the Golan Heights and 
threatened to go to war to preserve the Maronite community. To 
emphasize the point, Israeli jets overflew Syrian positions. The 
threat worked, and Syria withdrew its troops. 

Once again, Jumayyil took the opportunity to strengthen his grip 
over the Maronites. On July 7, 1980, the Phalangists launched 
another surprise attack, wiping out Shamun's militia, the Tigers. 
Through this process of elimination, Jumayyil emerged as the dom- 
inant Maronite military leader. 

Jumayyil persevered in his plot to embroil Israel in a full-scale 
war with Syria. In late 1980, after a series of meetings with Begin, 
he reportedly obtained a secret Israeli pledge to provide a defen- 
sive umbrella against a potential Syrian air attack. This pledge vir- 
tually committed Israel to fight Syria at Jumayyil 's behest, although 
Israel admonished the Phalangists not to attack the Syrians. 

In April 1981, Jumayyil decided to put Israel's promise to the 
test. Syria had launched its "Program of National Reconciliation," 
which was designed to install Sulayman Franjiyah as president. 
Jumayyil found the proposition unpalatable, but he was impotent 
to oppose it politically. Therefore, he staged an incident in the city 
of Zahlah deliberately calculated to flare into a major crisis. Zahlah, 
the capital of Al Biqa Province in eastern Lebanon, had never been 
a Phalangist base; its population was primarily pro-Syrian Greek 
Orthodox, and it was about fifteen kilometers west of the Syrian 
border in the heart of the Syrian-occupied zone of Lebanon. Jumay- 
yil infiltrated approximately 100 Phalangist militiamen into the city 
to attack Syrian positions and to shell the Syrian headquarters in 
the adjacent town of Shtawrah. The Syrians responded by besieg- 
ing Zahlah. Jumayyil then called an urgent meeting with Begin 
and convinced him that the Syrians intended to follow through on 
the siege with an all-out attack on the Christian heartland. Although 
Syrian president Hafiz al Assad had told Jumayyil he would lift 
the siege if the Phalangists evacuated the city, Jumayyil concealed 



199 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

this point from Begin and instead urged Israel to honor its promise 
and launch an air strike against the Syrians. 

On April 28, the Israeli cabinet convened and authorized a lim- 
ited air strike, but it did so over the strident objections of Israel's 
intelligence chiefs, who suspected that the crisis was a Phalangist 
ploy. Israeli fighters carried out the raid and downed two Syrian 
helicopter troop transports on Jabal Sannin, a strategic mountain 
overlooking Zahlah. 

The Missile Crisis 

The Israeli attack caught Assad by surprise. Syria had adhered 
to the so-called "Red Line" agreements by deliberately refrain- 
ing from deploying antiaircraft missiles in the Biqa Valley and by 
not impeding Israeli photoreconnaissance overflights. Assad 
responded to the Israeli attack by stationing SA-6 surface-to-air 
missiles (SAMs) in the vicinity of Zahlah. Other SAMs and surface- 
to-surface missiles were deployed on the Syrian side of the border. 

Begin vowed publicly that the IDF would launch an attack on 
the missiles. In response, President Ronald Reagan dispatched to 
the Middle East Special Ambassador Philip Habib, who averted 
the imminent Israeli strike. Meanwhile, the Phalangists abandoned 
Zahlah, and Syria reasserted its control over the Biqa Valley. The 
net effect of the crisis was that Syrian air defense missiles were 
deployed in Lebanon. Israel was forced to tolerate this situation 
in the short run, but it still regarded the missile deployment as an 
unacceptable shift in the balance of forces that could not be en- 
dured indefinitely. Therefore, Israel had reasons of its own for a 
future attack on the Syrians in Lebanon. 

The Two-Week War 

As the tension in the Biqa Valley subsided, IDF chief of staff 
Rafael Eitan urged Begin to mount an artillery bombardment of 
Palestinian bases in Lebanon. Israel routinely conducted preemp- 
tive artillery attacks and air strikes to deter PLO terrorist attacks 
against Galilee settlements in northern Israel. Then, on July 10, 
1981 , the IDF commenced five days of air strikes and naval bom- 
bardments against PLO strongholds in southern Lebanon. 

The PLO fought back by shelling the Israeli resort town of 
Nahariyya on the Mediterranean coast. The conflict escalated as 
Israel launched a devastating air raid against the heavily populated 
Palestinian neighborhood of Fakhani in West Beirut, killing over 
100 people and wounding over 600. By Israeli estimates, only thirty 
of those killed were terrorists. For ten days, the PLO then unleashed 
artillery fire against the upper Galilee. Six Israeli citizens were killed, 



200 



National Security 



and many Israelis were shocked and stunned by the PLO's capa- 
bility to sustain such an attack. 

On July 24, Ambassador Habib returned to Israel to negotiate 
an end to the artillery duel. Because the PLO was almost out of 
ammunition and most of its guns had been silenced, the IDF wanted 
to prolong the fighting until it could win a clear-cut victory. But 
the Israeli cabinet was eager to comply with Habib' s cease-fire 
proposal, and Israel entered into a truce with the PLO. 

PLO leader Yasir Arafat was determined not to break the cease- 
fire. On a political level, the truce enhanced the PLO's diplomatic 
credibility. Tactically, it allowed the PLO time to reinforce its mili- 
tary strength in southern Lebanon. The Soviet Union refused to 
provide the PLO with weapons, but PLO emissaries purchased 
arms from East European countries and the Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea (North Korea), acquiring Grad and Katyusha 
artillery rockets and antiquated but functional T-34 tanks. More 
significant, Arafat reorganized the command and control structure 
of his forces, transforming the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) 
from a decentralized collection of terrorist and guerrilla bands to 
a disciplined standing army. By 1981 the Kastel, Karami, and 
Yarmuk brigades were established, and seven new artillery battal- 
ions were organized. 

But on June 3, 1982, terrorists of the Abu Nidal Organization, 
a group that had split off from the PLO, attempted to assassinate 
Shlomo Argov, the Israeli ambassador to Britain. Israel seized on 
the attack as the pretext for launching its long-planned offensive. 
On June 4, IDF aircraft bombed Palestinian targets in West Beirut, 
and the PLO resumed artillery fire on Israeli settlements in the 
northern Galilee. 

The Israeli cabinet convened and voted to authorize an inva- 
sion, named Operation Peace for Galilee, but it set strict limits 
on the extent of the incursion. The IDF was to advance no farther 
than forty kilometers, the operation was to last only twenty-four 
hours, Syrian forces were not to be attacked, and Beirut was not 
to be approached. 

The 1982 Israeli Invasion and Its Aftermath 

Operation Peace for Galilee 

Because of the limits imposed by the Israeli cabinet, the IDF 
implemented its attack in increments, neither openly recognizing 
nor acknowledging its destination and objectives. Had it been 
ordered from the outset to secure Beirut, it could have done so in 



201 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

an effective and efficient manner. Instead, the IDF advance 
unfolded in an ad hoc and disorganized fashion, greatly increas- 
ing the difficulty of the operation. 

When IDF ground forces crossed into Lebanon on June 6, they 
pursued a battle strategy that entailed a three-pronged attack con- 
ducted by five divisions and two reinforced brigade-size units. On 
the western axis, two divisions converged on Tyre and proceeded 
north along the coastal road toward Sidon, where they were to link 
up with an amphibious commando unit that had secured a beach- 
head north of the city. In the central sector, a third division veered 
diagonally across southern Lebanon, conquered the Palestinian- 
held Beaufort Castle, located a few kilometers southwest of Marj 
Uyun, and headed west toward Sidon, where it linked up with the 
coastal force in a classic pincer movement. The IDF advanced rapid- 
ly in the first day of the war, bypassing and enveloping pockets 
of PLO resistance. Most PLO military officers fled, abandoning 
their men, who split into small roving guerrilla bands. Moreover, 
it became clear that the PLO was fighting alone against the Israeli 
onslaught. The Shia Amal guerrillas had been ordered by their lead- 
ers not to fight and to surrender their weapons if necessary. 
Southern Lebanon's Shias had long suffered under Palestinian 
domination, and Shia villagers welcomed the advancing Israelis 
by showering them with rice and flowers. This traditional form 
of homage, later repeated by the Druze and Christian populations, 
lent credence to the Israeli claim that it was "liberating" Lebanon. 

But Palestinian resistance proved tenacious, particularly in the 
sprawling refugee camps in the vicinity of Tyre and Sidon (see 
fig. 4). Staging hit-and-run operations and fighting in house-to- 
house and hand-to-hand combat, the Palestinians inflicted a high 
number of casualties on the IDF and impeded the progress of the 
Israeli advance. The IDF was further hampered because the refu- 
gee camps were inhabited by large numbers of civilian noncom- 
batants who harbored the Palestinian fighters. Although the IDF 
made significant initial efforts to evacuate the civilians, it ultimately 
resorted to saturation bombing to subdue the camps. Palestinian 
resistance was especially fierce in the Ayn al Hulwah camp near 
Sidon, where several hundred Palestinian fighters fought to the last 
man, delaying the IDF advance for seven days. After the camp 
was leveled, the IDF stood poised to move against Beirut. 

Two days later in eastern Lebanon, two divisions thrust directly 
north on parallel courses into Syrian-held territory with the mis- 
sion of severing the strategic Beirut-Damascus highway. On June 8, 
the IDF evicted the Syrian Army from Jazzin and proceeded north. 
A brigade of Syrian commandos, however, ambushed the Israeli 



202 






Israeli armored vehicles in Beirut during the 1982 invasion 
Courtesy Lebanese Information and Research Center 



column in the mountainous terrain near Ayn Zhalta, approximately 
five kilometers short of the highway. 

The IDF could not proceed further against the entrenched Syrian 
positions without close air support, but Syria's air defense systems 
threatened Israeli control of the skies. On June 9, the Israeli cabi- 
net gave permission for an air raid against the Syrian antiaircraft 
missile batteries in the Biqa Valley. The Syrians, caught by sur- 
prise, sustained severe losses; of the nineteen missile batteries, only 
two were left intact by the Israeli attack. The Syrian Air Force made 
a desperate bid to protect the air defense system by sending up 
scores of interceptors and fighters, resulting in what both sides 
described as the biggest air battle in history, with over 200 aircraft 
engaged in supersonic dogfights over a 2,500 square kilometer area. 
The Israeli Air Force shot down twenty-nine Syrian aircraft that 
day (and later about fifty more) without a single loss. The devasta- 
tion of the Syrian air defense system and the decimation of the 
Syrian Air Force provided the IDF with total air superiority in 
Lebanon and left the Syrian infantry exposed to air attack. 

For three more days, the IDF mauled Syria's First Armored Divi- 
sion. The IDF was still stalled short of the Beirut-Damascus high- 
way, but it was on the verge of breaking through the last line of 
Syria's defense. Bowing to political pressures, however, on June 11 
Israel and Syria agreed to a truce under United States auspices. 



203 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

The Siege of Beirut 

The cease-fire signaled the start of a new stage in the war, as 
Israel focused on PLO forces trapped in Beirut. Although Israel 
had long adhered to the axiom that conquering and occupying an 
Arab capital would be a political and military disaster, key Israeli 
leaders were determined to drive the PLO out of Beirut. Accord- 
ing to the original plan, the Phalangists were to move into West 
Beirut under the covering fire of Israeli artillery and reunite the 
divided capital. Bashir Jumayyil concluded, however, that such 
overt collusion with the IDF would prejudice his chance to become 
president, and he reneged on the promises he had made. 

Israel maintained the siege of Beirut for seventy days, unleash- 
ing a relentless barrage of air, naval, and artillery bombardment. 
At times, the Israeli bombardment appeared to be random and 
indiscriminate; at other times, it was targeted with pinpoint preci- 
sion. Israeli strategists believed that if they could "decapitate" the 
Palestinian movement by killing its leaders, Palestinian resistance 
would disappear. Therefore, the Israeli Air Force conducted what 
has been called a "manhunt by air" for Arafat and his top lieu- 
tenants and on several occasions bombed premises only minutes 
after the PLO leadership had vacated them. 

If the PLO was hurt physically by the bombardment, the politi- 
cal fallout was just as damaging to Israel. The appalling civilian 
casualties earned Israel world opprobrium. Morale plummeted 
among IDF officers and enlisted men, many of whom personally 
opposed the war. Meanwhile, the highly publicized plight of the 
Palestinian civilians garnered world attention for the Palestinian 
cause. Furthermore, Arafat was negotiating, albeit through inter- 
mediaries, with Ambassador Habib and other United States 
officials. Negotiating with Arafat was thought by some to be tan- 
tamount to United States recognition of the PLO. 

Arafat had threatened to turn Beirut into a "second Stalingrad," 
to fight the IDF to the last man. His negotiating stance grew tenu- 
ous, however, after Lebanese leaders, who had previously expressed 
solidarity with the PLO, petitioned him to abandon Beirut to spare 
the civilian population further suffering. Arafat informed Habib 
of his agreement in principle to withdraw the PLO from Beirut 
on condition that a multinational peacekeeping force be deployed 
to protect the Palestinian families left behind. With the diplomatic 
deadlock broken, Habib made a second breakthrough when Syria 
and Tunisia agreed to host departing PLO fighters. An advance 
unit of the Multinational Force (MNF), 350 French troops, arrived 



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Lebanese wave to departing Palestinian fighters. 
Courtesy Lebanese Information and Research Center 

in Beirut on August 21 . The Palestinian evacuation by sea to Cyprus 
and by land to Damascus commenced on the same day. On 
August 26, the remaining MNF troops arrived in Beirut, includ- 
ing a contingent of 800 United States Marines. The Palestinian 
exodus ended on September 1. Approximately 8,000 Palestinian 
guerrillas, 2,600 PLA regulars, and 3,600 Syrian troops had been 
evacuated from West Beirut. 

Taking stock of the war's toll, Israel announced that 344 of its 
soldiers had been killed and more than 2,000 wounded. Israel cal- 
culated that hundreds of Syrian soldiers had been killed and more 
than 1,000 wounded and that 1,000 Palestinian guerrillas had been 
killed and 7,000 captured. Lebanese estimates, compiled from 
International Red Cross sources and police and hospital surveys, 
calculated that 17,825 Lebanese had died and more than 30,000 
had been wounded. 

On August 23, the legislature elected Bashir Jumayyil president 
of Lebanon. On September 10, the United States Marines with- 
drew from Beirut, followed by the other members of the MNF. 
The Lebanese Army began to move into West Beirut, and the 
Israelis withdrew their troops from the front lines. But the war was 
far from over. By ushering in Jumayyil as president and evicting 
the PLO from Beirut, Israel had attained two of its key war goals. 
Israel's remaining ambition was to sign a comprehensive peace 



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Lebanon: A Country Study 

treaty with Lebanon that would entail the withdrawal of Syrian 
forces and prevent the PLO from reinfiltrating Lebanon after the 
IDF withdrew. 

Jumayyil repudiated earlier promises to Israel immediately after 
the election. He informed the Israelis that a peace treaty was in- 
conceivable as long as the IDF or any other foreign forces remained 
in Lebanon and that it could be concluded only with the consent 
of all the Lebanese. 

But on September 14, 1982, President-elect Jumayyil was as- 
sassinated in a massive radio-detonated explosion that leveled the 
Phalange Party headquarters where he was delivering a speech to 
party members. The perpetrator, Habib Shartuni, was soon ap- 
prehended. Shartuni, a member of the Syrian Socialist Nationalist 
Party, was allegedly a Syrian agent. Jumayyil's brother, Amin, 
who was hostile to the Israeli presence in Lebanon, was elected 
president with United States backing. 

On the evening of September 16, 1982, the IDF, having sur- 
rounded the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila, dis- 
patched approximately 300 to 400 Christian militiamen into the 
camps to rout what was believed to be the remnant of the Pales- 
tinian forces. The militiamen were mostly Phalangists under the 
command of Elie Hubayka (also seen as Hobeika), a former close 
aide of Bashir Jumayyil, but militiamen from the Israeli-supported 
SLA were also present. The IDF ordered its soldiers to refrain from 
entering the camps, but IDF officers supervised the operation from 
the roof of a six-story building overlooking parts of the area. Ac- 
cording to the report of the Kahan Commission established by the 
government of Israel to investigate the events, the IDF monitored 
the Phalangist radio network and fired illumination flares from mor- 
tars and aircraft to light the area. Over a period of two days, the 
Christian militiamen massacred some 700 to 800 Palestinian men, 
women, and children. 

The Multinational Force 

At the behest of the Lebanese government, the Multinational 
Force (MNF) was deployed again in Beirut, but with over twice 
the manpower of the first peacekeeping force. It was designated 
MNF II and given the mandate to serve as an "interpositional 
force," separating the IDF from the Lebanese population. Addi- 
tionally, MNF II was assigned the task of assisting the Lebanese 
Army in restoring the authority of the central government over 
Beirut. The United States dispatched a contingent of 1,400 men, 
France 1,500, and Italy 1,400. A relatively small British contin- 
gent of about 100 men was added in January 1983, at which time 



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the Italian contingent was increased to 2,200 men. Each contin- 
gent retained its own command structure, and no central command 
structure was created. The French contingent was assigned respon- 
sibility for the port area and West Beirut. The Italian contingent 
occupied the area between West Beirut and Beirut International 
Airport, which encompassed the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps. 
The 3 2d United States Marines Amphibious Unit returned to Beirut 
on September 29, where it took up positions in the vicinity of Beirut 
International Airport. The Marines' positions were adjacent to the 
IDF front lines. 

The Marines' stated mission was to establish an environment 
that would permit the Lebanese Army to carry out its responsibil- 
ities in the Beirut area. Tactically, the Marines were charged with 
occupying and securing positions along a line from the airport east 
to the Presidential Palace at Babda. The intent was to separate the 
IDF from the population of Beirut. 

The key to the initial success of MNF II was its neutrality. The 
Lebanese government had assured Ambassador Habib in writing 
that it had obtained commitments from various factions to refrain 
from hostilities against the Marines. The United States reputation 
among the Lebanese was enhanced when a Marine officer was ob- 
liged to draw his pistol to halt an Israeli advance, an event sensa- 
tionalized in the news media. And, in the same month, Marines 
conducted emergency relief operations in the mountains after a mid- 
winter blizzard. 

At this juncture, the prevalent mood in Lebanon was one of cau- 
tious optimism and hope. The Lebanese Army was pressed into 
service to clear away the rubble of years of warfare. The govern- 
ment approved a US$600 million reconstruction plan. On Oc- 
tober 1, President Jumayyil declared Beirut reunited, as the army 
demolished barricades along the Green Line that had been stand- 
ing since 1975. Hundreds of criminals and gang leaders were 
rounded up and arrested. In the first months of 1983, approximately 
5,000 government troops were deployed throughout Greater Beirut. 
Most important, the government began to build a strong national 
army (see The Lebanese Armed Forces in the 1980s, this ch). 

Lebanese optimism was bolstered by changing Israeli politics and 
policies. Minister of Defense Ariel Sharon, the architect of Israel's 
war in Lebanon, had resigned in the wake of the Sabra and Shatila 
investigation, although he remained in the cabinet as a minister 
without portfolio. He was replaced by the former ambassador to 
the United States, Moshe Arens. Although Arens was considered 
a hawk in the Israeli political spectrum, he was not committed to 
Sharon's ambitious goals and wanted the IDF to withdraw promptly 



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Lebanon: A Country Study 

from Lebanon, if only to avoid antagonizing the United States, 
with which he had cultivated a close relationship. Accordingly, Israel 
withdrew its forces to the outskirts of the capital. 

But the IDF had no clear tactical mission in Lebanon. Its con- 
tinued presence was intended as a bargaining chip in negotiations 
for a Syrian withdrawal. While awaiting the political agreement, 
the IDF was forced to fight a different kind of war, which Israeli 
newspapers compared with the Vietnam War. The IDF had been 
turned into a static and defensive garrison force like the Syrians 
before them, caught in the cross fire between warring factions. 
When Phalangist forces tried to exploit the fluid situation by 
attacking the Druze militia in the Shuf Mountains in late 1983, 
the IDF had to intervene and separate the forces. In southern 
Lebanon, the IDF had to protect the many Palestinian refugees 
who had streamed back to the camps against attacks by Israel's 
proxy force, the SLA. In one of the bigger ironies of the war, the 
IDF recruited and armed Palestinian home guards to prevent a 
repetition of the massacres in Beirut. 

The Rise of the Shias 

The 1979 Iranian Revolution galvanized Lebanon's Shia com- 
munity and inspired in it a new militancy. Iran sought to export 
Shia revolution throughout the Middle East, and in doing so it 
provided material support to an Amal terrorist campaign. From 
1979 until the 1982 Israeli invasion, Shia terrorists hijacked six 
airliners, attempted to bomb several others, assassinated the French 
ambassador to Lebanon, blew up the French and Iraqi embassies, 
and committed numerous other violent acts. 

The Israeli invasion served as a catalyst for a further upsurge 
in Shia militancy. In July 1982 Iran dispatched an expeditionary 
force of volunteer Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guards) to Lebanon, 
ostensibly to fight Israeli invaders. The approximately 650 Pasda- 
ran established their headquarters in the city of Baalbek in the 
Syrian-controlled Biqa Valley. There they conducted terrorist and 
guerrilla training, disbursed military materiel and money, and dis- 
seminated propaganda. 

The political fission that characterized Lebanese politics also 
afflicted the Shia movement, as groups split off from Amal. Husayn 
al Musawi, a former Amal lieutenant, entered into an alliance with 
the Revolutionary Guard and established Islamic Amal. Other Shia 
groups included Hizballah (Party of God), Jundallah (Soldiers of 
God), the Husayn Suicide Commandos, the Dawah (Call) Party, 
and the notorious Islamic Jihad Organization, reportedly headed 



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National Security 



by Imad Mughniyyah (see Internal Security and Terrorism, this 
ch.)- 

The May 17 Agreement 

In April 1983, a terrorist attack destroyed the United States em- 
bassy, and the ambassador moved diplomatic operations to his offi- 
cial residence. The United States persevered in its efforts to broker 
an Israeli-Lebanese agreement, and Israel announced its willing- 
ness to negotiate. Although Israel had envisaged a treaty like the 
Camp David Agreements with Egypt, entailing full bilateral diplo- 
matic recognition, it settled for mere ' 'normalization. " The mili- 
tary and security articles of the May 1 7 Agreement between the 
Israeli and Lebanese governments called for an abolition of the state 
of war between the two countries, security arrangements to ensure 
the sanctity of Israel's northern border, integration of Major Had- 
dad's SLA into the regular Lebanese Army, and Israeli withdrawal. 

The Israeli withdrawal was made contingent upon concurrent 
Syrian withdrawal, however. The United States had decided not 
to seek Syrian participation in the negotiations for the May 17 
Agreement for fear of becoming entangled in the overall Syrian- 
Israeli imbroglio. Instead, the United States intended to seek Syrian 
endorsement after the agreement was signed. But Syria vehemently 
opposed the agreement, and because implementation hinged on 
Syrian withdrawal, Damascus could exert veto power. Although 
President Jumayyil made conciliatory overtures to Damascus, he 
also notified the Arab League on June 4 that the ADF was no longer 
in existence. 

Syria responded by announcing on July 23, 1983, the founda- 
tion of the National Salvation Front (NSF). This coalition com- 
prised many sects, including the Druzes led by Walid Jumblatt; 
Shias led by Nabih Birri (also seen as Berri); Sunni Muslims led 
by Rashid Karami; Christian elements led by Sulayman Franjiyah; 
and several smaller, Syrian-sponsored, left-wing political parties. 
These groups, together with Syria, controlled much more of 
Lebanon's territory than did the central government. Therefore, 
the NSF constituted a challenge not only to Jumayyil but also to 
his patrons, the United States and Israel. To emphasize their op- 
position to the May 17 Agreement, Syrian and Druze forces in 
the mountains above the capital loosed a barrage of artillery fire 
on Christian areas of Beirut, underscoring the weakness of Jumay- 
yil 's government. 

By mid- 1983 the mood of optimism that had flourished at the 
end of 1982 had disappeared. It became clear that the tentative 
alliance of Lebanon's rival factions was merely a function of their 



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Lebanon: A Country Study 

shared opposition to a common enemy, Israel. Terrorist activity 
resumed, and between June and August 1983, at least twenty car 
bombs exploded throughout Lebanon, killing more than seventy 
people. Lebanon's prime minister narrowly escaped death in one 
explosion. Targets included a mosque in Tripoli; a television sta- 
tion, hospital, and luxury hotel in Beirut; and a market in Baalbek. 

The May 17 Agreement had significant implications for the 
MNF. As a noncombatant interpositional force preventing the IDF 
from entering Beirut, the MNF had been perceived by the Mus- 
lims in West Beirut as a protector. As the Israeli withdrawal neared, 
however, the MNF came to be regarded as a protagonist in the 
unfinished Civil War, propping up the Jumayyil government. In 
August militiamen began to bombard United States Marines posi- 
tions near Beirut International Airport with mortar and rocket fire 
as the Lebanese Army fought Druze and Shia forces in the southern 
suburbs of Beirut. On August 29, 1983, two Marines were killed 
and fourteen wounded, and in the ensuing months the Marines 
came under almost daily attack from artillery, mortar, rocket, and 
small-arms fire. 

The Israel Defense Forces Withdrawal 
and the Mountain War 

On September 3, 1983, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) began 
to evacuate the Shuf Mountains region and within twenty-four 
hours had completed its redeployment to south of the Awwali River. 
In the power vacuum resulting from the Israeli withdrawal, the 
Phalangist militia, no longer under Jumayyil 's firm control, clashed 
with the Druze militia at Bhamdun, a town located where the 
Beirut-Damascus highway touches the edge of the Shuf Mountains. 
Simultaneously, the Lebanese Army sought to guard the cities of 
Suq al Gharb and Khaldah to prevent Druze forces from invading 
Beirut. 

After several days of combat, the Phalangist militia was routed 
at Bhamdun and retreated to its stronghold of Dayr al Qamar, along 
with much of the Christian population. The Druzes surrounded 
and besieged Dayr al Qamar, which held 40,000 Christian resi- 
dents and refugees and 2,000 Phalangist fighters. In other areas 
of the Shuf Mountains, the Druzes went on a rampage reminis- 
cent of the 1860 massacres (see Religious Conflicts, ch. 1). The 
Catholic Information Center in Beirut reported that 1,500 Chris- 
tian civilians were killed and 62 Christian villages demolished. The 
defeat of the Phalangists was expensive for the Christian commu- 
nity, which lost a large amount of territory. 



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National Security 



The cost in political currency was even higher, however. Not 
only did the fighting deal a blow to Amin Jumayyil's credibility 
and authority in his dual role as chief of state and leader of the 
Christian community, it destroyed the myth shared by many differ- 
ent Lebanese factions that the Lebanese Civil War had been set- 
tled in 1976. Admittedly, Christians and Muslims had continued 
to fire on each other's neighborhoods on occasion, but this was 
perceived as part of Lebanon's environment, like the weather. In 
all the significant fighting between 1976 and 1982, the Syrians, 
Israelis, and Palestinians had been belligerents on either or both 
sides of the conflict. The Mountain War, as the 1983-84 fighting 
in the Shuf Mountains came to be called, however, was a purely 
Lebanese contest, and it dashed the hopes harbored by many that 
the withdrawal of foreign forces would end the Civil War. 

In Suq al Gharb and Khaldah, it was the Lebanese Army rather 
than the Phalangists that confronted the Druze militias. On Sep- 
tember 16, 1983, Druze forces massed on the threshold of Suq al 
Gharb. For the next three days the army's Eighth Brigade fought 
desperately to retain control of the town (see The Army, this ch.). 
The tiny Lebanese Air Force was thrown into the fray, losing several 
aircraft to Druze missile fire. United States Navy warships shelled 
Druze positions and helped the Lebanese Army hold the town until 
a cease-fire was declared on September 25, on which day the bat- 
tleship U.S.S. New Jersey arrived on the scene. 

The Multinational Force Withdrawal 

Although the Lebanese Army had beaten the Druze forces on 
the battlefield, it was a Pyrrhic victory because the army was dis- 
credited if not defeated. Approximately 900 Druze enlisted men 
and 60 officers defected from the army to join their coreligionists. 
The Lebanese Armed Forces chief of staff, General Nadim al 
Hakim, fled into Druze territory, but he would not admit he had 
actually defected. Thus, the army again had split along confessional 
lines. Furthermore, the army had halted the Druzes only with 
United States armed intervention. 

For its part, the United States had clearly inherited Israel's role 
of shoring up the precarious Lebanese government. On Septem- 
ber 29, 1983, the United States Congress, by a solid majority, 
adopted a resolution declaring the 1973 War Powers Resolution 
to apply to the situation in Lebanon and sanctioned the United 
States military presence for an eighteen-month period. 

Although the MNF remained in Lebanon after the October 1983 
suicide truck bombings, the situation of the United States and 
French contingents was precarious (see Suicide Bombings, this ch.). 



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Lebanon: A Country Study 

In early February 1984, Shia Amal militiamen clashed with the 
Lebanese Army in the southern suburbs of Beirut and after four 
days of heavy fighting gained control over Beirut International Air- 
port, evicted the army from West Beirut, and reestablished the 
Green Line partitioning the capital. The decisive defeat of the army 
on two key fronts led to its gradual disintegration, as demoralized 
soldiers defected to join the opposition. United States Marines sta- 
tioned near Beirut International Airport were surrounded by 
predominantly Shia militia groups. As the security environment 
in Lebanon deteriorated, Britain, France, Italy, and the United 
States decided to withdraw their MNF contingents. 

The Bikfayya Accord 

The withdrawal of the MNF left Syria as the dominant force 
in Lebanon, and Syria acted rapidly to consolidate its grip on 
Lebanese affairs. It pressured Jumayyil to abrogate the May 17 
Agreement, and he did so on March 6, 1985. This event led to 
the resignation of the Council of Ministers and its replacement by 
a new government of national unity headed by Rashid Karami. 

Syria hammered out yet another security accord, the Bikfayya 
Agreement of June 18. Muslim and Druze cabinet ministers had 
insisted on the creation of a military command council to replace 
the post of commander in chief of the armed forces, a proposal that 
was opposed by Christian cabinet ministers, who perceived it as 
a dilution of their control over the military. A compromise was 
reached providing for the continuation of the post of commander 
in chief, to be held by a Maronite as before, but also the establish- 
ment of a multiconfessional six-man military command council to 
have authority over appointments at the brigade and division levels 
(see Organization and Command Structure, this ch.). Major Gen- 
eral Ibrahim Tannus, the army commander, was replaced by Major 
General Michel Awn (also seen as Aoun), who was somewhat more 
acceptable to Muslims. Furthermore, a new intelligence agency, 
the National Security Council, was established, with the stipula- 
tion that it be headed by a Shia Muslim. A Shia general, Mustafa 
Nasir, was named as the first director of the new agency. Neverthe- 
less, the Maronite-commanded military intelligence apparatus re- 
mained intact as a separate but parallel institution. The agreement 
also called for a cease-fire, the withdrawal of heavy artillery and 
militiamen from the streets of East Beirut and West Beirut, the 
dismantling of barricades along the Green Line, and the reopen- 
ing of the airport and port. The agreement formally took effect 
on June 23 and was implemented by July 6, 1985. 



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National Security 



Optimistic predictions that the Bikfayya Agreement would end 
Lebanon's chronic conflict were dashed as sporadic battles and ter- 
rorist attacks resumed. The accord was criticized vehemently by 
elements among the Maronites as Druze, Shia, and Sunni militia 
fought one another in West Beirut. Armed Shias stormed and 
burned the Saudi Arabian embassy on August 24. On the same 
day, the Lebanese National Resistance Front, an umbrella organi- 
zation fighting Israel in southern Lebanon, fired two rocket- 
propelled grenades at the British embassy. On September 20, in 
a replay of the April 1983 attack, a suicide vehicle bomber attacked 
the new United States embassy building in East Beirut, killing eight 
and wounding dozens. The mounting tension in Lebanon was ex- 
acerbated by Israeli air raids against Palestinian guerrilla camps 
of the Abu Musa faction. The Bikfayya Agreement suffered another 
blow on August 23, when General Hakim, the newly appointed 
Druze chief of staff of the Lebanese Armed Forces, died in an acci- 
dental helicopter crash. And, on August 30 Maronite patriarch and 
Phalange Party founder Pierre Jumayyil died of a heart attack, set- 
ting the stage for a power struggle in the Christian community. 

Syria, determined to implement the security plans it had spon- 
sored, attempted to restore order. It curbed the activities of the 
Iranian Pasdaran and Hizballah in Baalbek in the Biqa Valley, 
and it quelled the fierce fighting in the northern port city of Tripoli 
between the pro-Syrian Arab Democratic Party and the Sunni fun- 
damentalist Tawhid (Islamic Unification Movement). 

Events in Southern Lebanon 

Some Israeli policymakers considered South Lebanon's Shias 
natural allies, especially because both Israel and the Shias wanted 
to prevent the PLO from returning to the area. Some Israelis en- 
visioned a Shia buffer state modeled after "Free Lebanon," con- 
trolled formerly by Saad Haddad (Haddad died of cancer in January 
1984 and was replaced by retired Lebanese general Antoine Lahad). 
Indeed, about 10 percent of the SLA was Shia, and the IDF armed 
and supported several Shia groups. 

These hopes, however, were never realized. The Shias, in fact, 
turned out to be implacable foes, vehemently resisting the Israeli 
presence in southern Lebanon. Concerned about the growing num- 
ber of casualties inflicted on the IDF by Shia militants, on Febru- 
ary 16, 1985, the IDF implemented the first stage of a withdrawal 
from Lebanon, evacuating its troops from the northern front at 
the Awwali River to south of the Litani River, thus removing 
Sidon from Israeli control. Sidon's feuding factions, determined 
to avoid a flare-up of internecine violence in the wake of the Israeli 



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Lebanon: A Country Study 

withdrawal, formed a special committee to organize the smooth 
entry of Lebanese Army troops into the city. On February 17, a 
3,000-man detachment of the army's predominantly Shia Twelfth 
Brigade took over the Israeli positions as the populace celebrated 
in the streets. 

But the celebration was short-lived. In March and April, a new 
round of Christian-Muslim fighting pitting a Palestinian-Druze- 
Shia coalition against the Phalangists engulfed Sidon. The army 
was dispatched but appeared powerless to stop the combat. The 
Phalangists suffered a major defeat, as thousands of Christian 
civilians retreated east to Jazzin, where they were protected by 
Lahad's SLA. Others fled behind Israeli occupation lines. 

Yet Israel's withdrawal gave it no respite from guerrilla attacks. 
On the contrary, the guerrilla campaign escalated into full-scale 
warfare, with most of the attacks occurring in the vicinity of Tyre. 
Frustrated by its inability to curb the resistance fighters, Israel 
resorted to what it called the "Iron Fist" policy, which entailed 
retaliatory and preemptive raids on villages suspected of harbor- 
ing Shia guerrillas. On March 4, an explosion devastated a mosque 
in the village of Marakah — only hours after the IDF had inspected 
the site — killing at least twelve people, many of whom were Shia 
guerrilla commanders. On March 1 1 , a large Israeli armored force 
wreaked vengeance on the village of Az Zrariyah, killing 40 peo- 
ple and detaining 200 men. 

The IDF hastened its withdrawal from southern Lebanon, ad- 
hering to an accelerated deadline voted by the Israeli cabinet, and 
pulled its troops back to the armistice line on June 6, 1985. Israel 
also closed its detention center in Ansar and freed 752 of the in- 
mates. But, in violation of the Geneva Conventions, which forbid 
transporting prisoners of war across international boundaries, 1 ,200 
prisoners were transferred to Israel. Israel preserved a security zone 
approximately five to ten kilometers wide, which it handed over 
to the SLA. Some 150 Israeli combat troops and 500 advisers re- 
mained within the security zone. 

Chaos in Beirut and Syrian Peacemaking Efforts 

Internecine Battles in the Lebanese Forces 

In early 1985, clashes erupted again in the capital, this time be- 
tween rival Christian factions. Recognizing that Syria was now the 
dominant arbiter of Lebanese affairs, Jumayyil and senior Phalange 
Party members held conciliatory talks with Syria and attempted 
to obtain Syrian security guarantees for Lebanon's Christians. In 



214 




Lebanese Forces rivals, Samir Jaja (left) and Elie Hubayka 

return, the Phalangists agreed to Syrian demands that the Christians 
make political concessions to the Muslims. However, a portion of 
the Lebanese Forces (LF) rebelled against the rapprochement with 
Syria. On March 13, 1985, Samir Jaja (also seen as Geagea), a 
pro-Israeli senior commander in the LF, ordered his followers to 
attack Jumayyil's loyalists, Lebanese Army units, and Muslim and 
Palestinian forces in Sidon and Beirut. Syria massed troops around 
the Christian heartland north of Beirut, but agreed to give Jumayyil 
time to neutralize the revolt before resorting to armed interven- 
tion. Jaja's relatively small force could not prevail against so many 
adversaries, and on May 10 he was replaced by Elie Hubayka, who 
was elected by Phalange Party executives as the new commander 
of the LF. Hubayka was notorious for his role in the 1982 Sabra 
and Shatila massacres but also had a reputation for being more 
pro-Syrian than Jaja (see The Siege of Beirut, this ch.). 

The War of the Camps 

Just as relative calm was restored to Christian East Beirut, fight- 
ing broke out again in Muslim West Beirut, Under Syria's aegis, 
the Shia Amal organization attempted to consolidate its control over 
West Beirut. Amal struck first in an April 15 assault that routed 
the once-formidable Sunni Murabitun militia of the Independent 
Nasserite Movement in a matter of days and sent its leader, Ibrahim 
Kulaylat, into exile. Then it turned its attention to the Palestinians 



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Lebanon: A Country Study 

in the refugee camps of Sabra, Shatila, and Burj al Barajinah. The 
Palestinians, with indirect support from the Druzes, put up stiff 
resistance against the Amal attacks, however. Although some 500 
Palestinians were killed in the battles and about 25,000 took refuge 
in Druze-controlled areas, the Palestinians retained control of the 
camps. But the Palestinians were confined to their camps by an 
Amal siege that was to last on and off for another two years before 
Syrian forces dispersed the Shias. 

The Tripartite Accord 

In late 1985, Syria sponsored yet another agreement among 
Lebanon's factions aimed at ending the ongoing war. On Decem- 
ber 28, the leaders of Lebanon's three main militias — Nabih Birri 
of Amal, Walid Jumblatt of the Druze Progressive Socialist Party, 
and Hubayka of the LF — signed the Tripartite Accord in Damas- 
cus. Although this agreement resembled many previous failed 
Syrian initiatives to restore order in Lebanon, it was more com- 
prehensive. It provided for an immediate cease-fire and an official 
proclamation of the end of the state of civil war within one year. 
The militias would be disarmed and then disbanded, and sole 
responsibility for security would be relegated to the reconstituted 
and religiously integrated Lebanese Army, supported by Syrian 
forces. More broadly, the accord envisaged a "strategic integra- 
tion" of the two countries in the spheres of military affairs, national 
security, and foreign relations. The accord also mandated fun- 
damental, but not sweeping, political reform, including the estab- 
lishment of a bicameral legislature and the elimination of the old 
confessional formula, which was to be replaced by majority rule 
and minority representation. The accord differed considerably from 
others inasmuch as the three signatories were the actual combat- 
ants in the war, rather than civilian politicians. This factor engen- 
dered considerable optimism in some quarters but great trepidation 
in others where it was viewed as an attempt to reconstruct Greater 
Syria (see Glossary). The most vehement protests came from the 
Sunni community, which was prominent in politics but had little 
military strength after its militia, the Murabitun, had been crushed 
earlier in the year. 

Jumayyil refused to endorse the agreement, however, and solic- 
ited the support of Samir Jaja, who had been demoted only eight 
months earlier for his anti-Syrian, Christian-supremacist stance. 
Fierce fighting raged within the Christian camp between partisans 
of Hubayka and Jaja. On January 16, Hubayka fled to Paris, and 
then to exile in Damascus. Hubayka' s defeat was a major blow 
to Syrian prestige, and Syria retaliated by urging the militias it 



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National Security 



controlled to attack Christian areas. The Presidential Palace and 
Jumayyil's home town of Bikfayya were shelled, and a series of 
car bombs were detonated in East Beirut. But the Christians closed 
ranks around their beleaguered president, and the Tripartite Accord 
was never implemented. Jaja, emboldened by his restored power, 
then challenged Jumayyil and the Phalange Party directly. In July 
he announced the creation of the Free Lebanon Army, which was 
to be under his sole command and was to serve as his personal power 
base. But LF loyalists fought this plan. On September 27, a 3,000- 
man force loyal to Hubayka launched a surprise attack across 
the Green Line from Muslim West Beirut against East Beirut. 
Hubayka' s men, supported by Syria and their erstwhile Muslim 
adversaries, forced back Jaja' s militiamen, and the invasion was 
stopped only when the Lebanese Army's Tenth Brigade and the 
Lebanese Air Force entered the three-way fray on the side of the 
president. 

Pax Syriana 

On July 4, 1986, Syrian troops entered West Beirut for the first 
time since being expelled during the 1982 Israeli invasion. Approx- 
imately 500 Syrian troops, working with the Lebanese Army and 
police, cleared roadblocks, closed militia offices, and collected 
weapons. In mid-February 1987, however, a new round of fight- 
ing broke out in West Beirut, this time between Druze and Shia 
militias, both of which were regarded as Syrian allies. The com- 
bat was described by witnesses as being of unrivaled intensity in 
twelve years of war, with the militiamen using formations of Soviet- 
made T-54 tanks that Syria had supplied to both sides. Five days 
of combat caused an estimated 700 casualties and set much of West 
Beirut aflame. 

Syria acted decisively to stop the chaos in West Beirut, and it 
seized the opportunity to reimpose its hegemony over the areas in 
Lebanon from which it had been evicted by Israel in 1982. On 
February 22, 1987, it dispatched 7,500 troops, configured in two 
brigades and a battalion, from eastern Lebanon. The Syrian troops, 
most of whom were veteran commandos, closed down some seventy 
militia offices, rounded up and arrested militia leaders, confiscated 
arms caches, deployed troops along the major roads and at Beirut 
International Airport, established checkpoints, and sent squads on 
patrol in the streets. 

The Syrian Army did not shy away from violence in its effort 
to restore order to the Lebanese capital. In the first two days of 
its police operation, Syrian troops shot some fifteen Lebanese of 
various militias. Then on February 24 a dozen trucks full of Syrian 



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Lebanon: A Country Study 

commandos entered the Basta neighborhood, a Shia stronghold, 
and attacked the Fathallah barracks, the headquarters of the 
Hizballah organization. There, Syrian troops killed eighteen 
Hizballah militants. 

In mid- April the Syrian Army deployed troops south of Beirut. 
Approximately 100 Syrian commandos, fighting alongside sol- 
diers of the Lebanese Army's Sixth Brigade, occupied key posi- 
tions along the strategic coastal highway linking Beirut with southern 
Lebanon and took control of the bridge over the Awwali River, 
near Sidon. 

By mid- 1987 the Syrian Army appeared to have settled into 
Beirut for a protracted stay. Lebanon's anarchy was regarded by 
Syrian officials as an unacceptable risk to Syrian security. The gov- 
ernment of Syria appeared prepared to occupy Beirut permanendy, 
if necessary. The senior Syrian military commander in Lebanon, 
Brigadier General Ghazi Kanaan, said that militia rule of Lebanon 
had ended and that the Syrian intervention was "open-ended," 
implying that Syria would occupy West Beirut indefinitely. Mean- 
while Syrian officials indicated that thousands of additional Syrian 
troops would probably be sent to Beirut to ensure stability. Kanaan 
declared that Syria would take full responsibility for the security 
of foreign embassies in West Beirut, and he invited foreign mis- 
sions to return. Kanaan also promised that Syria would expend 
all possible efforts to secure the release of Western hostages held 
by Lebanese terrorists. 

The Lebanese Armed Forces in the 1980s 

After the 1982 Israeli invasion, President Amin Jumayyil, con- 
vinced that a strong and unified army was a prerequisite to rebuild- 
ing the nation, announced plans to create a 12 -brigade 60,000-man 
army, equipped with French and American arms and trained by 
French and American advisers. In addition, he planned to increase 
the Internal Security Force to a strength of 20,000 men. But be- 
cause the Lebanese Army could muster only about 22,000 men 
in 1982, the government decided on November 24, 1982, to im- 
pose the Law of Service to the Flag, a conscription law first enact- 
ed on the eve of the Civil War but never implemented. The 
conscription law mandated one year of military service for eligible 
males. Additionally, some 2,000 to 3,000 soldiers who were act- 
ing as aides to officers were transferred to combat units. As part 
of a shake-up in the command structure, gaps in rank between 
officers and soldiers were narrowed. In December 1982, long-time 
army commander General Victor al Khuri was retired and replaced 
by General Tannus. At the same time, about 140 field- grade officers 



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were purged from the ranks through forced retirements. Many, 
including the once-powerful military intelligence chief Johnny 
Abdu, were dispatched to diplomatic posts abroad. Hundreds of 
new appointments were made on a nonsectarian basis. 

The United States was instrumental in helping the Lebanese 
government rebuild the armed forces. In 1982 the United States 
proposed a Lebanese Army Modernization Program to be im- 
plemented in four phases. The first three phases entailed organi- 
zation of seven full-strength, multiconfessional army brigades, 
created from existing battalions. The fourth phase focused on 
rebuilding the navy and air force. The total cost of the first three 
phases was estimated at US$500 million. The United States pledged 
to pay US$235 million of this sum, with the Lebanese government 
paying the balance. 

Initial progress was rapid. A new tank battalion equipped with 
M-48 tanks donated by Jordan was established. A new supply depot 
was built at Kafr Shima. About 1 ,000 vehicles, including hundreds 
of M- 113 armored personnel carriers, were transferred from the 
United States to Lebanon. And at one point, new recruits joined 
so rapidly that not enough uniforms could be found to outfit them. 

Lack of effective military leadership, however, remained the 
Achilles heel. United States experts were aware of this problem 
and devoted considerable attention to solving it. A cadre of Lebanese 
lieutenants was given infantry officer basic training in the United 
States. A team of eighty United States military advisers, includ- 
ing fifty- three Green Berets, provided officer training in Lebanon. 
Furthermore, Lebanese officers were attached to the United States 
MNF contingent for training in military unit operations. 

Nevertheless, the Lebanese Army disintegrated in the 1983-84 
battles in the Shuf Mountains (see Israel Defense Forces Withdrawal 
and the Mountain War, this ch.). Shortly after the MNF withdrawal 
in February 1984, precipitated in part by the eviction of the Lebanese 
Army from West Beirut by militia forces, the United States Con- 
gress slashed military materiel credits given to the Lebanese govern- 
ment from the 1983 level of US$100 million to US$15 million for 
1984. In addition, the training grant was cut from US$1.8 million 
to US$800,000. And in late 1984, the United States decided to sus- 
pend further transfers of military materiel to Lebanon. 

Organization and Command Structure 

The New Defense Law 

The 1926 Constitution designated the president of the republic 
as commander in chief of the armed forces, but it contained no 
other reference to the military establishment. On March 13, 1979, 



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Lebanon: A Country Study 

the Chamber of Deputies passed the New Defense Law, which 
reorganized the command structure of the armed forces. The law 
created the Supreme Defense Council, consisting of the president 
of the republic as chairman, the prime minister as vice chairman, 
and the deputy prime minister and the ministers of defense, for- 
eign affairs, interior, and finance as members. The commander 
of the armed forces attended Supreme Defense Council meetings 
in an advisory capacity. The Supreme Defense Council had a 
secretariat, whose secretary general was required to be an active 
officer of the rank of colonel or above and who reported to the prime 
minister. 

The Supreme Defense Council 

According to Articles 3,5, and 6 of the New Defense Law, the 
Council of Ministers and the Supreme Defense Council were autho- 
rized to decide the nation's defense policies and to define their aims. 
Although the law reiterated the president's constitutional author- 
ity as supreme commander in chief of the armed forces, it also stipu- 
lated that he exercise this power through the Supreme Defense 
Council. Therefore, the law circumscribed the president's power 
over the armed forces and distributed some decision-making power 
to ministers. Article 17 of the New Defense Law placed the Minis- 
try of Defense and all its attached organizations — such as the Mili- 
tary Bureau, the Lebanese Army, the General Administration 
Department, the Inspectorate General, and the Military Council — 
under the exclusive control of the minister of defense. 

The New Defense Law also stipulated that the commander of 
the armed forces be appointed by the Council of Ministers from 
among staff officers nominated by the minister of defense, who su- 
pervised him in his duties, except for military and security opera- 
tions, for which the commander of the armed forces had sole 
responsibility. The law designated the chief of staff as the second 
in command. The New Defense Law strengthened the position of 
the chief of staff by delegating to him some responsibilities previ- 
ously belonging to the commander of the armed forces — including 
training and legal affairs. The New Defense Law also created slots 
for two deputy chiefs of staff. 

The Military Council 

Articles 29 and 30 of the New Defense Law established the Mili- 
tary Council, which was attached directly to the minister of defense. 
Its members were the commander of the armed forces, the secre- 
tary general of the Supreme Defense Council, the director of the 
General Administration Department, the inspector general, and 



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National Security 



two officers with the rank of colonel or above. By tacit agreement, 
the membership was allotted along confessional lines and required 
to include a representative of each of the prominent communities: 
Maronite, Sunni, Shia, Druze, Greek Orthodox, and Greek Catho- 
lic. The Military Council's duties consisted primarily of organiz- 
ing the institutions attached to the Ministry of Defense and naming 
the commanders of military regions, divisions, and brigades; com- 
manders of air force, military, and naval academies; and military 
attaches in embassy posts. Because these responsibilities previously 
had belonged to the commander in chief alone, the New Defense 
Law diminished his power. 

Military Intelligence 

On January 22, 1981, a presidential decree was promulgated 
to settle a long-standing dispute over the Deuxieme Bureau, which 
had been under the exclusive control of the commander in chief 
and which Muslim politicians had sought to place under the author- 
ity of the Military Council. The law stipulated that the Deuxieme 
Bureau was answerable directly to the commander in chief but 
would provide the chief of staff with all information available to 
it. Because the chief of staff is traditionally a Druze, this compromise 
allowed other communities to share in some prerogatives formerly 
reserved for the Christian community alone. 

The Commander in Chief 

The commander of the Lebanese Army in July 1987 was Major 
General Michel Awn, who was appointed in June 1984 after long 
negotiations in the national unity government of Prime Minister 
Rashid Karami. Awn, a Christian, was a career military officer 
who entered the military academy at Al Fayadiyyah in 1955 and 
graduated as a lieutenant in the artillery corps. He attended 
advanced courses in France and the United States and was pro- 
moted to commander of the artillery corps in 1976 during the 
Lebanese Civil War. Although the majority of Christian officers 
supported the Christian militia, Awn stayed aloof from factional 
politics during the Civil War and earned a reputation for neutral- 
ity and loyalty to the government. During the war, he was appointed 
to a military committee charged with rebuilding the army. Awn 
strongly advocated the need for an integrated, nonsectarian army. 
In 1977 he assembled a group of army officers and soldiers from 
different religious groups who had not participated in the sectarian 
fighting and founded the Eighth Brigade, which, under his com- 
mand, suffered few defections. 



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Lebanon: A Country Study 

In rising to the position of commander in chief, Awn succeeded 
his old rival, Major General Tannus. Tannus's resignation was 
demanded by Muslim politicians who believed him responsible for 
bombing Muslim areas while leaving Christian areas unscathed. 
Unlike Awn, Tannus had also favored the creation of four separate 
sectarian armies — Christian, Sunni, Shia, and Druze. 

In 1987 the Lebanese Army consisted of 9 brigades containing 
a total of approximately 35,000 to 38,000 men, of whom only 15,000 
to 18,000 were under the operational control of the central com- 
mand structure. Many units existed only on paper, however, and 
soldiers who received paychecks were often in the service of the 
militias the army was intended to supplant. Under an informal 
agreement between the army and its renegade commanders, the 
ghost payroll was maintained to pump funds into Lebanon's war- 
torn economy. Additionally, the central government harbored hopes 
that the breakaway brigades eventually could be reunited with the 
official Lebanese Army. 

Lebanon's governmental expenditures on its armed forces were 
estimated to be US$328 million annually and its expenditure on 
military materiel imports US$240 million in 1983, the most re- 
cent year for which statistics were available in late 1987. In addi- 
tion, a 10-year US$955 million supplemental sum earmarked for 
rebuilding the armed forces was authorized in 1982, but the pro- 
gram was shelved when the army collapsed in 1984. Army equip- 
ment included 60 AMX-13 tanks, 137 M-48 tanks, 18 M-41 tanks, 
100 Saladin armored cars, several hundred M-113 armored per- 
sonnel carriers, an array of Western-supplied artillery, rocket 
launchers, antiaircraft artillery, and small arms. 

The Army 

In 1987 the order of battle of the Lebanese Army was in a state 
of flux. Officially, the army consisted of twelve nominal brigades. 
Most observers, however, omitted the first, second, and third 
brigades from the order of battle. The First Brigade, which was 
100-percent Shia in composition, was stationed in the Syrian- 
controlled Biqa Valley, where it has been assimilated by the Syrian 
Army and Shia militias. The Second Brigade, which had been a 
mostly Sunni unit stationed in Tripoli, had dispersed. Likewise, 
the Third Brigade had disbanded. The remaining nine brigades 
were considered part of the Lebanese Army insofar as the soldiers 
were on the army payroll and followed orders from commanding 
officers. Not all of these brigades, however, were regarded as loyal 
to President Jumayyil. 



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The Fourth Brigade 

The Fourth Brigade disintegrated during the Mountain War in 
February 1984 as Druze militiamen attempted to create a salient 
from Alayh to the coast at Khaldah, south of Beirut. Half of the 
soldiers deserted and joined the Druze forces, while the remainder 
fled to Christian East Beirut and enrolled in Christian-dominated 
brigades. 

The Fifth Brigade 

The Fifth Brigade in 1987 consisted of approximately 2,000 
mostly Maronite troops under the command of Colonel Khalil 
Kanaan. The brigade's administrative headquarters was located 
in Sarba, north of Juniyah, an LF stronghold. It consisted of three 
infantry battalions and an artillery unit stationed in Brummana, 
east of Beirut. In 1987 Fifth Brigade units were deployed in the 
strategic town of Suq al Gharb to prevent Druze militiamen from 
shelling the capital. The Fifth Brigade was regarded as loyal to the 
president, but observers believed that if called upon to fight a Chris- 
tian militia, it might remain neutral. 

The Sixth Brigade 

The mainly Shia Muslim Sixth Brigade had been commanded 
by a Christian officer, Colonel Luftijabar, and consisted of 1,600 
soldiers and officers. Its mission had been to maintain order in West 
Beirut. It refused to participate in the February 1986 combat be- 
tween the Shia Amal militia and the Lebanese Army, however; 
as a result, the Fifth Brigade was expelled from West Beirut. After 
the Sixth Brigade split off from the army command structure, it 
was taken over by a new officer, Major General Abd al Halim Kanj, 
and its ranks swelled to 6,000 men as Muslims from other army 
brigades deserted to join their coreligionists. In 1987 the Sixth 
Brigade was stationed in Shihab barracks in the southern suburbs 
of Beirut and was under the operational control of the Amal militia. 

The Seventh Brigade 

The Seventh Brigade was composed of 1,700 men in 1987. A 
contingent of the Seventh Brigade was stationed in the Jubayl dis- 
trict, north of Beirut. This contingent was regarded as loyal to for- 
mer President Sulayman Franjiyah, whose feudal seat, Zgharta, 
is a few kilometers southwest of Tripoli. Consequently, the cen- 
tral government equipped this contingent with light weapons only. 
The brigade's headquarters was located in Amshit, just north 
of Juniyah. Units at Amshit were well equipped with United 
States-made tanks and armored personnel carriers but were 



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Lebanon: A Country Study 

regarded as being under the sway of LF head Samir Jaja, who main- 
tained his retinue in Amshit (see Chaos in Beirut and Syrian Peace- 
making Efforts, this ch.). 

The Eighth Brigade 

The Eighth Brigade, commanded by Colonel Salim Kassis, was 
the strongest, best equipped, best trained, and most elite unit in the 
Lebanese Army in 1987. It was regarded as loyal to the president 
and the government. It consisted of 2,000 men, about 80 percent 
of whom were Christians from the northern region of Akkar, with 
the remaining 20 percent Sunni Muslims. It included a mechanized 
battalion equipped with ninety United States-made armored per- 
sonnel carriers, an armored battalion with thirty- three United States- 
made M-48 tanks, and a missile battalion equipped with eighteen 
pieces of field artillery. It was stationed at the Presidential Palace at 
Babda and at the Ministry of Defense in the Yarzah section of Beirut. 
In 1983 the Eighth Brigade bore the brunt of fighting against Druze 
militia in Suq al Gharb and against leftist militia in West Beirut. 

The Ninth Brigade 

The Ninth Brigade, established in 1983, was commanded in 1987 
by Colonel Sami Rihani, a Greek Orthodox. The majority of his 
soldiers were Christians from northern Lebanese cities, such as 
Tripoli, although the brigade also contained Sunni and Shia sol- 
diers and officers. It was headquartered in Al Hazimiyah, and one 
of its battalions was deployed in the Beirut port area. The Ninth 
Brigade was regarded as being totally loyal to the government, and 
it fought successfully against Phalangist forces in East Beirut in 
January 1986. 

The Tenth Brigade 

The Tenth Brigade consisted of 1,800 soldiers, most of whom 
were Christians, under the command of Colonel Nassib Eid, and 
in 1987 it was stationed along the Green Line. Its troops manned 
the Beirut-Damascus highway to the Kafr Shima-Ash Shuwayfat 
front. The brigade was enlarged in 1984 when some soldiers and 
officers defecting from the Fourth Brigade joined it. The Tenth 
Brigade was composed of three airborne battalions and an artillery 
unit. The army's commando forces under Lieutenant Colonel Yusuf 
Tahan were attached to the Tenth Brigade. Tahan was an LF sup- 
porter, and observers doubted his loyalty to the government. 

The Eleventh Brigade 

The Eleventh Brigade, composed primarily of Druzes, had a 
strength in 1987 of about 900 men. Its commander, Colonel Amin 



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National Security 



Qadi, ordered the unit confined to its Hammana garrison during 
the fighting between the Lebanese Army and the Druze militia in 
the Shuf Mountains in 1983 and 1984; this action was in response 
to a request from Druze leader Walid Jumblatt to neutralize the 
army. The Eleventh Brigade controlled the Hammana garrison and 
guarded the government radio station in West Beirut. 

The Twelfth Brigade 

Little was known in 1987 about the mostly Shia 1,300-man 
Twelfth Brigade. It was commanded by Colonel Muhammad Saad 
and was deployed in various positions in southern Lebanon, par- 
ticularly along the coastal highway between Khaldah and Sidon. 

The Air Force and Navy 

In 1987 the Lebanese Air Force consisted of about 800 mostly 
Maronite enlisted men and officers under the command of Gen- 
eral Fahim al Hajj. Its main base was Al Qulayat airfield, in the 
north near the Syrian border — an area under the control of Syrian 
forces. Additional military airfields were at Riyaq in the Biqa Valley 
and at Halat near Jubayl, where United States forces built an emer- 
gency landing strip using part of the coastal highway. 

In 1987 the air force was composed of one helicopter attack squad- 
ron equipped with four French-made SA-342 Gazelle helicopters 
armed with SS-1 1 and SS-12 air-to-surface missiles, twenty-eight 
AB-212 transports, and SA-315 and SA-316 Alouette transport 
helicopters. These helicopters were capable of airlifting 300 men. 
In 1983 the air force had planned to increase its helicopter fleet 
to forty aircraft, and the Lebanese government signed an agree- 
ment with France to purchase about US$80 million worth of 
unspecified air force equipment. These plans were shelved after 
the French MNF contingent withdrew in 1984, however. The exact 
number of operational fixed-wing and jet aircraft in the air force 
inventory was not available in 1987. The air force apparently lost 
three of its ten semiobsolete British-made Hawker-Hunter F-70 
fighter jets in the 1983-84 Mountain War, and only three of those 
remaining were reported to be serviceable. The air force was re- 
ported to have ten French-made Mirage fighter-bombers, of which 
only three were in commission. It also had eleven trainers — five 
Fouga Magisters and six propeller-driven Bulldogs. 

In 1987 the Lebanese Navy consisted of 450 sailors and officers 
stationed at a naval base in Juniyah. Most personnel were Chris- 
tians. The navy's fleet included six Aztec-class patrol boats, three 
Byblos-class patrol boats, and two French-made landing craft 



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Lebanon: A Country Study 

capable of transporting tanks and of being used in beachhead and 
evacuation operations. 

Internal Security and Terrorism 

By the mid-1980s, more than a decade of war had reduced drasti- 
cally the authority and ability of the central government to enforce 
law and to implement justice. The unofficial militias and foreign 
occupying armies that governed much of Lebanon's civilian 
populace tended to enforce their own version of justice, without 
regard to the central government or legal norms. Nevertheless, 
Lebanese law still pertained in some limited venues. In 1987 
Lebanon's police forces had been virtually assimilated into the 
armed forces and worked closely with the Syrian occupation force. 

Under Lebanese law, a suspect must be arraigned before a com- 
mittee composed of three judges and a prosecutor within forty-eight 
hours of being arrested. Nevertheless, government prosecutors 
sometimes held suspects for interrogation for indefinite periods of 
time without notifying judges. Every prisoner had the right to legal 
counsel, but there was no public defender's office. Bail was per- 
mitted in most cases. In practice and custom Lebanese law provided 
the right to a fair public trial, but many cases remained unadjudi- 
cated. Trial delays resulted from the difficulty of conducting in- 
vestigations when most of the country remained outside government 
control, from a shortage of judges, and from the general break- 
down in security. Courts existed in most parts of the country, but 
the disposition of criminal cases depended ultimately on the local 
power group. Militias frequently intervened to protect their mem- 
bers from prosecution and detention. 

Common crime, to the extent that it could be distinguished from 
political violence, was rampant. In 1986 the Lebanese press 
described a surge in violent crime, including a rash of over eighty 
well-organized armed bank robberies in a two-year period and 
numerous kidnappings for ransom. 

The definition of terrorism is fraught with controversy, partic- 
ularly in the Middle Eastern context. But by almost any defini- 
tion, Lebanon is an epicenter of terrorist activity. Assassination 
is an occupational hazard for politicians. The slaying of Prime 
Minister Karami on June 1, 1987, when a bomb exploded aboard 
his helicopter, was but another in a long string of political mur- 
ders. Car bombings, known in the Lebanese lexicon as "canned 
death," were occurring almost on a daily basis. The United States 
embassy had twice been attacked by suicide truck-bombers. And 
the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 in June 1985 was only the most 
brazen of a long series of airliner hijackings originating in Beirut. 



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National Security 



Over the years, literally hundreds of groups have claimed respon- 
sibility for various acts of terrorism committed against civilian tar- 
gets. Most of the names of the groups claiming responsibility, 
however, were merely code words or noms de guerre meant to con- 
ceal the true identity of the organization behind the attack. 

In the judgment of most informed observers, a few men or fam- 
ilies have been responsible for masterminding the majority of ter- 
rorist operations. For example, the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary 
Faction, a terrorist organization that assassinated United States 
and Israeli officials in Western Europe in 1982 and 1984 and staged 
numerous other attacks, was revealed eventually to be run by a 
single Maronite extended family, the Abdallah clan from the north- 
ern Lebanese town of Al Qubayyat. In March 1987, ringleader 
George Ibrahim Abdallah was sentenced by a French court to life 
imprisonment. Likewise, virtually all of the Shia terrorist attacks 
against Western interests in Lebanon since 1982, claimed in the 
name of the Islamic Jihad Organization and a dozen other groups, 
have been attributed by intelligence experts to two related Shia fam- 
ilies, the Mughniyyahs and the Musawis. Two leaders of these fam- 
ilies, Imad Mughniyyah and Husayn al Musawi, were widely 
believed to be responsible for holding twenty-three Westerners 
hostage in 1987. 

Suicide Bombings 

One of the most spectacular terrorist tactics in the 1980s was 
a series of suicide vehicle bombings. The first occurred on April 
18, 1983, when a pick-up truck driven by a suicide bomber ex- 
ploded in the driveway of the United States embassy in West Beirut. 
The explosives detonated with a force equivalent to 2,000 pounds 
of trinitrotoluene and destroyed the chancery building, killing 63 
people, including 17 Americans, and wounding 100, about 40 of 
whom were Americans. The Islamic Jihad Organization claimed 
responsibility for the attack. Informed sources believed that the 
Islamic Jihad Organization was a nom de guerre for Husayn 
Musawi' s Islamic Amal organization, while others believed that 
it was a cover name for Hizballah. 

On October 23, 1983, Shia terrorists struck the United States 
Marines compound and the French MNF headquarters in devastat- 
ing, near-simultaneous suicide bombing attacks. The attack on the 
United States Marines compound took 241 lives and wounded over 
100. The bombing was carried out by a lone terrorist driving a 
stakebed truck that penetrated the central lobby of the building 
and exploded. United States Federal Bureau of Investigation ex- 
perts announced that the blast, with the force of over 12,000 pounds 



227 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

of trinitrotoluene, was the largest non-nuclear explosion ever deto- 
nated. The attack on the French contingent claimed fifty-eight dead. 
On November 4, 1983, the suicide bombing tactic was used once 
again. Near Tyre in southern Lebanon, an explosives-laden pick- 
up truck crashed through an Israeli guard post and detonated near 
an IDF headquarters building, killing twenty-eight Israeli soldiers 
and thirty-two Lebanese and Palestinian prisoners. On Septem- 
ber 20, 1984, a suicide vehicle bomber attacked the new United 
States embassy building in East Beirut, killing eight and wound- 
ing dozens. On March 10, 1985, Israel was struck again when a 
suicide bomber drove a car packed with explosives into an IDF 
convoy at the border crossing point, near the Israeli town of 
Metulla. Twelve Israelis were killed and fourteen wounded. The 
initial spate of Shia suicide bombings was so successful that it in- 
spired other, secular organizations — particularly the Syrian Socialist 
Nationalist Party — to adopt the tactic in 1984 and 1985. As the 
frequency of suicide attacks rose, however, their effectiveness and 
impact waned. Lebanese groups abandoned the tactic and concen- 
trated on a more effective technique — hostage-taking. 

The Hostage Crisis 

On June 14, 1985, American attention was riveted on Lebanon 
once again. A TWA airliner, Flight 847 en route from Athens to 
Rome, was hijacked by Shia terrorists of the Hizballah organiza- 
tion who demanded the release of Shia prisoners held in Kuwait, 
Israel, and Spain. The airliner was forced to fly to Beirut, where 
nineteen passengers were released, then to Algiers, where twenty- 
two more were freed. It then returned to Beirut where on June 
15 one of the passengers, a United States Navy diver, was mur- 
dered. Seven American passengers, who, according to the terrorists, 
had Jewish-sounding surnames, were taken off the jet by Hizbal- 
lah terrorists and sequestered in Beirut. Then, about a dozen Amal 
members joined the hijackers on the airplane, and the pilot was 
forced once again to fly to Algiers, where sixty more passengers 
were freed. On the following day the airplane returned to Beirut 
with the thirty-two remaining passengers. Approximately 200 
Lebanese Army soldiers withdrew from the vicinity of Beirut In- 
ternational Airport, leaving the area in the control of Amal. In 
response to suspicions that the United States was planning a mili- 
tary rescue of the hostages, the terrorists moved the passengers off 
the airplane and sequestered them in various groups dispersed 
throughout Beirut. Amal and Hizballah members mined the run- 
ways at the airport to prevent a rescue attempt. 



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National Security 



On June 17, the third day of the crisis, Amal leader and Lebanese 
minister of justice Nabih Birri agreed to "mediate" and take respon- 
sibility for the safety of the hostages. Birri' s intervention appeared 
hypocritical because his men were holding most of the hostages and 
controlled the hijacked jet. Nevertheless, the Hizballah organiza- 
tion retained control of seven kidnapped Americans, leaving Birri 
unable to negotiate independently. Accordingly, Birri adopted a 
hardline stance and refused to release any hostages until Israel 
released 700 Shia detainees. Indeed, on June 24 Birri actually added 
another condition for the hostages' release, stipulating that United 
States warships leave Lebanese waters. 

The deadlock was finally broken through a series of complex and 
controversial political maneuvers. The United States, determined 
not to concede to the terrorists' demands, refused to request Israel 
to release its Shia prisoners but acknowledged that it would wel- 
come such a move. Israel, also unwilling as a matter of policy to 
negotiate with terrorists, refused to release its prisoners unless re- 
quested by the United States to do so. The thirty-nine hostages 
were ultimately freed on June 30. On July 1, Israel announced 
that it was ready to release the Shia detainees from its prison. Over 
the next several weeks, Israel released over 700 Shia prisoners, but 
Israel denied that the prisoners' release was related to the hijacking. 

Hostage-taking has become commonplace in Lebanon. By 1987 
the International Committee of the Red Cross estimated that 6,000 
Lebanese had been kidnapped or had disappeared since 1975. The 
systematic kidnapping of Western civilians began a few years after 
the Civil War. Perhaps the first victim whose case was widely pub- 
licized was American University of Beirut president David Dodge, 
abducted by Shia terrorists in 1981 and freed in 1982. As of Sep- 
tember 1987, twenty-three foreigners — most of whom were jour- 
nalists, diplomats, or teachers — were believed to be held hostage 
by various terrorist organizations in Lebanon. Of this total, nine 
were American. Terry Anderson, chief Middle East correspondent 
for the Associated Press, had been in captivity the longest. 
Anderson, seized on March 16, 1985, by the Shia fundamentalist 
Islamic Jihad Organization, was one of six hostages who had been 
held for more than two years. American television correspondent 
Charles Glass was seized on June 17, 1987. A previously unknown 
group, the "Organization for the Defense of Free People," claimed 
responsibility. Three hostages were Britons, including Anglican 
Church envoy Terry Waite, who disappeared January 20, 1986, 
while on a negotiating mission to free the other kidnap victims. 
Other hostages included one of two citizens of the Federal Repub- 
lic of Germany (West Germany) abducted in January 1987 by an 



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Lebanon: A Country Study 

organization calling itself "Strugglers for Freedom. ' ' The West Ger- 
mans were seized shortly after the West German government ar- 
rested Muhammad Ali Hamadi, a Shia terrorist leader who 
allegedly masterminded the 1985 TWA hijacking. Six French 
citizens, two of whom were diplomats, also remained in captivity 
in late 1987, as did an Indian professor, an Irish professor, an Italian 
businessman, and a Republic of Korea (South Korea) diplomat. 

Little information was available concerning the circumstances 
of the hostages: In late June 1987, the Lebanese magazine Ash Shira 
reported that some American hostages had been transferred from 
Beirut to Iran where they were being put on "trial" and that Imad 
Mughniyyah and Abdul Hadi Hamadi, security chiefs of the Hiz- 
ballah organization, had visited Tehran to testify in the "trial." 

Since 1982 seven kidnapped foreigners are believed to have been 
murdered by their captors. On October 3, 1985, the Islamic Jihad 
Organization claimed to have killed the United States Central In- 
telligence Agency Beirut chief of station, William Buckley, whom 
it had abducted on March 16, 1984. The Islamic Jihad Organiza- 
tion later released to a Beirut newspaper a photograph purporting 
to depict his corpse. Press reports stated that Buckley had been 
transferred to Iran, where he was tortured and killed. One of four 
Soviet diplomats kidnapped by the Islamic Liberation Organiza- 
tion on September 30, 1985, was killed by his captors; the other 
three were released a month later. On February 10, 1986, the 
Islamic Jihad Organization released a photograph that claimed to 
show the body of French citizen Michel Seurat, who had been kid- 
napped earlier. On April 17, 1986, the bodies of three American 
University of Beirut employees, American citizen Peter Kilburn 
and Britons John Douglas and Philip Padfield, were discovered 
near Beirut. The Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims 
claimed to have "executed" the three men in retaliation for the 
United States air raid on Libya on April 15, 1986. On April 23, 
1986, a Beirut newspaper received a videotape film showing a man 
being hanged. The Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Mus- 
lims claimed the man was British citizen Alec Collet, who had been 
kidnapped more than a year earlier. 

A few fortunate Western hostages have escaped from their cap- 
tors. American citizen Frank Regier, engineering professor at the 
American University of Beirut, was freed after several months in 
captivity by Amal militiamen, who raided the Beirut hideout of 
his extremist captors on April 15, 1984. On February 14, 1985, 
American journalist Jeremy Levin escaped from his captors in the 
Biqa Valley. On April 11, 1986, French captive Michel Brillant 
escaped several days after his abduction when his captors were 



230 



National Security 



surprised by a party of hunters in the Biqa Valley. On July 16, 
1986, a Saudi Arabian diplomat was freed when the Lebanese Army 
caught his captors. On September 26, 1986, British journalist David 
Hirst escaped by bolting from his captors' automobile in a Shia 
neighborhood of Beirut, and several days later French television 
correspondent Jean-Marc Sroussi escaped from a locked shed days 
after his capture. American Charles Glass escaped in August 1987, 
two months after his capture. 

Only a few hostages have been released by their captors. On May 
20, 1985, Saudi Arabian consul Husayn Farrash was released by 
Muslim fundamentalists after over a year in captivity. In mid- 
September 1985, the Reverend Benjamin Weir, a Presbyterian 
minister held hostage since May 1984, was freed by the Islamic 
Jihad Organization; on July 26, 1986, the same group released 
Father Lawrence Martin Jenco, who had been held since Janu- 
ary, 1985; and on November 2, 1986, American University of 
Beirut hospital administrator David Jacobsen was released after 
more than a year and a half in captivity. Americans Weir, Jenco, 
and Jacobsen had been held by the same Islamic Jihad Organiza- 
tion cell as Terry Anderson and Thomas Sutherland, who in Sep- 
tember 1987 remained in captivity. Several other hostages have 
been released by various groups, including a Spanish diplomat, 
a French journalist, two British women, a West German Siemens 
employee, and two Cypriot students. 

* * * 

A wide variety of published sources discuss Lebanese national 
security issues, although information on the armed forces is frag- 
mentary. Several impressionistic but vivid accounts of Lebanon's 
war, based on the authors' firsthand observations, provide a good 
introduction to the topic. The most prominent among these are 
Going All the Way by Jonathan C. Randal; Final Conflict and Death 
of a Country by John Bulloch; and Israel's Lebanon War by Ze'ev Schiff 
and Ehud Ya'ari. David C. Gordon's books, The Republic of Lebanon 
and Lebanon: The Fragmented Nation, provide a good general over- 
view. For a scholarly treatment of Lebanese political-military af- 
fairs, Michael C. Hudson's dated but seminal The Precarious Republic 
is useful for background information. More current scholarly works 
include The War for Lebanon, 1970-1983 by Itamar Rabinovich, The 
Lebanese Civil War by Marius Deeb, and Conflict and Violence in 
Lebanon by Rashid Khalidi. The contributions on Lebanon by 
Itamar Rabinovich and Yosef Olmert in the annual Middle East 
Contemporary Survey are a useful reference source. Other sources focus 



231 



Lebanon: A Country Study 



on more specific issues. Rashid Khalidi concentrates on the Pales- 
tinian presence in Lebanon in Under Siege. The Syrian role in 
Lebanon is explored in Syria and the Lebanese Crisis by Adeed I. 
Dawisha and Syrian Intervention in Lebanon by Naomi J. Weinberger. 
Middle East Insight, a periodical, frequently publishes articles about 
Lebanon, including Augustus Richard Norton's work on the Shia 
community. Journalistic coverage of Lebanese affairs by the in- 
ternational news media is comprehensive. In addition, Lebanon 
has a relatively large domestic press, although much of its cover- 
age represents partisan viewpoints. Among the most authoritative 
English-language Lebanese publications is the Middle East Reporter. 
(For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



232 



Appendix A 



Table 

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients 

2 School Enrollment by Province, 1981-82 

3 Principal Institutions of Higher Learning, 1981-82 

4 Hospitals, Beds, and Dispensaries by Province, 1982 

5 Port Activity, Selected Years, 1974-83 

6 Production of Main Crops, 1970-85 



233 



Appendix A 



Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 



When you know Multiply by To find 



Millimeters 0.04 inches 

Centimeters 0.39 inches 

Meters 3.3 feet 

Kilometers 0.62 miles 

Hectares (10,000 m 2 ) 2.47 acres 

Square kilometers 0.39 square miles 

Cubic meters 35.3 cubic feet 

Liters 0.26 gallons 

Kilograms 2.2 pounds 

Metric tons 0.98 long tons 

1.1 short tons 

2,204 pounds 

Degrees Celsius 9 degrees Fahrenheit 

(Centigrade) divide by 5 

and add 32 



235 



Lebanon: A 



Country Study 



CM CO CO CO ^ 



tn oi m <h 

i-H oo m cm 01 

m N N 

in OO T-H lt> 

cm o cn o O 

OT rt rt ^ 



ff) O CO N O 

CM tO ^ CO CT> 

CO O) CO Oi * 

co" o in o 



M CO CO Oi <£) 

t-h in 01 to to 

rv co a ^ 



O -h lO CO iO 
CM O O 

CO CO CO CO CT) 



o O t-> — < *f 

m m co to cm 

t)- o (N cti k 

co m o to ^ 

m t-h cm — 1 



c 
_o 

3 

3 — 

C- «J 



a 3 
cr c, 



236 



Appendix A 

Table 3. Principal Institutions of Higher Learning, 1981-82 

Lebanese 
Total Number of Students as 



Institutions 


Males 


Females 


Students 


Percentage of Total 


Lebanese University 


15,190 


13,858 


29,048 


93 


Beirut Arab University . . . . 


19,734 


5,122 


24,856 


11 


St. Joseph's University 


2,851 


2,530 


5,381 


94 


American Unive'rsity of 












2,813 


1,896 


4,709 


76 


Holy Spirit University 


1,274 


970 


2,244 


97 


Beirut University College . . 


815 


998 


1,813 


76 



Source: Based on information from Lebanon, Ministry of National Education and Fine 
Arts, Educational Center for Research and Development, Al Ahsa'at al Awwaliyyah 
lil Am adDirasi, 1981-82 (Basic Statistics for the 1981-82 School Year), Beirut, 
n.d., 37. 



Table 4. Hospitals, Beds, and Dispensaries by Province, 1982 





Bayrut 


Jabal Lubnan 


Ash Shamal 


Al Janub 


Al Biqa 


Hospitals 












Private 


22 


23 


15 


15 


6 


Public 


1 


4 


3 


5 


4 


Total hospitals . . . 


23 


27 


18 


20 


10 


Beds 












Private 


2,119 


1,663 


784 


824 


324 


Public 


20 


160 


130 


170 


210 


Total beds 


2,139 


1,823 


914 


994 


534 


Dispensaries 


48 


187 


61 


133 


78 



Source: Based on information from World Health Organization, Reconstruction of the Health 
Services in Lebanon, Geneva, 1983, 35-36. 



Table 5. Port Activity, Selected Years, 1974-83 
(in thousands of tons of goods unloaded) 



Port 


1974 


1978 


1979 


1980 


1981 


1982 


1983 




3,411 


n.a. 


2,480 


2,732 


2,195 


1,789 


2,546 




587 


825 


922 


625 


722 


591 


n.a. 


Sidon 


.... n.a. 


174 


88 


73 


20 


n.a. 


105 



n.a. — not available. 



237 



Lebanon: A Country Study 



m o o o - 
- ts (MOO - ™ 
CM ~ y-i C 



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^ —< cm m o <£> 



o cm m m x> o 
cm cm cm m CM to 



co m ix> ~h o 

CM « N CO (O 



cm m o o (J o 
cm x> o . m 



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^ * « o o co 

CT) -r-H _ _| ~H 



iD <t O CO lO O 
* h N Co O O 

co 



td cfl 

d d d d d d d 



ctj as a a 
c, d c c c, c, c 



«j £ 2 8 «j «5 * 

G co — — . C C 



m to X> o X> o 
m oi cT) x> O — i 

CM T-t ^ — i i- 1 



i-H cm co o m 
•<t n Oi o in ^ 



o u 



> U &h w < O h 



238 



Appendix B 



The Contending Sides in the 1975 Civil War 

THE TWO COMBATANT coalitions in the 1975 Civil War 
were the right-wing Christian Lebanese Front, sometimes called 
the Kufur Front, and the left-wing Muslim Lebanese National 
Movement (formerly the Front for Progressive Parties and Na- 
tional Forces). Combined Lebanese Front forces totaled about 
30,000 fighting men and women. Total Muslim-leftist forces were 
slightly fewer, but they were occasionally allied with Palestinian 
forces totaling some 20,000. The Syrian Army deployed about 
30,000 men in Lebanon and intervened first on the Christian and 
then on the Muslim side. The Lebanese Army numbered about 
18,000 men at the outset of the Civil War. It split quickly along 
confessional (see Glossary) lines, with about 3,000 officers and 
men joining the Lebanese Front and an approximately equal 
number joining the Lebanese National Movement. These defec- 
tions, as well as widespread desertions, left the Lebanese Army 
with a primarily Christian rump force of about 10,000 men. 
Commanded by General Hanna Said, the Lebanese Army was 
officially neutral and followed the orders of the government but 
provided tacit and active support to the Lebanese Front. 

The Lebanese Front 

The Phalange Party 

Known in Arabic as the Kataib, the Phalange Party (see Glos- 
sary) was the mainstay of the Lebanese Front and bore the brunt 
of the fighting for the Christian side. The party was founded by 
Christian patriarch Pierre Jumayyil (also seen as Gemayel) in 
1936 and was modeled on the German and Italian fascist parties. 
The Phalangist militia called itself the Lebanese Forces (LF). It 
could muster up to 20,000 troops, of which a core of 3,000 were 
full-time soldiers. Under the leadership of William Hawi, and 
then of Bashir Jumayyil, it evolved into a formidable and highly 
organized fighting force. The Phalange Party practiced conscrip- 
tion in the areas it controlled, drafting eligible young men to swell 
its ranks. In internecine fighting throughout the Civil War and 
up to 1982, the LF consolidated its leadership of the Lebanese 
Front by assimilating other Christian militia, often by force of 
arms. 



239 



Lebanon: A Country Study 



The Tigers 

A 500-man militia that was the armed force of the National Liberal 
Party of former President Camille Shamun (also seen as Chamoun). 
The Tigers (Namur) were more aggressive than the Phalan gists, 
often initiating hostilities with the Muslim side. On July 7, 1980, 
the Tigers were virtually wiped out by Phalangist forces in a sur- 
prise operation known as the "Day of the Long Knives." 

The Marada Brigade 

This 3,500-strong unit, also called the Marada (Giants), named 
after Byzantine border guards in ancient Lebanon, represented the 
interests of Sulayman Franjiyah (also seen as Franjieh), president 
of Lebanon at the outbreak of the Civil War. It was also called the 
Zghartan Liberation Army after Zgharta, Franjiyah's home town. 
It operated mainly out of Tripoli and other areas of northern Leba- 
non, but it also fought in Beirut. The alliance between the Phalan- 
gists and the Marada ended on June 13, 1978, with a surprise LF 
attack on Ihdin, the Marada headquarters, during which the Marada 
commander, Tony Franjiyah (Sulayman' s son), was killed. 

The Guardians of the Cedars 

This was an extremist Maronite (see Glossary) militia and ter- 
rorist organization led by a former police officer, Etienne Saqr. 
Named after Lebanon's national symbol, it consisted of about 500 
men and cooperated with the Phalangists during the Civil War. 

The Order of Maronite Monks 

An order of militant monks with a militia of 200 priests led by 
Father Sharbal Qassis, it fought alongside the other Christian forces. 

At Tanzim 

At Tanzim (The Organization) was originally a small secret 
society of Christian officers within the Lebanese Army who sup- 
ported the Phalangists. At Tanzim helped split the army early in 
the Civil War and attempted to incorporate defectors from the army 
into its ranks. At Tanzim also accepted members from outside the 
army, mostly from the upper and professional classes. It fielded 
its own militia of about 200. 

The Lebanese National Movement 

The Progressive Socialist Party 

Lebanon's Druze (see Glossary) community, led first by Kamal 
Jumblatt (also seen as Junblatt) and, after his assassination in 
1977, by his son Walid, provided the titular leadership of the 



240 



Appendix B 



Muslim-leftist coalition in the Civil War. The party's militia of 
approximately 2,500 men played only a small role in the actual 
combat, however, limiting its involvement to fighting in the Mount 
Lebanon (see Glossary) area. 

The Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party 

The Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party (SSNP) was established 
in Lebanon in 1932 by Antun Saadah, who hoped to unite the 
Levantine nations and recreate Greater Syria (see Glossary). Even 
though it fought in alliance with the Muslims and leftists in the 
Civil War, its membership was primarily Christian and its politi- 
cal stance right wing; in fact, its red hurricane symbol was mo- 
deled after the Nazi swastika. The SSNP has a long history of 
terrorism and subversion in Lebanon. Saadah was executed by the 
Lebanese government in 1949, after launching an abortive coup 
attempt. The SSNP was active in the 1958 Civil War, where it 
fought on the pro-Western side. In December 1961, an SSNP 
armored battalion commander staged the Lebanese Army's only 
significant attempted coup d'etat against the government and 
managed to arrest a half-dozen high-ranking officers before he was 
stopped. During the 1975 Civil War, the SSNP fielded a militia 
of about 3,000 men. After the 1976 Syrian intervention, it split 
into anti-Syrian and pro-Syrian factions. The latter group report- 
edly assassinated Druze patriarch Kamal Jumblatt in 1977 and 
President-elect Bashir Jumayyil in 1982. Since March 1985, the 
SSNP has dispatched about a half-dozen suicide vehicle-bombers 
against Israeli positions in southern Lebanon. 

Amal 

The word for hope in Arabic, Amal is also an acronym for Afwaj 
al Muqawamah al Lubnaniyyah (Lebanese Resistance Detach- 
ments). Amal, with a strength of approximately 1,500 men, played 
only a marginal role in the 1975 Civil War. Nevertheless, many 
Shias (see Glossary) fought for other leftist organizations and were 
the cannon fodder of the Civil War. The Shia renaissance was ini- 
tiated by Imam Musa as Sadr, a charismatic Iranian religious figure 
of Lebanese ancestry who founded a husayniyyah (Shia religious site) 
in Sidon in 1959. In 1974, on the eve of the Civil War, Sadr es- 
tablished the Movement of the Disinherited to represent Shia inter- 
ests. In 1975, with the help of the Palestine Liberation Organization, 
he organized the Amal militia as the military arm of The Move- 
ment of the Disinherited. Sadr disappeared and was presumed mur- 
dered while on an official visit to Libya in August 1978, and 
leadership of Amal was assumed by Nabih Birri (also seen as Berri), 



241 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

a secular-oriented Beirut lawyer. In 1987 Birri continued to lead 
Amal, but several fundamentalist splinter groups had broken away 
from his organization. 

Communist Organizations 

The Lebanese Communist Party (LCP), led by George Hawi, 
had a membership of about 3,000, mainly Greek Orthodox and 
Armenian Orthodox. Its militia, the Popular Guard, played a sig- 
nificant role in the Civil War, fighting on the Muslim-leftist side 
despite its Christian membership. The Organization of Communist 
Action, a dissident, radical splinter group of the LCP, was led by 
Muhsin Ibrahim and had a membership of about 2,000. 

The Najjadah 

Led by Adnan Hakim, the Najjadah was established in the 1930s 
as a Sunni (see Glossary) Muslim counterpart of the Christian 
Phalange Party, although it was not as successful. Its militia num- 
bered about 300. 

The Lebanese Arab Army 

The establishment of the Lebanese Arab Army (LAA) was an- 
nounced on January 21, 1976, by Lieutenant Ahmad Khatib, a 
Sunni Muslim officer in the Lebanese Armed Forces. Khatib urged 
his fellow Muslims to mutiny and desert the army. Within several 
days, he rallied 2,000 soldiers, including the members of 40 tank 
crews, to his side. At the zenith of its power, the LAA controlled 
three-quarters of all army barracks and posts in Lebanon. 

The Baath (Arab Socialist Resurrection) Party 

Both the Syrian and the Iraqi governments were, and in 1987 
continued to be, run by rival wings of the pan- Arab socialist Baath 
Party, and each government supported a Lebanese branch. The 
pro-Iraqi branch in Lebanon was headed by Abdal Majid ar Rifai 
and fielded a militia of about 3,000 men. The pro-Syrian branch 
in Lebanon was headed by a Shia, Issam Qansuh, and had a militia 
of similar size. The two militias fought each other in proxy battles 
for their sponsors. 

Nasserite Organizations 

Several Nasserite organizations, which adhered to the socialist 
ideals of the late Egyptian president Gamal Abdul Nasser, fought 
in Lebanon's Civil War. The largest was the Independent 
Nasserite Movement led by Ibrahim Kulaylat. Its 3,000-man 
militia, the Murabitun (Sentinels), was one of the mainstays of the 



242 



Appendix B 



anti-establishment side. The Union of Toiling People's Forces, led 
by Kamal Shatila, was tied closely to Syria. Its 1 ,000-man militia, 
called the Firqat an Nasr (Victory Divisions), played an active part 
in the Civil War. Another group, the Nasserite Correctionist Move- 
ment, was led by Issam al Arab and had a militia called the Quwwat 
an Nasir (Nasser's Forces). The Popular Nasserite Forces (led by 
Mustafa Saad), the Arab Socialist Action Organization, and the 
24 October Movement were also active in the war. 

Palestinians 

Dozens of Palestinian military entities operated in Lebanon dur- 
ing and after the Civil War. Most of these groups were controlled 
by the mainstream, moderate Palestine Liberation Organization, 
which maintained its neutrality during the first year of the Civil 
War. Other groups in the radical Rejectionist Front fought on the 
Muslim-leftist side. Still others, such as Saiqa, the Arab Libera- 
tion Front, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine — 
General Command were essentially mercenary armies for foreign 
governments (Syria, Iraq, and Libya, respectively). About 25,000 
Palestinians were under arms during the Civil War. 

* * * 

Journalists and scholars have written extensively on the various 
militias that participated in the 1975 Civil War. Many of the sources 
used for the national security chapter were also used in the prepa- 
ration of Appendix B. Particularly useful are the works of John 
Bulloch, Marius Deeb, David Gilmour, David C. Gordon, Michael 
Jansen, Itamar Rabinovich, Jonathan C. Randal, and Ze'ev Schiff 
and Ehud Ya'ari. A report by Paul A. Jureidini, R.D. McLaurin, 
and James M. Price on military operations in urban terrain is also 
useful. In addition, the periodical Middle East Reporter frequently 
spotlights individual militias, providing information on a group's 
ideology, leadership, and combat capability. (For further informa- 
tion and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



243 



Bibliography 



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York: Holmes and Meier, 1984. 

Randal, Jonathan C. Going All the Way. New York: Viking Press, 
1983. 

Schiff, Ze'ev, and Ehud Ya'ari. Israel's Lebanon War. New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1984. 

Sivard, Ruth L. World Military and Social Expenditures, 1986. 
Washington: World Priorities, 1986. 

TWA Hijacking: A Chronology of Events. (Library of Congress, Con- 
gressional Research Service, No. 85-845-F.) July 1986. 

Tyler, Patrick. "Lebanon's Soldiers Fight for Militia," Washing- 
ton Post, March 5, 1985. 

United States. Department of Defense. Report of the DO D Commis- 
sion on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, 23 October 1983. 
Washington: GPO, December 20, 1983. 

. Department of State. Country Reports on Human Rights Prac- 
tices for 1986. (Report submitted to United States Congress, 100th, 
1st Session, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, and House 
of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs.) Washing- 
ton: GPO, February 1987. 

Weinberger, Naomi J. Syrian Intervention in Lebanon. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1986. 

Zamir, Meier. The Formation of Modern Lebanon. London: Croom 
Helm, 1985. 

Appendix B 

Bulloch, John. Death of a Country. London: Weidenfeld and 

Nicholson, 1977. 
. Final Conflict: The War in the Lebanon. London: Century, 

1983. 

Creed, John. "Lebanon." (Library of Congress, Congressional 
Research Service, Major Issues System, 85-885-F.) July 31, 
1985. 

Deeb, Marius. The Lebanese Civil War. New York: Praeger, 1980. 
Gilmour, David. Lebanon: The Fractured Country. New York: St. 

Martin's Press, 1983. 
Gordon, David C. Lebanon: The Fragmented Nation. London: Croom 

Helm, 1980. 

The Republic of Lebanon: Nation in Jeopardy. Boulder: West- 
view Press, 1983. 



260 



Bibliography 



Jansen, Michael. The Battle of Beirut. Boston: South End Press, 1983. 

Jureidini, Paul A., R.D. McLaurin, and James M. Price. Mili- 
tary Operations in Built Up Areas, 1975-78. (Technical Memoran- 
dum, No. 11-79.) Aberdeen, Maryland: United States Army, 
Human Engineering Laboratory, Aberdeen Proving Ground, 
June 1979. 

Norton, Augustus Richard. "Political Violence and Shi'a Faction- 
alism in Lebanon," Middle East Insight, 3, No. 2, 1983, 9-16. 

Rabinovich, Itamar. The War for Lebanon, 1970-1983. Ithaca: Cor- 
nell University Press, 1984. 

Randal, Jonathan C. Going All the Way. New York: Viking Press, 
1983. 

Ya'ari, Ehud. "Behind the Terror," Atlantic Monthly, June 1987, 
18-22. 



261 



Glossary 



barrels per day (bpd) — Production of crude oil and petroleum 
products is frequently measured in barrels per day. A barrel 
is a volume measure of forty-two United States gallons. Con- 
version of barrels to tons depends on the density of the special 
product. About 7.3 barrels of average crude oil weigh one ton. 
Heavy products would be about seven barrels per ton. Light 
products, such as gasoline and kerosene, would average close 
to eight barrels per ton. 

confessional, confessionalism — In its broadest sense, refers to ad- 
herence to a faith or religion, such as Christianity or Islam. 
In Lebanon, however, it more often connotes identification with 
narrower affiliations, such as sect or clan. Often used inter- 
changeably with sectarian. 

Druze(s) — Religious community generally considered to be Mus- 
lim but whose practices also contain elements of Christianity 
and paganism. The religion was brought to Lebanon around 
the eleventh century by Darazi (hence the name Druze), a dis- 
ciple of Al Hakim, the Fatimid caliph of Egypt who considered 
himself the final incarnation of God. The religion is secretive, 
and very few members are masters. The Druze community lives 
primarily in West Beirut, the Shuf Mountains, the Al Matn 
district and the regions around Hasbayya and Rashayya. 

Greater Syria — Term used by historians and others to designate 
the region that includes approximately the present-day states 
of Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, and Syria before those states were 
formed. 

Green Line — A no-man's-land created in Beirut during the 1975 
Civil War by the forward lines of advance of the contending 
forces. The vegetation that grew in this abandoned area gave 
rise to the name Green Line. In 1987 it still separated Christian 
East Beirut from Muslim West Beirut. 

Gross domestic product (GDP) — A value measure of the flow of 
domestic goods and services produced by an economy over a 
period of time, such as a year. Only output values of goods 
for final consumption and investment are included because the 
values of primary and intermediate production are assumed 
to be included in final prices. The word gross indicates that 
deductions for depreciation of physical assets have not been 
made. Because of the turmoil in Lebanon since 1975, GDP 
estimates are very imprecise. 



263 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

International Monetary Fund (IMF) — Established along with the 
World Bank (q.v.) in 1945, the IMF is a specialized agency 
affiliated with the United Nations and is responsible for stabiliz- 
ing international exchange rates and payments. The main bus- 
iness of the IMF is the provision of loans to its members 
(including industrialized and developing countries) when they 
experience balance of payments difficulties. These loans fre- 
quently carry conditions that require substantial internal eco- 
nomic adjustments by the recipients, most of which are 
developing countries. 

Lebanese pound (L£) — The unit of currency, which is divided into 
100 piasters. Before the outbreak of the 1975 Civil War, the 
pound was strong, and it required only L£2.3 to buy a United 
States dollar. During and immediately after the worst fight- 
ing, confidence in the pound dropped, but in 1982 the exchange 
rate was still fairly firm at L£3.81 to the dollar. During the 
chaos from 1983 to 1987, however, the pound rapidly depreciat- 
ed, so that by August 1987 it was nearly worthless, trading at 
more than L£250 to the dollar. 

Maronites — The largest Christian sect in Lebanon, the Maronite 
Church is one of a group of Christian churches known as 
Uniate, which are in full communion with the Holy See in 
Rome but are separately organized and adhere to an Eastern 
rite. Maronites settled in the mountains of northern Lebanon 
in the mid- seventh century; many continue to live there and 
in East Beirut. Maronites traditionally have looked to the West 
for cultural inspiration. Maronites tend to be better educated 
and wealthier than other segments of Lebanese society. By cus- 
tom, the president of the republic is a Maronite. 

Mount Lebanon — A term first used during the Ottoman era to 
designate the central part of the Lebanon Mountains inhabited 
mostly by Maronites and Druzes. After 1864 the area was ad- 
ministered as a separate entity and Christians prospered. Most 
of the region surrounding Mount Lebanon (often called sim- 
ply "the Mountain") was considered part of Greater Syria, 
an area that encompassed present-day Syria, Lebanon, Israel, 
and Jordan. In 1920, while under the French Mandate, parts 
of Greater Syria (q. v. ) were annexed to Mount Lebanon to cre- 
ate Greater Lebanon. This newly established territory even- 
tually became the present-day state of Lebanon. 

Phalange Party — Founded in 1936 by Pierre Jumayyil (also seen 
as Gemayel), the Phalange, or Phalanxes (Kataib in Arabic), 
was a mostly Maronite organization whose followers were 
known as Phalangists. Its policies were Western oriented and 



264 



Glossary 



right wing. Its powerful militia, which was supported by Israel, 
participated heavily on the Christian side in the 1975 Civil War. 
Beginning in the late 1970s, as its militia, led by Pierre's son 
Bashir, seized control of other Christian forces, it became known 
as the Lebanese Forces (LF). By the mid- to late 1980s, 
however, after Bashir's assassination and Pierre's death, 
Phalange power ebbed, and it lost control of the LF. 

Shia(s) — The largest Muslim sect in Lebanon. The word Shia comes 
from Shiat Ali, or party of Ali. Those who believed that Ali, 
Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law, should have succeeded 
the Prophet have come to be known as Shias. Those who 
thought that the successor should have been chosen by the com- 
munity came to be known as Sunnis (q. v.). This dispute created 
the first great division in Islam. Most Lebanese Shias are 
Twelver Shias (also known as Imami Shias), believing that the 
twelfth imam (divinely appointed religious leader) is in hiding 
and will reappear. Shias live in West Beirut and its southern 
suburbs, southern Lebanon, and in parts of the Biqa Valley. 
Shias have tended to have less education and to be poorer than 
most other segments of society. 

Shiite(s) — See Shia(s). 

Sunni(s) — The second largest Muslim sect in Lebanon. After 
Muhammad's death, those followers who supported a tradi- 
tional method of election based on community agreement be- 
came known as Sunnis; those who supported Ali as successor 
became known as Shias (q.v.). Sunnis primarily inhabit parts 
of West Beirut, the south-central coast, and the north. By cus- 
tom, the prime minister is a Sunni. 

World Bank — Informal name used to designate a group of three 
affiliated international institutions: the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International 
Development Agency (IDA), and the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC). The IBRD, established in 1945, has the 
primary purpose of providing loans to developing countries for 
productive projects. The IDA, a legally separate loan fund but 
administered by the staff of the IBRD, was set up in 1960 to 
furnish credits to the poorest developing countries on much 
easier terms than those of conventional IBRD loans. The IFC, 
founded in 1956, supplements the activities of the IBRD 
through loans and assistance designed specifically to encourage 
the growth of productive private enterprises in the less devel- 
oped countries. The president and certain senior officers of the 
IBRD hold the same positions in the IFC. The three institu- 
tions are owned by the governments of the countries that 



265 



Lebanon: A Country Study 

subscribe their capital. To participate in the World Bank group, 
member states must first belong to the International Mone- 
tary Fund (IMF— q. v.). 
zaim (pi. , zuama) — Believed to be a vestige of feudal times, the zaim 
(Arabic for leader) is a political leader, either an officeholder 
or a power broker, whose followers are usually of the same re- 
ligious sect. Within his district, the zaim is all powerful, and 
his clients promise electoral loyalty in exchange for favors. 



266 



Index 



Abbas, Abul, 8 
Abbasids, 8, 10, 12 
Abdallah, George Ibrahim, 227 
Abdallah clan, 227 
Abdul Hamid II, 17 
Abu Bakr, Caliph, 7 
Abu Haydar, Munir, 114 
Abu Nidal Organization, 201 
Abu Sharqa, Shaykh Muhammad, 66 
Achaemenids, 5 
Acre, 11, 13-14 
Acre Armistice, 19 
Ad Damur, 120, 190, 192 
ADF. See Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) 
Administration for Tobacco and Tom- 
bacs, 119 
administrative system, 20 
Agha Khan, 63 

agriculture, xvi, xxiii; in Biqa Valley, 44; 
effect of landholding shifts on, 118; im- 
pacts on crop production, 118 

Ahdab, Aziz, 191 

Ahmose I, 4 

AID. See United States Agency for Inter- 
national Development (AID) 
air traffic, 112-14 
airports, xvii, 112-14 
Akkar region, 56, 123 
Alamuddin, Najib, 112 
Al Ashrafiyah, 191, 199 
Alawi Muslims, 59, 64-65 
Al Biqa Province, 49, 56, 154, 199 
Alexander the Great, 5 
Al Fatah, 26, 36 
Al Fayadiyyah, 192, 221 
Al Hakim, Caliph, 10, 65 
Al Hirmil, 120 

Aljanub Province, 26, 49, 56, 118, 126, 
131, 154 

Allenby Street, 192 

Al Matn region, 65 

Al Qulayat, 225 

Al Walid, Khalid ibn, 7 

Amal {see also Islamic Amal; Islamic Jihad 
Organization): anti-Israel position of, 
161; anti-PLO position of, 160-61; 
effect of Iranian Revolution on, 208; ef- 
fect of political fragmentation in Leba- 



non on, 208; effect of presence of 
Pasdaran, 208; efforts to attract Leb- 
anese Shias, 176; establishment of, 160; 
evolution of philosophy of, 161; 
Husayn Suicide Commandos splinter, 
208; Islamic Jihad Organization 
splinter, 208-9; Jundallah (Soldiers of 
God) splinter, 208; Movement of the 
Disinherited militia, 241; reestablish 
Green Line, 212; rise of militia of, 145; 
Shia military force of, 35 

American University of Beirut (AUB), 
16, 75, 83-84 

Amin, Ibrahim al, 162 

Anderson, Terry, 229, 231 

An Nabatiyah at Tahta, 154 

An Naqurah, 196 

Antigonus I, 5 

Anti-Lebanon Mountains, 44-47 

Aoun, Michel. See Awn, Michel 

Arab, Issam al, 243 

Arab Democratic Party, 213 

Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) {see also 
Shtawrah Accord): role and activities 
of, 325, 193, 195; Syrian troops in, 172, 
195 

Arabic: official language of Lebanon, xxii, 
71-72, 143; unifying role in Arab 
world, 72 

Arab-Israeli War (1948), 173, 175, 185 

Arab-Israeli War (June 1967): effect on 
Lebanon of, 25 

Arab-Israeli War (October 1973), 25, 29 

Arab League: Arab Deterrent Force 
(ADF) of, 32; Cairo meeting (October 
1976), 31; Lebanon becomes member 
of, 21; Riyadh Conference (1976), 193 

Arab Liberation Front, 243 

Arab nationalists, 17 

Arab rule, 3,8, 10 

Arabs, 7, 53 

Arab Socialist Action Organization, 243 

Arab states: reconstruction aid to Leba- 
non after Civil War, 128-31 

Arafat, Yasir, 26, 28, 170, 201; in negoti- 
ations for Beirut 1982 cease-fire, 204; 
preference for Amin Jumayyil by, 36 

Arens, Moshe, 207-8 



267 



Lebanon: A Country Study 



Argov, Shlomo, 201 

armed forces (see also Lebanese Air Force; 
Lebanese Army; Lebanese Navy; 
militia), xviii, 184, 211; under New 
Defense Law, 220 

Armenian groups: Catholics, 71; lan- 
guage, 72-73; in Lebanon, 57, 70; Or- 
thodox members of Lebanese 
Communist Party (LCP), 242; Ortho- 
dox religion of, 69-70, 242; political 
parties, 166-67 

Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation 
of Armenia (ASALA), 167 

army. See Lebanese Army 

Arslan, Faysal, 165 

Arslan, Majid, 165 

Arslan family, 21, 145 

Asad family, 21, 145 

ASALA. See Armenian Secret Army for 
the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) 

Ash Shamal Province, 49, 56, 154 

Assad, Hafiz al, 33; position on Lebanon 
of, 172; preference for Amin Jumayyil 
by, 36 

Assyrian language, 73 

Assyrian religion, 70 

Assyrian rule, xxii, 3, 4 

At Tanzim, 240 

Austria, 14, 16 

aviation, 112-15 

Awn, Michel, xxiv, xxv, 212, 221-22 
Ayn al Hulwah (refugee camp), 202 
Ayn ar Rummanah, 50, 190 
Az Zahrani, xvii, 109, 125-26 



Baalbek, 49-50, 62, 208; base of Islamic 
Amal and Pasdaran in, 162 

Baath (Arab Socialist Resurrection) 
Party, 168, 242 

Babylonians, xxii, 3, 4, 5 

Bahais, 71 

balance of payments: in 1985, 96; in 

mid-1980s, 97 
balancing principle, 140 
Bank Al Mashrek, 102-3, 105 
banking {see also Central Bank; Intra 

Bank) domestic, xxiii, 89-92, 

101-5; international, xxiii, 96, 103, 

105-6 
barley production, 120 
Bashir II, 13-14 
Bashir III, 14 



Battle of Yarmuk, 7-8 

Bayhum family, 62 

Bayrut Province, 154 

Beaufort Castle, 202 

Begin, Menachem: perception of Chris- 
tians and Maronites, 195; promise of 
defense of Lebanon, 199-200; 
promises to defend Lebanon against 
Syria, 199 

Beirut (see also Green Line) xvii, 3, 7, 11, 
16, 42, 111; as capital of Greater 
Lebanon, 18; demographic expansion in, 
49, 52; at end of Civil War (1976), 32; 
as health care center, 84; as model city, 
xxi; partition by Green Line of, 32, 50, 
192, 207, 212; population distribution of, 
49; reconstruction in 1982 of, 207; siege 
of, 80, 204-6; Sunnis in, 62; violence 
under Bikfayya Agreement in, 213 

Beirut, East: Christian enclave, 50, 215; 
fighting in (1989), xxv; Israeli intelli- 
gence in, 195; Maronite enclave, 67 

Beirut, West: clashes (1981-82), 35; fight- 
ing in (1989), xxv; Muslim enclave, 50, 
215 

Beirut Arab University, 83 
Beirut-Damascus highway, 15, 106-7, 

202, 203, 210 
Beirut International Airport, xvii, 25 
belt of misery, 41, 50 
Ben-Gurion, David, 194 
Berri, Nabih. See Birri, Nabih 
Bikfayya Agreement (1985), 212 
Biqa Valley, 10, 11, 14, 43, 44, 46-47; 

agricultural production in, 44, 120; 

Syrian controlled, 208, 222; watering 

of, 47 

Birri, Nabih, 161, 173, 209, 241-42 
Bizri family, 62 
Brillant, Michel, 230 
Britain, 14, 16 

British Bank of the Middle East, 106 
Buckley, William, 230 
budget deficit, 97 

bureaucracy: influence of militia and 
zuama on, 153-54; local administration 
and, 153-54 

Burj al Barajinah (refugee camp), 216 

Bustani, Emile, 21, 151 

Bustani, General Emil, 26 

Bustani, Mirna, 151 

Byblos (formerly Gubla), 3-4, 7 

Byzantine Empire, 7 



268 



Index 



cabinet {see also Council of Ministers; mili- 
tary cabinet), 18, 148-49 

Cairo Agreements (1969 and 1976), 26, 
31-32, 34, 175, 186; control of guer- 
rilla activity under, 28; effect on PLO 
of, 26, 187; invoked by PLO, 197 

Cambyses, 5 

Canaanites, 3 

cantonization, 141, 155, 181-82 

car bombings, 36, 210 

Carthage, 4 

Casino du Liban, 98 

Catholics. See Armenian groups; 
Chaldean Catholics; Greek Catholics; 
Roman Catholics 

Catroux, General Georges, 19 

CDR. See Council for Development and 
Reconstruction (CDR) 

cement industry, 124-25 

census of 1932, xvii, xxiii, 48, 140 

Central Bank: establishment and function 
of, 101; foreign assets in, 97; Intra 
Bank controversy of, 102-3; and pub- 
lic debt controversy, 103-5, 123 

Chaldean Catholics, 71 

Chamber of Deputies, xxiii-xxiv, 18, 
149-52; ends French mandate, 20; in- 
significant role in politics of, 149-50; 
role in electing president, 146; speaker 
of, 21 

Chamoun, Camille. See Shamun, Camille 

Chamseddine, Shaykh. See Shams ad Din, 
Shaykh Muhammad Mahdi 

Chehab, Fuad. See Shihab, Fuad 

child-rearing, 77-78 

Christians, 8, 10, 14-16, 17; conflict with 
Druzes, 14-16; disproportionate polit- 
ical power, 141; distribution among 
fighting groups in Civil War (1975), 
239-40, 242; effect of Shuf Mountains 
war on, 210-11; in Lebanese Army, 
224; in Lebanese Navy, 225; relations 
with Israel of, 195-96; supported by 
Syria in Civil War (1975-76), 31; vio- 
lence in Beirut among (1985), 214; 
weapons supplies from Israel to, 194 

Circassians, 71 

cities: population influx, 50; population of, 
49-50; religious distribution in, 49-50 
citrus fruit production, 119-20 
civil code: improved under French Man- 
date, 20; sectarian nature for personal 
status, 55-56 



Civil Service (see also bureaucracy), 139 
Civil War (1958), 24, 143, 185-86; 
Phalange Party in, 157; Progressive So- 
cialist Party in, 165; United States in, 
176, 186 

Civil War (1975), 29-32, 94, 143; effect 
on economy of, 94-95; Guardians of 
the Cedars in, 240; impact on family 
of, 78-81; impact on office of president, 
147; Independent Nasserite Movement 
(INM), 164, 215; issues unresolved, 
181, 211; Lebanese Front in, 30, 36, 
154-55; Lebanese National Movement 
in, 30, 154-55; Mountain War as con- 
tinuation of, 211; National Liberal 
Party in, 158; opposing coalitions in, 
239; Phalange Party in, 157-58, 
190-91 , 239; Progressive Socialist Party 
in, 165, 240-41; Soviet Union in, 177; 
start of, 29; Syrian role in, 172; United 
States in, 177 

clans. See family networks; zuama clien- 
telism 

climate, xvi, 45-47 

coalition (see also Lebanese Front; Leb- 
anese National Movement), impor- 
tance in political system of, 154 

Collet, Alec, 230 

commonality: Arabic language as symbol 
of, 71-72; within family networks, 21, 
56-57; of national loyalty, 92; with 
Syria, 171 

compressed wood industry, 123 

confessional system (see also sectarianism): 
communities of, xxii-xxiii, 42, 55-56; 
continuation to present of, 42; outlined 
in National Pact, 143-44; of personal 
status laws, 55-56; principle of balanc- 
ing in, 140; specified in National Pact 
of 1943, 140 

conscription: Law of Service to the Flag, 
218; practiced by Lebanese Forces 
(LF), 239 

consensus: to implement change in sys- 
tem of representation, 151-52; lacking 
on national issues, 42; of sectarianism 
in office of president, 147 

Constantinople, 7, 10, 13 

Constitution: amendments to, 19-20, 
142-43; contradictions in, 142; first 
Lebanese (1926), 18-19, 140; history 
of, 141-42; legitimizes National Pact, 
141; principles of, xvii, 141-43 



269 



Lebanon: A Country Study 



Constitutional Document, 172 
Constitution of 1926, 18-19, 140; speci- 
fied in National Pact of 1943, 140 
Consultative Council, 162 
Copts, 71 

Council for Development and Recon- 
struction (CDR), 94, 128-32 

Council of Ministers, 18, 143 

Council of State, 152 

courts, 152, 226 

Crete, 4 

crime, 226 

Crusades, 10-11, 12 

currency value, xvii, 89, 90-91, 96, 104, 
119 

current account, 97 
custom duties, 97-98, 100 
Cyprus, 4, 111 
Cyrus, 5 



Dabbas, Charles, 18 

Daud, Daud, 161 

Dauq family, 62 

Dawah (Call) Party, 208 

Dayan, Moshe, 194 

Dayr al Qamar, 210 

de Gaulle, General Charles, 19 

de Martel, Comte Damien, 19 

debt, external, 98 

deficit, public, xxiii, 96, 97, 103-5 

Democratic Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine, 170 

demographics: of Beirut, 49; characteris- 
tics, 49-50; lack of official statistics for 
analysis of, 48 

Dentz, General Henri-Fernand, 19 

Deuxieme Bureau, 186, 187, 221 

Directorate of Posts, Telephone, and 
Telegraph, 115 

Directorate of Waqfs, 61 

displacement of population, 51, 52 

divisive forces, xxi-xxii 

Dodge, David, 229 

Double Qaimaqamate, 15, 140 

Douglas, John, 230 

drug economy, 120, 122 

Druze militia (see also Progressive Socialist 
Party): in Lebanese Army, 224-25; in 
Shuf Mountains war, 210-11 

Druzes, 10, 12, 17; conflict with Chris- 
tians, 14-16, 53; in National Salvation 
Front (1983), 209; offshoot of Ismaili 



Islam, 65-66; in Progressive Socialist 
Party, 165 

EC. See European Community (EC) 

economic development and recovery, 94 

economy (see also banking, Central Bank) 
xxiii; in 1987, 92-93; benefits from in- 
creased security, 89-90; effect of sec- 
tarianism on, 53; failure to function 
efficiently, xxiii; fragmentation of, 89; 
official, 89; pre-Civil War (1975), 93 

Edde, Emile. See Iddi, Emile 

education, xvi, 16, 81-84; arguments 
over questions of curriculum, 55; 
higher, 83-84; intermediate, 82; 
primary, 81-82; secondary, 82; tech- 
nical and vocational, 82-83 

Egyptian rule (1832-40), xxii, 4, 139 

Eid, Nassib, 224 

Eisenhower, Dwight D., 176 

Eisenhower Doctrine, 23 

Eitan, Rafael, 200 

election system: interruption of, 150; in- 
trasectarian nature of, 150 

electric power (see also oil industry): de- 
pendence on oil for, 125; effect of war 
on generation of, 125-27 

Electricity of Lebanon, 125 

emigration, 16, 50, 52; among religious 
groups, 50; of Jews, 71 

English language, 73 

Esarhaddon, 4 

Eternit Libanaise, 124 

ethnic groups (see also Arabs; Armenian 
groups; Jews in Lebanon; Kurds): 
xxvii, 57 

European Community (EC), 126, 134 
European Investment Bank, 130 

Fadlallah, Shaykh Muhammad Husayn, 

63, 161-62 
Fakhr ad Din I, 12 
Fakhr ad Din II, 12-13, 183 
Fakhu, Faysal, 167 

family (see also child-rearing; marriage 
customs): effect of Civil War on struc- 
ture of, 78-79; structure and customs 
in, 73-74, 75, 76, 77-78 

family networks, 21, 56-57, 145 

Farrash, Husayn, 231 

Fatahland, 32 

Fatamids, 8 



270 



Index 



Firqat an Nasr, 243 

foreign domination, 183 

foreign interests in Lebanon. See Britain; 
France; Iran; Israel; Soviet Union; 
Syria; Turkey; United States 

foreign intervention, 141, 171-73, 182, 
183, 192-93 

foreign relations, xviii, 170-71; with Iran, 
176; with Syria, 171-73; with United 
States, 176-77 

foreign trade, xxiii, 3, 10, 11-12, 42, 93, 
95; in cement, 124; with Syria, 171 

fragmentation: economic, 89; political, 29 

France (see also Vichy government): 
Crusaders' interest in Lebanon, 11; end 
of Mandate of, 20; forms Levantine 
Special Forces, 184; influence under 
Mandate of, 61; interest in Lebanon, 
16; Mandate for Greater Lebanon 
(1920-43), xxii, 3, 14, 18-21, 41, 140, 
142 

Franco-Lebanese Treaty (1946), 21 
Franjieh, Sulayman. See Franjiyah, 
Sulayman 

Franjiyah, Sulayman, 26, 28-29, 199, 
209; actions in 1975 Civil War, 189; 
administration of, 26-29, 30, 94, 187; 
interest in Marada Brigade, 240 

Franjiyah, Tony, 199 

Franjiyah family, 21 

Free Lebanon Army (see also South Leb- 
anon Army), 174, 196, 217 

French language, 73 

Front for Progressive Parties and National 
Forces. See Lebanese National Move- 
ment 



GDP. See gross domestic product 
Geagea, Samir. .S^Jaja, Samir 
Gemayel, Pierre. See Jumayyil, Pierre 
General Administration Department, 220 
geography, xxii, 3, 42-45 
Ghandur family, 62 
Ghanim, Iskandar, 188 
Glass, Charles, 229, 231 
Good Fence policy, 34, 196 
Gouraud, General Henri, 18 
government, central, xvii 
Greater Lebanon, 14, 18, 41, 171 
Greater Syria, xxii, 14, 42, 140, 169, 171 
Greco-Persian War, 5 
Greek Catholics, 10, 16, 68 



Greek civilization in Lebanon, xxii, 3, 5 
Greek Orthodox, 16, 17, 69, 242 
Green Line, 32, 50; barricades down at, 
207; origin of, 192; reestablished by 
Shia Amal, 212 
Green Plan land reclamation project, 117 
Gregorians. See Armenian Orthodox 
gross domestic product (GDP), xvi, 90, 93 
Guardians of the Cedars, 240 
Gubla Qubayl), 3-4 
guerrilla tactics (see also Palestinian guer- 
rillas): Lebanese government attempts 
to curtail, 26; of Palestinians, 25-26, 
28-29; of Amal, 202, 214 

Habib, Philip, 207; averts Israeli air 
strike, 200; negotiates cease-fire be- 
tween Israel and PLO, 201; negotiates 
cease-fire in 1982 war, 204 

Haddad, Saad, 119, 174; Christian militia 
leader, 34-35; dies (1984), 213; "Free 
Lebanon" buffer area of, 34, 196-97; 
relation with Israel of, 174 

Hajj, Fahim al, 225 

Hakim, Adnan, 242 

Hakim, Nadim al, 211, 213 

Halat, xvii, 114, 225 

Hamada family, 21 

Hamadi, Abdul Hadi, 230 

Hamadi, Muhammad Ali, 230 

Hammud, Mahir, 164 

Hariri, Rafiq, 125 

hashish production, xxiii, 120, 122 

Hawi, George, 169, 242 

Hawi, William, 239 

health (see also medical services; public 
health): xvi 

Helou, Charles. See Hilu, Charles 

Higher Shia Islamic Council, 63, 160 

Hilu, Charles, 28, 146; administration of, 
25-26, 94, 186 

Hirst, David, 231 

Hizballah (Party of God): established as 
Shia organization, 161; Fadlallah as 
spiritual leader of, 63, 161 ; follows the- 
ology of Khomeini, 162; headquarters 
attacked by Syrian troops, 218; hijack 
TWA airliner, 228; link to Iran of, 1 76; 
purported leaders of, 162-63; splinter 
of Amal, 208; Syria curbs activities of, 
213; theological foundation of, 162 

Hobeika, Elie. See Hubayka, Elie 



271 



Lebanon: A Country Study 



Holy Spirit University, 67 

Hoss, Salim al. See Huss, Salim al 

hostages, Western: purported holders of, 

227; Syrian promise to help secure 

release of, 218 
hostage-taking, 229 

Hubayka, Elie, 159-60, 173, 206, 215, 
216 

Hunchak Party, 166 

Husayn Suicide Commandos, 208 

Husayni, Husayn, 161 

Huss, Salim al, 32, 35, 134; forms own 

cabinet (1988), xxiv 
Hussein (king of Jordan), 187 
Husseini, Husayn. See Husayni, Husayn 
Hyksos, 4 
hyperinflation, 96 



Ibrahim, Muhsin, 170, 242 

Ibrahim Pasha, 14 

Iddi, Emile, 18-19 

IDF. See Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 

Imami Shias. See Twelver Shias 

immigrants, 52-53, 175 

independence, 19-21, 184 

Independent Nasserite Movement 
(INM), 164, 215; formation and power 
of, 164; Murabitun militia of, 164 

industrial capacity, 123 

industry, xvi, xxiii, 121-27 

inflation {see also hyperinflation), 28, 96, 
99-100 

INM. See Independent Nasserite Move- 
ment (INM) 
Inspectorate General, 220 
Internal Security Force, 189, 218 
International Monetary Fund, 98, 130 
Intra Bank (later Intra Investment Com- 
pany), 101-2 
Intra Investment Company, 98, 102-3, 
114 

investment, 123-24, 126 

IPC. See Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) 

Iran, 24; Ismaili Muslims in, 63; relations 

with Lebanon of, 176; sends Pasdaran 

volunteers to Lebanon, 208; ties of 

Hizballah with, 162 
Iranian Revolution (1979), 208 
Iraq: revolution in, 23; supports a 

Lebanese branch of Baath Party, 242 
Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC), xvii, 127 
irrigation, 115, 117 



Islam: in areas around Lebanon, 7; Sunni 
and Shia as major divisions of, 61; 
tenets of, 59-61 

Islamic Amal: link with Iranian govern- 
ment through Pasdaran, 162; splinter 
of Amal, 208 

Islamic Grouping, 61-62, 163 

Islamic Jihad Organization, 176; splinter 
of Amal, 208-9; terrorist tactics of, 227 

Islamic Unification Movement (Tawhid), 
213 

Ismaili Muslims {see also Druzes): Shia 
sect known as, 59, 63-64 

Israel: actions after 1978 invasion of 
Lebanon, 196-97; air strike against pro- 
Syrian forces, 200; attacks in Lebanon 
of, 26, 28; effect of raid on Beirut In- 
ternational Airport, 25; gains from 1982 
offensive, 205-6; intelligence in East 
Beirut, 195; interference in shipping by, 
111-12; Iron Fist policy of, 214; lead- 
ers plan to intervene in Lebanon, 194; 
leaves Lebanon in 1984, 111; Lebanon's 
opposition to establishment of, 173; mili- 
tary supplies to Lebanon, 194-95; Oper- 
ation Litani, 196; Red Line policy of, 
194; relations with Haddad's South Leb- 
anon Army, 196; relations with Leb- 
anese Christian community, 194; 
relations with Lebanon of, 173-74; siege 
of Beirut by, 204; transfers Lebanese 
prisoners to Israel, 214 

Israel Defense Forces (IDF), 163-64; ac- 
tions of Operation Peace for Galilee 
(1982), 201-6; against PLO invaders, 
196; defends Maronite community, 
199; invasion of Lebanon by, 35, 95, 
173; offensive against PLO, 201; role 
in Lebanon after 1982 offensive, 206-8; 
withdrawal, 210, 213-14 

Israeli invasion (1978), 174, 182 

Israeli invasion (1982) {see also Operation 
Peace for Galilee), xxi; Arab states' 
reaction to, 129-30; cease-fire, 203, 
204, 211; effect on agriculture, 118-19; 
effect on Amal, 208; effect on economy 
of, 95; effect on PLO of cease-fire, 201; 
impact of, xxi, 174; opposition by Syria 
for, 173; role of Independent Nasserite 
Movement in, 164; role of Progressive 
Socialist Party in, 165 

Israeli raids: against Palestinian guerrilla 
activity, 26, 28, 188 



272 



Index 



Jabal Amil Province, 41, 154 
Jabal Lubnan Province, 154 
jabaliyyun, 44 
Jabar, Lufti, 223 
Jacobites, 69 
Jacobsen, David, 231 
Jaja, Samir, xxv, 215-17; leader of Leb- 
anese Forces (LF), 160 
Jamal Pasha, 17 
Jazzin, 47, 202, 214 
Jenco, Lawrence M., 231 
Jet Holdings, 114 

Jews in Lebanon, 57, 70-71; hostility 
toward, 71 

Jisr, Muhammad al, 19 

Jisr family, 62 

Jubayl, 3, 106, 115 

Judicial Council, 152 

judicial system, 20, 150-53, 226 

Jumayyil, Amin, 37, 74, 90, 96, 130, 134, 
158, 173, 174; abrogates the May 17 
Agreement (1985), 212; against Tripar- 
tite Agreement, 216; appoints Awn, 
xxiv; budget of administration of 
(1987), 100; cost of Shuf Mountains 
war for, 211; inherits family political 
role, 145; National Salvation Front chal- 
lenge to, 209; succeeds assassinated 
brother, 206 

Jumayyil, Bashir, 33, 36-37, 141, 157, 
158-59, 162, 172, 174; asks Israel for 
military aid, 194-95; attempts to get 
Israel into war with Syria, 199-200; as 
example of new social stratum, 57; 
heads Lebanese Forces (LF), 239; as 
president of Lebanon, 205-6; rise to 
power of, 198-200; strengthens leader- 
ship of Maronites, 199 

Jumayyil, Pierre, 22, 29, 74, 155, 157, 
158; effect of death of, 213; founder of 
Phalange Party, 155, 239; interest in 
Israeli offer of intervention, 194 

Jumayyil family, 21 

Jumblatt, Kamal, 21, 29, 154; as leader 
of Lebanese National Movement, 30, 
240; leader of Progressive Socialist 
Party, 164-65; and Lebanese Com- 
munist Party (LCP), 168; opposes Sha- 
mun, 22 

Jumblatt, Walid, 165, 173, 209, 240; in- 
herits family political role, 145 
Jumblatt family, 21. 66 
Junblatt, Kamal. Jumblatt, Kamal 



Jundallah (Soldiers of God), 208 
Juniyah, 98, 106-7, 111-12, 225 
Jurayj, Jubran, 170 

Kahan Commission, 206 

Kanaan, Ghazi, 218 

Kanaan, Khalil, 223 

Kanj, Abd al Halim, 223 

Kanj, Zuhayr, 164 

Karamah, Elie, 158 

Karami, Rashid, 29, 104, 134, 148, 209, 

212, 226 
Karami family, 21, 62 
Karantina, 190-92 
Kasrawan region, 11, 15 
Kassis, Salim, 224 
Kataib. See Phalange Party 
Khaldah, 210 

Khalid, Shaykh Hasan, 61, 163 
khamsin, 45-46 

Khatib, Ahmad, 31, 191, 242 

Khaybar Brigades, 71 

Khomeini, Ayatollah Sayyid Ruhollah 
Musavi, 162 

Khoury, Bishara. See Khuri, Bishara al 

Khuri, Bishara al, 18, 19, 143, 185; ad- 
ministration of, 21-22; and Rosewater 
Revolution, 22, 185 

Khuri, Victor al, 218 

Khuri family, 21 

Kilburn, Peter, 230 

Kufur Front. See Lebanese Front 

Kulaylat, Ibrahim, 164, 215, 242 

Kurdish political parties, 167 

Kurds, 57, 62 

LAA. See Lebanese Arab Army (LAA) 
labor force: in agriculture, service sector 

and industry, 80; emigration, 52; 

women's participation in, 80 
Lahad, Antoine, 213 
lakes, 47-48 

land: policy and use, 115, 116-17; tenure 

system, 117 
landholders, 117-18 
languages, xvi, 71-73 
Law of Service to the Flag, 218 
LCP, See Lebanese Communist Party 

(LCP) 

League of Arab States. See Arab League 
League of Nations, 14, 41, 140, 141-42, 
184 



273 



Lebanon: A Country Study 



Lebanese Air Force, xviii, 225 
Lebanese- Americans, 176 
Lebanese Arab Army (LAA), 31 
Lebanese Armed Forces, xxiv 
Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction, 
227 

Lebanese Army: against PLO, 188; 
allocation and disposition of brigades 
of (1987), 222-23; at beginning of Civil 
War (1975), 189; development and role 
of, 183-85; disintegration in Civil War 
(1975), 191; encounters with Arab De- 
terrent Force (ADF), 33; factional di- 
vision in, 30-31; fights Palestinians 
(1969), 186-87; history of, 183-84, 
217; losses in siege of Beirut, 205; role 
in Arab-Israeli War (1948), 185-86; 
role in Civil War (1975), 239; role in 
Israeli raids (1973), 188; role in poli- 
tics of, 184-85; in Shuf Mountains war, 
210-11; South Lebanon Army splinter 
of, 196 

Lebanese Army Modernization Program, 
219 

Lebanese Cement Company, 124 

Lebanese Christians: emigration com- 
pared to other groups of, 16, 50; fear 
of Turkish policies, 17; position on 
presence of Palestinians in Lebanon, 25 

Lebanese Communist Party (LCP), 
168-69, 188-89, 242 

Lebanese Forces (LF), 215, 239; estab- 
lishment and power of, 158-60; formal 
name of Phalangist militia, 239; oper- 
ating illegal Beirut port, xxv; port con- 
trol and revenue collection by, 100 

Lebanese Front, 154-55; coalition in Civil 
War (1975), 239; groups in Civil War 
of 1975-76, 30; internal disagreements 
of, 36 

Lebanese National Movement, 30-31, 
154-55, 239; established by Kamal 
Jumblatt, 188; Lebanese Arab Army 
(LAA) joins, 31; Syria against, 31 

Lebanese National Resistance Front, 213 

Lebanese Navy, xviii, 225-26 

Lebanese University, 83 

Lebanon: added to Roman Empire, 7; 
formation of, 41; link with Syria of, 
xxii; separated from Syria (1861), 16 

Lebanon Mountains, 44 

Lebanonization, xxi 

legislature. See Chamber of Deputies 



Levantine Special Forces (Troupes 

Speciales du Levant), 184 
Levin, Jeremy, 230 
LF. See Lebanese Forces (LF) 
Likud Party, Israel, 195 
literacy rate, xvi, 81 
living conditions, prewar and war time, 

79-81 

London Treaty (1840), 14 

Maan family, 12-13 
majlis, 15 
Mamluks, 11-12 

Marada Brigade: pro-Syrian Christian 
militia, 172, 199; role in Civil War 
(1975), 240 

Marada incursions, 8 

Maronite archdioceses and dioceses, 67 

Maronite Christians, 8, 10-11, 14, 16-17; 
Begin perception of, 195; communion 
with Roman Catholic Church, 66; con- 
flict with Druzes, 53; fear of Muslim 
dominance, 195; in Lebanese Air Force 
and Navy, 225; in Lebanese Army, 
223; tenets of religion of, 66-68 

marriage customs, 75-77, 78 

Martyrs' Day, 18 

May 17 Agreement, 173; effect of abro- 
gation (1985) of, 212; between Israel 
and Lebanon, 209 

Mayhayri, Issam, 170 

medical services, 84-85 

Mediterranean Refining Company, 126 

Melchites, 10 

Melkart Agreement, 188 

Middle East Airlines (MEA), 112-14, 186 

migration (see also displacement of popu- 
lation), 50-52; effect of, 41; precipitated 
by war, 26, 51-52; from rural areas, 50 

Mihhu, Jamil, 167 

military budget, 184, 222 

Military Bureau, 220 

military cabinet, 189 

Military Council, 220-21 

military government, interim, xxiv 

militia, armed (see also Lebanese Forces 
(LF)), xviii, xxiv; of Amal, 161; assum- 
ing government functions, 89, 97, 100; 
coalition among, 154-55; development 
by zuama of, 144-45; effect of presence 
of, 141; effect on Ministry of Justice, 
152-53; force cantonization, 155; 



274 



Index 



influence on bureaucracy of, 153-54; 
Lebanese Forces (LF), 158-60, 239; 
Muslim, 191; role of Amal and Hizbal- 
lah as, 145-46; support by Israel of 
Christian, 34 

millet system, 10 

Ministry of Defense, 220-21 

Ministry of Education, 83 

Ministry of Finance, 100, 129, 134, 154 

Ministry of Interior, 154 

Ministry of Public Health, 84 

Ministry of State for the South and 
Reconstruction, 149 

Ministry of Transport, 114 

missile crisis, 34, 200 

MNF. See Multinational Force (MNF) 

MNF II. See Multinational Force II 
(MNF II) 

modernization, 41, 80 

Mongols, 11 

Mossad, 194 

Mountain War (1983-84) (see also Shuf 
Mountains region), xxi, 210-11; role 
of United States in, 177 

Mount Lebanon, xxii, 14, 31, 41, 44, 
139, 159 

Movement of the Disinherited, 241 
Movement of Lebanese Socialists. See Or- 
ganization of Communist Action (OCA) 
Muawiyah, Caliph, xxii, 8 
Muez-Aibak, 11 

Mughniyyah, Imad: connected to Islamic 
Jihad Organization and Hizballah, 
227, 230; reported leader of Islamic 
Jihad, 208-9 

Multinational Force (MNF), 131, 133, 
173, 174; action in siege of Beirut, 
204-5; implications under May 17 
Agreement for, 210; withdrawal from 
Lebanon (1983) of, 133, 212 

Multinational Force II (MNF II), 206-7 

Munif Pasha, 17 

Muqaddam family, 62 

Murabitun militia, 242-43; of Indepen- 
dent Nasserite Movement, 164; rout of, 
215, 216 

Murrawwah, Karim, 169 

Musa, Al Ashraf, 11 

Musawi, Abbas al, 162 

Musawi, Husayn al: connected to Islamic 
Jihad Organization, 227; leader in 
Hizballah and Islamic Amal, 162-63; 
leader of Islamic Amal, 208 



musharaka, 147 

Muslims (see also Alawi Muslims): ask 
for increased representation, xxiv; 
distribution among fighting groups 
in Civil War (1975), 240-43; sects, 
61-65 

mutasarrif, 16-17, 140, 183 

mutasarrifiyah, 16, 41 

Naccache, Alfred. See Naqqash, Alfred 

Naccash, Alfred. See Naqqash, Alfred 

Nairn, Edmond, 97, 102, 124 

Najjadah, 242 

Napoleon, 13-14 

Naqqash, Alfred, 19 

narcotics industry, 120-21 

Nasir, Mustafa, 212 

Nasrallah, Hasan, 162 

Nasser, Gamal Abdul, 23, 55 

Nasserite Correctionist Movement, 243 

National Bloc Party, 26 

National Cotton Mill, 123 

National Covenant. See National Pact 

National Liberal Party (NLP), 240; 
Tigers militia of, 158 

nationalization of industry, 127 

National Pact (1943), xxiii, 20-21, 22, 29, 
140; basis for foreign relations before 
1975, 170-71; effect of sanction by 
Constitution, 141, 142; formal an- 
nouncement and effect of, 143-44; as 
means to reduce Christian-Muslim di- 
vision, 55, 143-44; representation 
based on 1932 census, 140-41; unwrit- 
ten agreement between Christians and 
Muslims, 20, 143 

National Salvation Front (NSF) coalition, 
209 

national security, xxiv, 181 
National Security Council, 212 
National Waste Management Plan, 132 
Nebuchadnezzar, 5 

Nestorian Church. See Assyrian religion 
New Defense Law (1979), 219-20 
Njaim, Jean, 26 

NLP. See National Liberal Party (NLP) 
NSF. See National Salvation Front 
(NSF) 



OCA. See Organization of Communist 

Action (OCA) 
October 1973 War, 29 
Ohannes Pasha, 17 



275 



Lebanon: A Country Study 



oil industry: finance and irregularity of 
supplies, 126; nationalization of Tripoli 
refinery, 127; revenues from, 93-94 
OPEC. See Organization of Petroleum 

Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
Operation Litani, 195-96 
Operation Peace for Galilee, 201 
opium production, xxiii, 121 
Order of Maronite Monks, 240 
Organization for the Defense of Free Peo- 
ple, 229 

Organization of Communist Action 
(OCA) {see also Democratic Front for 
the Liberation of Palestine), 168, 170, 
242 

Organization of the Oppressed of the 
Earth, 71 

Organization of Petroleum Exporting 

Countries (OPEC), 93, 128-31 
Organization of Socialist Lebanon. See 

Organization of Communist Action 

(OCA) 
Ottoman Empire, 16 
Ottoman rule {see also Turkish occupation, 

World War I), xxii, 3, 10, 12,16, 139- 

40, 183 



Padfield, Philip, 230 

Palestine Liberation Army (PLA), 30-31; 
transformed in standing army, 201 

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 
{see also Al Fatah): 26; activities in Leb- 
anon of, 175; activity in Jordan (1970), 
187; areas of control in 1987, 175; buys 
arms from North Korea and Eastern 
European countries, 201; transformed 
into standing army, 201 

Palestinian forces: in Civil War (1975), 
243; losses in Israeli offensive, 205 

Palestinian guerrillas: attacks from Leba- 
non, 173, 175; effect of presence in Leb- 
anon of, 25-26, 28, 173; expulsion from 
Jordan of, 52; struggle against Israel of, 
25-26, 28-29, 182 

Palestinian refugee camps {see also Burj al 
Barajinah refugee camp; Sabra refugee 
camp; Shatila refugee camp; Tall Zatar), 
30, 52-53, 174, 175, 188, 193, 202; 
Burj al Barajinah, Sabra, and Shatila 
massacres, 206, 216; function in Israeli 
1982 offensive, 202 

Palestinian Resistance Movement, 28 



Palestinians: effect of influx to Lebanon 
of, 187-88; effect of presence in Leba- 
non of, 25, 175; refuge in Lebanon of, 
52-53, 175 

pan-Arabism, 22-23, 55 

parliament. See Chamber of Deputies 

partition {see also Double Qaimaqamate; 
Green Line): in 1842, 14-15; in 1984, 
96; origin of Green Line (1976), 192 

Party of God. See Hizballah (Party of 
God) 

Pasdaran (Iranian Revolutionary 
Guards): headquarters in Lebanon of, 
120, 208; Iran sends volunteers to Leb- 
anon, 208; in Lebanon, 120, 176; link 
with Islamic Amal, 162; Syria curbs ac- 
tivities of, 213 

patronage. See family networks; zuama 
clientelism 

Pax Romana, 7 

peacekeeping forces, 89, 196-97; in Leb- 
anon after Israeli 1982 offensive, 182, 
205-8 

Persian Empire, xxii, 3, 5 

Personnel Law of 1959, 153 

Phalange Party, 22, 24, 29, 35-36; armed 
militia of, 157; in Civil War (1975), 
157; founding and philosophy of, 155; 
growth of power in 1958 and 1975 Civil 
Wars, 157-58; role in 1975 Civil War, 
190-91, 239 

Phalangist militia: called Lebanese Forces 
(LF), 239; decimate Tigers, 199; mas- 
sacre at Palestinian refugee camp by, 
206; in Shuf Mountains war, 210-11; 
training in Israel of, 195 

Phoenicians, xxii, 3-7 

pipelines, xvii, 126 

PLA. See Palestine Liberation Army 
(PLA) 

PLO. See Palestine Liberation Organiza- 
tion (PLO) 
police, xviii, 226 

political nature of religious conflict, 22, 47 
political parties, 17; dependence on sec- 
tarianism, 154; ideology as basis for 
some, 155; lack of significance of, 150; 
multisectarian, 167-70; sectarian com- 
position of, 56-57 
political system, xviii; in 1987, 139; ef- 
fect of sectarianism on, 53; history of 
multisectarianism, 139-40; importance 
of coalition in, 154; inadequacies of, 29; 



276 



Index 



Maronites in, 68; role of zuama in, 
56-57, 139, 140, 144-46, 150 

Pompey, 7 

Ponsot, Henri, 19 

Popular Front for the Liberation of Pales- 
tine, 168 

Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine — General Command, 243 

Popular Guard, 242 

Popular Nasserite Forces, 243 

population (see also emigration; migra- 
tion), xvi, xxii, 3, 48-50, 48-53; effect 
of decline in Christian, 3; effect of dis- 
placement of, 42, 51; effect of increase 
in Muslim, 3 

ports (see also foreign trade), xvii, 42, 110; 
control by militias of illegal, xxv, 100, 
110-11 

power-broker system (see also family net- 
works; patronage; zuama clientelism), 
xxiii 

president: power and role of, 21, 146-47; 

power in 1987, 139, 147 
prime minister, 21, 147-48 
Program of National Reconciliation, 199 
Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), 21, 

164-65, 240-41 
Prophet Muhammad, 7, 59-61 
Protestants, 70 
Provincial Council, 154 
Prussia, 14, 16 

PSP. See Progessive Socialist Party (PSP) 

Ptolemy, 5 

public health, 84-85 

qabadayat, 144 
Qadi, Amin, 224-25 
Qansuh, Isam, 242 
Qassis, Father Sharbal, 240 
Quwwat an Nasir, 243 

Rabin, Yitzhak, 194 

railroads, xvii, 109-10 

Ramadan, 60 

Ramgavar Party, 166-67 

Reagan, Ronald, 177, 200 

reconstruction: after Civil War (1975), 

94-96; after 1982 Israeli invasion, 

131-36; under French Mandate, 20; of 

roads, 108-9 
reconstruction aid, xxiii, 128-31; after 

Civil War, 96, 127-31; lack of guaran- 



tees for, 133-35; from United States, 
177 

Red Line policy: of Israel, 194; Syria ad- 
heres to, 200 

refugee camps. See Palestinian refugee 
camps 

Regier, Frank, 230 

reinforcement of, 42 

Rejectionist Front, 243 

religions, xvi, 57-71 

religious conflicts, 14-17 

religious leaders, 61, 68 

Representative Council, 142 

reserves, external, 98-99 

Revolutionary Organization of Socialist 
Muslims, 230 

Rhodes, 4 

Rifai, Abdal Majid ar, 242 
Rifai, Nur ad Din, 189 
Rihana, Sami, 224 
rivers, 47-48 

Riyadh Conference (1976), 31-32, 193 

Riyaq, xvii, 109, 225 

Riz Kari, 167 

roads, xvii, 20, 106-9 

Roman Catholics, 68-69 

Roman Empire, xxii, 3, 7 

Rosewater Revolution, 22, 185 

Russia, 14 



Saad, Habib as, 19 

Saad, Muhammad, 225 

Saad, Mustafa, 243 

Saadah, Antun, 169, 241 

Saadah, George, 158 

Sabra refugee camp: massacre in, xxi, 159, 
175, 206, 207, 215; siege by Amal, 216 

Sadr, Imam Musa as, 63, 65, 241; estab- 
lishes Arnal movement, 160 

sahil, 43-44 

Said, Hanna, 188, 239 

St. Joseph's University, 16, 83 

Saiqa, 243 

Salam, Saib, 28, 148, 188 
Salam family, 62 
Salvation Committee, 162 
San Remo Conference, 18 
Saqr, Etienne, 240 
Sargon II, 4 

Sarkis, Ilyas, 28; administration of 
(1976-82), 31-36, 141; support by 
Syria for, 172 



277 



Lebanon: A Country Study 



Saudi Development Fund. 130 

sectarianism, xxii-xxiii. 3. 41. 53. 55. 
56-57. 140: after Civil War (1975), 
141 : in Chamber of Deputies. 149-52: 
Civil War (19751 intensifies. 140; 
dependence of political parties on. 154: 
effect of National Pact tenets on. 
143-44: sects. 42. 59. 152 

Seleucid dynasty. 5-7 

Seleucus I. 5 

Seurat. Michel. 230 

Seveners. See Ismaili Muslims 

sexes. See family structure: population: 
women 

Sfeir. Nasrallah. See Sufavr. Nasrallah 
Butrus 

Shams ad Din. Shaykh Muhammad 
Mahdi. 36. 63 

Shamun. Camille. 21. 36. 134: adminis- 
tration of. 22-24. 176: founder of Na- 
tional Liberal Party (NLP). 158. 240; 
interest in Israeli offer to intervene. 
194: pro-Western administration of. 
55; role in Arab-Israeli War (1948). 
186 

Shamun. Dani. 158. 194: inherits familv 

political role. 145 
Shamun family. 21 
Sharon. Ariel. 207 
Shartum. Habib. 206 
Shatila. Kamal. 243 
Shatila refugee camp: massacre in. xxi, 

159. 175. 206. 207. 215: siege by Amal. 

216 

Shayah (section of Beirut). 50 
shaykh. 61 

Shias [see also Twelver Shias) . 11. 17. 41: 
attraction to Amal. 160-61: in belt of 
misery. 41. 50. 62: Fadlallah as leader 
of. 63; followers attracted to Amal. 
160-61; followers in Lebanon. 176: 
geographic locations of. 62-63: grow- 
ing importance of. 35. 36; in Lebanese 
Armv. 222-25; in National Salvation 
Front (1983). 209; leadership m. 62; 
leaving Amal for Hizballah. 162: posi- 
tion m society of. 62 

Shihab. Fuad'. 22. 24. 94 146. 185: 
role in Arab-Israeli War (1948). 
186 

Shihab familv. 12. 13-14. 21 
Shihabism. 24-25. 28 
shipping. 110-12 



Shtawrah. 106. 109. 123. 199 

Shtawrah Accord. 34. 193. 195 

Shuf Mountains region: fighting in 1989. 
xxv ; Lebanese Army and Druze fight- 
ing in. xxi: power vacuum after IDF 
withdrawal (1983). 210 

Shuf Mountains. 44 

Siblin Cement Company. 125 

Sidon. xvh. 3. 7. 1 1. 36. 42. 49. 95. 111. 
188-89. 192. 202: population distribu- 
tion of. 49-50; Sunnis in. 62 

SLA. See South Lebanon Army (SLA) 

SNF. See Social National Front (SNF) 

Social National Front (SNF). 21-22; for- 
mation of. 21 

social structure: [see also child-rearing); 
education: family: health: living con- 
ditions: marriage; women. 73-81: di- 
visions in. xxi-xxii, 53; fragmentation 
of. 41: Maronites at top of. 67-68 

Solh. Rashid. See Sulh, Rashid as 

Solh, Riyad. See Sulh. Riyad as 

South Lebanon Army (SLA) (see also Free 
Lebanon Army): 117; formerly Free 
Lebanon Army. 196: lack of coopera- 
tion with UNIFIL. 197; Lahad as head. 
213-14 

Soviet Lnion. 177-78 

Sroussi. Jean-Marc. 231 

SSNP. See Syrian Socialist Nationalist 
Party (SSNP) 

Statute of 1861. 16 

Strugglers for Freedom. 230 

subsidies. 100-101 

Suez Canal crisis. 22-23 

Sufayr. Nasrallah Butrus. 67 

suicide bombings: by Syrian Socialist Na- 
tionalist Partv (SSNP). 241: terrorist 
tactics using. 226, 227-28; of Western 
government installations, xxi 

Sulh. Rashid as. 29. 189 

Sulh. Riyad as. 19. 143. 148 

Sulh familv. 21. 62. 145 

Sunni Muslims. 17; comprise the Naj- 
jadah and Lebanese Arab Army 
(LAA), 242; growing power of. 36: in 
Lebanese Army, 224: in Lebanon. 
61-62; Murabitun militia of, 215, 216; 
in National Salvation Front (NSF) 
(1983). 209: orthodox. 61; Tawhid 
(Islamic Lnification Movement). 213 

Supreme Council of Justice. 152 

Supreme Defense Council, 220 



278 



Index 



Supreme Islamic Council: source of Sunni 
religious leadership, 61 

Suq al Gharb, 210, 223 

Sutherland, Thomas, 231 

Syria: added to Roman Empire, 7; Alawi 
faction in, 64; Arab Democratic Party 
and, 213; in Civil War (1975), 30, 
192-93; influence in Lebanon of, xxii, 
171-73; initiatives to restore order in 
Lebanon, 216; interest in Lebanese 
Civil War, 30-31; interference in Leb- 
anese politics, 199; intervenes in 1975 
Civil War, 192; link with Lebanon of, 
xxii; military intervention against Leb- 
anese National Movement, 31; pres- 
ence in Lebanon of, 31-32; Program 
of National Reconciliation, 199; rela- 
tions with Lebanon after Civil War 
(1975), 32-34; relations with Lebanon 
of, 171-73; responds to Jumayyil attack 
on Marada Brigade, 199; role in Leb- 
anon after Civil War (1975-76), 32; 
separated from Lebanon (1861), 16; 
sponsors Tripartite Accord, 216; sup- 
ports a Lebanese branch of Baath 
Party, 242; violence diminished by 
(1985), 213; violence initiated by, 
216-17 

Syrian Army: attempts to restore order 
in Lebanon, 217-18; losses in Israeli 
offensive, 205; and Red Line policy, 
194, 200; role in Civil War (1975), 239; 
troops enter West Beirut (1986), 217 

Syrian Monophysites or Syrian Ortho- 
dox. Jacobites 

Syrian Orthodox or Syrian Monophy- 
sites. See Jacobites 

Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party (SSNP), 
157, 169-70, 206, 241; role in Civil 
War (1975), 241; suicide bombings by, 
228 



Tahan, Yusuf, 224 
Tall Zatar, 30, 158, 191, 193 
Tamraz, Roger, 102-3, 114 
Tannus, Ibrahim, 212, 221-22 
Tapline. See Trans- Arabia Pipeline 
taqiyya, 64 

Tashnak Party: domestic activity of, 166; 

international activity of, 166 
Tawhid (Islamic Unification Movement), 

169, 213 



telecommunications, xvii, 115 

terrorist activity (see also car bombings; 
Hizballah; Islamic Jihad Organization; 
suicide bombings), 36, 176, 210, 
226-27, 228-29; against foreign diplo- 
mats, Muslim and Christian leaders, 
36, 201; of Amal, 208; of Syrian So- 
cialist Nationalist Party (SSNP), 241 

textile industry, 123 

Theodusius I, 7 

Thutmose III, 4 

Tigers militia: of National Liberal Party 
(NLP), 158, 240; training in Israel of, 
195 

Tiglath-Pilesar, 4 

TMA. See Trans Mediterranean Airways 
tobacco production and marketing, 119 
topography, 43-45 
tourism, xxiii, 95 

Trans- Arabia Pipeline (Tapline), xvii, 
126 

Trans Mediteranean Airways (TMA), 
114 

transportation, conventional and ad hoc, 
106-14 

Tripartite Accord (1985), 173, 216 
Tripoli, xvii, 8, 10, 11, 35, 42, 49, 95, 

111, 222 
Tripoli Oil Installation, 127 
Troupes Speciales du Levant, 184 
Tufayli, Subhi at, 162 
Tunisia, 204 
Turkey, 24 

Turkish occupation, World War I, 17-18 
Turkomans, 71 

TWA airliner: hijack of, 228-29 

Twelver Shias, 62, 63 

24 October Movement, 243 

Two-week war, 200-201 

Tyre, xvii, 3, 7, 10, 11, 42, 49-50, 111, 202 

Umar, Caliph, 8 

Umayyads, 8 

unemployment, 28, 90 

UNIFIL. See United Nations Interim 

Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) 
Union of Muslim Ulama, 163-64 
Union of Toiling People's Forces, 243 
United Arab Republic, 23 
United Nations (UN), 21 
United Nations Development Program 

(UNDP), 128 



279 



Lebanon: A Country Study 



United Nations Interim Force in Leba- 
non (UNIFIL), 117, 126-27, 174; cur- 
rent problems and lack of support, 197; 
establishment and mission of, 35, 196; 
exodus from Beirut, 205; Lebanese 
Army against, 188; in Lebanese Civil 
War, 30; peacekeeping efforts of, 
196-97 

United Nations International Children's 

Emergency Fund, 128, 131 
United Nations Relief and Works Agency 

(UNRWA) for Palestine Refugees in 

the Near East, 52-53 
United Nations Resolution 425 (1978), 

196 

United Nations Truce Supervision Or- 
ganization, 196 

United States Agency for International 
Development (AID), 128, 133 

United States: aid in rebuilding Lebanese 
armed forces, 219; embassy destroyed 
(1983), 209; military intervention in 
1958, 24; relations with Lebanon of, 
176-77; War Powers Resolution sanc- 
tions military presence, 211 

United States Marines: bombardment in 
Beirut of, 210; return to Beirut, 207; 
role in Civil War (1958), 186; at siege 
of Beirut, 205; suicide bombing of bar- 
racks, 133, 227-28; surrounded by 
predominantly Shia militia groups, 212 

United States Navy, 211 

universities, 83-84 

UNRWA. See United Nations Relief and 
Works Agency (UNRWA) for Palestine 
Refugees in the Near East 

urbanization, 41, 50, 56 



Vichy government, 19, 184 
violence {see also suicide bombings; ter- 
rorist activity): among Christian Leb 



anese factions, 214; in Beirut under 
Bikfayya Agreement, 213; role of Syria 
in, 213, 216-17 



Waite, Terry, 229 
waqf, 61 

war: effect on Lebanon of, 41-42; effect 
on quality of life during, 79-81 

War Powers Resolution (1973): sanction 
for presence of United States military, 
211 

water sources, 47-48 
Wazzan, Shafiq al, 35 
wealth: concentration of, xxiii 
Weir, Benjamin, 231 
wheat production, 120 
women, 52, 74-75, 76, 77 
World Bank: loan to open Beirut's port, 
132; reconstruction program of, 132 
World War I, 17-18 
World War II, 19-21 



Yafi family, 21 

Yarzah (section of Beirut), 224 

Yazbak family, 21, 66, 165 

Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen): 

Ismaili Muslims in, 63 
Young Turks, 17 



Zahlah, 33, 50, 95, 160, 199-200 
zaim, 56-57, 139, 145; as political leader, 

144-46, 150 
Zghartan Liberation Army. See Marada 

Brigade 

zuama clientelism {see also clans, family net- 
works), 56-57, 139, 140, 144-46, 150 

zuama: influence on bureaucracy, 153; in- 
fluence on judiciary, 152-53 



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